1
00:00:24,214 --> 00:00:26,614
Welcome to the Last American Vagabond. Joining me

2
00:00:26,614 --> 00:00:29,274
today is James Corbett to discuss the GiveWP

3
00:00:29,815 --> 00:00:32,320
security vulnerability that we've been mentioning on the

4
00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:34,320
show and something that is quite confounding. We

5
00:00:34,320 --> 00:00:36,420
were briefly talking about it before we started

6
00:00:36,479 --> 00:00:38,320
and just kind of the the issues, not

7
00:00:38,320 --> 00:00:40,479
just about, you know, the email addresses that

8
00:00:40,479 --> 00:00:42,320
were exposed, but, you know, what else could

9
00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:44,719
be going on there, the issues of transferring

10
00:00:44,719 --> 00:00:46,159
people from one thing to the other and

11
00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:47,827
what that does to the platform itself. And

12
00:00:47,827 --> 00:00:49,335
I wanna get into a couple different things

13
00:00:49,335 --> 00:00:51,015
with him about what this could mean, what

14
00:00:51,015 --> 00:00:52,854
he thinks, you know, might have driven this.

15
00:00:52,854 --> 00:00:54,375
But just in general, really, just kind of

16
00:00:54,375 --> 00:00:56,454
an informative discussion so you guys know what's

17
00:00:56,454 --> 00:00:58,375
going on. You can, you know, see the

18
00:00:58,375 --> 00:00:59,975
options on the table and, you know, plan

19
00:00:59,975 --> 00:01:02,369
accordingly. So, James, how are you today? I'm

20
00:01:02,369 --> 00:01:03,989
doing alright. How are you doing?

21
00:01:04,290 --> 00:01:06,370
You know, ups and downs. We're talking about

22
00:01:06,370 --> 00:01:08,530
before. You know, every day, it's another thing.

23
00:01:08,530 --> 00:01:10,209
But, you know, you almost kinda get used

24
00:01:10,209 --> 00:01:12,450
to the chaotic nature of of how this

25
00:01:12,450 --> 00:01:14,369
all works. But Yeah. It's it's just hard.

26
00:01:14,369 --> 00:01:15,890
But, you know, again, I I think to

27
00:01:15,890 --> 00:01:18,424
start on a positive note, that the reason

28
00:01:18,424 --> 00:01:20,505
anything like this, assuming this is something deliberate

29
00:01:20,505 --> 00:01:21,944
or not, but stuff like this is going

30
00:01:21,944 --> 00:01:23,465
on that is, I think we'd set a

31
00:01:23,465 --> 00:01:24,745
tie and and we're at a time where

32
00:01:24,745 --> 00:01:26,825
people are starting, at least in my experience,

33
00:01:26,825 --> 00:01:28,025
tell me what you think, more than I've

34
00:01:28,025 --> 00:01:29,305
ever seen doing this, and you've been doing

35
00:01:29,305 --> 00:01:30,990
this a lot longer than me. People are

36
00:01:30,990 --> 00:01:33,390
asking questions. People are skeptical of things, like,

37
00:01:33,390 --> 00:01:35,069
even in the partisanship. And I just think

38
00:01:35,069 --> 00:01:36,829
that's an important thing to recognize. There's a

39
00:01:36,829 --> 00:01:38,750
lot of you know, it feels bad because

40
00:01:38,750 --> 00:01:40,109
I think we're at a point where the

41
00:01:40,109 --> 00:01:41,950
system doesn't like what's happening, and so it's

42
00:01:41,950 --> 00:01:43,825
making it feel crazy. But I'm I'm in

43
00:01:43,825 --> 00:01:45,744
a weird way hopeful in how things have

44
00:01:45,744 --> 00:01:46,724
been going. You know?

45
00:01:47,265 --> 00:01:49,665
I hear you. And I I share that

46
00:01:49,665 --> 00:01:52,944
quiet optimism because I do certainly see that

47
00:01:52,944 --> 00:01:54,625
there are more people that are more aware

48
00:01:54,625 --> 00:01:56,545
of more issues than I have ever seen

49
00:01:56,545 --> 00:01:58,064
in the couple decades I've been doing this

50
00:01:58,064 --> 00:01:59,530
at any rate. And that is something. And

51
00:01:59,530 --> 00:02:01,609
we shouldn't I know it's easy to dismiss

52
00:02:01,609 --> 00:02:03,290
or poo poo that or go black pill

53
00:02:03,290 --> 00:02:04,890
and who cares, it doesn't matter. But I

54
00:02:04,890 --> 00:02:06,890
think it does matter. And it's actually a

55
00:02:06,890 --> 00:02:08,250
point I made on New World next week

56
00:02:08,250 --> 00:02:10,090
last week. You know, the fact that the

57
00:02:10,090 --> 00:02:12,330
UK government is so freaking out over people

58
00:02:12,330 --> 00:02:14,895
talking freely online, it means that people talking

59
00:02:14,895 --> 00:02:17,215
freely online does make a difference. It really

60
00:02:17,215 --> 00:02:18,034
does. They

61
00:02:18,335 --> 00:02:19,155
are actively

62
00:02:19,615 --> 00:02:21,295
scared of this and putting up, you know,

63
00:02:21,295 --> 00:02:21,795
entire

64
00:02:22,254 --> 00:02:25,635
information teams, national security and online information teams

65
00:02:25,870 --> 00:02:27,870
to try to coordinate against this threat of

66
00:02:27,870 --> 00:02:30,030
people talking to each other online. It's because

67
00:02:30,030 --> 00:02:31,790
what you say and what you think actually

68
00:02:31,790 --> 00:02:33,230
does make a difference. And I think it's

69
00:02:33,230 --> 00:02:34,689
easy for people to get,

70
00:02:35,150 --> 00:02:37,069
you know, black pilled on this sort of

71
00:02:37,069 --> 00:02:39,230
thing. Oh, it doesn't matter. Who cares? Whatever.

72
00:02:39,230 --> 00:02:41,504
We can't do anything. They control everything. No.

73
00:02:41,504 --> 00:02:43,925
They don't. That's enemy propaganda. And I wish

74
00:02:44,145 --> 00:02:45,525
I wish more people would stop

75
00:02:45,905 --> 00:02:48,625
basically taking that, that bait and start realizing

76
00:02:48,625 --> 00:02:50,384
that, you know, no. What we're saying, what

77
00:02:50,384 --> 00:02:52,305
we're doing, what we're thinking really does matter,

78
00:02:52,305 --> 00:02:53,745
and they are scared of it. They show

79
00:02:53,745 --> 00:02:54,805
it by their actions.

80
00:02:55,310 --> 00:02:57,550
Well and I've been I totally agree. And

81
00:02:57,550 --> 00:02:59,310
what I've been seeing lately, you know, how

82
00:02:59,310 --> 00:03:01,250
do you like, how does it not feel

83
00:03:01,629 --> 00:03:02,849
like, look at it this way.

84
00:03:03,310 --> 00:03:05,950
Despite the power, the money, the resources, the

85
00:03:05,950 --> 00:03:08,764
influence, the censorship of every platform, the, you

86
00:03:08,764 --> 00:03:10,944
know, the financial censorship, everything,

87
00:03:11,405 --> 00:03:13,004
we're still getting through. You know what I

88
00:03:13,004 --> 00:03:14,685
mean? Like, that's powerful to think about. Like,

89
00:03:14,685 --> 00:03:16,685
where the information is still forcing its way

90
00:03:16,685 --> 00:03:18,284
through and they're still trying to censor it.

91
00:03:18,284 --> 00:03:20,039
It's just you know? So that's a win,

92
00:03:20,120 --> 00:03:21,959
however you slice that, even if we're struggling

93
00:03:21,959 --> 00:03:23,639
and suffering to get it out, you know.

94
00:03:23,639 --> 00:03:24,919
But but James, didn't you know that we

95
00:03:24,919 --> 00:03:26,199
are the ones that are black filled. Right?

96
00:03:26,199 --> 00:03:26,280
So

97
00:03:27,239 --> 00:03:30,039
Oh, right. Oh, I forgot. Yeah. Yeah. We're

98
00:03:30,039 --> 00:03:32,439
the ones. Just because we don't believe in

99
00:03:32,439 --> 00:03:34,495
Lord savior Trump or something. Right? Yeah. Yeah.

100
00:03:34,495 --> 00:03:36,175
Which, by the way, many of them are

101
00:03:36,175 --> 00:03:37,614
now on that same page. You know, it's

102
00:03:37,614 --> 00:03:39,614
just funny how that works, but different conversation.

103
00:03:39,614 --> 00:03:40,974
But, yeah, I do I do definitely think

104
00:03:40,974 --> 00:03:42,414
that that's where we are, you know. And

105
00:03:42,414 --> 00:03:44,094
so that's what I wanna get into, not

106
00:03:44,094 --> 00:03:45,935
to start, but that, you know, wondering about

107
00:03:45,935 --> 00:03:47,534
where why you think this might happen before

108
00:03:47,534 --> 00:03:48,354
we get to that.

109
00:03:48,680 --> 00:03:50,200
So let let's just start with you breaking

110
00:03:50,200 --> 00:03:51,480
this down for people on how, you know,

111
00:03:51,480 --> 00:03:53,500
how you came about this, what you found,

112
00:03:53,639 --> 00:03:55,319
what the implications are, and then we can

113
00:03:55,319 --> 00:03:56,520
jump into some of the parts as we

114
00:03:56,520 --> 00:03:57,180
go through.

115
00:03:57,560 --> 00:03:58,860
Okay. Alright. So,

116
00:03:59,960 --> 00:04:02,664
I don't know, you know, the relative level

117
00:04:02,664 --> 00:04:04,745
of web development of any people out there,

118
00:04:04,745 --> 00:04:06,344
but corporatereport.com

119
00:04:06,344 --> 00:04:08,185
is my website. It runs off of the

120
00:04:08,185 --> 00:04:10,664
servers that have been graciously provided to me

121
00:04:10,664 --> 00:04:11,724
by Euro VPS.

122
00:04:12,745 --> 00:04:13,564
And so

123
00:04:13,864 --> 00:04:15,944
this website is built on,

124
00:04:16,345 --> 00:04:16,845
WordPress

125
00:04:18,930 --> 00:04:22,449
CMS, a content management system, which for people

126
00:04:22,449 --> 00:04:23,889
who don't know, again, there are different types

127
00:04:23,889 --> 00:04:26,050
of content management systems. A very common one

128
00:04:26,050 --> 00:04:28,689
is WordPress. There are again, this can confuse

129
00:04:28,689 --> 00:04:30,235
people. There's wordpress.com

130
00:04:30,235 --> 00:04:31,514
versus wordpress.org.

131
00:04:31,514 --> 00:04:32,555
Wordpress.com

132
00:04:32,555 --> 00:04:33,854
is so very recently.

133
00:04:34,634 --> 00:04:36,714
Yeah. Yeah. It's a it's a separate thing.

134
00:04:36,714 --> 00:04:38,654
Wordpress.org is the open source

135
00:04:39,115 --> 00:04:40,794
version of it. Wordpress.com

136
00:04:40,794 --> 00:04:42,095
is hosted by WordPress,

137
00:04:42,819 --> 00:04:43,560
an organization,

138
00:04:44,259 --> 00:04:46,900
etcetera etcetera. Anyway, long story short, I use

139
00:04:46,900 --> 00:04:49,560
the open source version of this. It's extremely

140
00:04:49,699 --> 00:04:52,040
common. Think of your favorite websites.

141
00:04:52,340 --> 00:04:53,480
Most of them probably

142
00:04:53,860 --> 00:04:56,085
operate on WordPress. But the thing about WordPress

143
00:04:56,085 --> 00:04:57,444
is, so on the back end, there are

144
00:04:57,444 --> 00:04:59,845
all these plugins that are developed by different

145
00:04:59,845 --> 00:05:00,345
developers

146
00:05:01,045 --> 00:05:01,785
and presumably

147
00:05:02,085 --> 00:05:02,745
go through

148
00:05:03,205 --> 00:05:05,865
security checks and what have you. Also, generally,

149
00:05:05,925 --> 00:05:07,605
the source code is posted to GitHub and

150
00:05:07,605 --> 00:05:09,205
other places so people can go through it

151
00:05:09,205 --> 00:05:11,750
and check for security vulnerabilities themselves,

152
00:05:12,770 --> 00:05:14,389
if you are coding inclined.

153
00:05:15,170 --> 00:05:17,410
But so there's a bunch of WordPress plugins

154
00:05:17,410 --> 00:05:19,029
that you can get that will help your

155
00:05:19,089 --> 00:05:21,490
website operate in different ways. One of them

156
00:05:21,490 --> 00:05:22,629
that I was using,

157
00:05:23,295 --> 00:05:24,975
for for about a year and a half

158
00:05:24,975 --> 00:05:27,535
from about 2024 until a couple of weeks

159
00:05:27,535 --> 00:05:28,834
ago was GiveWP.

160
00:05:29,455 --> 00:05:32,035
And this is a a donation

161
00:05:32,975 --> 00:05:35,555
management plug in. So the reason

162
00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:38,279
I was using that, it was recommended by

163
00:05:38,279 --> 00:05:41,480
my developer, Harley at Expand Designs. He liked

164
00:05:41,480 --> 00:05:44,040
using this particular one, for a number of

165
00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:45,740
reasons. One, it did make it,

166
00:05:46,279 --> 00:05:48,600
the the sign up process essentially a lot

167
00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:50,504
easier. I was using just direct,

168
00:05:50,985 --> 00:05:53,145
like PayPal or Stripe buttons that people would

169
00:05:53,145 --> 00:05:55,464
click and then they'd get shunted off. But

170
00:05:55,464 --> 00:05:57,485
this one tied in directly with the membership

171
00:05:57,545 --> 00:05:59,785
system that's on the back end of the

172
00:05:59,785 --> 00:06:02,665
WordPress database, etcetera. So it made it all

173
00:06:02,665 --> 00:06:05,384
connect very easily and also allowed for people

174
00:06:05,384 --> 00:06:06,045
to enter,

175
00:06:06,389 --> 00:06:07,990
which a lot of people ask for me

176
00:06:07,990 --> 00:06:10,229
for some reason, they want a specific link.

177
00:06:10,229 --> 00:06:11,589
No. I want to give you this much

178
00:06:11,589 --> 00:06:13,910
money. And all I had was for, like,

179
00:06:13,910 --> 00:06:15,350
you can donate this much or you can

180
00:06:15,350 --> 00:06:17,129
donate this much. And I kept getting people,

181
00:06:17,189 --> 00:06:18,870
no. I want to donate this specific amount.

182
00:06:18,870 --> 00:06:20,389
So anyway, this plug in helped to do

183
00:06:20,389 --> 00:06:22,095
all of that. And it worked

184
00:06:22,395 --> 00:06:23,935
fine until it didn't. Specifically,

185
00:06:24,714 --> 00:06:25,214
Thursday,

186
00:06:25,675 --> 00:06:27,935
I wanna say Thursday, July 24,

187
00:06:28,154 --> 00:06:28,795
there was,

188
00:06:29,115 --> 00:06:30,714
I'm not sure if that's exactly when the

189
00:06:30,714 --> 00:06:32,634
update happened, but there was an update that

190
00:06:32,634 --> 00:06:35,209
I updated the plugins because you have to

191
00:06:35,209 --> 00:06:37,529
update the plugins as you go because there's

192
00:06:37,529 --> 00:06:39,870
always security patches and things that are happening.

193
00:06:40,490 --> 00:06:42,509
So I updated the plugins as usual.

194
00:06:42,889 --> 00:06:45,209
And lo and behold, unbeknownst to me or

195
00:06:45,209 --> 00:06:47,689
literally anyone else in the world at that

196
00:06:47,689 --> 00:06:50,665
time, there was a vulnerability, a strange vulnerability

197
00:06:50,805 --> 00:06:51,625
in this update

198
00:06:51,925 --> 00:06:54,564
that took all of the information that had

199
00:06:54,564 --> 00:06:57,045
been entered into the back end of that

200
00:06:57,045 --> 00:06:59,045
had been entered into this membership sign up

201
00:06:59,045 --> 00:07:00,745
form at some point.

202
00:07:01,269 --> 00:07:04,790
Names, specifically names and email addresses and for

203
00:07:04,790 --> 00:07:08,310
some reason started printing that information. All all

204
00:07:08,310 --> 00:07:09,750
of the people who had ever put their

205
00:07:09,750 --> 00:07:11,910
name and email address into this form, printing

206
00:07:11,910 --> 00:07:12,649
that information

207
00:07:13,029 --> 00:07:14,810
into the source code of the website.

208
00:07:15,115 --> 00:07:17,034
And again, for people who aren't developers or

209
00:07:17,034 --> 00:07:19,834
whatever, you couldn't see the email addresses on

210
00:07:19,834 --> 00:07:21,675
the screen. It wasn't there for you to

211
00:07:21,675 --> 00:07:23,435
see. But it was in the source code

212
00:07:23,435 --> 00:07:25,194
that was being put out by the the

213
00:07:25,194 --> 00:07:26,175
website that

214
00:07:26,634 --> 00:07:28,634
what you see is constructed from. And for

215
00:07:28,634 --> 00:07:29,134
no

216
00:07:29,740 --> 00:07:31,839
discernible reason in the universe,

217
00:07:32,300 --> 00:07:34,699
suddenly it started putting all these donor names

218
00:07:34,699 --> 00:07:36,300
and email addresses in the source code of

219
00:07:36,300 --> 00:07:38,060
the website. And again And you said it

220
00:07:38,060 --> 00:07:39,919
was just through that just through the membership

221
00:07:39,979 --> 00:07:41,339
sign up, but not all of them, but

222
00:07:41,339 --> 00:07:42,620
just through that sign up. Right? The ones

223
00:07:42,620 --> 00:07:43,979
with the Right. So for I again, I

224
00:07:43,979 --> 00:07:45,555
don't know how other people did it. But

225
00:07:45,555 --> 00:07:46,134
for me,

226
00:07:46,595 --> 00:07:49,314
I had had members signing up, you know,

227
00:07:49,314 --> 00:07:51,235
years before. I have people signing up through

228
00:07:51,235 --> 00:07:53,714
Substack and other places that never touched that

229
00:07:53,714 --> 00:07:56,915
membership form. So they their email addresses were

230
00:07:56,915 --> 00:07:59,189
not exposed. But anyone who had used that

231
00:07:59,189 --> 00:08:02,169
particular form had entered their information in there.

232
00:08:02,229 --> 00:08:04,569
For whatever reason, it started coughing it up.

233
00:08:04,789 --> 00:08:07,430
And again, I didn't know. No one saw

234
00:08:07,430 --> 00:08:08,889
it at that time until,

235
00:08:09,750 --> 00:08:12,245
it was I think maybe Sunday the twenty

236
00:08:12,245 --> 00:08:14,324
seventh or Monday the twenty eighth, somewhere in

237
00:08:14,324 --> 00:08:16,165
that time frame, I got an email from

238
00:08:16,165 --> 00:08:18,805
someone who said, hey, I have an email

239
00:08:18,805 --> 00:08:19,305
alias.

240
00:08:20,245 --> 00:08:21,544
You know, whatever. CorbettReports123blahblah

241
00:08:25,125 --> 00:08:26,939
dot com. So for people who don't know,

242
00:08:26,939 --> 00:08:29,740
an email alias is a sort of not

243
00:08:29,740 --> 00:08:31,740
a fake email address, but in a sense,

244
00:08:31,740 --> 00:08:33,500
it's a it's an email name that you

245
00:08:33,500 --> 00:08:35,820
create. Like a burner phone. Like a burner

246
00:08:35,820 --> 00:08:37,580
phone. Yeah. It's a burner email address that

247
00:08:37,580 --> 00:08:39,179
you create when you sign up to something.

248
00:08:39,179 --> 00:08:41,304
You can sign up with a specific email

249
00:08:41,445 --> 00:08:43,605
alias for that one, and that points back

250
00:08:43,605 --> 00:08:46,004
to your real email. But the point is

251
00:08:46,004 --> 00:08:48,024
when you start getting, for example, spam,

252
00:08:48,404 --> 00:08:51,065
you'll know, oh, it's coming to that particular

253
00:08:51,284 --> 00:08:52,964
address that I used to sign up for

254
00:08:52,964 --> 00:08:55,570
that particular website. So you know, oh, they've

255
00:08:55,570 --> 00:08:58,210
sold my info or somebody's, you know, hacked

256
00:08:58,210 --> 00:09:00,690
it or whatever. So I started getting emails,

257
00:09:00,690 --> 00:09:03,250
multiple emails from multiple users of mine who

258
00:09:03,250 --> 00:09:05,090
did this, who said, hey, I'm getting spammed

259
00:09:05,090 --> 00:09:07,029
my corporate report email alias.

260
00:09:08,210 --> 00:09:08,950
I think you

261
00:09:11,065 --> 00:09:12,504
know what's going on, but it happened to

262
00:09:12,504 --> 00:09:14,904
several people. So, like, okay. There's clearly a

263
00:09:14,904 --> 00:09:17,464
leak here somewhere, which began this frantic search

264
00:09:17,464 --> 00:09:19,464
for, like, what is be how is this

265
00:09:19,464 --> 00:09:20,924
happening? And eventually

266
00:09:21,304 --> 00:09:23,699
found in the source code, eventually. And I

267
00:09:23,699 --> 00:09:25,779
will credit where credit is due. I have

268
00:09:25,779 --> 00:09:27,399
a user called, Frood

269
00:09:27,860 --> 00:09:31,459
Chresteville, who I've interviewed actually on SolutionsWatch, for

270
00:09:31,459 --> 00:09:31,959
example.

271
00:09:32,659 --> 00:09:34,579
So my listeners might be familiar with him.

272
00:09:34,579 --> 00:09:36,134
He was the one who managed to find

273
00:09:36,134 --> 00:09:37,654
that in the source code and figure out,

274
00:09:37,654 --> 00:09:39,735
oh, it's from the Scout get WP plug

275
00:09:39,735 --> 00:09:42,855
in. So big props to Crude. And he

276
00:09:42,855 --> 00:09:45,355
was, as far as I can tell, literally

277
00:09:45,414 --> 00:09:47,254
the first person on the planet to figure

278
00:09:47,254 --> 00:09:48,954
this out. And this was,

279
00:09:49,580 --> 00:09:51,259
at this point, I think it was Tuesday

280
00:09:51,259 --> 00:09:52,700
the twenty ninth. So it was, like, five

281
00:09:52,700 --> 00:09:54,480
days into this update.

282
00:09:54,940 --> 00:09:56,700
Finally, someone had discovered it, and it happened

283
00:09:56,700 --> 00:09:58,080
to be a corporate report user.

284
00:09:58,540 --> 00:09:59,120
And so

285
00:10:00,139 --> 00:10:02,804
then begins the Odyssey. So, of course, immediately

286
00:10:03,024 --> 00:10:05,504
upon discovering that, literally, the second that was

287
00:10:05,504 --> 00:10:08,384
discovered, okay, I disabled the GiveWP plugin. Because

288
00:10:08,384 --> 00:10:10,625
at that point, there was no update. You

289
00:10:10,625 --> 00:10:12,384
know, they hadn't seen it. They hadn't patched

290
00:10:12,384 --> 00:10:13,125
it. GiveWP

291
00:10:13,745 --> 00:10:16,620
didn't know that their own plug in was

292
00:10:16,620 --> 00:10:18,620
doing this. And it wasn't just Corbett Report.

293
00:10:18,620 --> 00:10:20,240
It was literally every

294
00:10:20,540 --> 00:10:22,240
website that used GiveWP

295
00:10:22,540 --> 00:10:24,620
that updated to 4.6

296
00:10:24,620 --> 00:10:27,259
o. And I don't know exactly how many

297
00:10:27,259 --> 00:10:28,860
that is, but I did find a website

298
00:10:28,860 --> 00:10:32,955
that, said there was something like 46,178

299
00:10:32,955 --> 00:10:35,534
whatever websites that use the plugin generally.

300
00:10:35,995 --> 00:10:38,075
How many of them updated to 4.6? Who

301
00:10:38,075 --> 00:10:40,794
knows? But some significant number. And I did

302
00:10:40,794 --> 00:10:43,580
personally confirm a number of websites. I saw

303
00:10:43,580 --> 00:10:46,299
several that I confirmed. Oh, yeah. There's there's

304
00:10:46,299 --> 00:10:48,220
email addresses in the source code. There's email

305
00:10:48,220 --> 00:10:49,740
addresses in the source code. So it was

306
00:10:49,740 --> 00:10:52,460
a it's a big deal. And the one

307
00:10:52,460 --> 00:10:54,700
of the interesting things about this to me

308
00:10:54,700 --> 00:10:55,440
is that,

309
00:10:55,865 --> 00:10:58,904
okay, I get the average person just out

310
00:10:58,904 --> 00:11:00,904
there, like, maybe doesn't know or care or

311
00:11:00,904 --> 00:11:03,065
understand the implications of this. But, like, surely

312
00:11:03,065 --> 00:11:06,184
these, you know, the hacker news websites and

313
00:11:06,184 --> 00:11:08,345
TechDirt and places like that would be interested

314
00:11:08,345 --> 00:11:09,544
in a story like this. This is a

315
00:11:09,544 --> 00:11:11,404
pretty big thing. It's not

316
00:11:11,759 --> 00:11:13,040
it's not as big as it could have

317
00:11:13,040 --> 00:11:15,779
been. There was no financial information or passwords

318
00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:17,679
or anything like that. But it is names

319
00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:20,259
and email addresses, specifically of donors.

320
00:11:20,639 --> 00:11:22,080
And I just I can't imagine there are

321
00:11:22,080 --> 00:11:24,399
many organizations that are would be totally blase

322
00:11:24,399 --> 00:11:26,475
about, oh, okay. You know, here's the names

323
00:11:26,475 --> 00:11:28,394
and email addresses of all all the donors

324
00:11:28,394 --> 00:11:29,295
who've ever donated

325
00:11:29,675 --> 00:11:31,835
to me. Especially in independent media where people

326
00:11:31,835 --> 00:11:32,495
are already

327
00:11:32,795 --> 00:11:35,934
very, you know, concerned about their privacy, rightfully

328
00:11:36,075 --> 00:11:38,290
so, and, like, who you know, what three

329
00:11:38,290 --> 00:11:41,590
letter agencies might be interested in knowing who's

330
00:11:41,649 --> 00:11:44,129
watching the last American Vagabond or corporate or

331
00:11:44,129 --> 00:11:46,370
what have you. So it's it's a big

332
00:11:46,370 --> 00:11:48,850
deal. But I only saw and I only

333
00:11:48,850 --> 00:11:52,290
found one news article on one website that

334
00:11:52,290 --> 00:11:54,634
covered this. And they were only covering it

335
00:11:54,634 --> 00:11:55,914
because there was,

336
00:11:56,794 --> 00:11:58,794
what I believe is an ad blocker of

337
00:11:58,794 --> 00:12:00,875
some sort called Pie Hole. I don't use

338
00:12:00,875 --> 00:12:03,514
it myself. But anyway, they discovered that it

339
00:12:03,514 --> 00:12:06,240
had happened to them. And they had

340
00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:09,459
inadvertently leaked something like 30,000

341
00:12:09,519 --> 00:12:12,080
email addresses. So they were freaking out about

342
00:12:12,080 --> 00:12:14,500
this because they take their privacy very seriously.

343
00:12:14,720 --> 00:12:16,559
And so they did a press release about

344
00:12:16,559 --> 00:12:18,639
this. And as a result, it got covered

345
00:12:18,639 --> 00:12:20,659
by, as I say, exactly one

346
00:12:21,154 --> 00:12:23,475
one news article that I've found out about

347
00:12:23,475 --> 00:12:25,634
this whole situation. So I don't know where

348
00:12:25,634 --> 00:12:26,995
you wanna take it from there, but it's

349
00:12:26,995 --> 00:12:28,675
it's to me, it's a crazy story in

350
00:12:28,675 --> 00:12:30,595
a number of different ways. Well, even just

351
00:12:30,595 --> 00:12:32,595
today, as I'm getting ready, I'm looking at

352
00:12:32,595 --> 00:12:34,434
the story and and, you know, researching just

353
00:12:34,434 --> 00:12:36,100
the general idea of it. And there's I

354
00:12:36,100 --> 00:12:38,519
I don't I honestly don't see any mainstream

355
00:12:38,660 --> 00:12:40,340
platforms or like you're talking about. Like, it

356
00:12:40,340 --> 00:12:41,500
it like, to your point, I mean, it's

357
00:12:41,620 --> 00:12:42,899
yes. It's just emails and names. And I

358
00:12:42,899 --> 00:12:44,580
shouldn't even say just. It's it's not just

359
00:12:44,580 --> 00:12:45,879
about that. It's the vulnerability.

360
00:12:46,340 --> 00:12:47,860
Right? So who knows if there's even more

361
00:12:47,860 --> 00:12:48,980
than that that we don't know about. Right?

362
00:12:48,980 --> 00:12:51,059
And so the point that nobody's talking about

363
00:12:51,059 --> 00:12:53,144
that is really telling to me. I mean,

364
00:12:53,144 --> 00:12:54,665
what do you what is your what is

365
00:12:54,665 --> 00:12:56,345
your kinda gut about that? Because I wanted

366
00:12:56,345 --> 00:12:58,425
to think see, get your thoughts about, you

367
00:12:58,425 --> 00:13:00,264
know, whether this because so you said, what,

368
00:13:00,264 --> 00:13:02,665
40 the number you said was 45,000, something

369
00:13:02,665 --> 00:13:05,750
like that. 46,000 websites. So so again, put

370
00:13:05,750 --> 00:13:07,590
that in perspective for people who don't know.

371
00:13:07,590 --> 00:13:10,070
Yeah. There might be like again, WordPress is

372
00:13:10,070 --> 00:13:12,230
an open source thing. Any developer can develop

373
00:13:12,230 --> 00:13:14,230
any plugin they want. And so there's I'm

374
00:13:14,230 --> 00:13:16,230
sure there's a million plugins out there and

375
00:13:16,230 --> 00:13:17,954
some of them have like, you know, 10

376
00:13:17,954 --> 00:13:20,355
installations or a 100 installations, like Mickey Mouse

377
00:13:20,355 --> 00:13:21,875
kind of things. But this is not a

378
00:13:21,875 --> 00:13:23,315
Mickey Mouse thing. 46,000

379
00:13:23,315 --> 00:13:23,815
websites.

380
00:13:24,595 --> 00:13:26,834
And even one of those websites alone, the

381
00:13:26,834 --> 00:13:28,774
pie hole one, had 30,000

382
00:13:29,235 --> 00:13:31,254
users' emails exposed. So

383
00:13:32,169 --> 00:13:35,290
we're talking hundreds of thousands, millions of emails.

384
00:13:35,290 --> 00:13:37,370
Who knows? I've been here. Yeah. Email addresses.

385
00:13:37,370 --> 00:13:38,649
Yeah. And what what I what I mean

386
00:13:38,649 --> 00:13:40,250
though is that is that in it, like,

387
00:13:40,250 --> 00:13:42,330
comparing that to, I don't know, something that

388
00:13:42,330 --> 00:13:43,929
Fox News uses. Right? Like, it's not or

389
00:13:43,929 --> 00:13:45,834
whatever. You know, something large. That's that's I

390
00:13:45,834 --> 00:13:47,274
think, in the eyes of somebody who might

391
00:13:47,274 --> 00:13:48,554
do this for a re like, it seems

392
00:13:48,554 --> 00:13:50,634
like small potatoes or something like that. Not

393
00:13:50,634 --> 00:13:51,834
in the sense of how many were leaked.

394
00:13:51,834 --> 00:13:53,115
That's a big deal. But, I mean, like,

395
00:13:53,115 --> 00:13:54,955
I get what I'm getting at is why

396
00:13:54,955 --> 00:13:56,014
focus on GiveWP

397
00:13:56,475 --> 00:13:58,309
if you if this was an effort? And

398
00:13:58,309 --> 00:13:59,990
and then I'm what I'm kind of wondering

399
00:13:59,990 --> 00:14:01,750
if your thoughts on whether or not, like

400
00:14:01,830 --> 00:14:03,190
so to me, this seemed like something that

401
00:14:03,190 --> 00:14:03,850
was created

402
00:14:04,470 --> 00:14:06,070
for the kind of person that can't you

403
00:14:06,070 --> 00:14:07,509
know, it's it's like a a little bit

404
00:14:07,509 --> 00:14:10,309
of a circumvention of the normal processes. Right?

405
00:14:10,309 --> 00:14:11,589
And so I would just I wonder if

406
00:14:11,589 --> 00:14:12,934
this was like a trap. You know what

407
00:14:12,934 --> 00:14:14,534
I mean? Like just to Yeah. What do

408
00:14:14,534 --> 00:14:15,894
you think about that or just the possibility

409
00:14:15,894 --> 00:14:17,894
of that today in general? So okay. So

410
00:14:17,894 --> 00:14:18,394
GiveWP's

411
00:14:18,855 --> 00:14:21,815
official explanation is that they were updating a

412
00:14:21,815 --> 00:14:25,115
legacy database system that they'd been using since,

413
00:14:25,174 --> 00:14:25,914
I would guess,

414
00:14:26,230 --> 00:14:28,629
for years. And they were updating that to

415
00:14:28,629 --> 00:14:29,769
a completely different

416
00:14:30,149 --> 00:14:33,269
format. Mhmm. And in that process, they had

417
00:14:33,269 --> 00:14:35,750
to basically reconfigure all sorts of things in

418
00:14:35,750 --> 00:14:37,269
the back end. And wouldn't you know it,

419
00:14:37,269 --> 00:14:39,190
lo and behold, oops, we kinda did the

420
00:14:39,190 --> 00:14:41,365
wrong thing and that happened. But we they

421
00:14:41,365 --> 00:14:42,804
fixed it right away as soon as they

422
00:14:42,804 --> 00:14:44,804
found out within twenty four hours of finding

423
00:14:44,804 --> 00:14:47,605
out about it. But to me, first of

424
00:14:47,605 --> 00:14:50,164
all, their response is crazy because their their

425
00:14:50,164 --> 00:14:52,164
official response, which I've linked to from their

426
00:14:52,164 --> 00:14:53,065
web website,

427
00:14:53,605 --> 00:14:56,480
actually talks more about, oh, don't worry. We

428
00:14:56,480 --> 00:14:58,320
fixed this so that now people can report

429
00:14:58,320 --> 00:15:00,559
vulnerabilities to us secretly rather than out in

430
00:15:00,559 --> 00:15:02,480
the open so people won't see them. That

431
00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:03,779
seems to be their main point.

432
00:15:04,720 --> 00:15:07,139
It's crazy to me. But also, I mean,

433
00:15:07,440 --> 00:15:09,075
just the fact that it had to be

434
00:15:09,075 --> 00:15:10,914
some third party person, in this case, a

435
00:15:10,914 --> 00:15:13,475
corporate report member who managed to find this

436
00:15:13,475 --> 00:15:15,554
and then report it to them, that should

437
00:15:15,554 --> 00:15:17,554
be kind of a big deal in and

438
00:15:17,554 --> 00:15:19,714
of itself because that means they are not

439
00:15:19,714 --> 00:15:21,794
checking their own updates for these kinds of

440
00:15:21,794 --> 00:15:24,450
critical security flaws. And a true shout out

441
00:15:24,450 --> 00:15:25,970
to the and this is just this goes

442
00:15:25,970 --> 00:15:28,129
beyond even just your, you know, fantastic audience.

443
00:15:28,129 --> 00:15:29,730
But, like, this is something that I try

444
00:15:29,730 --> 00:15:31,970
to I've emulated in in my platform is

445
00:15:31,970 --> 00:15:33,970
just the idea of, you know, open source

446
00:15:33,970 --> 00:15:35,730
investigation. Like, I love that. That's what I

447
00:15:35,730 --> 00:15:37,225
was saying earlier. I just really think that's

448
00:15:37,225 --> 00:15:39,165
worth noting on that that's what you've cultivated.

449
00:15:39,304 --> 00:15:41,625
Like, this group of people that are aren't

450
00:15:41,625 --> 00:15:43,465
just passive, you know, that are out there

451
00:15:43,465 --> 00:15:45,465
looking and checking. I think that's fantastic, and

452
00:15:45,465 --> 00:15:47,225
I think that's, you know, one of the

453
00:15:47,225 --> 00:15:48,904
reasons why where this direction is right now

454
00:15:48,904 --> 00:15:51,329
is making power structures uncomfortable. But, what's funny

455
00:15:51,329 --> 00:15:52,769
is it says what's worse is that we

456
00:15:52,769 --> 00:15:54,529
didn't communicate it well and we're owning that.

457
00:15:54,529 --> 00:15:56,289
I thought that was funny. You know, like,

458
00:15:56,289 --> 00:15:57,809
wait until we that sort of retro

459
00:15:58,289 --> 00:16:00,049
after the fact doesn't really make as much

460
00:16:00,049 --> 00:16:02,610
impact. But And specifically what they're talking about

461
00:16:02,610 --> 00:16:03,829
there is the GitHub,

462
00:16:04,449 --> 00:16:05,589
thread that was opened

463
00:16:06,014 --> 00:16:08,175
about this issue that was what brought it

464
00:16:08,175 --> 00:16:10,654
to their attention. Right? That one. And in

465
00:16:10,654 --> 00:16:12,495
that one, they're like, oh, okay. Well, we

466
00:16:12,495 --> 00:16:13,955
took care of it. And so

467
00:16:14,335 --> 00:16:16,175
what? It's it's only been like four hours

468
00:16:16,175 --> 00:16:17,615
since you let us know about it. So

469
00:16:17,615 --> 00:16:19,055
what's the big deal, guys? Why are you

470
00:16:19,055 --> 00:16:20,735
getting all busy? So I think they're trying

471
00:16:20,735 --> 00:16:22,700
to cover their tracks on that particular and

472
00:16:22,700 --> 00:16:24,860
that's why they say, oh, now we've opened

473
00:16:24,860 --> 00:16:27,179
this new channel that people can report bugs

474
00:16:27,179 --> 00:16:28,620
to us directly. You don't have to go

475
00:16:28,620 --> 00:16:30,139
to, like, places like GitHub, you know, where

476
00:16:30,220 --> 00:16:31,039
Yeah. See

477
00:16:31,980 --> 00:16:34,879
that we've made a major major security violation

478
00:16:34,940 --> 00:16:37,245
here. Because if it weren't for the Gorbachev

479
00:16:37,245 --> 00:16:40,205
report and that computer website and and the

480
00:16:40,205 --> 00:16:41,264
last American Vagabond

481
00:16:41,884 --> 00:16:44,285
and Pie Hole, I guess, would anyone even

482
00:16:44,285 --> 00:16:46,365
know that this happened? I mean, I yeah.

483
00:16:46,365 --> 00:16:48,365
Because I've I have heard from all a

484
00:16:48,365 --> 00:16:50,750
lot of the people that were unfortunately, their

485
00:16:50,750 --> 00:16:53,470
emails addresses were exposed who said, yeah. I

486
00:16:53,470 --> 00:16:55,470
have definitely seen an uptake in spam since

487
00:16:55,470 --> 00:16:56,129
this happened.

488
00:16:56,429 --> 00:16:58,990
But for everyone see, this is another great

489
00:16:58,990 --> 00:17:01,549
thing about the audiences that we've cultivated is

490
00:17:01,549 --> 00:17:04,049
that people not only know about email aliases,

491
00:17:04,269 --> 00:17:07,075
but use them. Right. Precisely for things like

492
00:17:07,075 --> 00:17:08,515
this so that they can come and tell

493
00:17:08,515 --> 00:17:10,755
me, hey. Your website is leaking data. Wow.

494
00:17:10,755 --> 00:17:12,755
Thank you. Awesome. And if it weren't for

495
00:17:12,755 --> 00:17:13,234
that,

496
00:17:13,875 --> 00:17:16,275
who knows? We Right. How would you ever

497
00:17:16,275 --> 00:17:18,119
know? Oh, I'm getting more spam than usual.

498
00:17:18,200 --> 00:17:19,799
It must be because there's some plug in

499
00:17:19,799 --> 00:17:21,240
on the back end of corporate report or

500
00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:22,299
or whatever. Right?

501
00:17:22,680 --> 00:17:24,519
You know? Well, so so in in regard

502
00:17:24,519 --> 00:17:26,440
to so we're at at the moment, it

503
00:17:26,440 --> 00:17:28,599
has been updated. Right? So they what at

504
00:17:28,599 --> 00:17:30,039
least what we're being told is it was

505
00:17:30,039 --> 00:17:31,980
only emails, names, and I think the ID

506
00:17:32,039 --> 00:17:34,335
number associated with the the donor. You know?

507
00:17:34,335 --> 00:17:36,255
But other than that, no passwords, no and

508
00:17:36,255 --> 00:17:38,095
they have updated. So at the moment, they're

509
00:17:38,095 --> 00:17:40,255
claiming there's no more risk. But, you know,

510
00:17:40,255 --> 00:17:41,694
where do you feel like that's gonna be

511
00:17:41,694 --> 00:17:42,974
going? Like, do you have a may I

512
00:17:42,974 --> 00:17:44,974
ask you, like, point blank or just specific?

513
00:17:44,974 --> 00:17:46,035
Do you think GiveWP

514
00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:49,960
should be not just responsible because they clearly

515
00:17:49,960 --> 00:17:51,559
weren't looking, but, like, you feel there's any

516
00:17:51,559 --> 00:17:52,299
more potential?

517
00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:54,200
Yeah. Again, do you think this is something

518
00:17:54,200 --> 00:17:56,600
that's patched up in that regard that only

519
00:17:56,600 --> 00:17:57,960
is you know, was it laziness in your

520
00:17:57,960 --> 00:17:59,160
mind? Do you feel like there's more to

521
00:17:59,160 --> 00:18:00,359
the story? Just, I guess, to make it

522
00:18:00,359 --> 00:18:01,500
broad. Okay.

523
00:18:01,974 --> 00:18:02,855
100

524
00:18:02,855 --> 00:18:04,694
speculation here. Right. It's like I do not

525
00:18:04,694 --> 00:18:06,214
have any inside skinny. But,

526
00:18:06,615 --> 00:18:09,894
my web developer was at least contemplating the

527
00:18:09,894 --> 00:18:11,914
idea that this was some sort of deliberate

528
00:18:11,974 --> 00:18:14,534
sabotage from within. It's at least a possibility

529
00:18:14,534 --> 00:18:15,034
because,

530
00:18:15,690 --> 00:18:17,609
certainly, when we discovered it, I mean, my

531
00:18:17,609 --> 00:18:19,929
jaw dropped when I figured out, oh, it's

532
00:18:20,009 --> 00:18:22,169
this plug in is literally printing it to

533
00:18:22,169 --> 00:18:23,849
the source code. Like, again, that is not

534
00:18:23,849 --> 00:18:26,809
a minor thing. Yeah. That's that's the most

535
00:18:27,784 --> 00:18:30,025
essentially, that is the most sensitive information that

536
00:18:30,025 --> 00:18:33,404
GiveWP specifically is collecting because all the financial

537
00:18:33,544 --> 00:18:35,625
information is going through Stripe or PayPal or

538
00:18:35,625 --> 00:18:37,724
the payment gateway. So I don't think GiveWP

539
00:18:37,944 --> 00:18:39,724
even has that information.

540
00:18:40,549 --> 00:18:43,109
Essentially, the most sensitive information it's getting is

541
00:18:43,109 --> 00:18:45,269
names and email addresses, and it just barfed

542
00:18:45,269 --> 00:18:46,710
it all up. That's But how did that

543
00:18:46,710 --> 00:18:48,309
even happen too? Like, how does that end

544
00:18:48,309 --> 00:18:49,429
up I mean, I'm not an expert in

545
00:18:49,429 --> 00:18:50,710
this field in in regard to, you know,

546
00:18:50,710 --> 00:18:53,265
coding in general, but Yeah. Printing the email

547
00:18:53,265 --> 00:18:54,945
addresses on the source code, like, is that

548
00:18:55,025 --> 00:18:56,144
do you know enough about it to whether

549
00:18:56,224 --> 00:18:57,904
know whether that's something that's even like, how

550
00:18:57,904 --> 00:18:59,825
does that happen accidentally? That seems very I

551
00:18:59,825 --> 00:19:01,684
am not enough of a coder to understand

552
00:19:01,744 --> 00:19:03,664
if that is likely to just sort of

553
00:19:03,664 --> 00:19:04,565
randomly happen.

554
00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:06,640
Again, according to them, it's something that was

555
00:19:06,640 --> 00:19:08,000
supposed to be happening on the back end,

556
00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:10,720
but oops, it got printed and basically published

557
00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:11,460
to the websites.

558
00:19:12,320 --> 00:19:14,480
But I don't know. Could it have happened,

559
00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:17,539
you know, just stupidity and incompetence and whatever?

560
00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:20,144
I think it's possible. But could it have

561
00:19:20,144 --> 00:19:21,505
been some sort of deliberate thing on the

562
00:19:21,505 --> 00:19:23,664
inside? Maybe that's possible too. Yeah.

563
00:19:24,465 --> 00:19:26,785
And I, again, I had heard, but I

564
00:19:26,785 --> 00:19:28,384
don't I haven't been able to confirm this,

565
00:19:28,384 --> 00:19:29,684
that there was some sort of

566
00:19:30,065 --> 00:19:31,365
some sort of management

567
00:19:32,009 --> 00:19:34,410
swap or takeover or something that was happening

568
00:19:34,410 --> 00:19:36,330
with GiveWP and there might have been some

569
00:19:36,330 --> 00:19:38,970
disgruntled employees. I haven't been able to verify

570
00:19:38,970 --> 00:19:40,029
any of that. So

571
00:19:40,410 --> 00:19:42,490
if that's true, that might add another layer

572
00:19:42,490 --> 00:19:44,595
to this story. I don't know. But anyway,

573
00:19:44,595 --> 00:19:46,275
is it possible that this was some sort

574
00:19:46,275 --> 00:19:48,295
of deliberate thing? Yeah. It's certainly possible.

575
00:19:49,075 --> 00:19:50,434
The other part that I wanted to talk

576
00:19:50,434 --> 00:19:51,875
about is the spam aspect of it. You

577
00:19:51,875 --> 00:19:53,714
know? Is it you know? Like, thinking in

578
00:19:53,714 --> 00:19:55,474
a broader sense, like, I wonder like, is

579
00:19:55,554 --> 00:19:57,279
like, here's what's interesting. The fact that this

580
00:19:57,279 --> 00:19:59,320
took your audience to show that, like, this

581
00:19:59,440 --> 00:20:00,880
the the the I guess, the reason it's

582
00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:02,799
even being discussed by us and literally nobody

583
00:20:02,799 --> 00:20:03,299
else,

584
00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:05,599
it's possible there's plenty more of these happening

585
00:20:05,599 --> 00:20:07,440
that aren't being highlighted, aren't being discussed. So

586
00:20:07,440 --> 00:20:09,119
my my worry in that is that so

587
00:20:09,119 --> 00:20:10,640
one here's what I'm dealing with every day.

588
00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:11,880
And I I I we were laughing before

589
00:20:11,880 --> 00:20:13,805
we went on that In Corbett's video about

590
00:20:13,805 --> 00:20:15,724
this, he makes a joke about, you know,

591
00:20:15,724 --> 00:20:17,244
the emails he sent out about this, but

592
00:20:17,244 --> 00:20:19,085
it probably went to spam. Literally, the one

593
00:20:19,085 --> 00:20:20,285
he sent me went to spam. I showed

594
00:20:20,285 --> 00:20:21,805
him today a little spam marker on it.

595
00:20:21,805 --> 00:20:23,565
It's like this is just funny. The point

596
00:20:23,565 --> 00:20:25,289
is that in my world right now, I

597
00:20:25,289 --> 00:20:27,369
barely I almost I'm almost gravitating away from

598
00:20:27,369 --> 00:20:29,289
email in general because it's so impossible for

599
00:20:29,289 --> 00:20:30,970
me unless I know what I'm looking for.

600
00:20:30,970 --> 00:20:32,490
And even then, half the time, I don't

601
00:20:32,490 --> 00:20:33,610
even see it in spam when I look

602
00:20:33,610 --> 00:20:35,210
for it. Blah blah blah. It's just so

603
00:20:35,210 --> 00:20:36,809
muddled together, and I don't think that's by

604
00:20:36,809 --> 00:20:38,744
accident, accident, personally. I think TLAB has been

605
00:20:38,744 --> 00:20:40,744
blacklisted in all these places. My point is

606
00:20:40,744 --> 00:20:42,524
that it gets to a point to where

607
00:20:42,664 --> 00:20:44,044
one of the most used

608
00:20:44,744 --> 00:20:48,504
communication tools starts to become Yep. Hard to

609
00:20:48,504 --> 00:20:50,130
use. And I wonder if there might some

610
00:20:50,130 --> 00:20:51,970
level of that direction because, you know, like,

611
00:20:51,970 --> 00:20:53,410
some people might even care. They're like, well,

612
00:20:53,410 --> 00:20:54,769
I already get a bunch of spam. So

613
00:20:54,769 --> 00:20:55,970
we'll go in the No. I've I've heard

614
00:20:55,970 --> 00:20:57,329
that from a lot of people too. Yeah.

615
00:20:57,329 --> 00:20:59,490
My email has been leaked many times. Whatever.

616
00:20:59,490 --> 00:21:02,049
You know? So, yeah, unfortunately, that is true.

617
00:21:02,049 --> 00:21:04,265
And, yeah, again, for people who've never tried

618
00:21:04,265 --> 00:21:05,884
to maintain a mail server

619
00:21:06,345 --> 00:21:08,845
Mhmm. Man, just trying to get it,

620
00:21:09,545 --> 00:21:11,224
you know, a compliance with all the million

621
00:21:11,224 --> 00:21:12,744
rules so that you don't get marked as

622
00:21:12,744 --> 00:21:14,845
spam is Right. An ongoing

623
00:21:15,509 --> 00:21:18,089
struggle. And that's just me doing just regular

624
00:21:18,150 --> 00:21:20,230
sort of email. I mean, I'm not out

625
00:21:20,230 --> 00:21:22,070
there trying to email, you know, thousands of

626
00:21:22,070 --> 00:21:24,390
people at a time. I use Substack as

627
00:21:24,390 --> 00:21:27,109
my email list essentially. And so they have

628
00:21:27,109 --> 00:21:29,664
to handle the problem of sending out emails

629
00:21:29,724 --> 00:21:31,644
to thousands of people at a time, you

630
00:21:31,644 --> 00:21:32,785
know. However,

631
00:21:33,164 --> 00:21:34,924
again, it's a pay for play system like

632
00:21:34,924 --> 00:21:36,845
everything else. If you're a big if you're

633
00:21:36,845 --> 00:21:39,184
a big organization, a big company, a big

634
00:21:39,244 --> 00:21:41,970
corporation, you can probably afford all the the

635
00:21:41,970 --> 00:21:44,549
dedicated IT team to keep your mail server

636
00:21:44,769 --> 00:21:46,230
functioning in a way that you can

637
00:21:46,609 --> 00:21:48,609
send emails out on that scale, but I'm

638
00:21:48,609 --> 00:21:51,089
not. So, yeah, the big irony here. Yeah.

639
00:21:51,089 --> 00:21:54,130
The spammers, of course, scraping websites at all

640
00:21:54,130 --> 00:21:57,190
times immediately found us and immediately started spamming

641
00:21:57,414 --> 00:22:00,454
the email addresses. But me sitting here having

642
00:22:01,095 --> 00:22:03,575
I'm going through and informing every I'm emailing

643
00:22:03,575 --> 00:22:05,755
every single person whose email was exposed,

644
00:22:06,055 --> 00:22:07,414
and I have to do it one by

645
00:22:07,414 --> 00:22:09,174
one because I'm not gonna send out a

646
00:22:09,174 --> 00:22:11,174
mass email that's going to end up in

647
00:22:11,174 --> 00:22:13,095
people's spam if it gets delivered at all.

648
00:22:13,095 --> 00:22:14,509
And And I'm not going to take all

649
00:22:14,509 --> 00:22:16,669
those email addresses and put them into some

650
00:22:16,669 --> 00:22:19,230
other, you know, newsletter service or something in

651
00:22:19,230 --> 00:22:20,990
order to send out a mass email because,

652
00:22:20,990 --> 00:22:22,910
again, I'm not gonna give people's information out

653
00:22:22,910 --> 00:22:24,990
a second way. Right. But this is the

654
00:22:24,990 --> 00:22:26,369
second potential exposure.

655
00:22:26,829 --> 00:22:27,329
So

656
00:22:27,924 --> 00:22:29,525
so I'm doing it the manual way. And,

657
00:22:29,525 --> 00:22:31,924
you know, that's that's the difference. That's that

658
00:22:31,924 --> 00:22:34,724
is exactly the whole dynamic here. Again, if

659
00:22:34,724 --> 00:22:37,125
you're a big corporation that has dedicated IT

660
00:22:37,125 --> 00:22:39,684
teams, you can you can handle things like

661
00:22:39,684 --> 00:22:41,970
this a lot easier than us fly by

662
00:22:41,970 --> 00:22:44,210
an independent independent people who are doing it

663
00:22:44,210 --> 00:22:45,890
literally by ourselves or in my case, I

664
00:22:45,890 --> 00:22:48,369
have a web developer, but it's still it's

665
00:22:48,369 --> 00:22:50,609
a huge battle. Right. And that's that's kind

666
00:22:50,609 --> 00:22:52,049
of the one the the kind of extended

667
00:22:52,049 --> 00:22:53,490
extension of the point is that, you know,

668
00:22:53,490 --> 00:22:55,845
it's it's just it's it's it's not designed.

669
00:22:55,845 --> 00:22:57,205
Like, it's almost meant to be I mean,

670
00:22:57,205 --> 00:22:58,725
it is. It's two steps back, one step

671
00:22:58,725 --> 00:23:00,085
forward, or rather, I guess, two steps forward,

672
00:23:00,085 --> 00:23:02,085
one step back if we're making progress, but

673
00:23:02,085 --> 00:23:04,404
it's clear that it's, you know, just overly

674
00:23:04,404 --> 00:23:06,565
complicated. And so where I come into it,

675
00:23:06,565 --> 00:23:08,265
I didn't even hear about this until,

676
00:23:08,769 --> 00:23:09,970
Brock had to reach out to me because

677
00:23:09,970 --> 00:23:11,649
I didn't see James' email. Same thing, by

678
00:23:11,649 --> 00:23:14,529
the way, different email. And ended up seeing

679
00:23:14,529 --> 00:23:16,849
this after it had already updated to force

680
00:23:16,849 --> 00:23:18,210
the the new one where they claim there's

681
00:23:18,210 --> 00:23:19,730
no issue. And so I at the moment,

682
00:23:19,730 --> 00:23:21,410
at least as it seems, I'll I'll be

683
00:23:21,410 --> 00:23:23,284
talking to James more about this after. Doesn't

684
00:23:23,284 --> 00:23:24,644
seem that I I can't even access the

685
00:23:24,644 --> 00:23:26,804
emails that were manipulated. You know? So it's

686
00:23:26,804 --> 00:23:28,644
just this I you know, where do you

687
00:23:28,644 --> 00:23:30,804
go forward from here, James? Like, with especially

688
00:23:30,804 --> 00:23:32,724
with where you know? So right now, especially

689
00:23:32,724 --> 00:23:35,304
with TLAP having a huge portion of donations

690
00:23:35,365 --> 00:23:37,044
coming through here, you know, like, what do

691
00:23:37,044 --> 00:23:38,789
you recommend people go to? You know, other

692
00:23:38,789 --> 00:23:40,070
than the things they already have, like the

693
00:23:40,070 --> 00:23:42,309
options. Like, is there another avenue that you'd

694
00:23:42,309 --> 00:23:43,830
recommend for somebody? You know? Or what what

695
00:23:43,830 --> 00:23:45,750
do you think? I mean, there's no you

696
00:23:45,750 --> 00:23:47,130
know, this is the big

697
00:23:47,750 --> 00:23:48,250
problem

698
00:23:48,789 --> 00:23:51,509
of online communication at all. If you want

699
00:23:51,509 --> 00:23:52,764
to do this,

700
00:23:53,065 --> 00:23:54,184
how are you going to do it in

701
00:23:54,184 --> 00:23:55,944
a way that isn't going to expose one

702
00:23:55,944 --> 00:23:58,845
of your email addresses to the potential vulnerabilities?

703
00:23:59,304 --> 00:24:01,224
And I've had a lot of responses from

704
00:24:01,224 --> 00:24:03,224
people, very kind responses from my listeners who

705
00:24:03,224 --> 00:24:05,065
say, hey, I appreciate the integrity of you

706
00:24:05,065 --> 00:24:06,744
admitting this and and getting in touch with

707
00:24:06,744 --> 00:24:08,690
me. It shows that my trust in you

708
00:24:08,690 --> 00:24:10,690
is not misplaced or whatever. And that's great.

709
00:24:10,690 --> 00:24:12,930
I I truly hope I can continue to

710
00:24:12,930 --> 00:24:15,109
earn that kind of trust because I truly

711
00:24:15,330 --> 00:24:17,009
do not want things like this to happen.

712
00:24:17,009 --> 00:24:19,009
But actually, it goes to show kind of

713
00:24:19,009 --> 00:24:20,865
the opposite point that even if you do

714
00:24:20,865 --> 00:24:22,865
trust and even if you validly trust the

715
00:24:22,865 --> 00:24:25,105
person Right. With your information because you know

716
00:24:25,105 --> 00:24:26,384
they're not gonna sell it or they're not

717
00:24:26,384 --> 00:24:28,625
trying to leak it out, there's still a

718
00:24:28,625 --> 00:24:31,919
thousand points of potential vulnerability that work, you

719
00:24:31,919 --> 00:24:33,759
know, 99.999%

720
00:24:33,759 --> 00:24:35,779
of the time, but that one time suddenly

721
00:24:36,399 --> 00:24:39,220
done. Right? So yes, there's so many vulnerabilities

722
00:24:39,519 --> 00:24:41,539
out there that you can't possibly

723
00:24:41,839 --> 00:24:43,919
really contain them all. I guess the only

724
00:24:43,919 --> 00:24:45,460
things you can do is,

725
00:24:46,134 --> 00:24:48,154
basically disconnect from the Internet

726
00:24:48,775 --> 00:24:50,775
altogether, which, hey, maybe that is a solution

727
00:24:50,775 --> 00:24:51,894
for some people. And if you can do

728
00:24:51,894 --> 00:24:54,054
it, I wouldn't I wouldn't try to dissuade

729
00:24:54,054 --> 00:24:56,214
people from doing that. Right. But for most

730
00:24:56,214 --> 00:24:58,214
people who are already online in some way

731
00:24:58,214 --> 00:25:00,509
and who get information online, what do you

732
00:25:00,509 --> 00:25:00,830
do?

733
00:25:01,390 --> 00:25:03,470
I have, for example, a couple of years

734
00:25:03,470 --> 00:25:05,309
ago, I had a solutions watch that seems

735
00:25:05,309 --> 00:25:07,549
incredibly pertinent now, which is just called salting

736
00:25:07,549 --> 00:25:09,390
your data. And for people who don't know

737
00:25:09,390 --> 00:25:10,369
about that concept,

738
00:25:10,910 --> 00:25:13,544
the idea is, yeah, websites and various places,

739
00:25:13,544 --> 00:25:15,784
they're always asking for your name and email

740
00:25:15,784 --> 00:25:17,865
and birthday and next of kin and whatever

741
00:25:17,865 --> 00:25:20,265
else. And 99% of the time, it's not

742
00:25:20,265 --> 00:25:22,265
like you're signing some kind of legal contract

743
00:25:22,265 --> 00:25:23,484
that you're gonna be hauled

744
00:25:23,944 --> 00:25:26,345
into court for, you know, you told me

745
00:25:26,345 --> 00:25:28,779
your birth date was January

746
00:25:28,779 --> 00:25:29,900
'8.

747
00:25:29,900 --> 00:25:31,600
You're you're you're you're lying.

748
00:25:31,980 --> 00:25:34,619
Not yet, anyway. Yeah. Well, that's the point.

749
00:25:34,619 --> 00:25:37,660
Right? So so yeah. Exactly. Right. Actually, that's

750
00:25:37,660 --> 00:25:39,259
a good point. Because when I made that

751
00:25:39,259 --> 00:25:41,660
episode, the idea of online age verification was

752
00:25:41,660 --> 00:25:43,255
still a, you know, pipe dream kind of

753
00:25:43,255 --> 00:25:44,934
thing. But now it's a very, very real

754
00:25:44,934 --> 00:25:46,855
conversation, especially for people in The UK and

755
00:25:46,855 --> 00:25:48,855
elsewhere. Yeah. But but the point at that

756
00:25:48,855 --> 00:25:50,295
time was if you don't have to give

757
00:25:50,295 --> 00:25:53,494
your real, true, accurate, valid information, don't do

758
00:25:53,494 --> 00:25:55,335
it. And I would say, yeah. Well, when

759
00:25:55,335 --> 00:25:57,275
I was using that GiveWP form,

760
00:25:58,130 --> 00:26:00,690
again, don't give me your name. Like Yes.

761
00:26:00,769 --> 00:26:02,630
Whatever. I'm I'm Arthur b

762
00:26:03,009 --> 00:26:05,569
Blobovir. Whatever. Who cares? Make something up. I

763
00:26:05,569 --> 00:26:06,630
don't need your name.

764
00:26:07,329 --> 00:26:09,409
I do need a valid email address that

765
00:26:09,409 --> 00:26:11,765
will work and so that I can contact

766
00:26:11,765 --> 00:26:13,525
you and that you can sign in and

767
00:26:13,525 --> 00:26:15,305
all that kind of stuff. But

768
00:26:15,765 --> 00:26:18,085
even then, again, so that's why the very

769
00:26:18,085 --> 00:26:20,884
first Solutions Watch after this whole kerfuffle was

770
00:26:20,884 --> 00:26:23,045
on email aliases. How to set up an

771
00:26:23,045 --> 00:26:25,599
email alias. So I talked to, Hakeem Anwar

772
00:26:25,599 --> 00:26:28,400
of of of our phone. Right? Because again,

773
00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:29,460
this is a simple

774
00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:32,480
thing that actually only takes a few minutes,

775
00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:35,279
really. And he showed demonstrated exactly how to

776
00:26:35,279 --> 00:26:37,059
do it on on the screen there. So

777
00:26:37,279 --> 00:26:38,720
it can be done and it should be

778
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:41,355
done. And again, that's one of the things

779
00:26:41,355 --> 00:26:42,875
I'm so glad about is I have the

780
00:26:42,875 --> 00:26:45,035
audience that, you know, actually, I have a

781
00:26:45,035 --> 00:26:46,795
fair few number of people who actually did

782
00:26:46,795 --> 00:26:49,515
this, but hopefully more now. People who know

783
00:26:49,515 --> 00:26:51,275
to set up an email address. Why? An

784
00:26:51,275 --> 00:26:54,359
email alias. Why? Precisely four things like this.

785
00:26:54,599 --> 00:26:57,500
At the very least, number one, you know

786
00:26:57,640 --> 00:26:59,559
that when you're you start getting the spam

787
00:26:59,559 --> 00:27:02,200
to that email alias, you start knowing, okay,

788
00:27:02,200 --> 00:27:04,039
so something happened with that website or they're

789
00:27:04,039 --> 00:27:06,440
selling my data or something. And two, it's

790
00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:08,519
like a burner email. You can just delete

791
00:27:08,519 --> 00:27:10,299
that email alias and boom,

792
00:27:11,184 --> 00:27:13,184
spam problem gone. Just never give out your

793
00:27:13,184 --> 00:27:16,384
core actual real email address and then you'll

794
00:27:16,384 --> 00:27:18,144
be okay. Right? Yeah. I mean, it's just

795
00:27:18,144 --> 00:27:19,985
about privacy. You know, it's it's one of

796
00:27:19,985 --> 00:27:21,505
the most obvious things in the world right

797
00:27:21,505 --> 00:27:23,184
now that it's we're going in a rapidly

798
00:27:23,184 --> 00:27:24,625
in a direction where privacy will be a

799
00:27:24,625 --> 00:27:25,664
thing of the past or at least that's

800
00:27:25,664 --> 00:27:28,069
the effort. You know? And I think that

801
00:27:28,069 --> 00:27:29,990
one step in the right direction, there's probably

802
00:27:29,990 --> 00:27:31,829
a thousand other ways that this very thing

803
00:27:31,829 --> 00:27:33,269
could be done in all aspects of our

804
00:27:33,269 --> 00:27:34,789
life, you know, but this is something that

805
00:27:34,789 --> 00:27:36,309
is still one of the largest tools people

806
00:27:36,309 --> 00:27:38,309
use to communicate. So, why not keep yourself

807
00:27:38,309 --> 00:27:40,470
private in that regard? Where so, in in

808
00:27:40,470 --> 00:27:42,595
the overlap to this, to to, you know,

809
00:27:42,595 --> 00:27:43,634
kind of, I guess, we can finish on

810
00:27:43,634 --> 00:27:44,294
this point,

811
00:27:44,835 --> 00:27:46,294
you know, where the the vulnerability

812
00:27:46,835 --> 00:27:48,595
aspect of it. You know? It's clear that

813
00:27:48,595 --> 00:27:49,095
there's

814
00:27:49,634 --> 00:27:51,394
a lot around this. Like, to the where

815
00:27:51,394 --> 00:27:53,654
this world's going. You know? Technocracy,

816
00:27:53,954 --> 00:27:56,454
whatever whatever word you see, we all see

817
00:27:56,599 --> 00:27:58,759
in some ways what's being built to the

818
00:27:58,759 --> 00:27:59,259
Palantir

819
00:27:59,559 --> 00:28:01,720
and all the surveillance. You know? So where

820
00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:03,400
do you see this, you know, in a

821
00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:05,500
broader sense, like, what this is about? Like,

822
00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:08,759
right now go ahead. No. No. It's just

823
00:28:08,759 --> 00:28:11,714
such an excellent, important, pertinent question about this

824
00:28:11,714 --> 00:28:14,035
because yes, this is a big deal, certainly

825
00:28:14,035 --> 00:28:15,634
for me, for you, for other sites that

826
00:28:15,634 --> 00:28:16,775
were affected by it.

827
00:28:17,154 --> 00:28:19,315
But in the bigger picture, what does this

828
00:28:19,315 --> 00:28:21,795
mean? And again, one of the interesting and

829
00:28:21,795 --> 00:28:23,795
perhaps disturbing aspects of this is how many

830
00:28:23,795 --> 00:28:26,047
responses I've gotten from people. You know, whatever.

831
00:28:26,047 --> 00:28:27,825
My email's been out there so much, and

832
00:28:27,825 --> 00:28:29,603
I get spam all the time anyway. So

833
00:28:29,603 --> 00:28:31,381
whatever. Maybe just the solidarity with you, really,

834
00:28:31,381 --> 00:28:33,159
is probably what you're saying. I I get

835
00:28:33,159 --> 00:28:34,936
it. And I I understand why people are

836
00:28:34,936 --> 00:28:36,937
like that, and they're, they're just basically saying,

837
00:28:36,937 --> 00:28:38,714
oh, don't worry about it too much, James.

838
00:28:38,794 --> 00:28:40,794
Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. But the

839
00:28:40,794 --> 00:28:43,115
bigger point is exactly as you're saying, like

840
00:28:43,115 --> 00:28:44,174
email is becoming

841
00:28:44,634 --> 00:28:46,875
a more and more troublesome, bothersome thing that

842
00:28:46,875 --> 00:28:48,954
is not nearly as useful as it used

843
00:28:48,954 --> 00:28:50,714
to be. And I get why everyone's on

844
00:28:50,714 --> 00:28:52,315
group chats and things these days. I don't

845
00:28:52,315 --> 00:28:54,179
use any of that stuff, which makes me

846
00:28:54,179 --> 00:28:54,679
incredibly

847
00:28:55,220 --> 00:28:56,980
a, an old fuddy duddy and b, hard

848
00:28:56,980 --> 00:28:59,779
to contact. So sorry Ryan, I know. I

849
00:28:59,779 --> 00:29:01,319
should get with the times. But,

850
00:29:02,139 --> 00:29:04,119
it it is it does seem

851
00:29:04,980 --> 00:29:07,880
again, maybe not this particular thing, maybe, but

852
00:29:07,984 --> 00:29:10,384
in the bigger picture of the all of

853
00:29:10,384 --> 00:29:13,205
these leaks and vulnerabilities and problems that happen,

854
00:29:13,424 --> 00:29:15,525
they all add up to the

855
00:29:15,825 --> 00:29:18,085
essentially the the the growing,

856
00:29:20,029 --> 00:29:22,289
I'm trying not to use that word that

857
00:29:22,909 --> 00:29:24,369
you wouldn't use on air.

858
00:29:24,909 --> 00:29:26,049
The and badification

859
00:29:26,429 --> 00:29:26,929
of

860
00:29:27,389 --> 00:29:29,630
of services like email and other things that

861
00:29:29,630 --> 00:29:31,169
can be genuinely useful,

862
00:29:31,470 --> 00:29:34,509
genuinely helpful tools that are becoming more and

863
00:29:34,509 --> 00:29:37,174
more basically not worth your people's time.

864
00:29:37,575 --> 00:29:39,255
And it's not, of course, just email, but

865
00:29:39,255 --> 00:29:41,255
that's one aspect of this. And what so

866
00:29:41,255 --> 00:29:41,914
what ultimately

867
00:29:42,215 --> 00:29:44,775
becomes the solution to this? You know, as

868
00:29:44,775 --> 00:29:46,615
as Hakim was making the point on the

869
00:29:46,615 --> 00:29:48,715
solutions watch I just did about email aliases.

870
00:29:48,855 --> 00:29:49,674
You know, Yahoo,

871
00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:52,759
oops leaked whatever, however many hundreds of millions

872
00:29:52,759 --> 00:29:55,279
of people's data and there was, I I

873
00:29:55,279 --> 00:29:57,299
can't remember which other one he cited with

874
00:29:57,440 --> 00:29:59,920
credit card data and passports and things like

875
00:29:59,920 --> 00:30:00,820
this. And now,

876
00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:03,255
now what what are we doing?

877
00:30:03,734 --> 00:30:05,515
The online age verification

878
00:30:06,055 --> 00:30:08,134
laws that obviously just got passed in Britain,

879
00:30:08,134 --> 00:30:09,494
they're working on it in Europe. I covered

880
00:30:09,494 --> 00:30:10,775
this on New World Next Week a couple

881
00:30:10,775 --> 00:30:12,454
of years ago. We are entering the age

882
00:30:12,454 --> 00:30:13,914
of online age verification.

883
00:30:14,375 --> 00:30:16,154
How do you do that? Well increasingly,

884
00:30:16,619 --> 00:30:18,380
you know, take a selfie of you holding

885
00:30:18,380 --> 00:30:20,400
your government issued ID and whatever.

886
00:30:20,779 --> 00:30:22,079
And you better believe

887
00:30:22,460 --> 00:30:24,700
there's gonna be, you know, the big scandal,

888
00:30:24,700 --> 00:30:26,720
the next big scandal. Oops. One of those

889
00:30:27,019 --> 00:30:28,779
kind of companies got hacked. And they said

890
00:30:28,779 --> 00:30:30,775
they were deleting your selfies, but actually they're

891
00:30:30,775 --> 00:30:32,695
all there and so now all of your

892
00:30:32,695 --> 00:30:33,674
data is gone.

893
00:30:34,295 --> 00:30:36,775
You you know where this ultimately leads with

894
00:30:36,775 --> 00:30:37,674
enough security

895
00:30:38,215 --> 00:30:41,095
breaches and data breaches and privacy breaches. You

896
00:30:41,095 --> 00:30:43,070
know, sorry guys, the only way to do

897
00:30:43,070 --> 00:30:45,230
this now is some sort of biometric digital

898
00:30:45,230 --> 00:30:46,990
item. Right? The only way you can do

899
00:30:46,990 --> 00:30:48,509
it is you gotta scan your fingerprint and

900
00:30:48,509 --> 00:30:50,509
eyeball to get on the internet. That is

901
00:30:50,509 --> 00:30:52,750
where this is ultimately heading and that's why

902
00:30:52,750 --> 00:30:53,330
I think

903
00:30:53,869 --> 00:30:54,670
we need to,

904
00:30:55,150 --> 00:30:57,309
we need to present the alternative to all

905
00:30:57,309 --> 00:30:58,005
of this which

906
00:30:58,484 --> 00:31:00,825
again is to the extent possible

907
00:31:01,365 --> 00:31:04,884
using privacy protecting tools and salting your data

908
00:31:04,884 --> 00:31:07,605
and email aliases and everything else we can

909
00:31:07,605 --> 00:31:09,605
think of to make it so that people

910
00:31:09,605 --> 00:31:10,825
are not putting their

911
00:31:11,320 --> 00:31:14,600
personal lives online. Right. You know? And then

912
00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:16,440
again, that's harder and harder for people to

913
00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:18,440
do. Oh, I'm already online over my work

914
00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:20,519
and whatever and blah blah blah. But to

915
00:31:20,519 --> 00:31:22,539
the extent that it is possible to

916
00:31:22,840 --> 00:31:23,340
stop

917
00:31:23,654 --> 00:31:25,414
feeding this beast, we have to stop feeding

918
00:31:25,414 --> 00:31:27,734
this beast. Absolutely. I mean, as you're saying,

919
00:31:27,734 --> 00:31:29,734
this this one thing could be part of,

920
00:31:29,734 --> 00:31:31,494
you know, even or just used, but very

921
00:31:31,494 --> 00:31:34,215
well could be an, you know, multifaceted effort

922
00:31:34,215 --> 00:31:36,295
to drive the idea that these things are

923
00:31:36,295 --> 00:31:38,210
no longer secure. You know, and which they're

924
00:31:38,210 --> 00:31:40,130
not in many cases. You know, it's one

925
00:31:40,130 --> 00:31:41,509
of the one of the main things here

926
00:31:41,730 --> 00:31:43,410
that that and this and more and more,

927
00:31:43,410 --> 00:31:45,330
I'm seeing autentics pop up in these things.

928
00:31:45,330 --> 00:31:47,330
It Twitter is still using it despite the

929
00:31:47,330 --> 00:31:49,250
fact that he he publicly said he would

930
00:31:49,250 --> 00:31:50,785
stop using it and it's still there, which

931
00:31:50,785 --> 00:31:52,305
if they don't know out there listening, it's

932
00:31:52,305 --> 00:31:54,464
an Israeli I mean, it's literally tied into

933
00:31:54,464 --> 00:31:57,025
Israeli intelligence, not through some side thing. It's

934
00:31:57,025 --> 00:31:59,025
a major part of Israeli intelligence, and it

935
00:31:59,025 --> 00:32:00,944
is being used right now on Twitter to

936
00:32:01,265 --> 00:32:02,865
at least for some people. Like, I actually

937
00:32:02,865 --> 00:32:04,464
saw an interesting point where somebody showed me

938
00:32:04,464 --> 00:32:05,505
what the one that came up for them

939
00:32:05,505 --> 00:32:07,409
was different. To me, I do whatever. I

940
00:32:07,409 --> 00:32:08,769
check it all the time. It still says,

941
00:32:08,769 --> 00:32:10,529
check here to approve that Authentics can take

942
00:32:10,529 --> 00:32:11,190
your biometrics

943
00:32:11,490 --> 00:32:13,009
and hold on to them for a period

944
00:32:13,009 --> 00:32:14,690
of time. And they at this moment, they

945
00:32:14,690 --> 00:32:16,369
still don't even need that for signing for

946
00:32:16,369 --> 00:32:18,289
Twitter, yet yet it's happening. And I saw

947
00:32:18,289 --> 00:32:19,890
it for other platforms popping up. And it's

948
00:32:19,890 --> 00:32:21,409
not just about Israel, but it's about where

949
00:32:21,409 --> 00:32:23,184
it's going and the scooping up of this

950
00:32:23,184 --> 00:32:25,105
and the scooping of all the data they

951
00:32:25,105 --> 00:32:27,424
can get their hands on from everything, US.

952
00:32:27,424 --> 00:32:29,585
You know, it's like the the Palantir element

953
00:32:29,585 --> 00:32:31,744
of it all. Like, it's very rapidly going

954
00:32:31,744 --> 00:32:33,664
in this direction. Yep. You know, when do

955
00:32:33,664 --> 00:32:35,599
you think that shoe is gonna drop? You

956
00:32:35,599 --> 00:32:37,039
know, the idea where it's, like, not just

957
00:32:37,039 --> 00:32:39,359
digital ID, but, like, the you know, this

958
00:32:39,359 --> 00:32:40,960
is the new norm kind of a thing

959
00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:43,039
in regard to going into a store, you

960
00:32:43,039 --> 00:32:44,799
know, this kind of stuff, like China. Do

961
00:32:44,799 --> 00:32:46,980
you think that that's close in this country?

962
00:32:47,804 --> 00:32:48,304
Yeah.

963
00:32:48,845 --> 00:32:51,164
Well, I have so I've been talking about

964
00:32:51,164 --> 00:32:53,644
this, on New World Next Week with Pilato

965
00:32:53,644 --> 00:32:55,565
for Mhmm. I don't know, fifteen years now.

966
00:32:55,565 --> 00:32:57,085
So people are probably sick of hearing about

967
00:32:57,085 --> 00:32:59,484
it, but I truly I really do think

968
00:32:59,484 --> 00:33:01,470
that the stage has been set for the

969
00:33:01,789 --> 00:33:03,089
digital Pearl Harbor.

970
00:33:03,390 --> 00:33:05,549
I think at this point, there still needs

971
00:33:05,549 --> 00:33:07,390
to be that punch in the Facebook as

972
00:33:07,390 --> 00:33:10,429
Pilato says. Something that's actually, that we we

973
00:33:10,429 --> 00:33:11,950
need to update that because no one uses

974
00:33:11,950 --> 00:33:14,589
Facebook anymore. Right? But Yeah. But the point

975
00:33:14,589 --> 00:33:15,329
is, like,

976
00:33:15,855 --> 00:33:17,795
I still feel they need that shocking

977
00:33:18,174 --> 00:33:20,335
shock and awe moment of, oh my god,

978
00:33:20,335 --> 00:33:22,095
you know, look what just happened to get

979
00:33:22,095 --> 00:33:24,494
everybody on board. I think they're at for

980
00:33:24,494 --> 00:33:26,414
the last couple of decades, they've been trying

981
00:33:26,414 --> 00:33:28,654
the inching towards just more and more and

982
00:33:28,654 --> 00:33:30,580
more and more putting, you know, more of

983
00:33:30,580 --> 00:33:33,299
this normalizing this sort of stuff. But I

984
00:33:33,299 --> 00:33:35,380
still at this point, if they wanted to

985
00:33:35,380 --> 00:33:37,779
do it tomorrow to get everybody to have

986
00:33:37,779 --> 00:33:39,619
to, like, face scan or whatever to get

987
00:33:39,619 --> 00:33:41,460
online, I think there'd still need to be

988
00:33:41,460 --> 00:33:42,360
that big event.

989
00:33:42,755 --> 00:33:45,075
Maybe not. Maybe not because as we are

990
00:33:45,075 --> 00:33:46,914
seeing again right now with The UK. I

991
00:33:46,914 --> 00:33:47,815
mean, to get onto

992
00:33:48,115 --> 00:33:48,615
Reddit,

993
00:33:48,995 --> 00:33:50,674
I guess, on The UK or at least

994
00:33:50,674 --> 00:33:53,255
certain subreddits. People are, like, having to

995
00:33:53,795 --> 00:33:56,115
show their government ID or take selfies or

996
00:33:56,115 --> 00:33:56,615
whatever.

997
00:33:57,839 --> 00:34:00,240
For Reddit? Like, what is going on? And,

998
00:34:00,240 --> 00:34:02,640
of course, this is about the normalization of

999
00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:04,880
essentially giving up all your personal data in

1000
00:34:04,880 --> 00:34:06,180
order to access websites.

1001
00:34:06,880 --> 00:34:07,380
And,

1002
00:34:07,759 --> 00:34:09,679
again, I just see so clearly where this

1003
00:34:09,679 --> 00:34:11,855
is going. There there's gonna be some kind

1004
00:34:11,855 --> 00:34:14,014
of big breach, some kind of amazing like,

1005
00:34:14,014 --> 00:34:15,614
oh my god, you know, all these people's

1006
00:34:15,614 --> 00:34:17,775
records just got leaked and is all their

1007
00:34:17,775 --> 00:34:18,835
data and everything.

1008
00:34:19,375 --> 00:34:22,114
So we need now the digital ID. That's

1009
00:34:22,494 --> 00:34:22,920
that's

1010
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:25,239
it's so obvious where this is setting and

1011
00:34:25,239 --> 00:34:27,880
that's where all the infrastructure is. Again, like,

1012
00:34:27,880 --> 00:34:30,199
it's like back in whatever 2009 when I

1013
00:34:30,199 --> 00:34:32,199
did the medical martial law podcast. It's not

1014
00:34:32,199 --> 00:34:34,599
because I'm some sort of Nostradamus. It's because

1015
00:34:34,599 --> 00:34:36,695
they've been by that point, already setting up

1016
00:34:36,695 --> 00:34:38,775
the infrastructure for medical marshal law for at

1017
00:34:38,775 --> 00:34:40,695
least a a decade in terms of the

1018
00:34:40,695 --> 00:34:41,195
institutional

1019
00:34:41,735 --> 00:34:43,894
legal infrastructure for it. Well, now they've been

1020
00:34:43,894 --> 00:34:45,974
working on the digital ID infrastructure for a

1021
00:34:45,974 --> 00:34:48,295
couple of decades. I remember part reporting back

1022
00:34:48,295 --> 00:34:50,159
in, I think, like, 2008

1023
00:34:50,159 --> 00:34:52,159
or something like that about digital,

1024
00:34:52,639 --> 00:34:54,260
driver's license for the Internet.

1025
00:34:54,559 --> 00:34:55,920
Right. Right. Was a phrase that was being

1026
00:34:55,920 --> 00:34:57,380
slung around by Microsoft,

1027
00:34:57,840 --> 00:34:59,519
VPs and people like that talking about, you

1028
00:34:59,519 --> 00:35:01,280
know, we're gonna need some sort of driver's

1029
00:35:01,280 --> 00:35:03,359
license for the Internet. I remember the Obama

1030
00:35:03,359 --> 00:35:06,194
White House was doing trial runs of government

1031
00:35:06,194 --> 00:35:08,914
issued digital ID back in 2012

1032
00:35:08,914 --> 00:35:10,914
or whenever it was. So this has been

1033
00:35:10,914 --> 00:35:12,514
in the works for a long time. The

1034
00:35:12,514 --> 00:35:14,835
only question I mean, it's not a technical

1035
00:35:14,835 --> 00:35:16,855
question at this point. The only question is

1036
00:35:16,940 --> 00:35:18,539
how do they get people to adopt it

1037
00:35:18,539 --> 00:35:20,460
on mass? And they're trying it already in

1038
00:35:20,460 --> 00:35:22,140
The UK and The EU and places like

1039
00:35:22,140 --> 00:35:24,780
that. Maybe, I'd like to think people in

1040
00:35:24,780 --> 00:35:26,860
America are still stubborn enough and still have

1041
00:35:26,860 --> 00:35:29,340
at least the idea of sort of freedom

1042
00:35:29,340 --> 00:35:30,640
and privacy and stuff.

1043
00:35:30,945 --> 00:35:32,625
Maybe there's enough of that that it would

1044
00:35:32,625 --> 00:35:34,785
require a spectacular false flag. But if that's

1045
00:35:34,785 --> 00:35:35,684
what it'll require,

1046
00:35:36,305 --> 00:35:38,244
do we really think they wouldn't do it?

1047
00:35:38,704 --> 00:35:40,485
Yeah. Right. And I think both our audiences

1048
00:35:40,545 --> 00:35:42,864
are already well aware. That's the most likely

1049
00:35:42,864 --> 00:35:45,179
thing in this conversation. But the last thing

1050
00:35:45,179 --> 00:35:47,019
on last thing. You know, when you say

1051
00:35:47,099 --> 00:35:48,300
for those that may not know, which is

1052
00:35:48,300 --> 00:35:50,300
probably few and far between for both of

1053
00:35:50,300 --> 00:35:50,960
our audiences,

1054
00:35:51,339 --> 00:35:53,199
but digital Pearl Harbor,

1055
00:35:53,579 --> 00:35:55,500
you know, what we end with that. What

1056
00:35:55,500 --> 00:35:56,539
do you mean by that, and what would

1057
00:35:56,539 --> 00:35:57,900
that look like? However you wanna go with

1058
00:35:57,900 --> 00:35:59,034
that. Cause I think that's important. Yeah. Let

1059
00:35:59,034 --> 00:36:00,894
me just on this. It was the Half

1060
00:36:00,894 --> 00:36:01,795
Moon Bay,

1061
00:36:03,295 --> 00:36:06,094
Technology Conference. I think it was 2007

1062
00:36:06,094 --> 00:36:08,494
or something along those lines. I've cited it

1063
00:36:08,494 --> 00:36:10,255
so many times that now I forget these

1064
00:36:10,255 --> 00:36:12,034
specifics. And it was Lawrence Lessig,

1065
00:36:12,549 --> 00:36:13,510
who's the Harvard,

1066
00:36:13,909 --> 00:36:14,409
IP

1067
00:36:14,949 --> 00:36:15,449
lawyer,

1068
00:36:15,829 --> 00:36:18,389
whatever law professor guy, who was talking about

1069
00:36:18,389 --> 00:36:20,949
a conversation that he had. And it was,

1070
00:36:20,949 --> 00:36:22,010
I believe, shortly

1071
00:36:23,269 --> 00:36:24,089
after nine eleven

1072
00:36:24,389 --> 00:36:26,230
and, the Patriot Act and all of that.

1073
00:36:26,230 --> 00:36:27,914
And he was talking to Richard Clark,

1074
00:36:28,474 --> 00:36:29,275
the ex,

1075
00:36:30,155 --> 00:36:32,655
security intelligence czar of,

1076
00:36:33,914 --> 00:36:35,215
Clinton and then Bush,

1077
00:36:35,675 --> 00:36:37,135
who was the intelligence czar

1078
00:36:37,914 --> 00:36:39,054
at the time of nineeleven,

1079
00:36:39,755 --> 00:36:42,409
who, by the way, later years later told,

1080
00:36:42,650 --> 00:36:43,710
Duffy and Novoshelski

1081
00:36:44,010 --> 00:36:46,650
about that story about how he was being

1082
00:36:46,650 --> 00:36:47,150
deliberately

1083
00:36:47,449 --> 00:36:50,089
deceived by Tenet at the CIA about what

1084
00:36:50,089 --> 00:36:51,069
they knew about,

1085
00:36:52,010 --> 00:36:54,164
Al Al Hazmi and Al Midar Hazmi and

1086
00:36:54,164 --> 00:36:55,144
Al Midar. Whatever.

1087
00:36:55,445 --> 00:36:58,164
You know, the nine eleven hijacker Patsy's. Anyway

1088
00:36:58,405 --> 00:36:58,805
Right.

1089
00:36:59,204 --> 00:37:01,364
Whole other sort of digression there. But Lawrence

1090
00:37:01,364 --> 00:37:03,285
Lessig was talking about this conversation he had

1091
00:37:03,285 --> 00:37:05,525
with Richard Clark where he said, like, so,

1092
00:37:05,525 --> 00:37:06,965
you know, do you have some sort of

1093
00:37:06,965 --> 00:37:08,664
Patriot Act equivalent for

1094
00:37:09,039 --> 00:37:11,219
the, you know, some sort of Internet event?

1095
00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:13,359
And Richard Clark said, yeah. Of course. It's

1096
00:37:13,359 --> 00:37:15,440
on the shelf. It's ready to go. In

1097
00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:17,199
the event of the, you know, I Pearl

1098
00:37:17,199 --> 00:37:19,199
Harbor, there will be the I Patriot Act.

1099
00:37:19,199 --> 00:37:20,799
Mhmm. And they have it all, you know,

1100
00:37:20,799 --> 00:37:22,605
that in the same way that they didn't

1101
00:37:22,605 --> 00:37:24,204
just come up with the Patriot Act, all

1102
00:37:24,204 --> 00:37:27,005
several 100 pages of densely worded, you know,

1103
00:37:27,005 --> 00:37:29,405
legalese referring to all these different sections of

1104
00:37:29,405 --> 00:37:31,164
US code and everything. They didn't just whip

1105
00:37:31,164 --> 00:37:33,005
that up in a few weeks. That was

1106
00:37:33,005 --> 00:37:35,670
ready to go. And in fact, Biden actually

1107
00:37:35,670 --> 00:37:37,989
bragged at one point about having essentially, you

1108
00:37:37,989 --> 00:37:38,489
know,

1109
00:37:39,510 --> 00:37:41,030
not written it. Of course, he didn't write

1110
00:37:41,030 --> 00:37:43,429
anything, but having essentially tried to forward it

1111
00:37:43,429 --> 00:37:45,670
back in the Clinton days. Anyway, so that

1112
00:37:45,670 --> 00:37:47,349
was already on the shelf and ready to

1113
00:37:47,349 --> 00:37:48,869
go, of course. And then when nine eleven

1114
00:37:48,869 --> 00:37:50,914
happened, boop. Here's the Patriot Act. And, oh,

1115
00:37:50,914 --> 00:37:52,675
by the way, there's this anthrax thing, so

1116
00:37:52,675 --> 00:37:54,355
you're gonna close down Congress. So you better

1117
00:37:54,355 --> 00:37:55,795
vote now, and you no time to read

1118
00:37:55,795 --> 00:37:56,934
the bill. Just pass it.

1119
00:37:57,315 --> 00:37:57,815
Well,

1120
00:37:58,275 --> 00:37:59,815
that's exactly the blueprint.

1121
00:38:00,195 --> 00:38:02,434
And Richard Clark even said it and admitted

1122
00:38:02,434 --> 00:38:04,275
it. Yes. There is an IPatriate Act that's

1123
00:38:04,275 --> 00:38:05,554
ready to go in the event of the

1124
00:38:05,554 --> 00:38:06,769
next I Pearl Harbor.

1125
00:38:07,230 --> 00:38:09,550
So we know this already exists and who

1126
00:38:09,550 --> 00:38:11,309
knows what's in it? I mean, Lawrence Lessig

1127
00:38:11,309 --> 00:38:13,949
never if he asked Richard if if Clark

1128
00:38:13,949 --> 00:38:15,969
said anything about it, we don't know. But,

1129
00:38:16,510 --> 00:38:18,269
so who knows exactly what's in it? But

1130
00:38:18,269 --> 00:38:21,114
you you gotta believe there's gonna be essentially

1131
00:38:21,114 --> 00:38:24,015
the crackdown on the Internet, which of course

1132
00:38:24,155 --> 00:38:24,655
powers

1133
00:38:25,035 --> 00:38:27,355
that shouldn't be have been lusting after essentially

1134
00:38:27,355 --> 00:38:28,255
since the Internet

1135
00:38:28,635 --> 00:38:30,474
or the World Wide Web came along and

1136
00:38:30,474 --> 00:38:33,055
started offering us this Gutenberg two point o.

1137
00:38:33,275 --> 00:38:33,775
Now

1138
00:38:34,239 --> 00:38:36,800
because I have studied the bigger picture of

1139
00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:38,719
the history of mass media and the media

1140
00:38:38,719 --> 00:38:40,500
matrix and my online,

1141
00:38:41,200 --> 00:38:42,340
mass media course,

1142
00:38:42,880 --> 00:38:43,619
I know

1143
00:38:44,079 --> 00:38:44,900
that ultimately,

1144
00:38:45,680 --> 00:38:47,760
censorship is not gonna win out over the

1145
00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:48,260
technology.

1146
00:38:48,905 --> 00:38:50,664
That's not how it worked with Gutenberg one

1147
00:38:50,664 --> 00:38:53,484
point o. Yes. Absolutely. Kings

1148
00:38:53,864 --> 00:38:56,125
and popes and tyrants of various sorts

1149
00:38:56,505 --> 00:38:57,964
tried their best

1150
00:38:59,464 --> 00:39:00,984
to essentially put the cork on the bottle

1151
00:39:00,984 --> 00:39:02,204
of the Gutenberg revolution,

1152
00:39:02,630 --> 00:39:04,570
but they were not successful at that ultimately.

1153
00:39:04,710 --> 00:39:06,809
It worked for a time in various places,

1154
00:39:06,869 --> 00:39:09,190
but it didn't work forever. And, you know,

1155
00:39:09,190 --> 00:39:10,570
licenses to print

1156
00:39:11,550 --> 00:39:13,349
to run a printing press and things like

1157
00:39:13,349 --> 00:39:15,769
this, it worked for times, but not forever

1158
00:39:15,905 --> 00:39:17,505
because you can't really put the cork on

1159
00:39:17,505 --> 00:39:19,204
that technology once it's out there.

1160
00:39:19,984 --> 00:39:21,824
So I'd like to think that this Gutenberg

1161
00:39:21,824 --> 00:39:24,065
two point o, yeah, they'll try to censor

1162
00:39:24,065 --> 00:39:24,964
and keep people,

1163
00:39:25,505 --> 00:39:27,585
off of these platforms and things, but there

1164
00:39:27,585 --> 00:39:29,519
will always be cracks in the system.

1165
00:39:30,559 --> 00:39:32,579
Ways around it. And, you know,

1166
00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:36,340
Quartle and whatever, a million other ways of

1167
00:39:36,480 --> 00:39:38,800
essentially using the Internet for what it's actually

1168
00:39:38,800 --> 00:39:40,820
supposed to be for peer to peer connection

1169
00:39:41,119 --> 00:39:43,679
will exist, will continue to be developed, will

1170
00:39:43,679 --> 00:39:45,434
not easily be suppressible,

1171
00:39:46,214 --> 00:39:47,974
and to some extent maybe even the powers

1172
00:39:47,974 --> 00:39:49,894
that shouldn't be will recognize the utility of

1173
00:39:49,894 --> 00:39:51,974
such platforms and will leave cracks in the

1174
00:39:51,974 --> 00:39:54,135
system so that you'll be a a pirate,

1175
00:39:54,135 --> 00:39:56,295
you know, illegal person if you try to

1176
00:39:56,295 --> 00:39:58,579
communicate in ways that aren't approved. But they'll

1177
00:39:58,579 --> 00:40:00,179
always leave back doors like that open for

1178
00:40:00,179 --> 00:40:02,260
their intelligence cutouts and what have you as

1179
00:40:02,260 --> 00:40:03,000
well. So

1180
00:40:03,300 --> 00:40:05,460
so, you know, like drug running and things,

1181
00:40:05,460 --> 00:40:07,699
like, if they actually wanted to stop drug

1182
00:40:07,699 --> 00:40:09,380
running into The US, they could, but they

1183
00:40:09,380 --> 00:40:11,219
don't because, of course, the CIA, you know,

1184
00:40:11,219 --> 00:40:12,900
funds their black budget with it and things

1185
00:40:12,900 --> 00:40:14,375
like that. Right? So Yep. The same thing.

1186
00:40:14,414 --> 00:40:16,735
Bad. You know? Yeah. Like crypto and other

1187
00:40:16,735 --> 00:40:18,974
things. Like, yeah, if they really wanted to

1188
00:40:18,974 --> 00:40:20,574
absolutely crack down on it, they could, but

1189
00:40:20,574 --> 00:40:22,175
they don't because they wanna use it for

1190
00:40:22,175 --> 00:40:22,994
their own purposes.

1191
00:40:23,454 --> 00:40:25,934
So I think those those cracks always exist.

1192
00:40:25,934 --> 00:40:27,875
You'll always be a pirate, you know, and

1193
00:40:28,380 --> 00:40:29,739
on the run from the law if you're,

1194
00:40:29,739 --> 00:40:30,960
you know, in those spaces.

1195
00:40:31,260 --> 00:40:32,699
But those will always exist. So I don't

1196
00:40:32,699 --> 00:40:34,139
think they'll actually be able to cork the

1197
00:40:34,139 --> 00:40:36,460
bottle. Yeah. But then again, also as people

1198
00:40:36,460 --> 00:40:38,219
know from the Gutenberg one point o revolution

1199
00:40:38,219 --> 00:40:40,460
and what ultimately happened, the thing that ultimately

1200
00:40:40,460 --> 00:40:43,179
happened is that the technology became so capital

1201
00:40:43,179 --> 00:40:45,954
intensive and so, you know, so out of

1202
00:40:45,954 --> 00:40:48,594
the reach of just an average mod pod

1203
00:40:48,594 --> 00:40:50,434
to run their own personal printing press. Suddenly

1204
00:40:50,434 --> 00:40:52,914
you've got these corporations running these massive newspaper

1205
00:40:52,914 --> 00:40:53,414
syndicates

1206
00:40:53,954 --> 00:40:55,255
and it gets corporatized

1207
00:40:56,130 --> 00:40:57,589
and then you get the oligopoly

1208
00:40:58,210 --> 00:41:00,369
and then you have the gatekeepers and all

1209
00:41:00,369 --> 00:41:02,609
of that. That's I think probably the model

1210
00:41:02,609 --> 00:41:04,769
that may work for Gutenberg two point o.

1211
00:41:04,769 --> 00:41:06,789
And we've already seen it to some extent

1212
00:41:06,929 --> 00:41:09,409
as everybody starts to pile on to the

1213
00:41:09,409 --> 00:41:10,710
same handful of websites.

1214
00:41:11,285 --> 00:41:15,045
The Internet now is YouTube and Instagram and

1215
00:41:15,045 --> 00:41:16,825
Meta and X and whatever.

1216
00:41:17,204 --> 00:41:18,885
That is the Internet to a lot of

1217
00:41:18,885 --> 00:41:20,805
people. And to the extent that that's that

1218
00:41:20,805 --> 00:41:23,529
SIOP has worked, it's, well, that's that's the

1219
00:41:23,529 --> 00:41:25,769
end of the Internet revolution to whatever extent

1220
00:41:25,769 --> 00:41:26,829
it it existed.

1221
00:41:27,289 --> 00:41:28,509
Luckily, our audiences,

1222
00:41:29,049 --> 00:41:29,549
obviously,

1223
00:41:29,929 --> 00:41:32,329
are not, you know, totally in the grip

1224
00:41:32,329 --> 00:41:34,250
of that, psyop, but a lot of people

1225
00:41:34,250 --> 00:41:36,569
are. Yeah. And, well, hopefully, they're out there

1226
00:41:36,569 --> 00:41:38,154
doing which I know they are, doing the

1227
00:41:38,154 --> 00:41:40,474
same thing, talking to people, sharing information, which

1228
00:41:40,474 --> 00:41:42,554
is the whole point. Right? I'll include this

1229
00:41:42,554 --> 00:41:44,394
since you mentioned, you know, the of the

1230
00:41:44,394 --> 00:41:46,315
word. I I what the other term for

1231
00:41:46,315 --> 00:41:47,694
another time, is

1232
00:41:48,154 --> 00:41:49,514
where we're going in the future. You know,

1233
00:41:49,514 --> 00:41:51,114
it's clear this is kind of the direction.

1234
00:41:51,114 --> 00:41:52,414
And I'll I'll leave you with,

1235
00:41:53,079 --> 00:41:54,679
you know, I mean, you you've mentioned this

1236
00:41:54,679 --> 00:41:56,359
to yourself, but, what we just discussed there

1237
00:41:56,359 --> 00:41:57,800
at the end, let's not forget that, you

1238
00:41:57,800 --> 00:41:59,400
know, you got PNAC and, you know, the

1239
00:41:59,400 --> 00:42:01,179
new nine eleven, we've also had Trump.

1240
00:42:01,480 --> 00:42:02,920
Who in his first term made it clear.

1241
00:42:02,920 --> 00:42:04,760
We need another nine eleven like event. He

1242
00:42:04,760 --> 00:42:06,344
said that on record, You know? And so

1243
00:42:06,344 --> 00:42:07,704
it's not new. Or what I forget her

1244
00:42:07,704 --> 00:42:08,585
name off the top of my head, that

1245
00:42:08,585 --> 00:42:10,184
blonde lady in front of congress that kinda

1246
00:42:10,184 --> 00:42:11,945
said the same thing. You know, it's clear

1247
00:42:11,945 --> 00:42:13,465
that, you know, I think that's what it's

1248
00:42:13,465 --> 00:42:15,704
pointing to. And whether that's a written out

1249
00:42:15,704 --> 00:42:17,864
plan that the current administration is planning out

1250
00:42:17,864 --> 00:42:19,724
or it's something that's on the shelf somewhere,

1251
00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:21,480
it's very clear that there is a building

1252
00:42:21,480 --> 00:42:23,320
momentum that way. And so, you know, things

1253
00:42:23,320 --> 00:42:24,519
like this is you know, if you're out

1254
00:42:24,519 --> 00:42:26,039
there thinking this is a small thing, like,

1255
00:42:26,039 --> 00:42:28,519
recognize that this is, I think, one part

1256
00:42:28,519 --> 00:42:30,360
of a much larger thing happening, even if

1257
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:32,119
it's just, you know, random things popping up

1258
00:42:32,119 --> 00:42:34,315
that are being used. So, thank you, James,

1259
00:42:34,315 --> 00:42:37,195
for, you know, forcing this into the conversation

1260
00:42:37,195 --> 00:42:38,635
that people don't seem to wanna talk about

1261
00:42:38,635 --> 00:42:40,555
because I do think it's important that we

1262
00:42:40,555 --> 00:42:41,914
do our best to make sure these things

1263
00:42:41,914 --> 00:42:43,355
are tied up and that we're you know,

1264
00:42:43,355 --> 00:42:45,035
privacy, it has to matter. Don't don't get

1265
00:42:45,035 --> 00:42:46,555
that mindset out there where it's like, well,

1266
00:42:46,555 --> 00:42:48,289
like James was saying, they already got this.

1267
00:42:48,289 --> 00:42:49,570
They already have my phone. You don't know

1268
00:42:49,570 --> 00:42:51,650
that for sure. Right? You do everything you

1269
00:42:51,650 --> 00:42:53,250
can where you can. That's how it is.

1270
00:42:53,250 --> 00:42:55,570
Also, yeah. Also, let me address that because,

1271
00:42:55,969 --> 00:42:58,449
yeah. Sometimes, again, people kinda get black pilled

1272
00:42:58,449 --> 00:42:59,730
or doom pilled on this sort of thing

1273
00:42:59,730 --> 00:43:01,170
and just go, well, you know, they're gonna

1274
00:43:01,170 --> 00:43:02,309
find it one way or another.

1275
00:43:03,054 --> 00:43:04,974
But even if that's true, even if the

1276
00:43:04,974 --> 00:43:06,655
NSA or, you know, whoever is looking at

1277
00:43:06,655 --> 00:43:08,655
the trunk line of the Internet truly can

1278
00:43:08,655 --> 00:43:11,614
see everything and monitoring you and trying to

1279
00:43:11,614 --> 00:43:14,255
expose you. Okay. Even if that's the case,

1280
00:43:14,255 --> 00:43:16,860
there are still just garden variety criminals and,

1281
00:43:16,860 --> 00:43:18,619
you know, people that you should still be

1282
00:43:18,619 --> 00:43:21,019
protecting your data from. Right? Good point. Yeah.

1283
00:43:21,019 --> 00:43:23,980
Right. So Hackers and you know Exactly. So

1284
00:43:23,980 --> 00:43:25,820
just be careful as much as you can

1285
00:43:25,820 --> 00:43:27,599
be. And let me also clarify,

1286
00:43:27,980 --> 00:43:29,680
yes, I stopped using the UWP

1287
00:43:31,585 --> 00:43:33,985
MWP, plugin. I have a new plugin that's

1288
00:43:33,985 --> 00:43:35,204
managing the membership

1289
00:43:35,505 --> 00:43:37,425
form on the back end right now. So

1290
00:43:37,425 --> 00:43:39,364
I have a new membership sign up thing

1291
00:43:39,505 --> 00:43:41,925
at mycorporatereport.com.

1292
00:43:42,239 --> 00:43:43,780
If people are, you know,

1293
00:43:44,159 --> 00:43:46,000
reticent about the all of this now, I

1294
00:43:46,000 --> 00:43:47,920
understand. But if you want to continue to

1295
00:43:47,920 --> 00:43:49,460
support corporatereport.com,

1296
00:43:49,519 --> 00:43:51,199
again, I am doing my level best to

1297
00:43:51,199 --> 00:43:53,440
make sure that it this absolutely never happens

1298
00:43:53,440 --> 00:43:55,464
again and I'm implementing new checks for every

1299
00:43:55,464 --> 00:43:57,224
time I run an update to plugins and

1300
00:43:57,224 --> 00:43:59,144
other such things that Right. I think might

1301
00:43:59,144 --> 00:44:01,724
be a good way of, at least determining

1302
00:44:01,784 --> 00:44:03,864
if something is leaking. But anyway, I have

1303
00:44:03,864 --> 00:44:05,385
a new membership form, a new sign up

1304
00:44:05,385 --> 00:44:06,744
thing. So if people want, they can go

1305
00:44:06,744 --> 00:44:08,505
to corporatereport.com/members

1306
00:44:08,505 --> 00:44:10,445
and support the work. And hopefully,

1307
00:44:10,880 --> 00:44:12,960
again, support the independent media that's fighting the

1308
00:44:12,960 --> 00:44:15,280
uphill battle against the the Goliaths of the

1309
00:44:15,280 --> 00:44:18,000
world. Yep. You know, and, honestly, I would

1310
00:44:18,000 --> 00:44:19,360
just recommend, at least for me, I don't

1311
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:20,480
know if you I I believe you probably

1312
00:44:20,480 --> 00:44:22,320
have something of the same. Go go snail

1313
00:44:22,320 --> 00:44:24,000
mail. Go through the direction. That's that's where

1314
00:44:24,000 --> 00:44:25,715
at least I'm at. A lot of people

1315
00:44:25,715 --> 00:44:27,474
are going that direction. You know, that's how

1316
00:44:27,635 --> 00:44:29,635
you know, ultimately, I think it's important that

1317
00:44:29,635 --> 00:44:31,474
if this you know, don't be scared away.

1318
00:44:31,474 --> 00:44:33,074
Keep supporting James, right? To get it. That's

1319
00:44:33,074 --> 00:44:34,914
that's the important thing is that we the

1320
00:44:34,914 --> 00:44:36,755
support I honestly think some of these things

1321
00:44:36,755 --> 00:44:38,070
can be just like that to sort of

1322
00:44:38,070 --> 00:44:39,269
you know, like I said earlier, I think

1323
00:44:39,269 --> 00:44:41,110
off the air with James when Patreon happened

1324
00:44:41,110 --> 00:44:42,869
with with Whitney and I. It's, you know,

1325
00:44:42,869 --> 00:44:44,469
you you follow over and you you probably

1326
00:44:44,469 --> 00:44:46,309
retain, like, 20% of the people that were

1327
00:44:46,309 --> 00:44:47,910
donating there. And I think that's kind of

1328
00:44:47,910 --> 00:44:49,269
by design because I get it. People get

1329
00:44:49,269 --> 00:44:50,789
frustrated. They don't wanna go through it again

1330
00:44:50,789 --> 00:44:52,304
and, you know, so just don't let them

1331
00:44:52,304 --> 00:44:53,905
win is the point. Keep fighting out there.

1332
00:44:53,905 --> 00:44:55,744
But thank you, James, for coming on. I

1333
00:44:55,744 --> 00:44:57,264
appreciate all that you do, man. And I

1334
00:44:57,264 --> 00:44:58,224
look forward to talking to you in the

1335
00:44:58,224 --> 00:45:00,065
future. Well, thank you, Ryan, for being one

1336
00:45:00,065 --> 00:45:01,984
of the, what, free outlets in the world

1337
00:45:01,984 --> 00:45:04,385
that are talking about this now? Anyway, we'll

1338
00:45:04,385 --> 00:45:06,244
we'll keep letting people know this happened.

1339
00:45:07,010 --> 00:45:08,289
Anything you wanna shout out before we leave

1340
00:45:08,289 --> 00:45:09,969
up to up upcoming events or anything? I

1341
00:45:09,969 --> 00:45:10,769
think that's it. I,

1342
00:45:11,650 --> 00:45:13,650
it's August here in Japan and it's getting

1343
00:45:13,650 --> 00:45:14,389
to the sweaty,

1344
00:45:14,849 --> 00:45:16,849
uncomfortable weather. So I am going to be

1345
00:45:16,849 --> 00:45:18,530
probably taking a couple of weeks,

1346
00:45:19,010 --> 00:45:21,184
not off. I'm not going anywhere. I'm not

1347
00:45:21,184 --> 00:45:22,945
doing any vacation stuff. I'm gonna be working

1348
00:45:22,945 --> 00:45:24,465
behind the scenes, but I will be probably

1349
00:45:24,465 --> 00:45:26,405
posting less in the next few weeks. But

1350
00:45:26,704 --> 00:45:28,864
anyway, people can stay tuned to corporate report

1351
00:45:28,864 --> 00:45:31,105
because I have some pretty interesting and important

1352
00:45:31,105 --> 00:45:32,864
stuff coming out next month. So I hope

1353
00:45:32,864 --> 00:45:34,650
people will stick around for that. Alright. I'm

1354
00:45:34,650 --> 00:45:36,409
sure we'll be talking about it. So as

1355
00:45:36,409 --> 00:45:39,130
always, everybody out there, question everything. Come to

1356
00:45:39,130 --> 00:45:39,949
your own conclusions.

1357
00:45:40,489 --> 00:45:41,309
Stay vigilant.