1 00:00:03,520 --> 00:00:06,000 Welcome to episode 423 2 00:00:06,000 --> 00:00:09,220 of the Microsoft Cloud IT Pro podcast recorded 3 00:00:09,279 --> 00:00:12,609 live from Workplace Ninjas US in December 4 00:00:12,609 --> 00:00:13,460 2025. 5 00:00:13,679 --> 00:00:16,024 This is a show about Microsoft three sixty 6 00:00:16,024 --> 00:00:18,265 five and Azure from the perspective of IT 7 00:00:18,265 --> 00:00:20,425 pros and end users, where we discuss a 8 00:00:20,425 --> 00:00:22,664 topic or recent news and how it relates 9 00:00:22,664 --> 00:00:25,464 to you. In this episode, Ben sits down 10 00:00:25,464 --> 00:00:28,530 with fellow security MVPs, Eric Woodruff and Chris 11 00:00:28,530 --> 00:00:31,650 Brum, to discuss the often overlooked world of 12 00:00:31,650 --> 00:00:32,149 nonhuman 13 00:00:32,530 --> 00:00:34,630 identities in Microsoft EntraID. 14 00:00:35,329 --> 00:00:36,950 We cover service principles, 15 00:00:37,329 --> 00:00:39,090 why they tend to fly under the radar, 16 00:00:39,090 --> 00:00:40,789 and how attackers actively 17 00:00:41,155 --> 00:00:43,954 exploit that gap. They also spend time talking 18 00:00:43,954 --> 00:00:47,734 about credential management best practices, challenges around nonhuman 19 00:00:47,875 --> 00:00:50,434 identities, and how you should be thinking about 20 00:00:50,434 --> 00:00:53,394 them, especially with the growing challenges of how 21 00:00:53,394 --> 00:00:56,219 they relate to AI. Let's dive in. 22 00:00:58,700 --> 00:01:01,100 I'm sitting here with another episode of Microsoft 23 00:01:01,100 --> 00:01:02,479 Cloud IT Pro podcast 24 00:01:02,780 --> 00:01:05,739 at Workplace Ninjas, the first one in 2025. 25 00:01:05,739 --> 00:01:08,239 We all get to be honorary attendees, so 26 00:01:08,540 --> 00:01:10,700 Scott, who I normally do the podcast with, 27 00:01:10,700 --> 00:01:13,174 if you guys if people listen, is not 28 00:01:13,174 --> 00:01:16,454 here once more. But instead, I have Eric 29 00:01:16,454 --> 00:01:16,954 Woodruff 30 00:01:17,334 --> 00:01:17,834 and 31 00:01:18,614 --> 00:01:20,775 Chris Brum. And, we are going to talk 32 00:01:20,775 --> 00:01:21,275 about 33 00:01:21,814 --> 00:01:24,375 non human identities in Entra. So, this is 34 00:01:24,375 --> 00:01:27,130 an interesting topic because, yeah, I'm excited to 35 00:01:27,130 --> 00:01:28,650 dive into it. But first, do you guys 36 00:01:28,650 --> 00:01:31,370 wanna tell us a little bit about who 37 00:01:31,370 --> 00:01:33,450 you are, where you are, company that you 38 00:01:33,450 --> 00:01:36,010 work for? Yeah. Sure. Yeah. So I'm Eric 39 00:01:36,010 --> 00:01:39,130 Woodruff. Currently, I'm the chief identity architect at 40 00:01:39,130 --> 00:01:39,630 Semperis. 41 00:01:39,935 --> 00:01:41,375 I I do a whole mixed bag of 42 00:01:41,375 --> 00:01:43,534 things, which I I won't sorta go down 43 00:01:43,534 --> 00:01:44,755 the rabbit hole on there. 44 00:01:45,375 --> 00:01:46,594 But, yeah, MVP 45 00:01:47,055 --> 00:01:50,174 in security focused on identity, so all things, 46 00:01:50,174 --> 00:01:52,115 Entra, some active directory 47 00:01:52,810 --> 00:01:54,409 thrown in the mix. Yeah. And it's just 48 00:01:54,489 --> 00:01:56,489 it's, you know, great to be here. You 49 00:01:56,489 --> 00:01:58,569 know, I will say you can find me 50 00:01:58,569 --> 00:02:01,230 on the socials as Eric on Identity. It's 51 00:02:01,370 --> 00:02:03,770 maybe not super hackery sounding, but it's hopefully 52 00:02:03,770 --> 00:02:05,310 easy to remember. Okay. 53 00:02:06,090 --> 00:02:08,115 Yeah. There you go. Easy to remember is 54 00:02:08,115 --> 00:02:08,615 good. 55 00:02:09,875 --> 00:02:12,694 Hi. I'm Chris Broom. I'm from Germany, 56 00:02:12,995 --> 00:02:16,134 and I'm a cybersecurity architect with Glucanje. 57 00:02:17,074 --> 00:02:18,455 And, yeah, I'm doing 58 00:02:18,754 --> 00:02:19,254 cybersecurity 59 00:02:19,875 --> 00:02:22,020 for, I don't know, sixteen years or so. 60 00:02:22,020 --> 00:02:24,020 I think I did everything that you could 61 00:02:24,020 --> 00:02:27,400 do there, but my main topic is identity 62 00:02:27,460 --> 00:02:27,960 security. 63 00:02:28,260 --> 00:02:30,819 And like Eric, I'm also an MVP in 64 00:02:30,819 --> 00:02:33,400 that area. So my company is doing, 65 00:02:33,754 --> 00:02:35,694 yeah, managed SOC services mainly. 66 00:02:36,074 --> 00:02:36,895 Okay. And, 67 00:02:37,194 --> 00:02:39,034 yeah, we are protecting our customers, and I 68 00:02:39,034 --> 00:02:40,955 think identity is one of the main main 69 00:02:40,955 --> 00:02:43,034 topics there. Alright. So no red teaming? Are 70 00:02:43,034 --> 00:02:45,514 my devices safe around you? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 71 00:02:45,514 --> 00:02:47,375 I'm I'm in the blue team. Absolutely. 72 00:02:48,074 --> 00:02:48,360 So 73 00:02:50,199 --> 00:02:52,000 Yeah. That's kind of funny. Like security conferences 74 00:02:52,000 --> 00:02:53,639 are like, don't ever connect to the WiFi 75 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:54,680 because you never know who you can connect. 76 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:55,180 Yeah. 77 00:02:55,479 --> 00:02:57,819 You just have to scan this QR code. 78 00:02:58,520 --> 00:03:00,520 Yeah. So that's been funny. This conference, the 79 00:03:00,520 --> 00:03:02,439 amount of QR codes and everybody's like, this 80 00:03:02,439 --> 00:03:03,740 is a security conference. 81 00:03:04,305 --> 00:03:07,185 Yeah. Yeah. And we just found here USB 82 00:03:07,185 --> 00:03:09,364 sticks. Have you plugged it in yet? No. 83 00:03:10,305 --> 00:03:12,004 I don't do this in general. 84 00:03:13,984 --> 00:03:14,484 Oh, 85 00:03:14,784 --> 00:03:16,864 good times. So moving on to non human 86 00:03:16,864 --> 00:03:18,949 identity. It's like when I kinda reached out 87 00:03:18,949 --> 00:03:20,550 and said, who wants to talk on the 88 00:03:20,550 --> 00:03:22,009 podcast? Who wants to do some interviews? 89 00:03:22,310 --> 00:03:23,509 You guys were like, well, we did a 90 00:03:23,509 --> 00:03:24,969 session on non human identities 91 00:03:25,430 --> 00:03:27,750 in Entra. And this is an interesting one 92 00:03:27,750 --> 00:03:29,849 because a lot of times when people think 93 00:03:30,310 --> 00:03:32,914 Entra, they think, oh that's how I log 94 00:03:32,914 --> 00:03:35,414 in. I have my username, my password, 95 00:03:36,034 --> 00:03:39,074 I'm doing MFA whatever Entra. But there's a 96 00:03:39,074 --> 00:03:41,655 whole another component to it around 97 00:03:42,275 --> 00:03:45,180 non human identities and Entra that maybe sometimes 98 00:03:45,240 --> 00:03:47,639 gets forgotten and I think that was some 99 00:03:47,639 --> 00:03:48,780 of the premise of 100 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:50,840 your presentation. Kind of what we wanna talk 101 00:03:50,840 --> 00:03:53,419 about today. Yeah. Our basic idea was to 102 00:03:53,719 --> 00:03:56,199 to just collect all the stuff that should 103 00:03:56,199 --> 00:03:58,620 become a knowledge by an intro admin 104 00:03:59,134 --> 00:04:01,375 and just to make sure that everyone knows 105 00:04:01,375 --> 00:04:02,275 it. So about 106 00:04:02,574 --> 00:04:04,275 permissions and credential handling 107 00:04:04,574 --> 00:04:06,495 and all the stuff that yeah. What could 108 00:04:06,495 --> 00:04:08,974 go possibly go wrong? Yeah. What are our 109 00:04:08,974 --> 00:04:10,034 topic? Yeah. 110 00:04:10,334 --> 00:04:12,194 Yeah. And I'll just say, like, I think, 111 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:14,000 really mean the the term is new, but 112 00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:16,800 nonhuman identities have been in Entra for as 113 00:04:16,800 --> 00:04:17,699 long as it's 114 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:19,839 been Azure AD. Right? I mean, like, we've 115 00:04:19,839 --> 00:04:21,839 been talking about service principles and stuff. They've 116 00:04:21,839 --> 00:04:23,680 always been there. But, yes, it's like a 117 00:04:23,680 --> 00:04:25,725 a hot topic in the industry now with 118 00:04:25,964 --> 00:04:28,685 nonhuman or workload identities, whatever you wanna call 119 00:04:28,685 --> 00:04:30,605 them. But yeah. And for as long as 120 00:04:30,605 --> 00:04:32,145 these have they have existed, 121 00:04:32,605 --> 00:04:33,105 there's 122 00:04:33,485 --> 00:04:36,845 abuses on them that attackers love. So trying 123 00:04:36,845 --> 00:04:38,225 to talk about those things. 124 00:04:38,560 --> 00:04:40,019 Yeah. So if somebody's 125 00:04:40,560 --> 00:04:42,639 newer to this because sometimes I think we 126 00:04:42,639 --> 00:04:44,560 even make the assumption, oh, everybody to your 127 00:04:44,560 --> 00:04:46,740 point, everybody should know about non human identities. 128 00:04:47,039 --> 00:04:49,199 When you start talking about non human identities, 129 00:04:49,199 --> 00:04:51,360 we're talking about SPNs. What are those? For 130 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:53,360 somebody that may be newer to enter is 131 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:54,615 like, wait a minute, I need to think 132 00:04:54,615 --> 00:04:56,855 about non human identities in Entra. Where do 133 00:04:56,855 --> 00:04:58,375 you kinda start with those when you talk 134 00:04:58,375 --> 00:05:00,714 to people about non human identities in Entra? 135 00:05:00,774 --> 00:05:01,834 I mean, I would say 136 00:05:03,894 --> 00:05:06,235 Chris is like, oh, no, not this topic. 137 00:05:09,409 --> 00:05:10,930 I mean, I guess it depends if they 138 00:05:10,930 --> 00:05:12,769 know AD. Right? If they know AD, I 139 00:05:12,769 --> 00:05:14,769 would try to relate it to, you know, 140 00:05:14,769 --> 00:05:15,269 GMSA's 141 00:05:16,209 --> 00:05:18,689 service accounts. Right? And if they don't know 142 00:05:18,689 --> 00:05:20,529 anything in general, I guess not that they 143 00:05:20,529 --> 00:05:22,129 don't know stuff. Right? I guess I'd be 144 00:05:22,129 --> 00:05:24,525 saying that this is like for you know, 145 00:05:24,525 --> 00:05:26,764 you think of applications that might go do 146 00:05:26,764 --> 00:05:28,525 stuff. You have SaaS apps that are doing 147 00:05:28,525 --> 00:05:30,605 things behind the scenes with, you know, data 148 00:05:30,605 --> 00:05:33,004 and like SharePoint or OneDrive or, you know, 149 00:05:33,004 --> 00:05:36,540 Exchange. Right? There's still identities to all those 150 00:05:36,779 --> 00:05:38,939 things. Right? Those services under the covers and 151 00:05:38,939 --> 00:05:41,660 that's essentially what, like, service principles are that 152 00:05:41,660 --> 00:05:44,379 are operating, like, without people. That's the the 153 00:05:44,379 --> 00:05:46,379 non human part. Yeah. And a lot of 154 00:05:46,379 --> 00:05:48,060 those have access to data. And I think 155 00:05:48,060 --> 00:05:49,580 that was a big part of your talk 156 00:05:49,580 --> 00:05:51,654 is or part of your talk, and I'll 157 00:05:51,654 --> 00:05:53,254 let you guys kind of direct it is 158 00:05:53,254 --> 00:05:55,414 managing those SPNs and to your point, they 159 00:05:55,414 --> 00:05:55,914 have 160 00:05:56,214 --> 00:05:57,354 access to data 161 00:05:57,894 --> 00:06:00,615 much like a user would, but yet I 162 00:06:00,615 --> 00:06:02,774 don't think they maybe get us necessarily as 163 00:06:02,774 --> 00:06:03,514 much attention 164 00:06:03,814 --> 00:06:05,995 as users and what they have access to. 165 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:08,000 Yeah. I think there are two big topics 166 00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:08,500 that 167 00:06:08,879 --> 00:06:10,720 we have to talk about. And the first 168 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:14,339 thing is what permissions can f apps have. 169 00:06:14,720 --> 00:06:17,699 So and apps can have huge permissions. 170 00:06:18,079 --> 00:06:18,980 So and 171 00:06:19,544 --> 00:06:21,625 we should if an app has the same 172 00:06:21,625 --> 00:06:24,185 permissions like a global administrator, we should handle 173 00:06:24,185 --> 00:06:26,664 it like a global administrator. And the other 174 00:06:26,664 --> 00:06:29,004 part is, okay, who has permissions on apps? 175 00:06:29,225 --> 00:06:31,384 And there are some really bad practices out 176 00:06:31,384 --> 00:06:33,324 there. So as an example, 177 00:06:33,709 --> 00:06:36,050 yeah, a lot of companies are assigning owners 178 00:06:36,430 --> 00:06:38,670 at at the app registration and the service 179 00:06:38,670 --> 00:06:41,230 principles, and they are assigning that owner permission 180 00:06:41,230 --> 00:06:44,270 to normal user accounts. So and an owner 181 00:06:44,270 --> 00:06:46,110 is such, yeah, is a person who can 182 00:06:46,110 --> 00:06:48,464 do everything with that app. So including 183 00:06:48,764 --> 00:06:50,764 adding new secrets and log in as that 184 00:06:50,764 --> 00:06:52,524 app and use the permission of the app. 185 00:06:52,524 --> 00:06:55,245 So there's a big potential for stuff that 186 00:06:55,245 --> 00:06:57,725 could go wrong. Yeah. So as you're working 187 00:06:57,725 --> 00:07:00,524 at identity then, you're working with this SPNs 188 00:07:00,524 --> 00:07:01,884 and the owner rights and doing all of 189 00:07:01,884 --> 00:07:03,185 that. How do you start 190 00:07:03,589 --> 00:07:06,169 guiding people through some of that 191 00:07:06,789 --> 00:07:08,250 management of those 192 00:07:09,029 --> 00:07:11,370 SPNs? Yeah. I mean, I'll I'll say it's 193 00:07:11,669 --> 00:07:13,050 tricky at times because 194 00:07:13,430 --> 00:07:15,209 but there's always places where 195 00:07:16,245 --> 00:07:18,964 customers love Microsoft docs and customers want to 196 00:07:18,964 --> 00:07:20,884 do nothing against Microsoft. Right? They wanna do 197 00:07:20,884 --> 00:07:22,964 things as, like, this is what Microsoft wrote. 198 00:07:22,964 --> 00:07:25,625 That's what we wanna do. And occasionally, right, 199 00:07:25,685 --> 00:07:26,745 the rest of the industry 200 00:07:27,045 --> 00:07:27,545 disagrees. 201 00:07:28,165 --> 00:07:30,750 And and, like, owners is a thing. In 202 00:07:30,750 --> 00:07:32,689 particular, like, when I worked at Microsoft, 203 00:07:33,230 --> 00:07:34,210 I would tell people, 204 00:07:34,670 --> 00:07:37,550 go add, you know, Joe, you know, owns 205 00:07:37,550 --> 00:07:39,790 Salesforce in the business. Right? Go make Joe 206 00:07:39,790 --> 00:07:41,389 an owner. So that way you sort of 207 00:07:41,389 --> 00:07:43,150 know, right, we gotta go bother Joe about 208 00:07:43,150 --> 00:07:44,449 Salesforce. Not realizing 209 00:07:44,854 --> 00:07:46,314 that again, if an attacker 210 00:07:46,694 --> 00:07:49,415 targets Joe who's not treated as a privileged 211 00:07:49,415 --> 00:07:50,714 user. Right? That now 212 00:07:51,175 --> 00:07:54,134 attacker, right, compromises Joe, phishes him, whatever. And 213 00:07:54,134 --> 00:07:56,854 now attacker can move into Salesforce. And and 214 00:07:56,854 --> 00:07:59,175 to your point about data. Right? You see 215 00:07:59,175 --> 00:07:59,910 in the news 216 00:08:00,389 --> 00:08:03,269 that data is the thing attackers want. Yeah. 217 00:08:03,269 --> 00:08:04,810 But identity So it's a little bit. 218 00:08:05,430 --> 00:08:07,209 Yeah. Yeah. And but the I mean, 219 00:08:07,509 --> 00:08:09,589 I think to what we were saying about 220 00:08:09,589 --> 00:08:11,990 the permissions that they have on data. Right? 221 00:08:11,990 --> 00:08:12,490 Like, 222 00:08:13,029 --> 00:08:14,024 obviously, like, 223 00:08:14,584 --> 00:08:16,685 it's very broad. Right? Like, if an application 224 00:08:17,064 --> 00:08:19,944 has permissions to exchange, right, many times, it's 225 00:08:19,944 --> 00:08:23,225 like it has permissions to everyone's mailbox and 226 00:08:23,225 --> 00:08:23,884 can do 227 00:08:24,185 --> 00:08:26,285 whatever it wants with all that. So, 228 00:08:26,740 --> 00:08:28,899 yeah. Yeah. I think about that. Like, I've 229 00:08:28,899 --> 00:08:31,220 I've done migrations before. Right? Whenever you start 230 00:08:31,220 --> 00:08:33,379 migrating email, they're like, oh, go create the 231 00:08:33,379 --> 00:08:35,080 migration tool, the 232 00:08:36,259 --> 00:08:36,759 exchange 233 00:08:37,220 --> 00:08:39,220 web I think it's exchange web services Yep. 234 00:08:39,299 --> 00:08:40,980 In the SPN. Go create an SPN for 235 00:08:40,980 --> 00:08:42,825 it. Go create access so it can migrate 236 00:08:42,825 --> 00:08:43,565 all the email 237 00:08:43,945 --> 00:08:44,445 and 238 00:08:44,825 --> 00:08:46,605 it is it's that concept of 239 00:08:46,904 --> 00:08:48,424 wait a minute if this is migrating all 240 00:08:48,424 --> 00:08:49,945 the email it's touching all the email which 241 00:08:49,945 --> 00:08:52,504 means it's going to have access to all 242 00:08:52,504 --> 00:08:55,245 of the email and am I treating this 243 00:08:55,384 --> 00:08:57,250 in that way? Yep. And in this case, 244 00:08:57,250 --> 00:08:59,570 it's not only about write permission. So people 245 00:08:59,570 --> 00:09:02,370 don't usually, when when I talk to people, 246 00:09:02,370 --> 00:09:04,289 say relax when they heard say, it's only 247 00:09:04,289 --> 00:09:06,289 read permission. So, yeah, but read permission to 248 00:09:06,289 --> 00:09:08,529 your whole file system or your whole mailbox 249 00:09:08,529 --> 00:09:11,554 is, yeah, also. But Yeah. Pricing. Data data 250 00:09:11,554 --> 00:09:13,955 exfiltration is a is a huge problem right 251 00:09:13,955 --> 00:09:16,774 now. So yeah. And I think 252 00:09:17,235 --> 00:09:20,195 we you maybe have or we see better 253 00:09:20,195 --> 00:09:20,695 practices 254 00:09:21,009 --> 00:09:25,009 regarding authentication method policies and conditional access rule 255 00:09:25,009 --> 00:09:28,309 set, but it doesn't affect work nonhuman identities 256 00:09:28,370 --> 00:09:30,629 usually. So there are other policies. 257 00:09:31,169 --> 00:09:33,809 There are application management policies, and there is 258 00:09:33,809 --> 00:09:36,370 conditional access for workloads by yeah. But I 259 00:09:36,370 --> 00:09:38,684 rarely see this. Yeah. Yeah. And I mean 260 00:09:38,684 --> 00:09:40,545 I think it's almost like right like workloads, 261 00:09:41,165 --> 00:09:42,065 service principles, 262 00:09:42,524 --> 00:09:44,365 they're treated like a sort of second class 263 00:09:44,365 --> 00:09:46,125 citizen. And and I get like as a 264 00:09:46,125 --> 00:09:47,644 sys admin right you might feel like you 265 00:09:47,644 --> 00:09:50,065 already have too much to do. So 266 00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:52,559 it's easy to say you have to do 267 00:09:52,559 --> 00:09:54,740 more. But on the other hand, 268 00:09:55,440 --> 00:09:55,940 attackers 269 00:09:56,480 --> 00:09:59,360 love going after service principles because they they 270 00:09:59,360 --> 00:10:01,519 tend to know that assist admins don't have 271 00:10:01,519 --> 00:10:02,420 a strong understanding 272 00:10:02,879 --> 00:10:04,240 of what they do or what they have 273 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:06,575 access to. And and again, if you see 274 00:10:06,575 --> 00:10:08,575 a tax on, you know, Microsoft three sixty 275 00:10:08,575 --> 00:10:11,875 five going after, you know, OneDrive, SharePoint, Exchange, 276 00:10:12,654 --> 00:10:14,975 many times it is using those, you know, 277 00:10:14,975 --> 00:10:17,294 enterprise apps as your service principles that they'll 278 00:10:17,294 --> 00:10:18,720 they'll leverage. So 279 00:10:24,559 --> 00:10:26,799 This episode is brought to you by Trusted 280 00:10:26,799 --> 00:10:29,839 Tech. If you're managing Microsoft three sixty five, 281 00:10:29,839 --> 00:10:32,024 you already know licensing isn't simple. 282 00:10:32,425 --> 00:10:34,585 E three versus e five, the brand new 283 00:10:34,585 --> 00:10:35,565 e seven licenses, 284 00:10:35,865 --> 00:10:38,985 Copilot security bundles, and with price changes coming 285 00:10:38,985 --> 00:10:39,985 in July 286 00:10:39,985 --> 00:10:40,824 2026, 287 00:10:40,825 --> 00:10:43,625 the stakes are getting higher. 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Plus, they offer proactive 295 00:11:03,795 --> 00:11:06,514 and reactive support, which has been awarded yet 296 00:11:06,514 --> 00:11:09,335 another solution partner designation from Microsoft 297 00:11:09,955 --> 00:11:11,335 for support services. 298 00:11:11,795 --> 00:11:14,215 If you want a clear, data backed plan 299 00:11:14,355 --> 00:11:17,149 that has helped over seven five hundred subscribing 300 00:11:17,370 --> 00:11:20,090 customers save up to 20% on Microsoft three 301 00:11:20,090 --> 00:11:29,769 sixty five before your next renewal, visit trustedtech.team/mscloudprom365 302 00:11:29,769 --> 00:11:31,845 and schedule your free consultation 303 00:11:32,144 --> 00:11:32,644 today. 304 00:11:37,585 --> 00:11:39,585 We talk about security risk for unused user 305 00:11:39,585 --> 00:11:41,264 accounts. Right? Like, you have an unused user 306 00:11:41,264 --> 00:11:42,865 account that's active. Part of the reason that's 307 00:11:42,865 --> 00:11:45,209 a security risk is it's not monitored or 308 00:11:45,209 --> 00:11:47,049 watched as closely because the user's not using 309 00:11:47,049 --> 00:11:49,370 it. I feel like service principles can kind 310 00:11:49,370 --> 00:11:51,129 of fall in that boat as, yeah, they're 311 00:11:51,129 --> 00:11:54,350 being used, but they're probably not being watched 312 00:11:54,730 --> 00:11:56,110 Yeah. Quite as closely 313 00:11:56,490 --> 00:11:56,990 as 314 00:11:58,115 --> 00:12:00,835 a normal user account Yeah. So to speak. 315 00:12:00,835 --> 00:12:01,335 And 316 00:12:02,274 --> 00:12:02,774 attackers 317 00:12:03,075 --> 00:12:05,794 probably tend they don't wanna be seen. Yeah. 318 00:12:05,794 --> 00:12:07,475 Yeah. They're gonna go after things that aren't 319 00:12:07,475 --> 00:12:09,554 as visible. Yep. Yep. Yeah. I mean, I 320 00:12:09,554 --> 00:12:12,330 would say, you know, using service principles for 321 00:12:12,490 --> 00:12:15,210 persistent. Right? Persistence, like, assigning credentials to them, 322 00:12:15,210 --> 00:12:17,129 but in the way that they can dwell. 323 00:12:17,129 --> 00:12:19,290 Right? Like, they might get access to something 324 00:12:19,290 --> 00:12:21,070 and then wait and see if they're detected. 325 00:12:21,370 --> 00:12:23,210 Right? And then after some time, then they 326 00:12:23,210 --> 00:12:25,565 go on to do their their nasty Yes. 327 00:12:25,565 --> 00:12:27,714 So yeah. And as I said, my team 328 00:12:27,714 --> 00:12:30,294 is running SOC services. So and monitoring 329 00:12:30,674 --> 00:12:33,634 credential addition to a service principle in a 330 00:12:33,634 --> 00:12:34,534 bigger environment, 331 00:12:35,074 --> 00:12:37,654 that's so loud. We see a lot of 332 00:12:38,355 --> 00:12:40,534 modifications. We'll see a lot of 333 00:12:40,919 --> 00:12:43,960 credential adding and so on. You really have 334 00:12:43,960 --> 00:12:45,659 to correlate this with 335 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:49,259 the permissions of the app to get a 336 00:12:49,720 --> 00:12:52,679 reasonable signal to noise ratio. So Right. So 337 00:12:52,679 --> 00:12:54,679 do you have guidelines, Chris, in, like, how 338 00:12:54,679 --> 00:12:55,339 you guys 339 00:12:55,725 --> 00:12:57,884 do that from a SOC perspective that if 340 00:12:57,884 --> 00:12:59,725 end users are doing this or not end 341 00:12:59,725 --> 00:13:01,105 users, but other sysadmins, 342 00:13:01,485 --> 00:13:03,725 companies are doing it internally is how do 343 00:13:03,725 --> 00:13:06,704 you go about even starting to monitor 344 00:13:07,084 --> 00:13:08,784 things you maybe watch for? 345 00:13:09,110 --> 00:13:10,550 You have to do both. You have to 346 00:13:10,550 --> 00:13:12,330 do prevention and detection. 347 00:13:12,710 --> 00:13:15,509 And I always start with, okay, do you 348 00:13:15,509 --> 00:13:18,490 have any life cycle processes? So companies usually 349 00:13:18,950 --> 00:13:21,910 have managed to have life cycle processes for 350 00:13:21,910 --> 00:13:22,570 their users. 351 00:13:23,044 --> 00:13:26,004 Admins is getting more rare and for non 352 00:13:26,004 --> 00:13:28,184 human identities. So, yeah, it's 353 00:13:30,004 --> 00:13:30,985 lost in vain. 354 00:13:31,605 --> 00:13:33,845 There are some good practices. So there are 355 00:13:33,845 --> 00:13:36,419 a lot of good practices around how to 356 00:13:36,659 --> 00:13:38,659 implement OpenID Connect. So this is for the 357 00:13:38,659 --> 00:13:40,899 developers. You have to be the go to 358 00:13:40,899 --> 00:13:42,360 person for your developers 359 00:13:42,820 --> 00:13:45,639 regarding identity. And there are some good practices 360 00:13:45,700 --> 00:13:47,240 how to configure the applications. 361 00:13:48,259 --> 00:13:51,554 And you should leverage that. Yeah, that workload 362 00:13:51,855 --> 00:13:53,154 ID features. 363 00:13:53,934 --> 00:13:56,834 Is that it's a separate license, but, yeah, 364 00:13:57,214 --> 00:14:00,514 we for powerful apps, I think it's reasonable 365 00:14:01,054 --> 00:14:03,679 to protect them. And if you want to 366 00:14:03,679 --> 00:14:04,179 monitor 367 00:14:04,559 --> 00:14:07,679 your apps, you have to rely on on 368 00:14:07,679 --> 00:14:10,000 the intro audit logs and you can adjust 369 00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:10,899 them in Sentinel. 370 00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:14,080 A good starting point is Microsoft has has 371 00:14:14,080 --> 00:14:14,820 a repository 372 00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:16,179 full of detections. 373 00:14:16,879 --> 00:14:18,259 But yet, to be honest, 374 00:14:18,855 --> 00:14:21,995 this is very noisy because it's just detecting, 375 00:14:22,134 --> 00:14:25,014 yeah, someone added a reply URL. Someone added 376 00:14:25,014 --> 00:14:25,595 a credential. 377 00:14:26,054 --> 00:14:29,615 So without context, it's very, very hard. So 378 00:14:29,735 --> 00:14:31,254 and this is what yeah. This is what 379 00:14:31,254 --> 00:14:33,889 what SOC providers are doing. So someone added 380 00:14:33,889 --> 00:14:36,450 a credential. Okay. We have a sign in 381 00:14:36,450 --> 00:14:38,610 risk. Okay. But if we have a sign 382 00:14:38,610 --> 00:14:39,750 in risk and then 383 00:14:40,050 --> 00:14:41,730 this person is adding, 384 00:14:42,129 --> 00:14:44,309 credential to an app. This is interesting. 385 00:14:44,610 --> 00:14:46,125 So it's regarding context. 386 00:14:46,845 --> 00:14:49,565 And another context is, okay, are we talking 387 00:14:49,565 --> 00:14:50,625 about an app 388 00:14:51,004 --> 00:14:53,965 without big permissions or are we talking about 389 00:14:53,965 --> 00:14:55,904 an app with very high permissions? 390 00:14:56,284 --> 00:14:58,065 And bringing all that stuff together. 391 00:14:58,830 --> 00:15:00,910 But, say, yes, there's it's hard to do 392 00:15:00,910 --> 00:15:02,290 a one on one on this. 393 00:15:02,990 --> 00:15:05,309 Yeah. There's a lot of data there. And 394 00:15:05,309 --> 00:15:07,870 it was interesting you mentioned developers and because 395 00:15:07,870 --> 00:15:09,230 I do IT pro stuff, I like to 396 00:15:09,230 --> 00:15:12,044 pick on developers and probably pushing that because 397 00:15:12,044 --> 00:15:14,284 developers probably have a tendency too to say, 398 00:15:14,284 --> 00:15:15,644 oh, I'm writing an app. It needs a 399 00:15:15,644 --> 00:15:18,544 service principle. Just give it these permissions versus 400 00:15:18,605 --> 00:15:22,065 really trying to narrow down and really hone 401 00:15:22,524 --> 00:15:24,605 what does it really need versus what makes 402 00:15:24,605 --> 00:15:27,059 a developer's job easier. Yep. Yeah. I mean, 403 00:15:27,059 --> 00:15:29,139 it's it's easy to sort of dump on 404 00:15:29,139 --> 00:15:30,740 developers and, you know, no offense to them. 405 00:15:30,740 --> 00:15:31,860 And I get that they have a job. 406 00:15:31,860 --> 00:15:33,379 Right? Like, if Yep. If you're a software 407 00:15:33,379 --> 00:15:35,220 company and you're not making software, then you'd 408 00:15:35,220 --> 00:15:36,980 have no reason to be there. But, yeah, 409 00:15:36,980 --> 00:15:39,074 there it it's I think the problem is 410 00:15:39,074 --> 00:15:41,235 finding in the business, like, the balance. Right? 411 00:15:41,235 --> 00:15:43,235 And it's not the same across the board. 412 00:15:43,235 --> 00:15:45,475 Again, companies just wanna be sort of told 413 00:15:45,475 --> 00:15:47,074 what to do, but it's it's more of 414 00:15:47,074 --> 00:15:48,674 an art, I'd say, than a than a 415 00:15:48,674 --> 00:15:51,235 science because, you know, like, developers, right, you 416 00:15:51,235 --> 00:15:52,440 need to make sure that if if you 417 00:15:52,440 --> 00:15:54,519 create too much friction they'll go spin up 418 00:15:54,519 --> 00:15:56,679 their own tenants their own subscriptions right and 419 00:15:56,679 --> 00:15:59,580 they'll go do all their developer stuff possibly 420 00:15:59,639 --> 00:16:02,379 with like real data and now you have 421 00:16:02,679 --> 00:16:05,254 shadow IT things going on. Right. So yeah, 422 00:16:05,254 --> 00:16:06,695 you definitely have to like configure things in 423 00:16:06,695 --> 00:16:08,154 a way where you can let developers 424 00:16:08,774 --> 00:16:10,455 do their stuff, but I think I'll just 425 00:16:10,455 --> 00:16:13,414 say also security people tend not to like 426 00:16:13,414 --> 00:16:15,254 to talk to anyone. Right? Yeah. Yeah. We 427 00:16:15,254 --> 00:16:17,495 really don't. But but I mean it is 428 00:16:17,495 --> 00:16:18,910 one of the the points we try to 429 00:16:18,910 --> 00:16:20,670 drive home in our talk is like you 430 00:16:20,670 --> 00:16:22,830 need to work with your developers, right? Like 431 00:16:22,830 --> 00:16:24,529 you you can't expect 432 00:16:24,990 --> 00:16:27,170 everyone to be an expert in like OpenID 433 00:16:27,230 --> 00:16:29,389 Connect. I mean barely security people in the 434 00:16:29,389 --> 00:16:31,230 industry. But you need to work with them, 435 00:16:31,230 --> 00:16:33,330 right, to make sure that when they're implementing 436 00:16:33,470 --> 00:16:35,914 things that they're doing it right and not, 437 00:16:35,914 --> 00:16:37,674 I'd say, almost like shaming them for not, 438 00:16:37,674 --> 00:16:38,414 like, understanding 439 00:16:38,875 --> 00:16:40,654 every OAuth flow out there. 440 00:16:41,034 --> 00:16:43,054 Yeah. Yeah. And and I think another 441 00:16:43,434 --> 00:16:45,695 important thing is, so, yeah, people make mistakes. 442 00:16:45,754 --> 00:16:48,589 We don't know stuff. Yeah. We know today 443 00:16:48,589 --> 00:16:50,589 maybe stuff that we didn't know two years 444 00:16:50,589 --> 00:16:52,509 ago. So and it's a good idea to 445 00:16:52,509 --> 00:16:54,750 make regular reviews. And there's a lot of 446 00:16:54,750 --> 00:16:58,190 open source community tools out there. So stuff 447 00:16:58,190 --> 00:17:01,089 like, entra ops. So greetings to Thomas Nalheim. 448 00:17:01,870 --> 00:17:04,744 And, yeah, just use it and review your 449 00:17:04,744 --> 00:17:07,724 environment and find that stuff. Yeah. Yeah. And 450 00:17:07,785 --> 00:17:10,184 another thing that kinda goes with developers, and 451 00:17:10,184 --> 00:17:12,424 I know another thing you touched on in 452 00:17:12,424 --> 00:17:13,565 your talk was 453 00:17:14,105 --> 00:17:16,105 not just these SPNs and the permissions they 454 00:17:16,105 --> 00:17:16,924 have, but 455 00:17:17,384 --> 00:17:17,884 there's 456 00:17:18,240 --> 00:17:19,460 secrets and certificates 457 00:17:20,559 --> 00:17:21,519 and how these 458 00:17:22,319 --> 00:17:23,619 how you actually authenticate 459 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:25,380 to these applications Yeah. And 460 00:17:25,680 --> 00:17:26,960 managing some of that. Do you want to 461 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:29,039 talk a little bit about what you guys 462 00:17:29,039 --> 00:17:31,279 touched on best practices, things that people should 463 00:17:31,279 --> 00:17:33,144 be aware of when it comes to credential 464 00:17:33,144 --> 00:17:33,644 management 465 00:17:34,424 --> 00:17:36,744 for non human identities. Yeah. I mean, that 466 00:17:36,744 --> 00:17:38,744 that is a ball in itself. Right? Like, 467 00:17:38,744 --> 00:17:40,744 I mean, if you're talking about credentials, I 468 00:17:40,744 --> 00:17:42,585 mean, you have secrets which are the easy 469 00:17:42,585 --> 00:17:44,664 thing, but it essentially is just a password. 470 00:17:44,664 --> 00:17:46,610 Right? It is a password for an application. 471 00:17:46,610 --> 00:17:47,830 It's a better name. 472 00:17:48,609 --> 00:17:49,109 Yeah. 473 00:17:49,490 --> 00:17:51,490 Right. Yeah. We should just call it app 474 00:17:51,490 --> 00:17:53,330 passwords or something. Although we used to have 475 00:17:53,330 --> 00:17:54,950 those in Entra. Well, I think 476 00:17:55,490 --> 00:17:56,070 in graphs, 477 00:17:56,529 --> 00:17:59,170 either on app registrations or service principles somewhere, 478 00:17:59,170 --> 00:18:02,125 like, it It's a lot of secrets in 479 00:18:02,125 --> 00:18:05,219 the UI, but you then you have certificates, 480 00:18:05,219 --> 00:18:08,312 right, which are better, but certificates also, right, 481 00:18:08,312 --> 00:18:11,406 people can still do silly things, leaving them 482 00:18:11,406 --> 00:18:13,700 laying around. Yep. Like that. Save them to 483 00:18:13,700 --> 00:18:15,220 their documents so they sync it up to 484 00:18:15,220 --> 00:18:17,700 OneDrive. Yeah. So I mean, Lori, the the 485 00:18:17,700 --> 00:18:20,680 North Star is is like federated credentials, which, 486 00:18:20,740 --> 00:18:22,600 again, is something that's difficult 487 00:18:23,140 --> 00:18:25,140 to understand for some people. But in if 488 00:18:25,140 --> 00:18:27,460 you're, like, solely like a Microsoft shop, right, 489 00:18:27,460 --> 00:18:30,195 like, it's manage identities, which are easier to 490 00:18:30,195 --> 00:18:32,115 deploy. Right? Because then you don't have credential 491 00:18:32,115 --> 00:18:35,035 management. Nobody's having to hold secrets or Right. 492 00:18:35,234 --> 00:18:37,634 Use them. And another advantage of the managed 493 00:18:37,634 --> 00:18:40,515 identities is that you have an integrated life 494 00:18:40,515 --> 00:18:43,420 cycle. If you delete that function, the, 495 00:18:43,720 --> 00:18:46,600 the managed identity is also gone, including its 496 00:18:46,600 --> 00:18:48,519 permissions. So Yep. Yep. And I mean, I 497 00:18:48,519 --> 00:18:50,680 I will say, right, there's security research out 498 00:18:50,680 --> 00:18:51,900 there that will show 499 00:18:52,200 --> 00:18:54,759 there's sometimes cracks in sort of hybrid things 500 00:18:54,759 --> 00:18:57,755 like with ARC relative to manage identities. But 501 00:18:57,755 --> 00:18:59,115 I think if you sort of zoom out, 502 00:18:59,115 --> 00:19:01,035 right, and look at all the issues people 503 00:19:01,035 --> 00:19:03,195 have with secrets, right, it's still better to 504 00:19:03,195 --> 00:19:03,695 use 505 00:19:04,315 --> 00:19:07,515 manage identities whenever, you know, possible than, you 506 00:19:07,515 --> 00:19:09,539 know, certificates or or secrets. So yeah. And 507 00:19:09,619 --> 00:19:11,299 and I think we have to talk about 508 00:19:11,299 --> 00:19:14,259 this secret password. So if we if the 509 00:19:14,259 --> 00:19:16,340 time comes, we have to get rid of 510 00:19:16,340 --> 00:19:17,480 it because 511 00:19:17,940 --> 00:19:19,240 I know it's hard 512 00:19:19,539 --> 00:19:20,359 to do it, 513 00:19:20,660 --> 00:19:23,559 and it's even harder than with end users. 514 00:19:24,019 --> 00:19:25,724 But we see attacks 515 00:19:26,184 --> 00:19:27,085 where attackers 516 00:19:28,265 --> 00:19:29,484 are phishing developers 517 00:19:30,585 --> 00:19:32,444 and or attacking developers 518 00:19:32,744 --> 00:19:35,224 to get their secrets. So there is an 519 00:19:35,224 --> 00:19:37,884 attack out there that's called, ShyHulu, 520 00:19:38,265 --> 00:19:39,164 and it's 521 00:19:39,580 --> 00:19:43,279 leveraging that NPM packages. So they're they're 522 00:19:43,740 --> 00:19:45,039 targeting developers 523 00:19:45,340 --> 00:19:45,840 for 524 00:19:46,220 --> 00:19:47,519 NPM packages, 525 00:19:48,140 --> 00:19:49,440 then they are distributing 526 00:19:50,380 --> 00:19:52,000 malicious NPM packages 527 00:19:52,460 --> 00:19:54,080 to the max of the developers. 528 00:19:54,984 --> 00:19:58,125 And then there are tools like TruffleHawk 529 00:19:58,505 --> 00:20:01,804 that are scanning for secrets in GitHub repositories. 530 00:20:02,264 --> 00:20:02,764 And 531 00:20:03,224 --> 00:20:05,544 then you see an a login of an 532 00:20:05,544 --> 00:20:06,605 of an application 533 00:20:07,144 --> 00:20:08,444 with a correct password 534 00:20:08,825 --> 00:20:09,804 out of nothing, 535 00:20:10,119 --> 00:20:12,359 with a correct secret and so on. And 536 00:20:12,359 --> 00:20:14,779 it's, yeah, almost impossible to monitor. 537 00:20:15,319 --> 00:20:18,220 So and and even on the endpoint perspective, 538 00:20:18,359 --> 00:20:18,759 so 539 00:20:19,559 --> 00:20:21,179 yeah. Developers are 540 00:20:21,480 --> 00:20:24,644 not the best protected part of most environments 541 00:20:25,265 --> 00:20:28,865 and lock in lock ingestion into your theme 542 00:20:28,865 --> 00:20:31,025 from the GitHub and so on. This is 543 00:20:31,025 --> 00:20:33,045 also not very common. 544 00:20:33,345 --> 00:20:35,369 So yeah. And at the end, we have 545 00:20:35,369 --> 00:20:36,890 also as I said, we have to do 546 00:20:36,890 --> 00:20:38,570 some preventive stuff and we have to do 547 00:20:38,570 --> 00:20:39,309 some detection 548 00:20:39,690 --> 00:20:41,849 and prepare for response. But as the best 549 00:20:41,849 --> 00:20:43,950 prevention is to get rid of these secrets 550 00:20:44,009 --> 00:20:46,570 or passwords. When I think of nonhuman identities, 551 00:20:46,570 --> 00:20:48,345 I probably tend to hear the most is, 552 00:20:48,345 --> 00:20:50,204 to your point, someone leaving a secret 553 00:20:50,585 --> 00:20:52,125 in their code or 554 00:20:52,585 --> 00:20:54,904 they go in and check some code that 555 00:20:54,904 --> 00:20:56,284 has that secret 556 00:20:56,664 --> 00:20:59,865 into a public repo and it's like, oh, 557 00:20:59,865 --> 00:21:01,384 but I pulled it down five minutes later 558 00:21:01,384 --> 00:21:03,065 after I realized it. You don't know who 559 00:21:03,065 --> 00:21:05,019 saw that in those five minutes. Yeah. I 560 00:21:05,019 --> 00:21:06,779 feel like that's where I hear the most 561 00:21:06,779 --> 00:21:09,740 compromises when it comes to SPNs is due 562 00:21:09,740 --> 00:21:11,660 to those secrets and just I don't know 563 00:21:11,660 --> 00:21:14,779 that I wanna say carelessness, but just accidents 564 00:21:14,779 --> 00:21:17,339 happen. Right? Probably everyone whether they want to 565 00:21:17,339 --> 00:21:19,339 admit it or not. Right? Is guilty of 566 00:21:19,339 --> 00:21:21,974 like sending a password or something over Teams 567 00:21:21,974 --> 00:21:23,414 and be like, I'll delete it right after. 568 00:21:23,414 --> 00:21:25,174 Right? But I mean, there there's absolutely, you 569 00:21:25,174 --> 00:21:26,534 know, risk in there. I mean, and I 570 00:21:26,615 --> 00:21:28,375 I've been guilty of the these things, you 571 00:21:28,375 --> 00:21:30,615 know, myself. Right? Yeah. I mean, the secret 572 00:21:30,615 --> 00:21:32,759 part I think is also tough. Just just 573 00:21:32,759 --> 00:21:34,279 made me think of earlier when you were 574 00:21:34,279 --> 00:21:36,059 asking Chris about detection. 575 00:21:36,440 --> 00:21:37,640 It's one of the other things with secret 576 00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:39,880 management as we we now are also starting 577 00:21:39,880 --> 00:21:41,559 to talk about, like, well, let's lower the 578 00:21:41,559 --> 00:21:43,320 lifetime. Right? Because it it'd be like, well, 579 00:21:43,320 --> 00:21:45,080 I'll go ahead the certificate as a secret, 580 00:21:45,080 --> 00:21:46,955 and I'll just have it not expire until 581 00:21:46,955 --> 00:21:48,654 I'm retiring. Right? I'll 582 00:21:48,955 --> 00:21:51,515 make it somebody else's problem because we all 583 00:21:51,515 --> 00:21:53,835 hate rotating search. But now we're we're going 584 00:21:53,835 --> 00:21:55,934 down this path of saying like short lifetimes 585 00:21:56,075 --> 00:21:58,475 whether it's certificates or secrets which is awesome 586 00:21:58,475 --> 00:22:00,119 but now it creates I mean, in my 587 00:22:00,119 --> 00:22:02,380 eyes, right, even more noise if we're saying 588 00:22:02,680 --> 00:22:05,400 every every week, right, that that credential should 589 00:22:05,400 --> 00:22:07,660 be rotated. Yeah. And if we have different 590 00:22:07,799 --> 00:22:10,619 policies for lifetime, for secrets, and for certificates, 591 00:22:10,920 --> 00:22:12,140 maybe we are nudging 592 00:22:12,755 --> 00:22:13,414 the developers 593 00:22:13,715 --> 00:22:16,434 to rethink if a certificate would be an 594 00:22:16,434 --> 00:22:18,835 alternative. Yeah. Yeah. So when you work with 595 00:22:18,835 --> 00:22:21,575 customers, do you it I'm sure it varies 596 00:22:21,875 --> 00:22:24,355 customer to customer, but do you guys kinda 597 00:22:24,355 --> 00:22:25,495 have like a recommended, 598 00:22:26,179 --> 00:22:28,019 you should maybe we're not gonna go till 599 00:22:28,019 --> 00:22:28,759 you retire, 600 00:22:29,140 --> 00:22:31,299 but it's okay to go a year, two 601 00:22:31,299 --> 00:22:34,500 years, or I know passwords like the NIST 602 00:22:34,500 --> 00:22:36,900 is now saying, oh, just rotate it when 603 00:22:36,900 --> 00:22:39,984 there's a risk detected. Yep. Yep. I mean, 604 00:22:39,984 --> 00:22:42,144 I don't know, like, I think certificates like 605 00:22:42,144 --> 00:22:44,384 the Microsoft recommendation now what I think is 606 00:22:44,384 --> 00:22:46,785 six months for the lifetime on them. I 607 00:22:46,785 --> 00:22:48,005 mean, I I would say 608 00:22:48,384 --> 00:22:51,345 in ways, right, you could be more aggressive 609 00:22:51,345 --> 00:22:53,259 than that. I mean, honestly, like, I'm not 610 00:22:53,259 --> 00:22:55,420 a developer so I don't wanna pretend that 611 00:22:55,420 --> 00:22:56,559 coding is easy. 612 00:22:57,019 --> 00:22:58,940 But in other ways, right, like, I think 613 00:22:58,940 --> 00:23:00,859 sometimes people don't put the effort into the 614 00:23:00,859 --> 00:23:02,700 fact that, like, if you own if you 615 00:23:02,700 --> 00:23:04,779 have control over the currency graph, it's just 616 00:23:04,779 --> 00:23:07,154 like a few graph API calls to ask 617 00:23:07,154 --> 00:23:08,674 for a new one. Right? And and I 618 00:23:08,674 --> 00:23:11,414 mean, if you see a big identity systems 619 00:23:12,115 --> 00:23:14,195 where they have certain workload stuff like, I 620 00:23:14,195 --> 00:23:16,595 think Spiffy Inspire do things where it's like, 621 00:23:16,595 --> 00:23:18,595 you know, they're they're like rotating the secret 622 00:23:18,595 --> 00:23:20,674 like daily. Like that is used behind the 623 00:23:20,674 --> 00:23:22,750 covers for some of this stuff. I'd like 624 00:23:22,750 --> 00:23:24,670 to pick up the point, change password only 625 00:23:24,670 --> 00:23:26,589 if you have a reason. So this is 626 00:23:26,589 --> 00:23:27,650 something for 627 00:23:28,029 --> 00:23:30,049 user accounts, not for admin accounts. 628 00:23:30,429 --> 00:23:32,130 And we should delete workload 629 00:23:32,750 --> 00:23:35,710 nonhuman identities more than admin accounts than as 630 00:23:35,710 --> 00:23:36,609 user accounts. 631 00:23:36,910 --> 00:23:40,424 And I think that don't share don't rotate 632 00:23:40,424 --> 00:23:40,924 passwords 633 00:23:41,305 --> 00:23:43,865 is there is a yeah. I think we 634 00:23:43,865 --> 00:23:46,265 all think or come to the conclusion, a 635 00:23:46,265 --> 00:23:49,484 password is not enough. And we have additional 636 00:23:49,625 --> 00:23:52,825 stuff like MFA, device compliance, and all of 637 00:23:52,825 --> 00:23:53,519 those things. 638 00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:54,980 And, yeah, 639 00:23:55,359 --> 00:23:57,759 we don't have it in place in most 640 00:23:57,759 --> 00:23:59,779 environments for nonhuman identities. 641 00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:03,119 So the only things that is between an 642 00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:05,680 attacker and the and the resources is just 643 00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:08,080 a password at that point. Yeah. And I 644 00:24:08,080 --> 00:24:10,535 think, yeah, we should try to get rid 645 00:24:10,535 --> 00:24:11,914 of passwords. We should 646 00:24:12,454 --> 00:24:13,674 decrease the lifetime. 647 00:24:14,615 --> 00:24:16,555 And and, yes, we should 648 00:24:17,335 --> 00:24:19,894 introduce stuff like conditional access for workloads. So 649 00:24:20,134 --> 00:24:21,654 Yep. Yeah. I mean, I was just saying 650 00:24:21,654 --> 00:24:24,619 not not to increase my my Microsoft stock 651 00:24:24,619 --> 00:24:25,440 value but 652 00:24:25,980 --> 00:24:27,740 like for like a lot of people don't 653 00:24:27,740 --> 00:24:30,640 do workload identity protection. Right? Because it's like 654 00:24:30,940 --> 00:24:32,859 a pay for thing. But I would just 655 00:24:32,859 --> 00:24:34,619 say and I try to tell people like 656 00:24:34,619 --> 00:24:37,259 if you can identify what is considered like 657 00:24:37,259 --> 00:24:39,575 the high privileged risky workloads. 658 00:24:39,954 --> 00:24:41,394 Right? I mean, it's, like, $3 a month 659 00:24:41,394 --> 00:24:42,994 or something. So say you have 10 or 660 00:24:42,994 --> 00:24:44,294 15 service principles, 661 00:24:44,674 --> 00:24:46,994 like, start there. Right? It's only, you know, 662 00:24:46,994 --> 00:24:49,075 maybe a $100 a month to protect those. 663 00:24:49,075 --> 00:24:51,255 Right? But you could be potentially protecting 664 00:24:51,750 --> 00:24:53,430 the keys to your kingdom with, you know, 665 00:24:53,430 --> 00:24:56,309 conditional access for workloads and the identity protection 666 00:24:56,309 --> 00:24:59,269 features. So That's an interesting one too. Is 667 00:24:59,269 --> 00:25:02,070 Microsoft starting to do There's a couple aspects 668 00:25:02,070 --> 00:25:03,349 there. They're starting to do a lot more 669 00:25:03,349 --> 00:25:05,369 with conditional access for non human identities. 670 00:25:05,670 --> 00:25:06,170 Around 671 00:25:07,224 --> 00:25:07,724 SPNs, 672 00:25:08,345 --> 00:25:10,904 Ignite, couple weeks ago they said you can 673 00:25:10,904 --> 00:25:13,085 start doing conditional access now for 674 00:25:13,384 --> 00:25:16,284 agents which are just Yeah. Yeah. Look, agents 675 00:25:16,345 --> 00:25:19,065 are exploding in creating just a massive new 676 00:25:19,065 --> 00:25:20,284 influx of 677 00:25:20,759 --> 00:25:23,559 additional nonhuman identities. Do you work with clients 678 00:25:23,559 --> 00:25:25,480 around the conditional access and around some of 679 00:25:25,480 --> 00:25:27,660 the how do we start thinking about agents? 680 00:25:27,799 --> 00:25:29,559 Kinda two questions in there. It it it 681 00:25:29,559 --> 00:25:31,400 starts. So I think we are in the 682 00:25:31,400 --> 00:25:33,160 beginning of that. So there's just a big 683 00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:35,480 interest out there. So and our first message 684 00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:38,765 is the building blocks for agent IDs are 685 00:25:39,065 --> 00:25:40,845 human and non human identities. 686 00:25:41,224 --> 00:25:43,724 So they are not reinventing the wheel. They're 687 00:25:43,785 --> 00:25:46,265 reusing the building blocks that we already have. 688 00:25:46,265 --> 00:25:47,944 And if you have a good practice for 689 00:25:47,944 --> 00:25:50,765 protecting your human and not non human 690 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:51,940 identities, 691 00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:53,859 you have a very good 692 00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:55,220 starting point 693 00:25:55,519 --> 00:25:57,759 for all that agents. But, I mean, I 694 00:25:57,759 --> 00:25:59,599 would just say with agent IDs and and 695 00:25:59,599 --> 00:26:00,099 workloads 696 00:26:00,559 --> 00:26:02,799 specific to conditional access, I think it's so 697 00:26:02,799 --> 00:26:04,934 when it's like being open minded. Right? Like, 698 00:26:05,095 --> 00:26:05,914 in for a long 699 00:26:06,215 --> 00:26:08,295 time, we say zero trust does not, you 700 00:26:08,295 --> 00:26:10,535 know, network. And people are like, well, I'm 701 00:26:10,535 --> 00:26:12,855 just gonna make my conditional access policy for 702 00:26:12,855 --> 00:26:14,934 users say, well, if you're coming from corporate 703 00:26:14,934 --> 00:26:16,775 network, like, don't MFA. And we're like, that's 704 00:26:16,775 --> 00:26:18,775 an awful idea. Right. But if you look 705 00:26:18,775 --> 00:26:20,394 at workload, right, like, workload 706 00:26:20,990 --> 00:26:23,710 because it's different and agent ID included here. 707 00:26:23,710 --> 00:26:26,130 Right? If you have the ability to say, 708 00:26:26,430 --> 00:26:29,230 if it's coming from, you know, this, you 709 00:26:29,230 --> 00:26:32,029 know, data center, the this egress. Right? Network 710 00:26:32,029 --> 00:26:33,630 location is one of the few things that 711 00:26:33,630 --> 00:26:35,765 you can use. Right? So it's like, in 712 00:26:35,765 --> 00:26:37,924 these cases, it's better than nothing. Right. You 713 00:26:37,924 --> 00:26:40,424 can't really MFA a SPN. That would be 714 00:26:40,964 --> 00:26:42,585 Right. Right. And I mean Certificates 715 00:26:42,884 --> 00:26:43,544 are MFA. 716 00:26:43,845 --> 00:26:45,684 Yeah. I mean, but I see I've seen 717 00:26:45,684 --> 00:26:47,605 people ask, like, weird things like, can you 718 00:26:47,605 --> 00:26:50,179 assign FIDO two keys to you know 719 00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:53,440 Yeah. And and yeah. But it like sometimes 720 00:26:53,440 --> 00:26:55,359 I think I'll see people say well we're 721 00:26:55,359 --> 00:26:56,579 not supposed to do 722 00:26:56,960 --> 00:26:59,519 network for users so why would we do 723 00:26:59,519 --> 00:27:01,859 it for workloads and and almost like right 724 00:27:02,095 --> 00:27:04,174 maybe we've caused the own problem as security 725 00:27:04,174 --> 00:27:05,775 people by saying don't do that so much. 726 00:27:05,775 --> 00:27:06,975 But I think it's like looking at it 727 00:27:06,975 --> 00:27:09,154 right well, it's it's better than nothing. 728 00:27:09,535 --> 00:27:10,815 Right. It's one of the few things we 729 00:27:10,815 --> 00:27:12,735 have. So Yeah. And I'd like to add 730 00:27:12,735 --> 00:27:15,055 something. I think so we will see what 731 00:27:15,055 --> 00:27:18,119 happens with that agent IDs, but I think 732 00:27:18,419 --> 00:27:20,759 we will have a lot more 733 00:27:21,460 --> 00:27:24,099 non human identities. So there will be much 734 00:27:24,099 --> 00:27:25,640 more agents and applications, 735 00:27:26,099 --> 00:27:29,559 and we already have in many environments more 736 00:27:29,700 --> 00:27:31,079 applications and user. 737 00:27:31,394 --> 00:27:33,095 So just from the quantity, 738 00:27:33,555 --> 00:27:36,434 we have a bigger problem there. And I 739 00:27:36,434 --> 00:27:38,994 think the permissions of agents will be a 740 00:27:38,994 --> 00:27:41,815 little broader because you don't exactly 741 00:27:42,355 --> 00:27:44,615 know what is really needed. 742 00:27:45,089 --> 00:27:47,190 So and I think over time, 743 00:27:47,569 --> 00:27:50,210 the permissions of the agents will extend. So 744 00:27:50,210 --> 00:27:52,230 we have more of them. They have more 745 00:27:52,289 --> 00:27:54,609 permissions. So, yeah. We have to take care 746 00:27:54,609 --> 00:27:56,450 of it. Yeah. Because I think especially with 747 00:27:56,450 --> 00:27:58,634 agents, to your point people are like an 748 00:27:58,634 --> 00:28:00,154 agent's not any good if it doesn't have 749 00:28:00,154 --> 00:28:02,154 access to data. Right. People are like I 750 00:28:02,154 --> 00:28:03,355 want it to have the access to the 751 00:28:03,355 --> 00:28:05,194 most amount of data so my agent's good 752 00:28:05,194 --> 00:28:05,694 or 753 00:28:05,994 --> 00:28:07,454 this data or that data. 754 00:28:08,075 --> 00:28:10,234 And we've already seen, right? Copilot came out 755 00:28:10,234 --> 00:28:12,349 and everybody's like, Oh, all these security issues. 756 00:28:12,349 --> 00:28:14,349 And it's, no, it doesn't create new security 757 00:28:14,349 --> 00:28:16,049 issues. It just It identifies. It highlights 758 00:28:16,509 --> 00:28:19,309 quicker Yes. The security issues you already had. 759 00:28:19,309 --> 00:28:21,089 Yep. Yep. And we're gonna continue 760 00:28:21,470 --> 00:28:22,909 to see that and I think to your 761 00:28:22,909 --> 00:28:24,829 point it's just going to create a whole 762 00:28:24,829 --> 00:28:25,329 new 763 00:28:25,914 --> 00:28:29,214 security issues are gonna become more easily quickly 764 00:28:29,755 --> 00:28:31,434 visible. Yeah. But yeah, I mean that's like 765 00:28:31,434 --> 00:28:33,115 I feel like I'd see so many people 766 00:28:33,275 --> 00:28:35,194 you you had the similar problem with with 767 00:28:35,194 --> 00:28:37,515 Delve. Right? But like Yep. You know, point 768 00:28:37,515 --> 00:28:39,940 at SharePoint and then all of a sudden 769 00:28:39,940 --> 00:28:41,539 people like, how come I can see all 770 00:28:41,539 --> 00:28:43,779 this corporate data I'm not supposed to because 771 00:28:43,779 --> 00:28:45,700 it's indexed and you can just go write 772 00:28:45,700 --> 00:28:46,200 query. 773 00:28:46,740 --> 00:28:49,700 But that's not, like, AI's fault. It's that 774 00:28:49,700 --> 00:28:52,474 you have, like, everyone has access to everything 775 00:28:52,474 --> 00:28:54,714 permissions going on. Right. If you would've used 776 00:28:54,714 --> 00:28:57,034 SharePoint search or Microsoft three sixty five search, 777 00:28:57,034 --> 00:28:59,115 you probably could've found them. It would've just 778 00:28:59,115 --> 00:29:00,174 taken a little longer. 779 00:29:00,875 --> 00:29:02,815 But no. I mean, it it's definitely, like, 780 00:29:03,220 --> 00:29:06,500 not even just a Microsoft, but industry thing 781 00:29:06,500 --> 00:29:08,259 that I feel like people are noodling on. 782 00:29:08,259 --> 00:29:10,180 Right? Because we have this issue where, yes, 783 00:29:10,180 --> 00:29:11,940 you wanted to have permissions, but then you 784 00:29:11,940 --> 00:29:13,860 say, well, you only wanted to have permissions 785 00:29:13,860 --> 00:29:16,144 when it needs them. But also if if 786 00:29:16,144 --> 00:29:18,625 you're hammering a user constantly saying, like, do 787 00:29:18,625 --> 00:29:20,544 you want the AI to still have permissions? 788 00:29:20,544 --> 00:29:22,544 Like, you have fatigue and people just start 789 00:29:22,544 --> 00:29:24,304 hitting yes all the time to things. Right? 790 00:29:24,304 --> 00:29:26,144 I mean, that's like a lot of consent 791 00:29:26,144 --> 00:29:28,990 grant issues where because nobody reads the thing. 792 00:29:28,990 --> 00:29:30,589 Right? You're just like, I just want it 793 00:29:30,589 --> 00:29:32,210 to work. Yes. Yeah. 794 00:29:33,630 --> 00:29:35,150 Yeah. So it's like trying to figure out 795 00:29:35,150 --> 00:29:37,390 how how can you let AI do its 796 00:29:37,390 --> 00:29:37,890 thing, 797 00:29:38,190 --> 00:29:40,349 but also not let it just, like, run 798 00:29:40,349 --> 00:29:43,125 away with access that is, you know, out 799 00:29:43,125 --> 00:29:44,424 of control. So 800 00:29:44,884 --> 00:29:46,404 and I don't know if there is, like, 801 00:29:46,404 --> 00:29:48,005 an answer out there yet for a lot 802 00:29:48,005 --> 00:29:50,565 of this. So Yeah. I think we can 803 00:29:50,565 --> 00:29:53,945 be happy that Microsoft has just launched that 804 00:29:54,539 --> 00:29:55,759 that AirBad stuff, 805 00:29:56,140 --> 00:29:58,619 and we will have conditional access and all 806 00:29:58,619 --> 00:30:00,400 of that stuff so that we 807 00:30:00,700 --> 00:30:04,080 we can, yeah, build good practices and guardrails 808 00:30:04,140 --> 00:30:05,840 and all of that stuff. Yeah. 809 00:30:09,019 --> 00:30:11,154 Do you feel overwhelmed by trying to manage 810 00:30:11,154 --> 00:30:13,474 your Office three sixty five environment? Are you 811 00:30:13,474 --> 00:30:16,775 facing unexpected issues that disrupt your company's productivity? 812 00:30:17,075 --> 00:30:18,994 Intelligink is here to help. Much like you 813 00:30:18,994 --> 00:30:20,835 take your car to the mechanic that has 814 00:30:20,835 --> 00:30:22,994 specialized knowledge on how to best keep your 815 00:30:22,994 --> 00:30:26,049 car running, Intelligent helps you with your Microsoft 816 00:30:26,109 --> 00:30:28,289 cloud environment because that's their expertise. 817 00:30:28,670 --> 00:30:30,990 Intelligent keeps up with the latest updates in 818 00:30:30,990 --> 00:30:33,150 the Microsoft cloud to help keep your business 819 00:30:33,150 --> 00:30:35,390 running smoothly and ahead of the curve. Whether 820 00:30:35,390 --> 00:30:37,390 you are a small organization with just a 821 00:30:37,390 --> 00:30:39,934 few users up to an organization of several 822 00:30:39,934 --> 00:30:40,914 thousand employees. 823 00:30:41,295 --> 00:30:43,214 They want to partner with you to implement 824 00:30:43,214 --> 00:30:43,954 and administer 825 00:30:44,255 --> 00:30:46,035 your Microsoft cloud technology. 826 00:30:46,734 --> 00:30:50,275 Visit them at inteligync.com/podcast. 827 00:30:50,494 --> 00:30:57,299 That's intelligink.com/podcast 828 00:30:57,599 --> 00:30:59,759 for more information or to schedule a thirty 829 00:30:59,759 --> 00:31:01,779 minute call to get started with them today. 830 00:31:02,079 --> 00:31:05,440 Remember, Intelligink focuses on the Microsoft cloud so 831 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:07,140 you can focus on your business. 832 00:31:09,575 --> 00:31:11,274 Anything else that 833 00:31:11,815 --> 00:31:14,134 you wanna talk about, you wanna make users 834 00:31:14,134 --> 00:31:16,294 aware of when it comes to managing those 835 00:31:16,294 --> 00:31:18,615 nonhuman identities and and try. I think we 836 00:31:18,615 --> 00:31:19,115 covered 837 00:31:19,519 --> 00:31:21,599 some of that credential management, the permissions. I 838 00:31:21,599 --> 00:31:23,119 think we touched on ownership a little bit, 839 00:31:23,119 --> 00:31:24,659 some of the agents. Anything else? 840 00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:27,859 I think when I look at our presentation 841 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:30,899 from yesterday, there are two things that are, 842 00:31:31,279 --> 00:31:31,779 yeah, 843 00:31:32,079 --> 00:31:32,579 problematic. 844 00:31:32,884 --> 00:31:34,644 And we already discussed the first thing that 845 00:31:34,644 --> 00:31:36,644 was the owner assignment, get rid of it. 846 00:31:36,644 --> 00:31:38,585 Yep. So use administrative 847 00:31:39,045 --> 00:31:41,865 roles for this. So like a cloud application 848 00:31:42,005 --> 00:31:43,684 admin, scope it to the dev. And the 849 00:31:43,684 --> 00:31:46,965 other part was, yeah, multi tenant apps are 850 00:31:46,965 --> 00:31:47,465 really 851 00:31:48,085 --> 00:31:48,585 challenge. 852 00:31:49,230 --> 00:31:51,549 So and we see we we saw a 853 00:31:51,549 --> 00:31:54,509 funny incident with, yeah, multi tenant apps by 854 00:31:54,509 --> 00:31:57,009 accident. So I think the Bing Bang story 855 00:31:57,069 --> 00:31:59,789 was one of the more known or someone 856 00:31:59,869 --> 00:32:01,950 it's just a radio button. Who is able 857 00:32:01,950 --> 00:32:04,134 to sign in? And Yeah. I mean, I 858 00:32:04,134 --> 00:32:05,174 I I tell you like with that. Right? 859 00:32:05,174 --> 00:32:07,414 So Bing Bang was when Wiz did research 860 00:32:07,414 --> 00:32:09,095 and found they could basically they they got 861 00:32:09,095 --> 00:32:11,015 into, like, some Bing back end and they 862 00:32:11,015 --> 00:32:12,394 could edit, like, search results. 863 00:32:12,855 --> 00:32:15,174 Got it. But yeah. Right. It it's like 864 00:32:15,174 --> 00:32:16,934 a radio button, but a lot of times 865 00:32:16,934 --> 00:32:19,230 you'll see devs again maybe sort of jumping 866 00:32:19,230 --> 00:32:20,830 on dev. See, right? They'll they'll pull up 867 00:32:20,830 --> 00:32:22,210 basically all the authorization 868 00:32:22,910 --> 00:32:24,509 sort of checks on enter. Right? And, like, 869 00:32:24,509 --> 00:32:26,769 people conflate authentication and authorization. 870 00:32:27,470 --> 00:32:29,230 So they won't have any logic in their 871 00:32:29,230 --> 00:32:31,654 app and they're just like, well, if they've 872 00:32:31,654 --> 00:32:34,394 authenticated, then I guess they should be here. 873 00:32:34,615 --> 00:32:36,535 Right? And now it's a multi tenant app 874 00:32:36,535 --> 00:32:38,934 that shouldn't be. And so you end up 875 00:32:38,934 --> 00:32:41,015 with anyone. Right? If they stumble across a 876 00:32:41,015 --> 00:32:44,119 thing, can go sign into it. And interestingly 877 00:32:44,180 --> 00:32:46,019 enough, you'll see a lot of times devs 878 00:32:46,019 --> 00:32:46,839 won't invest 879 00:32:47,539 --> 00:32:49,940 effort on, like, an admin sort of interface. 880 00:32:49,940 --> 00:32:52,039 Right? So maybe they have all this authorization 881 00:32:52,259 --> 00:32:54,099 stuff on a front end where all their 882 00:32:54,099 --> 00:32:55,859 customers are logging in and then there's some 883 00:32:55,859 --> 00:32:58,555 other admin portal thing that if you can 884 00:32:58,555 --> 00:33:00,394 get into it, right, you just have free 885 00:33:00,394 --> 00:33:02,075 reign to do whatever you want. And again, 886 00:33:02,075 --> 00:33:04,154 that's like basically what Wizz found in a 887 00:33:04,154 --> 00:33:05,674 lot of their the research. I mean, they 888 00:33:05,674 --> 00:33:08,875 were going after Microsoft stuff specifically. So Got 889 00:33:08,875 --> 00:33:10,109 it. I think the common 890 00:33:10,589 --> 00:33:13,230 the main problem with multi tenant apps is 891 00:33:13,230 --> 00:33:15,569 that we have a lot of controls 892 00:33:16,190 --> 00:33:16,929 in the 893 00:33:17,230 --> 00:33:19,869 app that where is the service principle, not 894 00:33:19,869 --> 00:33:22,109 in the app where the app registration is. 895 00:33:22,109 --> 00:33:24,724 And the attacker can have its own service 896 00:33:24,724 --> 00:33:27,464 principle and has control over assignment 897 00:33:27,845 --> 00:33:30,505 and role mappings and all of that stuff. 898 00:33:30,884 --> 00:33:33,605 And, yeah, Eric just yesterday showed those in 899 00:33:33,605 --> 00:33:35,605 no hours attacks, so you can find it 900 00:33:35,605 --> 00:33:37,940 also on, it's on your on your blocks. 901 00:33:37,940 --> 00:33:39,940 Right? Yeah. And and we know of, is 902 00:33:39,940 --> 00:33:42,180 on the December's blog. I I would spend 903 00:33:42,180 --> 00:33:43,779 an hour trying to explain it because I 904 00:33:43,779 --> 00:33:44,340 ramble about 905 00:33:45,059 --> 00:33:46,580 I mean, I I think I think a 906 00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:48,820 simple thing with with multi tenant apps is 907 00:33:48,820 --> 00:33:51,375 like, if you are not a software developer, 908 00:33:51,515 --> 00:33:53,455 like, as a business, you probably 909 00:33:53,914 --> 00:33:55,994 shouldn't have the app there. And and that 910 00:33:55,994 --> 00:33:57,674 is something again that you could use, you 911 00:33:57,674 --> 00:34:00,075 know, free tooling, paid tooling, right, to go 912 00:34:00,075 --> 00:34:02,474 find those sorts of things. So Yeah. So 913 00:34:02,555 --> 00:34:03,775 and if you are troubleshooting 914 00:34:04,315 --> 00:34:05,440 and switching 915 00:34:05,819 --> 00:34:07,740 configurations of your app I've seen that a 916 00:34:07,740 --> 00:34:09,980 lot. Don't touch this. It won't solve your 917 00:34:09,980 --> 00:34:12,159 problem, but bring you new problems. Yeah. 918 00:34:12,619 --> 00:34:13,599 Yeah. And 919 00:34:13,980 --> 00:34:15,900 and as I was saying, again, it's good 920 00:34:15,900 --> 00:34:18,844 to do reviews. When I I'm doing re 921 00:34:18,984 --> 00:34:21,385 entra reviews, so we are selling this as 922 00:34:21,385 --> 00:34:23,724 a as a package to customers. So and 923 00:34:23,864 --> 00:34:25,704 one of the main things I'm looking for, 924 00:34:25,704 --> 00:34:28,505 okay, do you have I'm always upfront asking, 925 00:34:28,505 --> 00:34:30,744 do you have any multitenant apps? No. We 926 00:34:30,744 --> 00:34:32,980 don't have. So and then I just turn 927 00:34:33,119 --> 00:34:35,359 turn on the tools. Okay. We found 20 928 00:34:35,359 --> 00:34:35,859 of 929 00:34:37,359 --> 00:34:37,859 them. 930 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:40,799 And usually, you just can turn them off. 931 00:34:40,799 --> 00:34:43,280 And when there are some that are not 932 00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:44,019 by accident, 933 00:34:44,405 --> 00:34:46,804 you have to endure that people running the 934 00:34:46,804 --> 00:34:47,304 application 935 00:34:47,844 --> 00:34:48,505 are doing 936 00:34:48,804 --> 00:34:51,445 additional stuff. Yeah. So Yeah. And I think 937 00:34:51,445 --> 00:34:53,545 that highlights again, like we talked about earlier, 938 00:34:54,164 --> 00:34:54,905 the need 939 00:34:55,525 --> 00:34:57,844 for security and developers to talk to each 940 00:34:57,844 --> 00:35:00,609 other. Yeah. Whether developers don't even, some developers 941 00:35:00,609 --> 00:35:01,809 may not even know, I don't even know 942 00:35:01,809 --> 00:35:03,570 what the difference is between single tenant and 943 00:35:03,570 --> 00:35:04,469 multi tenants. 944 00:35:04,769 --> 00:35:07,730 And really having that conversation and I've seen 945 00:35:07,730 --> 00:35:09,969 this across all of Microsoft March 946 00:35:09,969 --> 00:35:10,469 is 947 00:35:10,769 --> 00:35:12,449 one thing I feel like the cloud has 948 00:35:12,449 --> 00:35:15,194 done is it's caused IT people that don't 949 00:35:15,194 --> 00:35:17,114 typically like to talk to each other Yep. 950 00:35:17,194 --> 00:35:19,835 To have to talk Yep. Because all this 951 00:35:19,835 --> 00:35:22,875 stuff is so tightly integrated and has some 952 00:35:22,875 --> 00:35:25,355 of those broader reaching effects. Yep. No. I 953 00:35:25,355 --> 00:35:27,534 mean, absolutely right. Like, you start to see 954 00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:30,320 conversations about soft skills and communication, all that. 955 00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:32,660 Right? Like, coming into the industry because, 956 00:35:32,960 --> 00:35:36,099 like, sometimes the best security person isn't because 957 00:35:36,160 --> 00:35:38,559 you have the biggest brain. It's because you 958 00:35:38,559 --> 00:35:40,180 can work across the organization, 959 00:35:40,925 --> 00:35:41,984 right, to help implement 960 00:35:42,684 --> 00:35:45,804 strong security practices amongst your developers, amongst your 961 00:35:45,804 --> 00:35:48,605 end users. Right? This isn't like the old 962 00:35:48,605 --> 00:35:50,525 days where you could be that bastard operator 963 00:35:50,525 --> 00:35:51,264 from hell, 964 00:35:51,644 --> 00:35:53,324 you know, and just tell people to do 965 00:35:53,324 --> 00:35:55,260 this thing. Right? Because then you get shadow 966 00:35:55,260 --> 00:35:57,280 IT and and all sorts of stuff. 967 00:35:57,900 --> 00:36:00,539 So, yep. Awesome. Well, thanks guys. Yeah. I 968 00:36:00,539 --> 00:36:02,860 I appreciate the conversation, talking a little bit 969 00:36:02,860 --> 00:36:04,320 more about non human identities. 970 00:36:04,699 --> 00:36:06,140 We'll include a bunch of links in the 971 00:36:06,140 --> 00:36:08,485 show notes. I'll get links from you guys 972 00:36:08,864 --> 00:36:10,785 to social media where you want, if people 973 00:36:10,785 --> 00:36:13,105 wanna connect with you there, websites. If you 974 00:36:13,105 --> 00:36:14,385 have links to tools, I'll get some of 975 00:36:14,385 --> 00:36:15,505 those that we can put in the show 976 00:36:15,505 --> 00:36:17,364 notes as well. Any last 977 00:36:17,744 --> 00:36:20,545 things you wanna share, highlights, telling people to 978 00:36:20,545 --> 00:36:23,730 come to this conference next year or 2027, 979 00:36:23,730 --> 00:36:26,050 I guess. It was really a nice event, 980 00:36:26,050 --> 00:36:28,050 so Yeah. No. I mean, this has been 981 00:36:28,050 --> 00:36:31,510 great being at the inaugural Workplace Ninjas and 982 00:36:31,809 --> 00:36:33,730 hopefully I mean, we're a little ahead. I'm 983 00:36:33,730 --> 00:36:35,730 I'm hoping I can claim now that I 984 00:36:35,730 --> 00:36:37,590 will become the intra idol 985 00:36:37,985 --> 00:36:38,804 from the inaugural 986 00:36:39,265 --> 00:36:40,945 workplace Oh, do I need to go I 987 00:36:40,945 --> 00:36:42,465 have not voted yet. Do I need to 988 00:36:42,465 --> 00:36:43,905 go vote for You need to go vote 989 00:36:43,905 --> 00:36:45,265 for me, Ben. You have to you have 990 00:36:45,265 --> 00:36:46,644 to vote for Eric. Yeah. 991 00:36:47,344 --> 00:36:48,945 But, no, I mean, as far as myself, 992 00:36:48,945 --> 00:36:51,765 I'll be actually over in Europe at MC2MC 993 00:36:52,465 --> 00:36:53,204 and then 994 00:36:53,739 --> 00:36:54,559 Hip Europe 995 00:36:54,860 --> 00:36:56,480 a couple days after that and 996 00:36:56,860 --> 00:36:58,320 then Experts Live Denmark. 997 00:36:58,619 --> 00:37:00,460 We're co presenting Chris and I at MC 998 00:37:00,460 --> 00:37:02,900 two MC so Okay. Are you gonna go 999 00:37:03,099 --> 00:37:05,200 most important question if you're going to Denmark. 1000 00:37:05,420 --> 00:37:06,719 Are you gonna go to the Lego 1001 00:37:07,155 --> 00:37:09,074 headquarters while you're in Denmark? Oh, I do. 1002 00:37:09,074 --> 00:37:10,914 Are you a Lego guy? Yeah. Yeah. It's 1003 00:37:10,914 --> 00:37:13,094 not really close to Kommang. 1004 00:37:13,795 --> 00:37:15,235 Is it? Oh, I I have no idea. 1005 00:37:15,235 --> 00:37:17,074 But, yeah, I I am a Lego guy, 1006 00:37:17,074 --> 00:37:17,235 so 1007 00:37:19,155 --> 00:37:21,090 You can go get those secret Lego sets. 1008 00:37:21,250 --> 00:37:22,930 There's what? The two LEGO sets that you 1009 00:37:22,930 --> 00:37:25,910 can only get at LEGO headquarters in Denmark. 1010 00:37:26,050 --> 00:37:28,690 Oh, I did. Oh. I'll have to how 1011 00:37:28,690 --> 00:37:29,590 far is it? 1012 00:37:31,170 --> 00:37:33,489 I think for for Americans it's not that 1013 00:37:33,489 --> 00:37:33,989 far. 1014 00:37:38,135 --> 00:37:40,295 I will go rent the biggest SUV in 1015 00:37:40,295 --> 00:37:41,114 all of Denmark. 1016 00:37:42,534 --> 00:37:44,614 Go buy Allego. Right? We're in Texas. We're 1017 00:37:44,614 --> 00:37:45,114 like 1018 00:37:45,414 --> 00:37:48,775 Texas is huge over there. Everything's closer than 1019 00:37:48,775 --> 00:37:50,074 driving across Texas. 1020 00:37:51,230 --> 00:37:53,150 So, yeah, I'm really looking forward. So this 1021 00:37:53,150 --> 00:37:55,789 year was also was already a cool event 1022 00:37:55,789 --> 00:37:58,109 in in Copenhagen, but and and next year 1023 00:37:58,109 --> 00:37:59,869 will be a really huge, I think. So 1024 00:38:00,029 --> 00:38:02,190 Yeah. And but I also in enjoyed this 1025 00:38:02,190 --> 00:38:03,885 web with New Year's US. It was also 1026 00:38:03,965 --> 00:38:05,184 a very nice event. 1027 00:38:05,644 --> 00:38:07,885 And, yeah, we have a full second day. 1028 00:38:07,885 --> 00:38:10,364 So Yeah. Yeah. Alright. Well, I will let 1029 00:38:10,364 --> 00:38:12,525 you guys go enjoy your second day. Thanks 1030 00:38:12,525 --> 00:38:14,445 again. Enjoy the rest of the conference. Awesome. 1031 00:38:14,445 --> 00:38:16,465 Talk to you guys later. Thank you. Bye. 1032 00:38:18,469 --> 00:38:20,710 If you enjoyed the podcast, go leave us 1033 00:38:20,710 --> 00:38:22,949 a five star rating in iTunes. It helps 1034 00:38:22,949 --> 00:38:24,630 to get the word out so more IT 1035 00:38:24,630 --> 00:38:26,789 pros can learn about Office three sixty five 1036 00:38:26,789 --> 00:38:27,449 and Azure. 1037 00:38:27,989 --> 00:38:29,670 If you have any questions you want us 1038 00:38:29,670 --> 00:38:31,829 to address on the show or feedback about 1039 00:38:31,829 --> 00:38:34,175 the show, feel free to reach out via 1040 00:38:34,175 --> 00:38:36,355 our website, Twitter, or Facebook. 1041 00:38:36,655 --> 00:38:38,574 Thanks again for listening, and have a great 1042 00:38:38,574 --> 00:38:39,074 day.