1
00:00:23,339 --> 00:00:25,199
Welcome to the last American Vagabond

2
00:00:25,545 --> 00:00:28,445
here in studio. Joining me today is formerly

3
00:00:28,905 --> 00:00:31,385
Ramiro Armani, now Hakim Anwar. I'll let you

4
00:00:31,385 --> 00:00:32,744
talk about your new name and why you

5
00:00:32,744 --> 00:00:35,130
did that, but we'll talk about the privacy

6
00:00:35,350 --> 00:00:37,670
above phone that I think I'm kicking myself

7
00:00:37,670 --> 00:00:39,130
still to this very day for

8
00:00:39,590 --> 00:00:41,530
not using it. We'll talk about

9
00:00:41,965 --> 00:00:44,045
some why it's important. But we'll talk about,

10
00:00:44,045 --> 00:00:45,884
you know, any the creator of the above

11
00:00:45,884 --> 00:00:48,864
phone, an advocate for privacy, and, you know,

12
00:00:48,924 --> 00:00:51,149
technologically stepping in the right direction and a

13
00:00:51,149 --> 00:00:52,590
couple of things he'll talk about today that

14
00:00:52,590 --> 00:00:53,950
you might find interesting. How are you, brother?

15
00:00:53,950 --> 00:00:55,070
Good to see you again. Doing so well,

16
00:00:55,070 --> 00:00:56,590
man. Good to be in person. Yes. In

17
00:00:56,590 --> 00:00:57,969
the studio. I love it.

18
00:00:58,804 --> 00:01:00,725
Well, so, you you were talking about what

19
00:01:00,725 --> 00:01:02,325
that new name means. And, this is the

20
00:01:02,325 --> 00:01:03,604
first I'd heard about it. I didn't know

21
00:01:03,604 --> 00:01:05,284
he had changed his name. So why did

22
00:01:05,284 --> 00:01:06,805
you change it to Hakim Anwar? Tell us

23
00:01:06,805 --> 00:01:08,599
about that. Yeah. Well, I think when I

24
00:01:08,599 --> 00:01:10,680
was starting my activism, it was actually when

25
00:01:10,680 --> 00:01:13,239
Derek invited me down to Mexico for, the

26
00:01:13,239 --> 00:01:15,400
greater reset. And I thought I wanted to

27
00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:17,239
move to Mexico at the time because all

28
00:01:17,239 --> 00:01:18,825
the we were in the depth of the

29
00:01:18,825 --> 00:01:19,564
the pandemic,

30
00:01:19,944 --> 00:01:21,465
and I was like, okay. I'm I am

31
00:01:21,465 --> 00:01:22,844
Mexican now. So

32
00:01:24,265 --> 00:01:26,090
I gave myself a name that reflected that

33
00:01:26,090 --> 00:01:28,189
and I think as I came forward,

34
00:01:29,530 --> 00:01:31,370
I wanted a name that really reflected my

35
00:01:31,370 --> 00:01:33,290
roots and so I went to Hakim and

36
00:01:33,290 --> 00:01:34,810
War. And I think that a big part

37
00:01:34,810 --> 00:01:36,635
of that is my my life's mission is

38
00:01:36,635 --> 00:01:39,055
making healing technology. So Hakim

39
00:01:39,435 --> 00:01:42,795
means healer and Anwar means illuminated. So together,

40
00:01:42,795 --> 00:01:45,750
it's illuminated healer and, yeah. I like it.

41
00:01:45,750 --> 00:01:47,349
Some of the things I've spoken about at

42
00:01:47,349 --> 00:01:50,149
the last Greater Reset were energetics technologies because

43
00:01:50,149 --> 00:01:52,149
I think that there's a lot of weapons

44
00:01:52,149 --> 00:01:55,084
being used against us. Right? Informational weapons, energetic

45
00:01:55,084 --> 00:01:55,584
weapons.

46
00:01:55,885 --> 00:01:56,865
We also have

47
00:01:57,564 --> 00:02:00,064
to intuit that there are energetic

48
00:02:00,570 --> 00:02:02,329
forces of healing that we can use. And,

49
00:02:02,329 --> 00:02:04,250
I mean, frankly, humanity is gonna need it.

50
00:02:04,250 --> 00:02:06,250
Oh, interesting. Okay. Well, let's elaborate on that.

51
00:02:06,250 --> 00:02:07,450
And by the way, I think it's interesting

52
00:02:07,450 --> 00:02:08,995
that, you know, it I don't hear it

53
00:02:08,995 --> 00:02:10,935
often that people decide to change their name,

54
00:02:11,155 --> 00:02:12,675
you know, other than, like, trying to hide

55
00:02:12,675 --> 00:02:13,955
from the law or something like that. You

56
00:02:13,955 --> 00:02:15,235
know? So I like it. I like that,

57
00:02:15,235 --> 00:02:16,914
you know, do so do you feel that

58
00:02:16,914 --> 00:02:18,909
that, you know so, Ramiro, was that your

59
00:02:18,909 --> 00:02:20,590
birth name that you were born with? They're

60
00:02:20,590 --> 00:02:21,409
both pseudonyms.

61
00:02:21,789 --> 00:02:23,709
Okay. Okay. Yeah. They're both pseudonyms. And and

62
00:02:23,709 --> 00:02:24,909
I think, you know, I think So that's

63
00:02:24,989 --> 00:02:26,110
so I'm completely out of the loop. I

64
00:02:26,110 --> 00:02:27,215
have no idea what's going on.

65
00:02:28,894 --> 00:02:30,655
It's something I'm pretty private about. Right? I

66
00:02:30,655 --> 00:02:32,495
let people come to their own conclusions, which

67
00:02:32,495 --> 00:02:33,875
maybe maybe is a mistake.

68
00:02:34,175 --> 00:02:35,969
But, you know, I feel like we all

69
00:02:35,969 --> 00:02:38,370
we all have the liberty to invent ourselves.

70
00:02:38,370 --> 00:02:40,710
Right? The people that we wanna be. And,

71
00:02:41,569 --> 00:02:44,985
you you know, a family name means little,

72
00:02:44,985 --> 00:02:46,825
I think, because I think we're all realizing

73
00:02:46,825 --> 00:02:48,665
that we're we're in this together, and we're

74
00:02:48,665 --> 00:02:50,264
really looking for new leaders to shine up.

75
00:02:50,264 --> 00:02:51,979
So I think that if you need to

76
00:02:52,199 --> 00:02:54,280
change your name, do it. Yeah. Hey. I

77
00:02:54,280 --> 00:02:55,560
love it, man. I love it. I'm just

78
00:02:55,560 --> 00:02:56,840
seeing it. It's that's that's the whole thing.

79
00:02:56,840 --> 00:02:58,280
I like the fact that it's, you know,

80
00:02:58,280 --> 00:03:00,194
something you don't often see. But so why

81
00:03:00,194 --> 00:03:01,474
don't why don't you elaborate on what you

82
00:03:01,474 --> 00:03:02,995
open with there in general? You know, the

83
00:03:02,995 --> 00:03:04,995
idea of of, you know, dip energy and

84
00:03:04,995 --> 00:03:06,675
and, you know and so how do you

85
00:03:06,675 --> 00:03:08,034
mean that exactly? Do you mean that as,

86
00:03:08,034 --> 00:03:08,500
like,

87
00:03:09,060 --> 00:03:11,300
actual energy? You're talking about, like, personal energy

88
00:03:11,300 --> 00:03:13,219
and, you know, your your positivity and, you

89
00:03:13,219 --> 00:03:15,379
know, elaborate for me. Yeah. Absolutely. It's it's

90
00:03:15,379 --> 00:03:17,614
it's all interconnected. Right? We we can all

91
00:03:17,614 --> 00:03:19,614
be antennas. So when you see a really

92
00:03:19,614 --> 00:03:21,935
nice positive person, it does end up uplifting

93
00:03:21,935 --> 00:03:22,594
you. But,

94
00:03:22,974 --> 00:03:25,169
energetics in the sense it could be light

95
00:03:25,169 --> 00:03:27,090
technology, it could be sound technology, it could

96
00:03:27,090 --> 00:03:27,909
be electromagnetic

97
00:03:28,210 --> 00:03:28,710
technology.

98
00:03:29,090 --> 00:03:29,810
One person,

99
00:03:30,129 --> 00:03:33,189
whose work I'm really attracted to is, doctor

100
00:03:33,514 --> 00:03:34,334
Raymond Reif,

101
00:03:34,634 --> 00:03:35,134
and,

102
00:03:35,914 --> 00:03:38,794
he was famous for the Reif machine, which

103
00:03:38,794 --> 00:03:41,194
is he was able to, he was able

104
00:03:41,194 --> 00:03:43,129
to cure cancer in a study of about

105
00:03:43,290 --> 00:03:44,110
16 people,

106
00:03:45,050 --> 00:03:47,310
by matching the exact frequency

107
00:03:47,689 --> 00:03:50,810
of the pathogen, the cancer pathogen inside those

108
00:03:50,810 --> 00:03:53,415
people. And so, he was a doctor in

109
00:03:53,415 --> 00:03:54,715
California in the 1950s,

110
00:03:55,094 --> 00:03:57,655
and he made the world's most powerful microscope.

111
00:03:57,655 --> 00:03:59,435
So he was actually able to observe

112
00:04:00,030 --> 00:04:00,530
viruses

113
00:04:01,069 --> 00:04:02,530
and other things like tuberculosis

114
00:04:02,909 --> 00:04:03,409
bacteria,

115
00:04:04,270 --> 00:04:06,590
shatter between his eyes. Like literally, it's not

116
00:04:06,590 --> 00:04:08,349
the exact same thing, but a good metaphor

117
00:04:08,349 --> 00:04:10,935
would be like getting a glass and having

118
00:04:10,935 --> 00:04:13,814
an opera singer reach the resonant frequency and

119
00:04:13,814 --> 00:04:16,134
it chatter. So Fascinating. And so and so

120
00:04:16,134 --> 00:04:16,875
so using

121
00:04:17,629 --> 00:04:20,189
energy to to, what, destroy it or or

122
00:04:20,189 --> 00:04:21,870
how or break it up? Is that about

123
00:04:21,870 --> 00:04:22,370
cancer?

124
00:04:22,750 --> 00:04:25,870
Yeah. Absolutely. Yeah. Breaking up cancer and matching

125
00:04:25,870 --> 00:04:28,495
the frequency of different pathogens. And now his

126
00:04:28,495 --> 00:04:30,415
work, you know, is over 50 years ago.

127
00:04:30,415 --> 00:04:32,814
It's kind of evolved over time, and now

128
00:04:32,814 --> 00:04:34,275
there's open source communities.

129
00:04:34,975 --> 00:04:35,475
Spooky

130
00:04:35,959 --> 00:04:38,439
is one of these modern rife machines, which

131
00:04:38,439 --> 00:04:41,720
are like, they're, they're called pad based units

132
00:04:41,720 --> 00:04:43,899
because they're actually in contact with the body.

133
00:04:44,125 --> 00:04:45,644
We're kind of going off on a tangent

134
00:04:45,644 --> 00:04:47,485
here, but I think the important part is

135
00:04:47,485 --> 00:04:49,165
we really need to be looking outside of

136
00:04:49,165 --> 00:04:51,560
medical institutions for our own health. And it

137
00:04:51,560 --> 00:04:52,699
turns out,

138
00:04:53,080 --> 00:04:55,480
vibrational medicine is the best medicine. Maybe that's

139
00:04:55,480 --> 00:04:58,040
music for some people. Maybe that's yoga, which

140
00:04:58,040 --> 00:05:00,365
is literally, you know, we're talking about. I

141
00:05:00,365 --> 00:05:01,964
sit on a chair for 14 hours a

142
00:05:01,964 --> 00:05:04,845
day. Without yoga and opening up that energy

143
00:05:04,845 --> 00:05:06,605
body, my you know, it would be in

144
00:05:06,605 --> 00:05:08,329
a much worse state. This is this is

145
00:05:08,329 --> 00:05:09,610
interesting. This is why I asked that to

146
00:05:09,610 --> 00:05:11,529
start. So it is an overlap. Right? So

147
00:05:11,529 --> 00:05:14,029
you're talking about, like, actual, like, directed energy

148
00:05:14,169 --> 00:05:15,774
to to have an effect, but also just

149
00:05:15,774 --> 00:05:17,555
that the energy you produce, the mindset

150
00:05:18,014 --> 00:05:19,294
that that it has an effect. I mean,

151
00:05:19,294 --> 00:05:20,814
I I a 100% agree with that, like,

152
00:05:20,814 --> 00:05:22,254
that they're 1 and the same. But what

153
00:05:22,254 --> 00:05:23,766
I was gonna ask, I know I I

154
00:05:23,819 --> 00:05:25,500
this is necessarily what we wanna talk about.

155
00:05:25,500 --> 00:05:27,740
But so in regard to that, are is

156
00:05:27,740 --> 00:05:29,420
it, like, let's say, I'm talking about a

157
00:05:29,420 --> 00:05:31,754
pathogen or something. So the energy would in

158
00:05:31,834 --> 00:05:33,355
a sense, it's it's easy to see how

159
00:05:33,355 --> 00:05:35,194
you could break up, like, a cancerous concept

160
00:05:35,194 --> 00:05:36,795
with energy. But let's just say it's a

161
00:05:36,795 --> 00:05:38,475
pathogen. How does that work? Do you understand

162
00:05:38,475 --> 00:05:39,995
that? Like, you explain that for us? That's

163
00:05:39,995 --> 00:05:43,189
interesting. Sure. So, they call it Rife called

164
00:05:43,189 --> 00:05:44,490
it the mortal oscillatory

165
00:05:44,790 --> 00:05:47,990
resonance, the MOR rate of any pathogen, which

166
00:05:47,990 --> 00:05:49,509
could be a virus in the body. It

167
00:05:49,509 --> 00:05:52,235
could be bacteria. It could be literally anything.

168
00:05:52,235 --> 00:05:54,654
And it there's a specific frequency,

169
00:05:55,035 --> 00:05:57,035
which Rife measured it to be in a

170
00:05:57,035 --> 00:05:58,875
fraction of a decimal. I think it was,

171
00:05:58,875 --> 00:06:00,779
like, 4 or 5 places down. And it

172
00:06:00,779 --> 00:06:01,839
has to be exactly

173
00:06:02,220 --> 00:06:04,540
on the money. Otherwise, you're not gonna hit

174
00:06:04,540 --> 00:06:06,540
the frequency. And this is unique for each

175
00:06:06,540 --> 00:06:08,300
individual thing or just for all the stuff

176
00:06:08,300 --> 00:06:10,754
he's dealing with? For it's unique for each

177
00:06:10,754 --> 00:06:13,974
individual pathogen. Interesting. Absolutely. And he also discovered

178
00:06:14,034 --> 00:06:15,254
this thing called a pleomorphism,

179
00:06:15,555 --> 00:06:17,654
which when, some microorganisms

180
00:06:18,300 --> 00:06:18,800
microorganisms,

181
00:06:19,819 --> 00:06:20,319
like

182
00:06:20,699 --> 00:06:21,840
bacteria or viruses

183
00:06:22,220 --> 00:06:24,060
see that they're under attack, they can actually

184
00:06:24,060 --> 00:06:26,764
shape shift and turn into different things and

185
00:06:26,764 --> 00:06:29,404
then which then have different MORs. Interesting. So

186
00:06:29,404 --> 00:06:32,225
it was really, really fascinating. So his microscope,

187
00:06:32,925 --> 00:06:35,069
it had, what is it? It's like 20,000

188
00:06:35,370 --> 00:06:36,269
times magnification,

189
00:06:36,730 --> 00:06:39,050
which would make it more powerful than some

190
00:06:39,050 --> 00:06:42,089
electron microscopes. Mhmm. And, the the important thing

191
00:06:42,089 --> 00:06:43,964
about it, like electron microscope, you have to

192
00:06:43,964 --> 00:06:45,805
kill the thing you're looking at. Right? You're

193
00:06:45,805 --> 00:06:46,544
shooting electrons

194
00:06:47,084 --> 00:06:49,164
into it. And so, he was able to

195
00:06:49,164 --> 00:06:52,204
stain these pathogens in a live form and

196
00:06:52,204 --> 00:06:53,584
actually see them change.

197
00:06:53,949 --> 00:06:56,770
So, of course, after he passed away, someone

198
00:06:57,149 --> 00:07:00,189
took the, someone vandalized the microscope and it's

199
00:07:00,189 --> 00:07:02,904
completely gone, but there's lots of

200
00:07:03,345 --> 00:07:03,925
Someone. Someone.

201
00:07:05,105 --> 00:07:06,485
The industry that yeah.

202
00:07:07,024 --> 00:07:08,384
Yeah. I think the aim I think it

203
00:07:08,464 --> 00:07:10,149
I I believe it's the a AMA that

204
00:07:10,149 --> 00:07:11,830
tried to defraud him. There's this there's a

205
00:07:11,830 --> 00:07:14,389
whole Yeah. Public court case about him, and

206
00:07:14,389 --> 00:07:15,990
it's a really excellent rabbit hole for people

207
00:07:15,990 --> 00:07:17,830
to get through. Fast, man. And so they

208
00:07:17,910 --> 00:07:19,805
they're just, I'm just interested in that in

209
00:07:19,805 --> 00:07:21,564
general because, you know, I mean, I I

210
00:07:21,564 --> 00:07:23,324
tend to the work I do today in

211
00:07:23,324 --> 00:07:24,925
general, I tend to really try to focus

212
00:07:24,925 --> 00:07:25,425
on,

213
00:07:26,090 --> 00:07:27,649
you know, I mean, I guess, mostly just

214
00:07:27,649 --> 00:07:29,170
talking about current events and trying to break

215
00:07:29,170 --> 00:07:30,689
stuff down, but we're in a very, like,

216
00:07:30,689 --> 00:07:32,610
surface level, not in the sense of, like,

217
00:07:32,610 --> 00:07:34,290
the deep information, but not so much getting

218
00:07:34,290 --> 00:07:35,954
into the esoteric and you you know, so

219
00:07:35,954 --> 00:07:37,714
this to me is interesting because I my

220
00:07:37,714 --> 00:07:39,394
point saying that is I have a strong

221
00:07:39,394 --> 00:07:40,294
belief in

222
00:07:40,595 --> 00:07:42,354
these different a lot of times things we

223
00:07:42,354 --> 00:07:44,129
just simply can't prove. And so that is

224
00:07:44,129 --> 00:07:46,310
so interesting when you get into the the

225
00:07:46,449 --> 00:07:47,569
I don't know what word you would use.

226
00:07:47,569 --> 00:07:49,170
The fact that it applies each way and

227
00:07:49,170 --> 00:07:50,389
that, like, your physical,

228
00:07:50,774 --> 00:07:52,535
you know, your your the way the energy

229
00:07:52,535 --> 00:07:53,654
you put out into the world has an

230
00:07:53,654 --> 00:07:55,175
effect on things around you, including your own

231
00:07:55,175 --> 00:07:57,115
health, but then you can, in a legitimate,

232
00:07:57,254 --> 00:08:00,055
verifiable, measurable way, use energy from some kind

233
00:08:00,055 --> 00:08:00,470
of

234
00:08:02,149 --> 00:08:03,829
device to effectively do that. I just think

235
00:08:03,829 --> 00:08:06,069
that's so interesting. So here's this really cool

236
00:08:06,069 --> 00:08:08,089
thing. And, yeah, the field is called bioenergetics,

237
00:08:08,470 --> 00:08:10,805
but there's, now they have these units called

238
00:08:10,805 --> 00:08:13,125
remote units, and you can actually interact with

239
00:08:13,125 --> 00:08:14,504
people's DNA remotely.

240
00:08:14,884 --> 00:08:16,805
So at home Kinda scary, to be honest.

241
00:08:16,805 --> 00:08:18,040
It overlaps with things that

242
00:08:18,520 --> 00:08:19,420
bother me today.

243
00:08:20,520 --> 00:08:23,800
There is exactly. There this technology Nanotech and

244
00:08:23,960 --> 00:08:26,175
Codes for for for for evil. Yeah. But

245
00:08:26,175 --> 00:08:28,014
it's like at home right now, I actually

246
00:08:28,014 --> 00:08:30,574
have a little vial of my blood that's

247
00:08:30,574 --> 00:08:32,495
preserved in grain alcohol, and I can run

248
00:08:32,495 --> 00:08:33,955
frequencies on that DNA.

249
00:08:34,299 --> 00:08:36,460
And that DNA is attached to the rest

250
00:08:36,460 --> 00:08:37,040
of me

251
00:08:37,500 --> 00:08:38,639
through quantum entanglement.

252
00:08:42,815 --> 00:08:45,375
Quantum researchers are now, like, seeing that this

253
00:08:45,534 --> 00:08:48,095
that there actually is connection between all living

254
00:08:48,095 --> 00:08:50,910
things this way. And, so what you can

255
00:08:50,910 --> 00:08:52,669
do is you can make people feel sleepy.

256
00:08:52,669 --> 00:08:54,429
So, like, for instance, I have this Of

257
00:08:54,429 --> 00:08:55,899
course, crazy. Program.

258
00:08:57,524 --> 00:08:58,884
Go ahead. Sorry. Go ahead. It's called the

259
00:08:58,884 --> 00:09:00,485
daily wellness and it gets you ready for

260
00:09:00,485 --> 00:09:02,485
bed. It starts to produce more melatonin than

261
00:09:02,485 --> 00:09:04,425
as you're you're supposed to run it overnight.

262
00:09:04,699 --> 00:09:06,299
And so when I first started working with

263
00:09:06,299 --> 00:09:08,159
this, I was I was kind of skeptical.

264
00:09:08,220 --> 00:09:10,139
Mhmm. But the thing about this particular program,

265
00:09:10,139 --> 00:09:11,419
it goes in a loop. So if you

266
00:09:11,419 --> 00:09:13,179
don't turn it off, it it continues to

267
00:09:13,179 --> 00:09:15,055
go on. And so the 1st night, I

268
00:09:15,055 --> 00:09:17,615
sleep really, really heavy. I like intense dreams.

269
00:09:17,615 --> 00:09:18,735
It was hard to get out of bed.

270
00:09:18,735 --> 00:09:20,175
Right? Just because I was still in that

271
00:09:20,175 --> 00:09:22,309
zone. Then I wake up, it's like 11

272
00:09:22,309 --> 00:09:24,070
o'clock, and I'm starting to feel sleepy again.

273
00:09:24,070 --> 00:09:26,149
I'm like, What is going on? I looked

274
00:09:26,149 --> 00:09:28,149
over at my computer. Program had run again,

275
00:09:28,149 --> 00:09:29,769
and it was getting me ready for bed.

276
00:09:30,375 --> 00:09:32,615
That's weird. And I was like, alright. You

277
00:09:32,615 --> 00:09:34,394
know, that that was kind of a placebo

278
00:09:34,455 --> 00:09:36,774
moment there. I was totally wasn't expecting that.

279
00:09:36,774 --> 00:09:38,980
Mhmm. You know? So, that that's when I

280
00:09:38,980 --> 00:09:41,539
started looking into it more. And yeah. Yeah.

281
00:09:41,539 --> 00:09:43,539
It's just I mean, clearly, there's a ways

282
00:09:43,539 --> 00:09:45,495
that that could be, you know, used in

283
00:09:45,495 --> 00:09:47,254
a negative way. That's interesting. But so let's

284
00:09:47,254 --> 00:09:48,855
let's bring it back to because I mean,

285
00:09:48,855 --> 00:09:50,134
we I could I could literally talk about

286
00:09:50,134 --> 00:09:51,575
that for that's a real it's just really

287
00:09:51,575 --> 00:09:52,075
interesting

288
00:09:52,509 --> 00:09:54,269
in a positive way, but also as, you

289
00:09:54,269 --> 00:09:56,509
know, as most interesting things. Also, you can

290
00:09:56,509 --> 00:09:58,110
see that being used in very nefarious ways.

291
00:09:58,110 --> 00:10:00,110
Right? Overlapping with as my audience is probably

292
00:10:00,110 --> 00:10:01,389
thinking right now, a lot of the things

293
00:10:01,389 --> 00:10:03,695
that I've talked about, you know, labor and

294
00:10:03,695 --> 00:10:05,774
COVID 19 conversations and a lot of stuff.

295
00:10:05,774 --> 00:10:07,235
But so bringing that back to to,

296
00:10:07,615 --> 00:10:09,695
you know, the technological aspect and stuff. So

297
00:10:09,695 --> 00:10:11,054
how does this relate to your work and

298
00:10:11,054 --> 00:10:13,250
what you're doing today? Yeah. Absolutely. So I

299
00:10:13,250 --> 00:10:14,230
think it's another

300
00:10:14,769 --> 00:10:16,769
like, it's another factor of my work, the

301
00:10:16,769 --> 00:10:18,769
energetics work. But before I was doing that,

302
00:10:18,769 --> 00:10:20,850
I was a software engineer in a previous

303
00:10:20,850 --> 00:10:23,884
life. Right? Before I, decided to set off

304
00:10:23,884 --> 00:10:25,804
and start my own company based on privacy

305
00:10:25,804 --> 00:10:28,365
technologies. And I have, Derek Bros to really

306
00:10:28,365 --> 00:10:30,570
thank me on that, to put me on

307
00:10:30,570 --> 00:10:31,870
that path of algorithm

308
00:10:32,250 --> 00:10:34,889
and building solutions for people. I was originally

309
00:10:34,889 --> 00:10:36,409
part of the core team for the Freedom

310
00:10:36,409 --> 00:10:39,070
Sol Network, and during during the

311
00:10:39,615 --> 00:10:41,715
during the lockdowns, we we really

312
00:10:42,095 --> 00:10:44,575
we didn't find many sane people around us

313
00:10:44,575 --> 00:10:46,095
on the street. Right? Everyone was at home,

314
00:10:46,095 --> 00:10:48,210
so everyone turned to the Internet. And that's

315
00:10:48,210 --> 00:10:50,049
the beauty of of technology. You know? It

316
00:10:50,049 --> 00:10:52,610
can be a uniting force for good. Mhmm.

317
00:10:52,610 --> 00:10:54,964
And in my career, I've built web, mobile

318
00:10:54,964 --> 00:10:58,004
mobile applications. I've built cloud infrastructure. I've built

319
00:10:58,004 --> 00:11:00,245
robotic process automation. But none of it was

320
00:11:00,245 --> 00:11:01,384
so powerful

321
00:11:02,029 --> 00:11:04,750
as building a website to bring people together

322
00:11:04,750 --> 00:11:06,350
for an event. Yeah. And that's when I

323
00:11:06,350 --> 00:11:08,110
realized the power of technology. And I also

324
00:11:08,110 --> 00:11:10,615
saw people get persecuted for that. Right? Mhmm.

325
00:11:10,615 --> 00:11:13,815
We saw our our websites for DDoS by

326
00:11:13,815 --> 00:11:17,860
different people. Our our community was and there's

327
00:11:17,860 --> 00:11:20,500
Telegram scammers on Telegram everywhere, and that's when

328
00:11:20,500 --> 00:11:21,240
I realized,

329
00:11:22,100 --> 00:11:24,339
we need more protection than than anyone else.

330
00:11:24,339 --> 00:11:25,699
And I decided to go on a deep

331
00:11:25,699 --> 00:11:29,764
dive of, privacy and technology education. Mhmm. I

332
00:11:29,764 --> 00:11:32,325
started a educational initiative called Take Back Our

333
00:11:32,325 --> 00:11:34,345
Tech, which you can find on takebackortech.org.

334
00:11:35,309 --> 00:11:36,909
And I was really focused I was really

335
00:11:36,909 --> 00:11:37,789
inspired by,

336
00:11:38,350 --> 00:11:41,070
guys like you and Derek for that primary

337
00:11:41,070 --> 00:11:42,769
source objective journalism.

338
00:11:43,345 --> 00:11:45,264
And so I decided, hey. Like, let's not

339
00:11:45,264 --> 00:11:46,085
just assume

340
00:11:46,465 --> 00:11:49,264
they have visibility into everything. Let's actually look

341
00:11:49,264 --> 00:11:51,105
at what you can study and what data

342
00:11:51,105 --> 00:11:51,845
they're capturing,

343
00:11:52,220 --> 00:11:54,379
and let's get a real assessment for how

344
00:11:54,379 --> 00:11:56,299
how how vulnerable we are. Yeah. So that

345
00:11:56,460 --> 00:11:57,500
Yeah. We do tend to kind of have

346
00:11:57,500 --> 00:11:59,865
that view that they're just omnipotent, and there

347
00:11:59,865 --> 00:12:01,704
are some levels, but not everywhere. Maybe they'd

348
00:12:01,704 --> 00:12:03,304
like you to think that too. Right? Right.

349
00:12:03,304 --> 00:12:05,304
Right. Maybe or maybe they are watching everything,

350
00:12:05,304 --> 00:12:06,825
but there's so many of us. What they

351
00:12:06,904 --> 00:12:08,419
what can they really do it? That's that

352
00:12:08,419 --> 00:12:10,659
point from, like, the post well, probably before,

353
00:12:10,659 --> 00:12:13,299
but, you know, world, 9:11 concept where the

354
00:12:13,299 --> 00:12:14,740
net was so wide that they had so

355
00:12:14,740 --> 00:12:17,004
much data that there there's no ability to

356
00:12:17,004 --> 00:12:18,605
actually stop anything, but they can sure as

357
00:12:18,605 --> 00:12:19,964
hell look back and use it against you.

358
00:12:19,964 --> 00:12:21,105
Right? That's that's fascinating.

359
00:12:21,725 --> 00:12:24,205
Yeah. Absolutely. And so it brings it brings

360
00:12:24,205 --> 00:12:25,504
us to today where,

361
00:12:26,090 --> 00:12:28,750
we have been researching the best privacy technology

362
00:12:28,889 --> 00:12:30,970
available. We have our own privacy phone. We

363
00:12:30,970 --> 00:12:33,370
also just launched our privacy laptop, and these

364
00:12:33,370 --> 00:12:35,210
are all solutions I wanna put into people's

365
00:12:35,210 --> 00:12:37,514
hands so that they can start to create

366
00:12:37,514 --> 00:12:39,195
and put their own message out there. And

367
00:12:39,195 --> 00:12:41,195
at least if they're working peer to peer,

368
00:12:41,195 --> 00:12:43,034
if they're working on solutions in their hometown,

369
00:12:43,034 --> 00:12:45,320
have private ways to communicate. Yeah. Because if

370
00:12:45,320 --> 00:12:47,740
one thing is that certain, is that today

371
00:12:48,199 --> 00:12:51,000
today, like, the best evidence of all is

372
00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:54,174
is digital evidence. And and all this surveillance,

373
00:12:54,235 --> 00:12:56,794
it's just a preclusion to control. So first,

374
00:12:56,794 --> 00:12:58,634
they need to surveil you. Right? That's the

375
00:12:58,634 --> 00:13:01,434
CIA playbook. The first 2 thirds of an

376
00:13:01,434 --> 00:13:04,240
operation is them just sitting there and collecting

377
00:13:04,300 --> 00:13:06,860
data. And then they come at you on

378
00:13:06,860 --> 00:13:08,320
the last 3rd. So,

379
00:13:08,620 --> 00:13:10,940
I wanna prevent people from from being controlled

380
00:13:10,940 --> 00:13:11,920
by these technocrats.

381
00:13:12,904 --> 00:13:14,105
The lies. I mean, this is just such

382
00:13:14,105 --> 00:13:15,704
an important I mean, what's crazy to me

383
00:13:15,704 --> 00:13:17,384
is that despite the fact this is such

384
00:13:17,384 --> 00:13:19,464
an obvious issue for the, whatever you wanna

385
00:13:19,464 --> 00:13:21,804
call it, establishment, the technocratic, you know, organization,

386
00:13:22,190 --> 00:13:22,690
that

387
00:13:23,149 --> 00:13:24,590
that you you get why people will be

388
00:13:24,590 --> 00:13:26,190
resistant to step into it. But it's such

389
00:13:26,190 --> 00:13:28,910
an obvious open market. You know, clearly, there

390
00:13:28,910 --> 00:13:30,430
are enough people in the world for this

391
00:13:30,430 --> 00:13:32,585
to you'd expect to see more companies stepping

392
00:13:32,585 --> 00:13:33,945
into this field, but you just don't. I

393
00:13:33,945 --> 00:13:34,764
find that interesting.

394
00:13:35,144 --> 00:13:35,644
But

395
00:13:36,264 --> 00:13:37,785
what I love is it so, basically, you

396
00:13:37,785 --> 00:13:39,309
highlight that you just were like, hey. I

397
00:13:39,309 --> 00:13:40,669
like this, and I wanna change this, and

398
00:13:40,669 --> 00:13:41,870
you just make a phone. I just I

399
00:13:41,870 --> 00:13:43,629
just not everyone can do that. Right? So

400
00:13:43,629 --> 00:13:45,950
let's talk about that process and how, you

401
00:13:45,950 --> 00:13:46,909
know we know we I know we've talked

402
00:13:46,909 --> 00:13:48,269
this before, but it's been a while since

403
00:13:48,269 --> 00:13:49,615
we've talked about it. So let us know

404
00:13:49,615 --> 00:13:51,715
about that. And so how did it start?

405
00:13:51,935 --> 00:13:53,215
Where is it currently in regard to the

406
00:13:53,215 --> 00:13:56,095
phone in specifically? Absolutely. So it was because

407
00:13:56,095 --> 00:13:57,839
I was paranoid, and I was like, okay.

408
00:13:57,839 --> 00:13:59,440
If we're gonna work on this, let's try

409
00:13:59,440 --> 00:14:01,440
and do it as privately as we possibly

410
00:14:01,440 --> 00:14:03,539
can. Hide our hide our identities, and

411
00:14:04,079 --> 00:14:04,579
so,

412
00:14:05,440 --> 00:14:07,695
well, we are standing on the shoulders of

413
00:14:07,695 --> 00:14:09,215
giants and a lot of other people who

414
00:14:09,215 --> 00:14:11,134
who did the important work, like, build the

415
00:14:11,134 --> 00:14:13,054
operating system, and I think what we did

416
00:14:13,054 --> 00:14:15,669
was we came in and productized it because

417
00:14:15,669 --> 00:14:17,429
it is an open source piece of software.

418
00:14:17,429 --> 00:14:19,269
It's very raw. It needs to be refined.

419
00:14:19,269 --> 00:14:21,029
Right? You can't just expect someone off the

420
00:14:21,029 --> 00:14:22,389
street to get one of these phones in

421
00:14:22,389 --> 00:14:23,909
their hands and start using it to their

422
00:14:23,909 --> 00:14:25,674
day to day life. So we realized, like,

423
00:14:25,674 --> 00:14:27,595
we could be the missing link and come

424
00:14:27,595 --> 00:14:29,855
up with, good communication solutions,

425
00:14:30,394 --> 00:14:31,914
figure out the best apps to use. And

426
00:14:31,914 --> 00:14:34,340
so our company is called Above. The product

427
00:14:34,340 --> 00:14:36,340
is called Above Phone. You can check it

428
00:14:36,340 --> 00:14:37,160
out at abovephone.com.

429
00:14:38,500 --> 00:14:41,240
And, since last year, we've had so much

430
00:14:41,300 --> 00:14:44,485
amazing growth. We, we have our email, we

431
00:14:44,485 --> 00:14:46,565
have our email server. We have a calendar

432
00:14:46,565 --> 00:14:48,965
server. We have a VPN with multiple locations

433
00:14:48,965 --> 00:14:50,830
in the United States. These are all things

434
00:14:50,830 --> 00:14:53,950
that people need because, our Internet service providers

435
00:14:53,950 --> 00:14:55,950
are trying to monitor everything we're doing. Right.

436
00:14:55,950 --> 00:14:57,950
And in most cases, they're selling off that

437
00:14:57,950 --> 00:15:01,475
data. There's even, like, joint ventures between, telecom

438
00:15:01,475 --> 00:15:03,154
companies to to sell that data.

439
00:15:04,835 --> 00:15:05,154
And,

440
00:15:06,199 --> 00:15:08,360
so we're we're building all these private software

441
00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:10,279
services because we wanna make Google and Apple

442
00:15:10,279 --> 00:15:12,360
obsolete. Mhmm. Since then, there's also been a

443
00:15:12,360 --> 00:15:14,095
lot of growth in the open source space

444
00:15:14,095 --> 00:15:15,774
to so we now we see things like,

445
00:15:16,335 --> 00:15:19,375
offlinely voice keyboards, which is super, super useful

446
00:15:19,375 --> 00:15:21,375
if you're, you know, you're communicating a lot

447
00:15:21,375 --> 00:15:23,440
with people. Mhmm. So I'd love to demo

448
00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:24,799
some of this stuff. We might I might

449
00:15:24,799 --> 00:15:26,320
not be able to share my screen or

450
00:15:26,320 --> 00:15:27,220
anything. But,

451
00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:28,879
yeah, there's just been a lot of growth.

452
00:15:28,879 --> 00:15:30,480
And I think the most important part is

453
00:15:30,480 --> 00:15:32,764
we've been able to persist and grow. Right?

454
00:15:32,764 --> 00:15:35,004
Yeah. We're we're kind of fighting uphill, like,

455
00:15:35,004 --> 00:15:37,565
against again, this is a Google less phone.

456
00:15:37,565 --> 00:15:40,399
There's no connections to Big Tech, Google, Apple,

457
00:15:40,399 --> 00:15:42,399
any of those. And so not only has

458
00:15:42,399 --> 00:15:44,399
it been able to survive, but it's been

459
00:15:44,399 --> 00:15:46,659
able to flourish. And I think any

460
00:15:47,465 --> 00:15:51,384
any savvy person maybe maybe, who who's conscious

461
00:15:51,384 --> 00:15:52,745
about this stuff should take a step in

462
00:15:52,745 --> 00:15:55,225
this direction because now it's easier to use

463
00:15:55,225 --> 00:15:57,399
than a normal phone, and you've got more

464
00:15:57,399 --> 00:15:59,159
features, which I'd I'm happy to share more

465
00:15:59,159 --> 00:16:01,000
about. Yeah. Yeah. And, I mean, I look.

466
00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:02,919
I'm I'm I'm almost embarrassed as I said

467
00:16:02,919 --> 00:16:05,080
before that I haven't actually you know, because

468
00:16:05,080 --> 00:16:06,771
I I've had this phone for a very

469
00:16:06,771 --> 00:16:08,401
long time. I got it right when you

470
00:16:08,401 --> 00:16:10,031
first started this. Yep. And it's just like

471
00:16:10,235 --> 00:16:12,069
and so trust me, I get the not

472
00:16:12,273 --> 00:16:13,903
resistance is the wrong word, but why it's

473
00:16:13,903 --> 00:16:15,730
difficult for people to make this transition. I

474
00:16:15,730 --> 00:16:17,730
myself am just can't find you know, but

475
00:16:17,730 --> 00:16:19,410
it's I'm I'm making I'm making a promise

476
00:16:19,410 --> 00:16:20,610
to myself right now that I'm gonna go

477
00:16:20,610 --> 00:16:23,190
through this because this is so incredibly important,

478
00:16:23,415 --> 00:16:25,014
you know, that we all see the problems.

479
00:16:25,014 --> 00:16:27,335
And this is not the conversation from 10

480
00:16:27,335 --> 00:16:29,095
years ago or before where it's like, well,

481
00:16:29,095 --> 00:16:31,175
maybe, kind of. We know as a matter

482
00:16:31,175 --> 00:16:33,259
of fact that we are being surveilled We're

483
00:16:33,259 --> 00:16:34,940
being the data is not just being taken

484
00:16:34,940 --> 00:16:36,860
for government uses. It's being taken. It's being

485
00:16:36,860 --> 00:16:38,240
sold. It's being, you know,

486
00:16:39,019 --> 00:16:40,860
collected and organized. And, you know, so this

487
00:16:40,860 --> 00:16:42,944
is such an important thing. So, you know,

488
00:16:42,944 --> 00:16:44,964
what do you find is the biggest resistance

489
00:16:45,584 --> 00:16:47,745
to people making this transition? You know? And

490
00:16:47,824 --> 00:16:49,904
go ahead. It's exactly what you you pointed

491
00:16:49,904 --> 00:16:51,840
out. Right? It's this kind of this anticipation

492
00:16:52,139 --> 00:16:53,820
of all the changes you might have to

493
00:16:53,820 --> 00:16:56,059
make, which it doesn't have to be so

494
00:16:56,059 --> 00:16:57,899
bad for for people. Right? They can kind

495
00:16:57,899 --> 00:17:00,024
of pull off, maybe one service at a

496
00:17:00,024 --> 00:17:02,105
time. And for some people, a lot of

497
00:17:02,105 --> 00:17:03,865
people use 2 phones at once. So maybe

498
00:17:03,865 --> 00:17:05,144
they have a phone that they use to

499
00:17:05,144 --> 00:17:07,349
communicate with their family, but the above phone

500
00:17:07,349 --> 00:17:09,109
is their private phone that they use for

501
00:17:09,109 --> 00:17:11,609
private communications. Things like going off grid,

502
00:17:11,990 --> 00:17:14,390
speaking with their freedom cell, and and things

503
00:17:14,390 --> 00:17:16,335
like that. And some people just completely switch

504
00:17:16,335 --> 00:17:18,335
culture, which is which is a really good

505
00:17:18,335 --> 00:17:20,815
option. Now, if you're coming from the Apple

506
00:17:20,815 --> 00:17:22,654
landscape, it's a little bit more of a

507
00:17:22,654 --> 00:17:24,940
of a paradigm shift, but it's still it's

508
00:17:24,940 --> 00:17:27,259
still easy. And one of the things we're

509
00:17:27,259 --> 00:17:29,019
we're really proud of at our company is

510
00:17:29,019 --> 00:17:31,180
we're there to help you. So anytime you

511
00:17:31,180 --> 00:17:32,815
get a phone from us, we we have

512
00:17:32,815 --> 00:17:34,575
a we have a 45 minute call where

513
00:17:34,575 --> 00:17:36,414
we just sit down with you. We get

514
00:17:36,414 --> 00:17:37,855
your old phone and your new your new

515
00:17:37,855 --> 00:17:39,695
phone. We help you transfer stuff over. That's

516
00:17:39,695 --> 00:17:41,680
good. That's awesome. Which which by the way,

517
00:17:41,680 --> 00:17:43,039
I I I take you up on that

518
00:17:43,039 --> 00:17:44,880
pack and promise and we'll we'll get you

519
00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:46,640
an upgraded phone. Make me do it. Make

520
00:17:46,640 --> 00:17:48,525
me do it. Make you do it. Because

521
00:17:48,525 --> 00:17:50,944
sometimes you just need that accountability. Right?

522
00:17:51,244 --> 00:17:52,845
Absolutely. Well, so go why don't you go

523
00:17:52,845 --> 00:17:54,684
into to the developments on this side? Because,

524
00:17:54,684 --> 00:17:55,805
I mean, I mean, I'll tell you when

525
00:17:55,805 --> 00:17:57,184
when I first saw this thing,

526
00:17:57,549 --> 00:18:00,349
it was immediately evident that this was you

527
00:18:00,349 --> 00:18:01,869
know, it it it's like any other phone.

528
00:18:01,869 --> 00:18:03,230
I mean, it really is. And it it's

529
00:18:03,230 --> 00:18:06,005
very it's it's the the the difference was

530
00:18:06,005 --> 00:18:07,444
whether or not and, like, you can explain

531
00:18:07,444 --> 00:18:09,525
this. You you know, as I understand it,

532
00:18:09,525 --> 00:18:11,204
you can use all the same things if

533
00:18:11,204 --> 00:18:12,404
you wanted to. You could turn it into

534
00:18:12,404 --> 00:18:13,765
an Apple phone, right, if you really wanted

535
00:18:13,765 --> 00:18:15,740
to. But that's is that still correct? Like,

536
00:18:15,740 --> 00:18:17,740
you add these Google things to it, but

537
00:18:17,740 --> 00:18:19,100
the point is you shouldn't because that just

538
00:18:19,100 --> 00:18:19,920
defeats the purpose.

539
00:18:20,380 --> 00:18:21,900
Right. So it's like a a phone that

540
00:18:21,900 --> 00:18:24,174
doesn't make any big tech connections to Google

541
00:18:24,174 --> 00:18:25,934
and Apple. And first, it's like, well, why

542
00:18:25,934 --> 00:18:27,375
are they even involved in the phone? Right?

543
00:18:27,375 --> 00:18:29,214
Can't the phone just live by itself? But

544
00:18:29,214 --> 00:18:31,789
then you have things like Uber and Lyft

545
00:18:31,789 --> 00:18:33,869
and Airbnb and all these things that require

546
00:18:33,869 --> 00:18:34,369
location.

547
00:18:34,670 --> 00:18:36,670
And what you don't realize is that these,

548
00:18:37,070 --> 00:18:39,515
location services that Google and Apple run, they're

549
00:18:39,515 --> 00:18:42,075
not just using GPS satellites, they're actually using

550
00:18:42,075 --> 00:18:45,134
WiFi access points. Mhmm. And we have become

551
00:18:45,195 --> 00:18:47,579
instruments for their own surveillance. Because when you're

552
00:18:47,579 --> 00:18:49,359
going around and you have a normal phone,

553
00:18:49,579 --> 00:18:51,740
your phone is sending out all the Wi

554
00:18:51,740 --> 00:18:53,980
Fi networks that sees nearby. Those are getting

555
00:18:53,980 --> 00:18:56,065
sent off to Google and Apple. Right? There

556
00:18:56,065 --> 00:18:58,144
is a recent case, a few months ago

557
00:18:58,144 --> 00:19:00,404
where researchers at the University of Maryland

558
00:19:00,704 --> 00:19:03,669
found 2,000,000,000 Wi Fi access points in Apple's

559
00:19:03,889 --> 00:19:06,450
Wi Fi positioning system. And they're essentially able

560
00:19:06,450 --> 00:19:08,069
to abuse that system to see

561
00:19:08,450 --> 00:19:10,289
all of the Wi Fi points on Earth.

562
00:19:10,289 --> 00:19:12,149
Right. 2,000,000,000 points that covers

563
00:19:12,464 --> 00:19:12,704
every,

564
00:19:13,265 --> 00:19:15,825
basically every populated area on Earth. Now here's

565
00:19:15,825 --> 00:19:17,825
here's kind of the interesting part. They were

566
00:19:17,825 --> 00:19:19,204
able to see deserters

567
00:19:19,539 --> 00:19:20,759
from Ukraine Army,

568
00:19:21,340 --> 00:19:23,960
from people who were running away for mobilization.

569
00:19:24,100 --> 00:19:26,100
They saw their Wi Fi networks go from

570
00:19:26,100 --> 00:19:28,964
Ukraine to a nearby country. Interesting. In a

571
00:19:28,964 --> 00:19:31,444
darker note, they saw Wi Fi access points

572
00:19:31,444 --> 00:19:32,585
disappear from Gaza

573
00:19:32,964 --> 00:19:35,589
as, you know, the bombardment continued. So it's

574
00:19:35,589 --> 00:19:36,889
that level of granularity

575
00:19:37,349 --> 00:19:39,269
that both of these companies, Google and Apple,

576
00:19:39,269 --> 00:19:41,269
have. Now imagine I mean, Google is a

577
00:19:41,269 --> 00:19:44,250
huge military, tech technology contractor.

578
00:19:44,785 --> 00:19:46,705
Apple doesn't portray itself to be, but, you

579
00:19:46,705 --> 00:19:48,705
know, who know everyone at that level has

580
00:19:48,705 --> 00:19:49,924
got some sort of relationship.

581
00:19:50,384 --> 00:19:52,460
So they have this level of control. We're

582
00:19:52,539 --> 00:19:54,779
becoming instruments, and we don't we don't own

583
00:19:54,779 --> 00:19:56,700
our phones. So Mhmm. When this phone doesn't

584
00:19:56,700 --> 00:19:58,700
make any connections to big tech, you're cutting

585
00:19:58,700 --> 00:20:00,494
yourself off from that. Right. And like you

586
00:20:00,494 --> 00:20:02,255
were saying, you can still do a lot

587
00:20:02,255 --> 00:20:04,095
of the things you love without it. There

588
00:20:04,095 --> 00:20:06,275
are private ways to install applications

589
00:20:06,575 --> 00:20:08,809
from the Google Play Store. That you shouldn't

590
00:20:08,809 --> 00:20:10,490
do though, but yeah. Yeah. I'm just saying

591
00:20:10,490 --> 00:20:12,009
it's possible if you like, I think that

592
00:20:12,009 --> 00:20:13,529
my point was that makes the transition easier

593
00:20:13,529 --> 00:20:15,369
if you wanted to try to slowly bring

594
00:20:15,369 --> 00:20:17,695
yourself into it. Absolutely. Right? And this and

595
00:20:17,695 --> 00:20:19,695
this phone will work on any service. It

596
00:20:19,695 --> 00:20:21,695
will, work with every app. And there you

597
00:20:21,695 --> 00:20:24,000
can download apps from the Google Play Store

598
00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:26,640
more privately. There's this app called Aurora store.

599
00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:28,320
We might have talked about it last time.

600
00:20:28,320 --> 00:20:30,480
There's this one dude in India and some

601
00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:32,480
other developers who are building it. But essentially,

602
00:20:32,480 --> 00:20:34,785
it's like an anonymized pool of Google accounts

603
00:20:34,785 --> 00:20:37,585
that everyone uses to download apps. So, if

604
00:20:37,585 --> 00:20:39,105
there's an app on your phone that you

605
00:20:39,105 --> 00:20:41,265
like using, chances are you can probably use

606
00:20:41,265 --> 00:20:42,679
it on the above phone and you can

607
00:20:42,679 --> 00:20:44,220
use it with increased privacy.

608
00:20:45,079 --> 00:20:47,579
So, in terms of, like, additional features

609
00:20:47,880 --> 00:20:49,960
about it, you can do things like, you

610
00:20:49,960 --> 00:20:52,605
can portion off different parts of your phone.

611
00:20:52,605 --> 00:20:54,845
So sometimes apps has an app ever asked

612
00:20:54,845 --> 00:20:56,384
you, hey. Can I see your photos?

613
00:20:56,765 --> 00:20:59,085
Mhmm. Like, they ask for that permission. Usually,

614
00:20:59,085 --> 00:21:01,345
you give them access to your entire phone.

615
00:21:01,710 --> 00:21:04,670
Yeah. And because these apps are proprietary, no

616
00:21:04,670 --> 00:21:06,029
one can read the code, they could be

617
00:21:06,029 --> 00:21:08,829
taking your entire photo vault. Right? Right. WhatsApp

618
00:21:08,829 --> 00:21:11,785
is, you know, WhatsApp is notorious for all

619
00:21:11,785 --> 00:21:14,444
the permissions it takes. So with, with Graphene

620
00:21:14,505 --> 00:21:16,664
OS, which is the underlying operating system, they

621
00:21:16,664 --> 00:21:18,444
have things called storage scopes,

622
00:21:18,799 --> 00:21:20,400
which you can pick a folder on your

623
00:21:20,400 --> 00:21:22,079
phone, and then you can trick the app

624
00:21:22,079 --> 00:21:24,240
into thinking it has access over your entire

625
00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:26,240
phone Interesting. When it really just has that

626
00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:27,804
folder. I love it. I really wish I

627
00:21:27,804 --> 00:21:29,484
knew more about this stuff in general as

628
00:21:29,484 --> 00:21:31,164
to just, you know, the the the freedom

629
00:21:31,164 --> 00:21:33,085
it allows you when you truly understand how

630
00:21:33,085 --> 00:21:34,579
these things work and to be able to

631
00:21:34,579 --> 00:21:36,019
build stuff like this or be involved with

632
00:21:36,019 --> 00:21:37,720
it all. It's, you know, I just it's

633
00:21:37,940 --> 00:21:40,500
worth knowing more about this. So so what

634
00:21:40,500 --> 00:21:41,480
is essentially

635
00:21:41,994 --> 00:21:43,194
and and go in deeper if you want

636
00:21:43,194 --> 00:21:44,794
to in regard to the features and and

637
00:21:44,794 --> 00:21:46,634
not even just the phone, like other products.

638
00:21:46,634 --> 00:21:47,595
But I like, you know, where are you

639
00:21:47,595 --> 00:21:48,714
going next is what I was gonna ask.

640
00:21:48,714 --> 00:21:50,426
But if you wanna go deeper on that,

641
00:21:50,426 --> 00:21:52,092
I'm sure people wanna hear, you know, what

642
00:21:52,092 --> 00:21:53,757
else, you know, what what else other products

643
00:21:53,757 --> 00:21:55,422
and what else can this thing do that

644
00:21:55,422 --> 00:21:57,454
would benefit people today? Yeah. Absolutely. I I

645
00:21:57,454 --> 00:21:59,775
think one of its most important features is

646
00:21:59,775 --> 00:22:01,454
that allows you to have ownership of your

647
00:22:01,454 --> 00:22:03,154
data. So for instance, you

648
00:22:03,519 --> 00:22:05,599
can use this app called New Pipe. And

649
00:22:05,599 --> 00:22:07,200
in fact, if you have an Android phone

650
00:22:07,200 --> 00:22:08,559
at home, you can look up this app

651
00:22:08,559 --> 00:22:10,880
store called F droid. There's free and open

652
00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:12,720
source apps on this. That means the code

653
00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:14,794
is fully transparent. You can download some of

654
00:22:14,794 --> 00:22:16,174
these apps that I'm talking about.

655
00:22:16,474 --> 00:22:18,315
So, New Pipe is really awesome because it

656
00:22:18,315 --> 00:22:20,714
lets you download YouTube videos directly to your

657
00:22:20,714 --> 00:22:22,910
phone. Mhmm. So the audio or the video,

658
00:22:22,990 --> 00:22:24,750
and now you have, like, you're owning your

659
00:22:24,750 --> 00:22:27,070
your data. Yeah. So I remember when TLav

660
00:22:27,070 --> 00:22:29,150
was, heavily getting censored and there was a

661
00:22:29,150 --> 00:22:30,910
pirate live streamers like You mean you mean

662
00:22:30,910 --> 00:22:31,410
yesterday?

663
00:22:32,015 --> 00:22:32,515
Go

664
00:22:33,214 --> 00:22:35,054
ahead. It's just continuous. Right? It never it

665
00:22:35,054 --> 00:22:36,914
never stopped. Go ahead. Go ahead. Sorry.

666
00:22:39,380 --> 00:22:42,019
And, you know, at a certain point, we

667
00:22:42,019 --> 00:22:44,279
might see ourselves getting cut off from information.

668
00:22:44,339 --> 00:22:45,779
I I mean, I I'm of the belief

669
00:22:45,779 --> 00:22:48,444
that we should try and keep that information

670
00:22:48,585 --> 00:22:50,105
locally as for as long as we can,

671
00:22:50,105 --> 00:22:51,804
especially if it's useful content.

672
00:22:52,105 --> 00:22:54,505
So with these with these, with these different

673
00:22:54,505 --> 00:22:56,025
apps, you can do that. You can download

674
00:22:56,025 --> 00:22:58,029
podcasts directly to your device. You can download

675
00:22:58,029 --> 00:23:00,190
videos directly to your device. What I didn't

676
00:23:00,190 --> 00:23:01,470
mean to interrupt your point. What were you

677
00:23:01,470 --> 00:23:03,230
gonna say? So when TLAB was being censored,

678
00:23:03,230 --> 00:23:04,670
what was your your point there? What were

679
00:23:04,670 --> 00:23:06,884
you gonna say that? My my point was

680
00:23:06,884 --> 00:23:08,825
essentially you can hang on to things

681
00:23:09,125 --> 00:23:10,884
even if you don't have to trust third

682
00:23:10,884 --> 00:23:12,484
parties to Got it. Got it. Got it.

683
00:23:12,484 --> 00:23:14,940
Handle your media for you. Yeah. Very important

684
00:23:14,940 --> 00:23:16,380
today. It's a lot of I mean, so

685
00:23:16,380 --> 00:23:18,139
many people earlier in this. I think it's

686
00:23:18,139 --> 00:23:19,500
it's less and less these days because we

687
00:23:19,500 --> 00:23:21,019
see it, but, you know, had put all

688
00:23:21,019 --> 00:23:22,940
their eggs in the YouTube basket and and

689
00:23:22,940 --> 00:23:23,440
lost

690
00:23:24,125 --> 00:23:26,125
a decade of content because they didn't have

691
00:23:26,125 --> 00:23:27,805
it saved anywhere else. Right? And so that's

692
00:23:27,805 --> 00:23:30,205
obviously important today to save these things because

693
00:23:30,205 --> 00:23:31,025
it's rapidly

694
00:23:31,404 --> 00:23:33,250
vanishing. You know? I mean, I I even

695
00:23:33,329 --> 00:23:35,009
I even wonder about things in regard to,

696
00:23:35,009 --> 00:23:35,509
like,

697
00:23:35,809 --> 00:23:37,329
you know, my website in general. Like, I

698
00:23:37,329 --> 00:23:38,849
feel like I'm noticing things that are no

699
00:23:38,849 --> 00:23:40,769
longer there and how whether, like, it's a

700
00:23:40,769 --> 00:23:42,664
hosting or or or, you know, domain names

701
00:23:42,664 --> 00:23:43,944
and how these things could be abused. You

702
00:23:43,944 --> 00:23:45,804
know? So very important, I think.

703
00:23:46,105 --> 00:23:46,924
Yeah. Absolutely.

704
00:23:47,224 --> 00:23:49,384
And, I mean, some of these so these

705
00:23:49,384 --> 00:23:51,929
are kind of like open source. They're traditionally

706
00:23:51,929 --> 00:23:54,409
thought of as like scrappier amateurish projects, but

707
00:23:54,409 --> 00:23:54,909
really

708
00:23:56,329 --> 00:23:58,490
excuse me. You look at some of these

709
00:23:58,490 --> 00:24:01,424
big companies and they're not as responsible about

710
00:24:01,424 --> 00:24:02,785
our data, you know, as you think they

711
00:24:02,785 --> 00:24:04,865
are. There there's actually massive holes in their

712
00:24:04,865 --> 00:24:06,785
security and privacy. I mean, they don't seem

713
00:24:06,785 --> 00:24:07,845
to care about privacy.

714
00:24:08,230 --> 00:24:09,910
You would think that AT and T, which

715
00:24:09,910 --> 00:24:11,910
is one of the longest running partners of,

716
00:24:12,230 --> 00:24:16,089
United States, surveillance apparatus. Right? Like, super proudly,

717
00:24:16,470 --> 00:24:16,970
openly,

718
00:24:19,625 --> 00:24:22,045
rerouted their entire networks to facilitate

719
00:24:22,664 --> 00:24:24,664
surveillance. You would think they would have learned

720
00:24:24,664 --> 00:24:25,884
something from the NSA,

721
00:24:26,210 --> 00:24:27,250
but they're putting,

722
00:24:27,730 --> 00:24:30,070
tons of our call and text data

723
00:24:30,450 --> 00:24:30,950
on,

724
00:24:31,490 --> 00:24:33,730
on these longs heard term storage providers. So

725
00:24:33,730 --> 00:24:35,205
there is a recent hack. Don't know if

726
00:24:35,205 --> 00:24:36,565
you heard about it. Yeah. I'll bring it

727
00:24:36,565 --> 00:24:38,644
up for you. Go ahead. Yeah. So there

728
00:24:38,644 --> 00:24:40,184
is a recent breach,

729
00:24:40,644 --> 00:24:41,465
data leak,

730
00:24:41,924 --> 00:24:45,029
of, AT and T's call detail records, Just

731
00:24:45,029 --> 00:24:46,630
not not just for them, but also for

732
00:24:46,630 --> 00:24:49,029
many resellers. Right? There's in the United States

733
00:24:49,029 --> 00:24:51,269
at least, there's there's 3 main companies. And

734
00:24:51,269 --> 00:24:53,914
the other companies, they're just really reselling from

735
00:24:53,914 --> 00:24:55,835
the 3 main networks. Mhmm. AT and T

736
00:24:55,835 --> 00:24:57,855
is the biggest, and all 110,000,000

737
00:24:59,035 --> 00:24:59,535
customers,

738
00:25:00,440 --> 00:25:02,919
all of their call and text records were

739
00:25:02,919 --> 00:25:04,140
found in this database.

740
00:25:04,599 --> 00:25:05,579
So just like

741
00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:08,335
all calls and texts from May to October

742
00:25:08,335 --> 00:25:10,734
22nd and then one day, January 2nd. So

743
00:25:10,734 --> 00:25:11,394
it's like,

744
00:25:11,855 --> 00:25:14,095
why and they're restoring it on Amazon Web

745
00:25:14,095 --> 00:25:15,075
Services. So

746
00:25:15,640 --> 00:25:17,880
if you think about that, what type of

747
00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:19,799
investigation is just like, alright. Give me give

748
00:25:19,799 --> 00:25:21,640
me the calls for everyone in the United

749
00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:23,160
States. We'll we'll search through it. Right? You

750
00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:24,345
have to, like, think, why why is that

751
00:25:24,345 --> 00:25:25,625
data So they're not supposed to be holding

752
00:25:25,625 --> 00:25:27,144
all that, obviously. Right? So it's showing you

753
00:25:27,144 --> 00:25:29,304
that they're they're whole you know, everything is

754
00:25:29,304 --> 00:25:31,065
being tracked and held even by these companies

755
00:25:31,065 --> 00:25:32,609
as opposed to the government. And it's a

756
00:25:32,609 --> 00:25:35,329
surveillance program we we we know really nothing

757
00:25:35,329 --> 00:25:37,809
about. It reminded me of, the hemisphere program

758
00:25:37,809 --> 00:25:39,569
because, I mean, these these call logs are,

759
00:25:39,890 --> 00:25:41,910
anonymized. Right? So they don't have any

760
00:25:42,355 --> 00:25:43,835
they don't have a name to them, but

761
00:25:43,835 --> 00:25:45,315
they have a phone number. Right? And then,

762
00:25:45,315 --> 00:25:47,075
I mean, any of us could look up

763
00:25:47,075 --> 00:25:48,835
that phone number and see who's associated with

764
00:25:48,835 --> 00:25:52,019
it. But because they're, because they're all the

765
00:25:52,019 --> 00:25:53,700
calls and texts in the United States for

766
00:25:53,700 --> 00:25:54,599
a given time,

767
00:25:54,900 --> 00:25:55,940
it reminds me of the hemisphere,

768
00:25:56,984 --> 00:26:00,345
program, which was a, warrantless surveillance program by

769
00:26:00,345 --> 00:26:01,724
the Drug Enforcement Agency,

770
00:26:02,505 --> 00:26:04,419
all the way back in, like, I think

771
00:26:04,419 --> 00:26:07,059
the program was launched in 2008, operational in

772
00:26:07,059 --> 00:26:07,559
2010.

773
00:26:08,019 --> 00:26:11,059
So over 10 years ago, and back then,

774
00:26:11,059 --> 00:26:13,115
they were using it for burner phones. You've

775
00:26:13,115 --> 00:26:14,474
seen those shows where they do, like, a

776
00:26:14,474 --> 00:26:16,234
drug deal, and they're like, alright. I got

777
00:26:16,234 --> 00:26:18,474
you. And they break the clock. Doesn't work

778
00:26:18,474 --> 00:26:19,454
at all. Like,

779
00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:22,400
does not work. That's funny. All these things

780
00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:23,920
and it's probably put in there so we

781
00:26:23,920 --> 00:26:26,000
think that it does. Right? Just conspiracy. I

782
00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:27,599
know. But let me ask you this about

783
00:26:27,599 --> 00:26:29,200
the the AT and T thing in general.

784
00:26:29,200 --> 00:26:30,384
Right? So in your opinion,

785
00:26:31,345 --> 00:26:32,945
what do you think the likelihood is that

786
00:26:32,945 --> 00:26:34,085
this is not

787
00:26:34,545 --> 00:26:35,904
now you you made the point that it's

788
00:26:35,904 --> 00:26:38,065
surprising they haven't, you know, learned. Like, what

789
00:26:38,065 --> 00:26:39,424
do you think that either this is a

790
00:26:39,424 --> 00:26:39,924
deliberate,

791
00:26:40,450 --> 00:26:41,109
you know,

792
00:26:41,650 --> 00:26:43,890
allowance for this reality to happen? And then

793
00:26:43,890 --> 00:26:45,650
secondarily, do you think that might be in

794
00:26:45,650 --> 00:26:47,170
the sense of, you know or let me

795
00:26:47,170 --> 00:26:48,289
just put it that way. Do you think

796
00:26:48,289 --> 00:26:50,174
that's a deliberate thing? And do you think

797
00:26:50,174 --> 00:26:52,434
that that might be for a certain reason?

798
00:26:52,894 --> 00:26:55,054
I think they're too big to care. Mhmm.

799
00:26:55,054 --> 00:26:56,654
I I think that they have so much,

800
00:26:57,054 --> 00:26:57,554
insulation,

801
00:26:58,095 --> 00:27:00,259
and they're so friendly with,

802
00:27:00,720 --> 00:27:03,440
you know, intelligence agencies, just the government in

803
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:04,960
general. They're they're, you know, they're one of

804
00:27:04,960 --> 00:27:06,579
the strongest partners that,

805
00:27:06,934 --> 00:27:09,335
and they're and they're too big. Right? Because,

806
00:27:09,654 --> 00:27:12,375
what their their official response was, we're not

807
00:27:12,375 --> 00:27:14,694
sure if this was us or a third

808
00:27:14,694 --> 00:27:16,950
party. So they're you know, they have subsidiaries

809
00:27:17,169 --> 00:27:18,849
and contractors that they work with, and they

810
00:27:18,849 --> 00:27:20,390
can't even keep tabs on them.

811
00:27:20,769 --> 00:27:22,390
For for a 110,000,000

812
00:27:23,089 --> 00:27:24,595
people, they're they're call detail records.

813
00:27:25,394 --> 00:27:27,474
Right? So, it comes back to this concept

814
00:27:27,474 --> 00:27:28,355
of 3rd parties.

815
00:27:28,994 --> 00:27:30,515
And and one thing we wanted to do

816
00:27:30,515 --> 00:27:32,434
with our with our company, Above, is we

817
00:27:32,434 --> 00:27:34,740
wanted to have we wanted to minimize 3rd

818
00:27:34,740 --> 00:27:37,380
parties. Right. We're privately owned, and we don't

819
00:27:37,380 --> 00:27:39,380
work with any third parties. Like, everything from

820
00:27:39,380 --> 00:27:41,720
our own personal email to our chat system

821
00:27:42,365 --> 00:27:44,845
to, our our call system, all of that

822
00:27:44,845 --> 00:27:47,164
is run-in house in our data center. And

823
00:27:47,164 --> 00:27:48,445
that's one of the things that I think

824
00:27:48,445 --> 00:27:51,140
companies should look to. Otherwise, if you trust

825
00:27:51,140 --> 00:27:53,779
third parties with your servers and software services,

826
00:27:53,779 --> 00:27:56,019
you're gonna get crowd striked. Right. That's exactly

827
00:27:56,019 --> 00:27:57,684
what happened. Right? Exactly. Well, why why don't

828
00:27:57,684 --> 00:27:59,285
you touch on that and and connect that

829
00:27:59,285 --> 00:28:00,484
to what we're talking about? For those who

830
00:28:00,484 --> 00:28:02,244
don't know what that was and and, you

831
00:28:02,244 --> 00:28:03,605
know, and now we're talking about the we

832
00:28:03,605 --> 00:28:05,445
recently covered this in general, but the idea

833
00:28:05,445 --> 00:28:08,519
of these the CrowdStrike aspect being used or

834
00:28:08,599 --> 00:28:10,759
and even before that, essentially, being brought in

835
00:28:10,759 --> 00:28:12,119
in some of these cases as, like, the

836
00:28:12,119 --> 00:28:13,799
argument that this will help protect these things

837
00:28:13,799 --> 00:28:15,654
end up being the vulnerable point. Right? So

838
00:28:15,654 --> 00:28:17,095
explain that and and how this connects to

839
00:28:17,095 --> 00:28:19,595
what we're talking about. Yeah. Absolutely. So CrowdStrike

840
00:28:19,894 --> 00:28:21,755
was, it's this, cybersecurity

841
00:28:22,134 --> 00:28:23,035
firm, $83,000,000,000

842
00:28:23,654 --> 00:28:24,795
cybersecurity firm.

843
00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:27,820
They were trusted with the the first investigation

844
00:28:28,039 --> 00:28:30,359
after the SolarWinds hack that impacted, like, a

845
00:28:30,359 --> 00:28:31,580
lot of government agencies.

846
00:28:32,095 --> 00:28:34,575
Also trusted with the DNC email servers. So

847
00:28:34,575 --> 00:28:37,215
this company, which is Giant, they have around

848
00:28:37,215 --> 00:28:37,715
29,000

849
00:28:38,335 --> 00:28:41,315
customers in most western countries and Asian countries.

850
00:28:42,069 --> 00:28:44,650
They have their software embedded into,

851
00:28:45,509 --> 00:28:47,049
a lot of important infrastructure

852
00:28:47,349 --> 00:28:50,704
at, at companies like airlines. And so, last

853
00:28:50,865 --> 00:28:52,804
Friday or the Friday before that, I think,

854
00:28:54,065 --> 00:28:56,224
they pushed a faulty update to Windows servers,

855
00:28:56,224 --> 00:28:58,150
and so it all went down. Right? And

856
00:28:58,150 --> 00:28:59,609
the problem isn't necessarily

857
00:29:00,390 --> 00:29:02,549
Windows versus Linux. A lot of Linux users

858
00:29:02,549 --> 00:29:04,390
were saying, well, this is why we use

859
00:29:04,390 --> 00:29:07,444
Linux. And it's like, well, yeah. But in

860
00:29:07,444 --> 00:29:09,285
this particular case, you would have been fine.

861
00:29:09,285 --> 00:29:11,125
But if you trust a third party with

862
00:29:11,125 --> 00:29:12,724
the security of your servers, they can break

863
00:29:12,724 --> 00:29:13,785
it at any time.

864
00:29:14,339 --> 00:29:15,940
And a lot of people speculate, you know,

865
00:29:15,940 --> 00:29:17,940
that maybe this was was done on purpose

866
00:29:17,940 --> 00:29:20,099
to cause some larger event, which is which

867
00:29:20,099 --> 00:29:21,159
is totally feasible.

868
00:29:21,474 --> 00:29:23,154
But but, again, it just comes out to

869
00:29:23,154 --> 00:29:24,674
these these people have a lot of money

870
00:29:24,674 --> 00:29:26,115
and power, but that doesn't, you know, that

871
00:29:26,115 --> 00:29:28,294
doesn't necessarily translate to competence.

872
00:29:28,660 --> 00:29:30,660
Absolutely. Absolutely. And you're right, though. That's a

873
00:29:30,820 --> 00:29:31,799
just like we say,

874
00:29:32,100 --> 00:29:33,559
people tend to pretend the government,

875
00:29:34,019 --> 00:29:35,799
in in many senses, is just this omnipotent

876
00:29:35,940 --> 00:29:38,255
always watching concept. And I frankly don't think

877
00:29:38,255 --> 00:29:40,414
that's always the case in some areas, but

878
00:29:40,414 --> 00:29:42,174
we that that give it's almost like they've

879
00:29:42,174 --> 00:29:44,819
created that technocratic phenopticon where we think that

880
00:29:44,819 --> 00:29:46,579
so we act accordingly when in reality, there's

881
00:29:46,579 --> 00:29:48,019
some cases of some of the most incompetent

882
00:29:48,019 --> 00:29:49,299
people I've ever seen in my life. You

883
00:29:49,299 --> 00:29:51,960
know? And so, it's interesting though that that

884
00:29:51,984 --> 00:29:54,413
we and the other point is then we

885
00:29:54,413 --> 00:29:56,571
should obviously, as I'm sure you agree, consider

886
00:29:56,571 --> 00:29:58,730
if something like this may be done to

887
00:29:58,730 --> 00:30:00,599
create the call for the solution that they

888
00:30:00,599 --> 00:30:02,200
already have in the wings. Right? The classic

889
00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:03,960
concept. And I think that's where I same

890
00:30:04,039 --> 00:30:05,640
that I was kinda suggesting before is that

891
00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:06,539
I I wonder

892
00:30:06,984 --> 00:30:08,505
how much of this like, I guess my

893
00:30:08,505 --> 00:30:09,944
point would be if you're an AT and

894
00:30:09,944 --> 00:30:11,944
T or something like that. Sure. It could

895
00:30:11,944 --> 00:30:13,625
be that they're just so big they can't

896
00:30:13,625 --> 00:30:15,490
figure it out, but, you know, they're also

897
00:30:15,549 --> 00:30:17,470
wildly they have so much money, so much

898
00:30:17,470 --> 00:30:19,309
ability to take the time and money and

899
00:30:19,309 --> 00:30:20,509
spend to try to figure out how that

900
00:30:20,509 --> 00:30:22,429
doesn't happen. Like, as a company, you would

901
00:30:22,429 --> 00:30:23,869
know that that would be seen as a

902
00:30:23,869 --> 00:30:24,369
detriment.

903
00:30:24,734 --> 00:30:26,014
And maybe it's because you know that the

904
00:30:26,095 --> 00:30:27,454
they know they have nowhere else to go.

905
00:30:27,454 --> 00:30:29,375
But I would argue from a company perspective,

906
00:30:29,375 --> 00:30:31,934
you that's it's bad. It looks bad. You

907
00:30:31,934 --> 00:30:34,440
you hurt your your customers. So my point

908
00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:35,960
would be that it's hard for me to

909
00:30:35,960 --> 00:30:37,559
believe that this would just be like a

910
00:30:37,559 --> 00:30:39,559
whoopsie. You know, the same thing happened again,

911
00:30:39,559 --> 00:30:41,480
which is always possible. But all these events

912
00:30:41,480 --> 00:30:42,220
coming together,

913
00:30:42,744 --> 00:30:44,825
I genuinely believe some elements of this are

914
00:30:44,825 --> 00:30:45,325
about,

915
00:30:45,625 --> 00:30:48,105
you know, creating the justification for what we

916
00:30:48,105 --> 00:30:50,105
all kind of see building. You know? Yeah.

917
00:30:50,105 --> 00:30:52,130
That's a fair point. Maybe, like, eroding the

918
00:30:52,130 --> 00:30:54,549
the trust in really large institutions

919
00:30:54,930 --> 00:30:57,009
to to and then you have things like

920
00:30:57,009 --> 00:30:59,170
the, you know, the, the UN Digital Compact,

921
00:30:59,170 --> 00:31:00,769
which you and Derek were just talking about.

922
00:31:00,769 --> 00:31:02,434
And there's a whole there's a whole cluster

923
00:31:02,434 --> 00:31:04,994
in there about Internet governance. So maybe that

924
00:31:04,994 --> 00:31:07,394
completely plays into that as we show how

925
00:31:07,394 --> 00:31:08,914
bad everyone is. And this is why we

926
00:31:08,914 --> 00:31:10,920
need a cyber security framework that the whole

927
00:31:10,920 --> 00:31:12,519
world can follow. And that way, we can

928
00:31:12,519 --> 00:31:15,019
protect the Internet and hold these hackers accountable.

929
00:31:15,079 --> 00:31:17,079
And and it it could also be a

930
00:31:17,079 --> 00:31:18,774
a level of just, like, you know, like,

931
00:31:18,774 --> 00:31:20,174
it my point is it doesn't always have

932
00:31:20,174 --> 00:31:22,015
to be some kind of, like, coordinated deliberate

933
00:31:22,015 --> 00:31:23,454
action. Like you're saying, it could be a

934
00:31:23,454 --> 00:31:26,579
level of, like, almost willful laziness. That's like,

935
00:31:26,579 --> 00:31:28,140
well, you know, if we just leave it,

936
00:31:28,140 --> 00:31:29,579
so this will probably happen as well. And

937
00:31:29,579 --> 00:31:31,259
that way, it's never let a good crisis

938
00:31:31,259 --> 00:31:32,779
kinda thing. You know? But but either way,

939
00:31:32,779 --> 00:31:34,380
I mean, we all see the building of

940
00:31:35,224 --> 00:31:36,904
I mean, the the concept of we need

941
00:31:36,904 --> 00:31:37,644
to reimagine,

942
00:31:38,024 --> 00:31:39,704
you know, build back better kind of a

943
00:31:39,704 --> 00:31:40,605
site scenario,

944
00:31:41,065 --> 00:31:43,464
it's obvious that they're driving in these solutions

945
00:31:43,464 --> 00:31:45,400
in other ways. So even if this was

946
00:31:45,400 --> 00:31:48,359
a random thing, it's still being used to

947
00:31:48,359 --> 00:31:51,079
drive in that same solution. You know? And

948
00:31:51,079 --> 00:31:53,744
I think that's a really dangerous direction. Because,

949
00:31:53,744 --> 00:31:55,424
you know, rightly so, people who are just

950
00:31:55,424 --> 00:31:57,345
affected by this are gonna say, you know,

951
00:31:57,345 --> 00:31:59,345
that's not okay with me. You we have

952
00:31:59,345 --> 00:32:01,105
to fix this problem. You know? And there

953
00:32:01,105 --> 00:32:02,619
might be, as we Derek and I were

954
00:32:02,619 --> 00:32:04,700
just talking about, there might be solutions that

955
00:32:04,700 --> 00:32:06,779
don't involve giving up all of your you

956
00:32:06,779 --> 00:32:08,619
know, giving up anonymity and so on. Right?

957
00:32:08,619 --> 00:32:10,474
And that's exactly what we're talking about. Let

958
00:32:10,474 --> 00:32:11,794
me ask you this actually. Do you think

959
00:32:11,794 --> 00:32:12,535
it's possible

960
00:32:13,154 --> 00:32:14,775
for an AT and T sized

961
00:32:15,154 --> 00:32:16,214
company to

962
00:32:16,595 --> 00:32:18,515
adopt your practices and what you think would

963
00:32:18,515 --> 00:32:20,319
be, you know, the the right direction? Is

964
00:32:20,319 --> 00:32:22,039
that even possible for a company that size?

965
00:32:22,039 --> 00:32:24,079
I don't I don't think so. I I

966
00:32:24,079 --> 00:32:25,759
I know there's there's a name for this

967
00:32:25,759 --> 00:32:28,855
this concept where where organize gays organizations get

968
00:32:28,855 --> 00:32:30,934
so big, they can't even handle the amount

969
00:32:30,934 --> 00:32:32,775
of data and the and the the amount

970
00:32:32,775 --> 00:32:34,934
of connections, and they have to outsource certain

971
00:32:34,934 --> 00:32:36,619
things. But I I think I think that

972
00:32:36,619 --> 00:32:38,140
it I mean, it's the same thing with

973
00:32:38,140 --> 00:32:40,940
food, isn't it? Like, how much, how much

974
00:32:40,940 --> 00:32:42,940
food can you really produce before you have

975
00:32:42,940 --> 00:32:45,119
to start doing things like adding in additives

976
00:32:45,180 --> 00:32:47,394
to preserve the shelf life or

977
00:32:47,775 --> 00:32:48,015
to,

978
00:32:48,654 --> 00:32:50,734
to make things more efficient. And I think

979
00:32:50,734 --> 00:32:51,304
at a certain,

980
00:32:52,930 --> 00:32:55,170
it's just human nature not to be handled,

981
00:32:55,330 --> 00:32:56,769
to be able to handle things at a

982
00:32:56,769 --> 00:32:59,170
certain scale, and things start degrading. So that's

983
00:32:59,170 --> 00:33:00,845
that's the that's the metaphor I would make.

984
00:33:00,845 --> 00:33:02,005
I I did wanna make one more point

985
00:33:02,005 --> 00:33:03,484
of Real quick, though. I would simply add

986
00:33:03,484 --> 00:33:05,325
that's exactly I would argue that's why we

987
00:33:05,325 --> 00:33:07,164
shouldn't. I mean, it's not necessary to go

988
00:33:07,164 --> 00:33:09,130
to this mass production level. I just simply

989
00:33:09,130 --> 00:33:11,210
don't agree with that. And that's exactly where

990
00:33:11,210 --> 00:33:13,049
we end up, where we are feel driven

991
00:33:13,049 --> 00:33:15,289
to make these compromised choices because that just

992
00:33:15,289 --> 00:33:16,884
is the world. We don't need it like

993
00:33:16,884 --> 00:33:18,805
that. You know, we can use smaller local

994
00:33:18,805 --> 00:33:21,045
kind of concepts, and it works the functions

995
00:33:21,045 --> 00:33:22,724
just well just fine. So go ahead. And

996
00:33:22,724 --> 00:33:24,319
and that totally used to be the case.

997
00:33:24,319 --> 00:33:25,839
Right? I mean, I'm sure you remember the

998
00:33:25,839 --> 00:33:27,839
days where email was a lot more it

999
00:33:27,839 --> 00:33:29,679
feels a lot more community based. Right? Maybe

1000
00:33:29,679 --> 00:33:31,515
you had email through your Internet service provider,

1001
00:33:31,515 --> 00:33:33,515
but anyone could run an email server. Mhmm.

1002
00:33:33,515 --> 00:33:36,075
Now today, there's there's a handful of email

1003
00:33:36,075 --> 00:33:38,494
providers, Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail.

1004
00:33:38,875 --> 00:33:40,490
Always how it ends up. ProtonMail

1005
00:33:40,789 --> 00:33:42,789
is now just a big tech provider as

1006
00:33:42,869 --> 00:33:44,150
like the rest of them. Right? Mhmm. It

1007
00:33:44,150 --> 00:33:46,070
didn't used to be like this. Right? Software

1008
00:33:46,070 --> 00:33:46,630
used to be,

1009
00:33:48,365 --> 00:33:49,964
anyone should be able to run an email

1010
00:33:49,964 --> 00:33:51,484
server. So we Right. We have a few

1011
00:33:51,484 --> 00:33:53,964
1,000 customers on our email server, but we

1012
00:33:53,964 --> 00:33:56,045
we look into a future where the the

1013
00:33:56,045 --> 00:33:58,589
computing for our community could be handled at

1014
00:33:58,589 --> 00:34:00,670
the local level Mhmm. Where someone you trust

1015
00:34:00,670 --> 00:34:02,589
in your community is handling your end to

1016
00:34:02,589 --> 00:34:04,429
end encrypted messaging. That's great. I I love

1017
00:34:04,429 --> 00:34:06,509
that. I love that. Somebody that you, you

1018
00:34:06,509 --> 00:34:08,804
know, at least know and can call and

1019
00:34:08,804 --> 00:34:10,405
talk to and somebody that you think you

1020
00:34:10,405 --> 00:34:12,965
trust being, like, the the manager of your

1021
00:34:13,125 --> 00:34:15,045
this is actually really fascinating because thinking about

1022
00:34:15,045 --> 00:34:16,960
where the world is today. Right? Where now

1023
00:34:16,960 --> 00:34:18,719
we need some kind of, like, community data

1024
00:34:18,719 --> 00:34:20,880
manager. You know, so it's like makes managing

1025
00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:22,880
all of the data control flowing through your

1026
00:34:22,880 --> 00:34:23,619
one community.

1027
00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:25,440
I love stuff like that. Right? I mean,

1028
00:34:25,440 --> 00:34:27,594
that's it's you know, I personally, my mind,

1029
00:34:27,594 --> 00:34:29,034
I wanna go in the other direction. I

1030
00:34:29,034 --> 00:34:30,394
wanna go back before this stuff was even

1031
00:34:30,394 --> 00:34:32,634
around. You probably disagree. But, like, I I

1032
00:34:32,634 --> 00:34:34,394
just think that if we're forced to go

1033
00:34:34,394 --> 00:34:35,739
in this direction, right, where I think we

1034
00:34:35,739 --> 00:34:37,739
can kinda see that this is happening whether

1035
00:34:37,739 --> 00:34:39,260
we like it or not, that's the kind

1036
00:34:39,260 --> 00:34:40,780
of solution I can get behind. And the

1037
00:34:40,780 --> 00:34:42,300
only reason that will be pushed back on

1038
00:34:42,300 --> 00:34:44,059
is because it's not something that can be

1039
00:34:44,059 --> 00:34:46,924
centrally managed, in my opinion. Right? Like, if

1040
00:34:46,924 --> 00:34:48,444
you're gonna comment, go ahead. I was, the

1041
00:34:48,444 --> 00:34:50,045
only thing I was gonna say is, like,

1042
00:34:50,045 --> 00:34:51,724
so back before that time, you know, thing,

1043
00:34:52,045 --> 00:34:54,960
companies had federation, which would mean chat protocols

1044
00:34:54,960 --> 00:34:57,599
were interoperable with each other. Right? Even at

1045
00:34:57,599 --> 00:34:58,099
AOL

1046
00:34:58,559 --> 00:35:01,940
and, Apple Apple Messenger, like the original versions

1047
00:35:02,000 --> 00:35:04,864
would federate with something called Jabber or XMPP,

1048
00:35:05,085 --> 00:35:06,764
which is a chat protocol, which is just

1049
00:35:06,764 --> 00:35:08,605
a fancy way of saying here are some

1050
00:35:08,605 --> 00:35:10,364
rules so so we can chat with with

1051
00:35:10,364 --> 00:35:12,150
each other over the Internet. Right. And they

1052
00:35:12,150 --> 00:35:14,099
would allow federation. And then it kinda shifted

1053
00:35:14,099 --> 00:35:16,048
into, no. No. No. I want all these

1054
00:35:16,048 --> 00:35:17,996
customers for themselves. I want people in my

1055
00:35:17,996 --> 00:35:19,855
walled garden. I'm not gonna communicate with other

1056
00:35:19,855 --> 00:35:21,535
people. Mhmm. So I think it's gonna take

1057
00:35:21,535 --> 00:35:23,375
an organic shift for people to say, hey,

1058
00:35:23,375 --> 00:35:25,375
no, this is these are actually the qualities

1059
00:35:25,375 --> 00:35:27,369
that I want in my software. And so

1060
00:35:27,369 --> 00:35:27,869
XMPP

1061
00:35:28,250 --> 00:35:30,170
is a software that's been around for 20

1062
00:35:30,170 --> 00:35:32,409
years. Mhmm. It has all the features that

1063
00:35:32,409 --> 00:35:35,085
something like Telegram or WhatsApp has. It has,

1064
00:35:35,405 --> 00:35:38,525
end 10 encrypted encryption for the audio calls,

1065
00:35:38,525 --> 00:35:40,605
the messages, and the voice calls. And it

1066
00:35:40,605 --> 00:35:42,200
works similar to email. Like, you you can

1067
00:35:42,200 --> 00:35:43,880
sign up for free, you get something that

1068
00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:45,240
looks like an email address, and you can

1069
00:35:45,240 --> 00:35:47,559
immediately start messaging people. So I think in

1070
00:35:47,559 --> 00:35:49,675
the future, as as things start heating up

1071
00:35:49,755 --> 00:35:51,855
and, you know, you might see a shorter

1072
00:35:51,994 --> 00:35:53,295
cycle time from

1073
00:35:53,755 --> 00:35:55,775
maybe someone doing something wrong,

1074
00:35:56,235 --> 00:35:56,735
to,

1075
00:35:57,800 --> 00:36:00,280
to a consequence about it, that that smart

1076
00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:02,440
people are gonna shift to private communications. And

1077
00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:04,360
I think XMPP is an excellent way. There's

1078
00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:05,579
also many other solutions.

1079
00:36:05,934 --> 00:36:07,534
Well, so what I was gonna ask is,

1080
00:36:07,534 --> 00:36:09,795
you know, taking this idea of a more

1081
00:36:10,094 --> 00:36:11,954
localized in you know,

1082
00:36:12,654 --> 00:36:15,349
management of of these processes to at least

1083
00:36:15,349 --> 00:36:17,349
try to ensure that you're not being it's

1084
00:36:17,349 --> 00:36:19,349
not being used for companies or government access

1085
00:36:19,349 --> 00:36:21,464
and so on. Do you think that's, I

1086
00:36:21,464 --> 00:36:23,464
guess, scalable? Like, the idea like, let's just

1087
00:36:23,464 --> 00:36:24,204
say you

1088
00:36:24,744 --> 00:36:26,284
community started doing this.

1089
00:36:26,664 --> 00:36:28,025
Do you think that would have a negative

1090
00:36:28,025 --> 00:36:31,059
effect on on the current connectivity people have?

1091
00:36:31,059 --> 00:36:32,179
Or do you you know, could that be

1092
00:36:32,179 --> 00:36:34,099
managed that way in your mind? I think

1093
00:36:34,099 --> 00:36:36,420
so. Yeah. Absolutely. I I think that I

1094
00:36:36,420 --> 00:36:38,844
think that I mean, they're they're just protocols

1095
00:36:38,844 --> 00:36:39,804
at the end of the day. And if

1096
00:36:39,804 --> 00:36:41,365
they're if these servers are able to talk

1097
00:36:41,365 --> 00:36:42,765
to each other, it doesn't matter where the

1098
00:36:42,765 --> 00:36:44,765
server lives. It just matters that it's connected

1099
00:36:44,765 --> 00:36:46,125
to the Internet. And as long as there's

1100
00:36:46,125 --> 00:36:48,630
not any meddling going on at the higher

1101
00:36:48,630 --> 00:36:49,130
levels,

1102
00:36:49,510 --> 00:36:51,690
then, you know, there's nothing preventing,

1103
00:36:52,230 --> 00:36:54,150
people from running their own servers for everything.

1104
00:36:54,150 --> 00:36:55,829
Right? This is a this is a movement

1105
00:36:55,829 --> 00:36:58,015
called self hosting that is becoming more and

1106
00:36:58,015 --> 00:37:00,335
more popular where people just run their own

1107
00:37:00,335 --> 00:37:03,054
software services. Right? Anyone can rent a cloud

1108
00:37:03,054 --> 00:37:05,390
server. And maybe for people in the audience,

1109
00:37:05,450 --> 00:37:07,289
you're you're maybe a little bit more proficient

1110
00:37:07,289 --> 00:37:09,130
technically. You don't mind learning. You don't mind

1111
00:37:09,130 --> 00:37:09,869
reading documentation.

1112
00:37:10,329 --> 00:37:12,410
Maybe you start self hosting a few services.

1113
00:37:12,410 --> 00:37:13,695
You can look into XMPP.

1114
00:37:14,474 --> 00:37:16,474
There's also a bunch of great projects like

1115
00:37:16,474 --> 00:37:16,974
snicket,

1116
00:37:17,355 --> 00:37:19,114
which is s n I k k e

1117
00:37:19,114 --> 00:37:21,309
t, which you can just sign up and

1118
00:37:21,309 --> 00:37:23,869
they'll actually run a server for you. So

1119
00:37:23,869 --> 00:37:25,630
you pay once and then they run your,

1120
00:37:25,789 --> 00:37:28,349
they they start an encrypted messaging server for

1121
00:37:28,349 --> 00:37:30,114
you, which you can use with XMPP.

1122
00:37:30,414 --> 00:37:32,815
Interesting. So, that's something I think Tila could

1123
00:37:32,815 --> 00:37:34,735
definitely use right now. You know? Because we've

1124
00:37:34,735 --> 00:37:36,719
got we got booted out of Discord and

1125
00:37:36,719 --> 00:37:38,079
a lot of different Really? Yeah. We got

1126
00:37:38,079 --> 00:37:39,219
bit banned from the platform.

1127
00:37:39,519 --> 00:37:40,019
Why?

1128
00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:42,579
The same old stupid reasons. I mean, frankly,

1129
00:37:42,640 --> 00:37:44,320
you know, I I I actually rarely used

1130
00:37:44,320 --> 00:37:46,325
it to engage. I just posted our content

1131
00:37:46,325 --> 00:37:47,724
in there, people to come check it out.

1132
00:37:47,724 --> 00:37:50,125
And and, I forget their argue. I don't

1133
00:37:50,125 --> 00:37:51,505
even think we got an official

1134
00:37:51,805 --> 00:37:53,710
reason. Yeah. It just we just got banned.

1135
00:37:53,710 --> 00:37:55,230
And I think, you know, that we're trying

1136
00:37:55,230 --> 00:37:57,070
to we've been shuffling different we tried wire

1137
00:37:57,070 --> 00:37:58,109
for a minute. You know, it's just like

1138
00:37:58,109 --> 00:37:59,389
these things. It's not even close to the

1139
00:37:59,389 --> 00:38:00,989
same. It's you know? So that would be

1140
00:38:00,989 --> 00:38:02,425
something we should you know, maybe Maybe you

1141
00:38:02,425 --> 00:38:03,704
could set up a TLIVE version for us.

1142
00:38:03,704 --> 00:38:05,144
That'd be great. I would love to. Yeah.

1143
00:38:05,144 --> 00:38:06,824
That'd be awesome, man. And we definitely need

1144
00:38:06,824 --> 00:38:08,585
that. You know? And so I I think

1145
00:38:08,585 --> 00:38:09,324
this is

1146
00:38:09,869 --> 00:38:12,230
difficult for some people because it's you know,

1147
00:38:12,230 --> 00:38:14,109
I like host just hosting your own servers.

1148
00:38:14,109 --> 00:38:16,750
Right? Usually pretty expensive these days unless I

1149
00:38:16,750 --> 00:38:19,945
am, you know, outdated and then technical expertise

1150
00:38:19,945 --> 00:38:21,305
to do it, set it up, manage it,

1151
00:38:21,305 --> 00:38:23,785
a lot of electricity. And even then, the

1152
00:38:23,785 --> 00:38:26,239
issue that maybe you lose connection or electricity

1153
00:38:26,239 --> 00:38:27,760
in your local area and that would affect

1154
00:38:27,760 --> 00:38:29,679
a larger system. Yeah. You know, but there's

1155
00:38:29,679 --> 00:38:32,239
obviously potential downsides, but I I argue that

1156
00:38:32,239 --> 00:38:34,179
this is something we should definitely lean into.

1157
00:38:34,375 --> 00:38:36,375
Do you see that direction going in a

1158
00:38:36,375 --> 00:38:37,974
way or that going in the direction of

1159
00:38:37,974 --> 00:38:39,434
that being less

1160
00:38:39,894 --> 00:38:41,974
problematic in the expense side? Like, is this

1161
00:38:41,974 --> 00:38:44,359
becoming more feasible for the average person? I

1162
00:38:44,359 --> 00:38:46,119
think that we just need to get creative

1163
00:38:46,119 --> 00:38:47,800
with our monetization schemes. I don't think it's

1164
00:38:47,800 --> 00:38:49,179
that expensive. It's like,

1165
00:38:49,559 --> 00:38:52,119
you know, how much do do companies pay

1166
00:38:52,119 --> 00:38:54,184
for something like Google Suite? Maybe they pay,

1167
00:38:54,184 --> 00:38:56,184
like, 10 to $20 a month. Mhmm. Imagine

1168
00:38:56,184 --> 00:38:57,704
getting a group of your friends, maybe there's

1169
00:38:57,704 --> 00:38:59,465
a dozen of you, and putting that much

1170
00:38:59,465 --> 00:39:01,945
into a local server server pool. And you

1171
00:39:01,945 --> 00:39:03,929
just appoint one person to to set up

1172
00:39:03,929 --> 00:39:04,589
the server.

1173
00:39:05,050 --> 00:39:07,609
You know, server servers aren't that expensive. You

1174
00:39:07,609 --> 00:39:09,530
could see yourself paying maybe, like, 40 to

1175
00:39:09,530 --> 00:39:12,335
$60 for a really well equipped server. And

1176
00:39:12,335 --> 00:39:14,675
there's software that you can use to run

1177
00:39:14,815 --> 00:39:15,315
multiple,

1178
00:39:15,855 --> 00:39:19,319
multiple, like, applications on 1 server. So there

1179
00:39:19,319 --> 00:39:20,920
are ways you can make it cost effective.

1180
00:39:20,920 --> 00:39:21,900
It just takes

1181
00:39:22,440 --> 00:39:25,000
committing to committing to that structure. Yeah. So

1182
00:39:25,079 --> 00:39:27,659
yeah. Yeah. I I think it's definitely possible.

1183
00:39:27,719 --> 00:39:29,364
And if you guys are interested out there,

1184
00:39:29,364 --> 00:39:31,364
we're starting to be open up a little

1185
00:39:31,364 --> 00:39:33,285
bit more about what software we use. So

1186
00:39:33,285 --> 00:39:35,684
we we we run our own VPN service,

1187
00:39:35,684 --> 00:39:37,845
which is actually it's based off of mesh

1188
00:39:37,845 --> 00:39:39,159
network software. But,

1189
00:39:40,260 --> 00:39:40,760
essentially,

1190
00:39:41,139 --> 00:39:43,219
I think with VPN is really, really important.

1191
00:39:43,219 --> 00:39:45,619
So when we use our our software services,

1192
00:39:45,619 --> 00:39:46,579
you know, you have an end to end

1193
00:39:46,579 --> 00:39:48,704
encrypted connection. And And if you're using our

1194
00:39:48,704 --> 00:39:51,785
email server or our, encrypted messaging server or

1195
00:39:51,785 --> 00:39:53,125
a video conferencing server,

1196
00:39:53,425 --> 00:39:55,984
your, your connection is actually never leaving the

1197
00:39:55,984 --> 00:39:58,539
data center. So that's that's really, really special.

1198
00:39:58,539 --> 00:40:00,300
Yeah. The other part to it is that

1199
00:40:00,380 --> 00:40:02,300
alright. Then there is the, the other person

1200
00:40:02,300 --> 00:40:04,494
on the other end of the connection. Right?

1201
00:40:04,494 --> 00:40:06,335
Whether you're texting them or you're using a

1202
00:40:06,335 --> 00:40:08,494
different messenger, you also need to get them

1203
00:40:08,494 --> 00:40:10,094
on board. It can't be, like, a one

1204
00:40:10,094 --> 00:40:12,335
party thing. So okay. So that's that's one

1205
00:40:12,335 --> 00:40:14,239
of the largest limitations then. Right? Does it

1206
00:40:14,239 --> 00:40:16,159
you can't just adopt yourself and then acts

1207
00:40:16,159 --> 00:40:18,400
and to communicate with people that aren't on

1208
00:40:18,400 --> 00:40:18,900
that

1209
00:40:19,519 --> 00:40:21,119
network? Okay. It's like how do you get

1210
00:40:21,119 --> 00:40:22,295
how how do you get someone else to

1211
00:40:22,295 --> 00:40:24,394
adopt it to a way that is,

1212
00:40:24,694 --> 00:40:25,194
is,

1213
00:40:26,054 --> 00:40:26,554
maybe

1214
00:40:26,934 --> 00:40:29,359
appropriate enough or to the extent enough where

1215
00:40:29,359 --> 00:40:31,280
both of you feel protected. Yeah. So a

1216
00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:33,280
good example of this is, like, Jitsi video

1217
00:40:33,280 --> 00:40:35,280
conferencing, which I'm sure you've heard of maybe

1218
00:40:35,280 --> 00:40:37,114
a little bit, which is a really nice

1219
00:40:37,114 --> 00:40:38,554
because you don't need an app. Like, if

1220
00:40:38,554 --> 00:40:39,994
you invite your friend to it, you don't

1221
00:40:39,994 --> 00:40:41,594
need an app. They can kinda just show

1222
00:40:41,594 --> 00:40:43,914
up to a meeting link URL, and then

1223
00:40:43,914 --> 00:40:45,594
you hop into a call. It's very zoom

1224
00:40:45,594 --> 00:40:47,900
like. But if you're running your own Jitsi

1225
00:40:47,900 --> 00:40:49,420
server, it is end to end encrypted. And

1226
00:40:49,420 --> 00:40:50,859
once you end the call, there is no

1227
00:40:50,859 --> 00:40:53,019
trace. So I see in the future, right,

1228
00:40:53,019 --> 00:40:54,940
we're gonna maybe we're gonna we're gonna see

1229
00:40:54,940 --> 00:40:57,755
less and less people using cell networks Mhmm.

1230
00:40:57,835 --> 00:41:00,235
Thanks to all these crazy things that they're

1231
00:41:00,235 --> 00:41:02,394
doing and and they're dropping the ball and

1232
00:41:02,394 --> 00:41:04,735
hopefully using these end to end encrypted communications.

1233
00:41:05,339 --> 00:41:07,099
So I understand it make sure I'm understanding

1234
00:41:07,099 --> 00:41:09,579
it correctly. So you you can communicate, but

1235
00:41:09,579 --> 00:41:11,739
it's not secure in that sense? Or, like

1236
00:41:11,980 --> 00:41:13,579
so you set up your own server bank

1237
00:41:13,579 --> 00:41:15,405
and, you know, your own location and you

1238
00:41:15,405 --> 00:41:17,664
run this network, and some has an iPhone,

1239
00:41:18,125 --> 00:41:19,644
and you wanna talk to that person. Is

1240
00:41:19,644 --> 00:41:21,244
that not possible, or it just is, but

1241
00:41:21,244 --> 00:41:22,065
it's not secure?

1242
00:41:22,369 --> 00:41:24,530
There's there's I think there's just layers that

1243
00:41:24,530 --> 00:41:27,010
you're you're passing through which aren't aren't vetted.

1244
00:41:27,010 --> 00:41:29,010
So for instance, it's like I get someone

1245
00:41:29,089 --> 00:41:30,449
which you can totally do with this on

1246
00:41:30,449 --> 00:41:32,125
an iPhone. You can run XMPP. You can

1247
00:41:32,125 --> 00:41:33,885
use that Snicket app that I was talking

1248
00:41:33,885 --> 00:41:35,885
about. Mhmm. Okay. So we're messaging back and

1249
00:41:35,885 --> 00:41:38,065
forth. And in transit, I know it's encrypted.

1250
00:41:38,204 --> 00:41:40,144
But what do I know about Apple's keyboard?

1251
00:41:40,230 --> 00:41:42,070
Do I have the the code for Apple's

1252
00:41:42,070 --> 00:41:44,230
keyboard? How do I know not nothing is

1253
00:41:44,230 --> 00:41:46,570
being logged when someone's typing into the keyboard?

1254
00:41:46,630 --> 00:41:48,635
Which there is a ton of logging happening

1255
00:41:48,635 --> 00:41:50,394
at least on the, on the Google side

1256
00:41:50,394 --> 00:41:51,375
with different keyboards

1257
00:41:51,914 --> 00:41:54,074
there. And so, yeah, there's, like, different, I

1258
00:41:54,074 --> 00:41:56,320
would just call them leaks in the communication

1259
00:41:56,380 --> 00:41:59,180
chain. So I think for for maximum privacy

1260
00:41:59,180 --> 00:42:01,260
and security, you'd wanna use something like a

1261
00:42:01,260 --> 00:42:03,420
d Google phone, an above phone. Mhmm. Have

1262
00:42:03,420 --> 00:42:05,264
both parties on that and also be using,

1263
00:42:05,664 --> 00:42:07,984
Internet based communications. Right. Right. So the reason

1264
00:42:07,984 --> 00:42:09,824
I ask is that's important because the point

1265
00:42:09,824 --> 00:42:11,585
is that that so the limitation I thought

1266
00:42:11,664 --> 00:42:13,025
so it's actually less limiting than I thought.

1267
00:42:13,025 --> 00:42:14,489
It's just more of a security issue. Right?

1268
00:42:14,489 --> 00:42:16,409
But I think it's important that, you know,

1269
00:42:16,409 --> 00:42:17,710
you build these networks

1270
00:42:18,730 --> 00:42:20,569
that you can still, if you want to,

1271
00:42:20,569 --> 00:42:22,449
overlap with the current existing because you're gonna

1272
00:42:22,449 --> 00:42:23,815
get a lot of people that, you know,

1273
00:42:23,815 --> 00:42:25,335
like, if you simply knew that you had

1274
00:42:25,335 --> 00:42:27,015
to, like it's like having an app, like,

1275
00:42:27,015 --> 00:42:28,615
a communication app that you can't talk to

1276
00:42:28,615 --> 00:42:30,135
us unless you download the app. A lot

1277
00:42:30,135 --> 00:42:31,289
of people just don't do it. You know

1278
00:42:31,289 --> 00:42:32,410
what I mean? And so this is that

1279
00:42:32,489 --> 00:42:34,010
that's I'm glad that that works out that

1280
00:42:34,010 --> 00:42:35,610
way. So I think that's important and I

1281
00:42:35,610 --> 00:42:37,929
think this is I mean, I'm I'm not

1282
00:42:37,929 --> 00:42:38,010
as,

1283
00:42:39,315 --> 00:42:40,595
keeping up on a lot of these new

1284
00:42:40,595 --> 00:42:42,434
directions and steps, and I should. I just

1285
00:42:42,434 --> 00:42:44,035
think that's that's exactly what I think we

1286
00:42:44,035 --> 00:42:45,555
should lean into. And I it's I think

1287
00:42:45,555 --> 00:42:47,530
that this is not as difficult as it

1288
00:42:47,530 --> 00:42:49,610
may seem to some people, myself included. You

1289
00:42:49,610 --> 00:42:51,690
know? So it's important to talk about. We'd

1290
00:42:51,690 --> 00:42:53,449
love to get you onboarded. So, I mean,

1291
00:42:53,449 --> 00:42:56,235
if if you think Ryan should, completely divest

1292
00:42:56,235 --> 00:42:58,075
himself from big tech, leave him a comment.

1293
00:42:58,075 --> 00:43:00,095
Let's all motivate each other. Please.

1294
00:43:01,035 --> 00:43:03,515
Seriously. Upgrade. Well, you know, as I'm thinking,

1295
00:43:03,515 --> 00:43:04,795
just what I was thinking about what you're

1296
00:43:04,795 --> 00:43:06,010
talking about, that is, is, you know, like,

1297
00:43:06,010 --> 00:43:07,610
we we should definitely try to work more

1298
00:43:07,610 --> 00:43:09,769
together and, you know, we could build stuff

1299
00:43:09,769 --> 00:43:11,369
just for TLab. Like, I think we need

1300
00:43:11,369 --> 00:43:13,050
that, you know, and, obviously, it's a fine

1301
00:43:13,130 --> 00:43:14,965
the financial side. You know, that's why you

1302
00:43:14,965 --> 00:43:16,644
guys support us. We're trying to build out

1303
00:43:16,644 --> 00:43:18,405
these actions, but we should talk more about

1304
00:43:18,405 --> 00:43:20,644
this for sure. So so where where are

1305
00:43:20,965 --> 00:43:22,485
you know, we talked about the phone. Right?

1306
00:43:22,485 --> 00:43:24,349
But you have there's a computer. Correct? Yes.

1307
00:43:24,349 --> 00:43:25,710
Is there anything else that you've added since

1308
00:43:25,710 --> 00:43:27,329
last time we talked in the kind of,

1309
00:43:27,390 --> 00:43:29,390
you know, what rev whatever you call it,

1310
00:43:29,390 --> 00:43:30,610
the the, repertoire?

1311
00:43:32,235 --> 00:43:33,675
There's there's a lot, you know, we have

1312
00:43:33,675 --> 00:43:35,434
a giant roadmap, but I think one of

1313
00:43:35,434 --> 00:43:37,034
the things is like good work takes time.

1314
00:43:37,034 --> 00:43:39,114
And so this is a second iteration of

1315
00:43:39,114 --> 00:43:40,875
the computer. You guys can check it out

1316
00:43:40,875 --> 00:43:41,614
at abovephonedot

1317
00:43:42,079 --> 00:43:42,579
com/book.

1318
00:43:43,519 --> 00:43:45,460
This is a, Linux based computer.

1319
00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:48,960
It's running an operating system called, Arch Linux,

1320
00:43:48,960 --> 00:43:51,039
which is a really advanced version of Linux.

1321
00:43:51,039 --> 00:43:52,625
But the reason we like it, it it's

1322
00:43:52,625 --> 00:43:54,784
very configurable. Right? Arch could be as small

1323
00:43:54,784 --> 00:43:56,465
as just one terminal prompt or it could

1324
00:43:56,465 --> 00:43:58,760
be a full fledged operating system, And of

1325
00:43:58,760 --> 00:44:00,380
course, that's what we opted for.

1326
00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:00,920
And,

1327
00:44:01,559 --> 00:44:03,239
I I think the the real piece was

1328
00:44:03,239 --> 00:44:05,640
like, okay, what is the best way to

1329
00:44:05,640 --> 00:44:08,235
use Linux? Let's learn a little bit from

1330
00:44:08,235 --> 00:44:11,114
Apple. Right? That there's really beautiful gestures that

1331
00:44:11,114 --> 00:44:12,875
they have, which which you'll get to try

1332
00:44:12,875 --> 00:44:14,730
out here in a second, Ryan. Let's let's

1333
00:44:14,730 --> 00:44:16,329
learn a little bit from them. Let's learn

1334
00:44:16,329 --> 00:44:17,849
a bit little bit from the Windows side

1335
00:44:17,849 --> 00:44:19,869
and have a machine that is private,

1336
00:44:20,489 --> 00:44:22,809
that gives you access to a tremendous amount

1337
00:44:22,809 --> 00:44:24,655
of software, which Arch Linux does, thanks to

1338
00:44:24,655 --> 00:44:26,195
the Arch user repository,

1339
00:44:26,574 --> 00:44:28,675
which is one of the only decentralized

1340
00:44:28,974 --> 00:44:29,795
user repositories,

1341
00:44:30,335 --> 00:44:32,335
which I'm saying a lot of technical sounding

1342
00:44:32,335 --> 00:44:34,730
words. All that means is that anyone can

1343
00:44:34,730 --> 00:44:36,570
taste a piece piece of software and publish

1344
00:44:36,570 --> 00:44:39,289
it. So imagine your friends can, like, upload

1345
00:44:39,289 --> 00:44:40,730
software and you can install it in a

1346
00:44:40,730 --> 00:44:42,734
second. And then what we decided to do

1347
00:44:42,734 --> 00:44:44,894
was, like, okay. It's already hard enough setting

1348
00:44:44,894 --> 00:44:46,894
up a Linux system. Let's do all that

1349
00:44:46,894 --> 00:44:48,494
work for you. And then in the process,

1350
00:44:48,494 --> 00:44:50,839
we just built our own operating system. Mhmm.

1351
00:44:50,839 --> 00:44:52,839
And then we also made programs to to

1352
00:44:52,839 --> 00:44:54,519
make everything a lot easier. So if you

1353
00:44:54,519 --> 00:44:56,679
wanna install a piece of software, you can

1354
00:44:56,679 --> 00:44:58,519
literally search it in a program. You'll see

1355
00:44:58,519 --> 00:45:00,784
the image. You can click install. Right? No

1356
00:45:00,784 --> 00:45:02,724
terminal commands. That was something we wanted.

1357
00:45:03,585 --> 00:45:05,585
Good amount of our audiences, you know, the

1358
00:45:05,585 --> 00:45:06,565
the older generation,

1359
00:45:07,059 --> 00:45:09,480
and we wanted to support them, and also

1360
00:45:09,539 --> 00:45:11,539
new people too. Right? Because this is this

1361
00:45:11,539 --> 00:45:13,940
is hard enough already. People want the best,

1362
00:45:13,940 --> 00:45:16,385
and so we decided to, yeah, make it

1363
00:45:16,385 --> 00:45:18,224
as easy as What explain what what do

1364
00:45:18,224 --> 00:45:19,744
you mean by no terminal commands? What does

1365
00:45:19,744 --> 00:45:22,065
it mean? So, normally, in a Linux environment,

1366
00:45:22,065 --> 00:45:23,664
you know, you will do things like,

1367
00:45:24,250 --> 00:45:26,650
go in a terminal even to install software.

1368
00:45:26,650 --> 00:45:28,889
So like to say, let's just say to

1369
00:45:28,889 --> 00:45:32,250
install Zoom. Okay. On, on Arch Linux, you

1370
00:45:32,250 --> 00:45:34,704
might use the Pac Man package manager and

1371
00:45:34,704 --> 00:45:37,105
you might type Zoom after it and to

1372
00:45:37,105 --> 00:45:39,025
actually install it. So you need to know

1373
00:45:39,025 --> 00:45:40,625
the terminal commands. You need to know the

1374
00:45:40,625 --> 00:45:42,849
flags. That's that's too much. Right? That you're

1375
00:45:42,849 --> 00:45:44,849
learning a little bit. And and maybe some

1376
00:45:44,849 --> 00:45:46,609
Linux purists would get mad at me. Actually,

1377
00:45:46,609 --> 00:45:48,184
a lot of people in Arch Linux would

1378
00:45:48,184 --> 00:45:49,625
would would get mad at me for for

1379
00:45:49,625 --> 00:45:52,184
saying that. Right? People people should learn. Yes.

1380
00:45:52,184 --> 00:45:53,704
But we're kind of on a time crunch

1381
00:45:53,704 --> 00:45:55,864
here, and and there's a greater reason to

1382
00:45:55,864 --> 00:45:57,489
why we're using this technology. So why don't

1383
00:45:57,489 --> 00:45:59,250
we just make it easier for people and

1384
00:45:59,570 --> 00:46:00,869
And a lot of people out there

1385
00:46:01,170 --> 00:46:02,690
just may not want to, and that doesn't

1386
00:46:02,690 --> 00:46:04,130
mean they still might be open to the

1387
00:46:04,130 --> 00:46:05,250
change if you give it to them in

1388
00:46:05,250 --> 00:46:07,195
a way that's easily digestible. I mean, that's

1389
00:46:07,195 --> 00:46:09,454
that's yeah. I get it. I agree. It's

1390
00:46:09,835 --> 00:46:11,914
better for people to learn and understand it.

1391
00:46:11,914 --> 00:46:13,035
I see that with a lot of stuff

1392
00:46:13,035 --> 00:46:15,239
we do. But, you know, if someone's, like,

1393
00:46:15,239 --> 00:46:16,920
willing to take those steps but just doesn't

1394
00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:18,279
wanna go through that work, I get it.

1395
00:46:18,279 --> 00:46:19,739
I mean but it it's still important

1396
00:46:20,119 --> 00:46:21,880
to bring them along if they're interested. Because

1397
00:46:21,880 --> 00:46:23,414
what we're trying to do is not just

1398
00:46:23,655 --> 00:46:25,655
change one aspect of something. We're talking about

1399
00:46:25,655 --> 00:46:27,414
larger changes that affect the world, you know,

1400
00:46:27,414 --> 00:46:29,094
in in positive ways in our society and

1401
00:46:29,094 --> 00:46:30,855
our communities. And I just think a lot

1402
00:46:30,855 --> 00:46:32,539
of people are, you know, some some people,

1403
00:46:32,539 --> 00:46:34,859
like, are are just aren't capable of doing

1404
00:46:34,859 --> 00:46:36,699
those things. You know, maybe want to but

1405
00:46:36,699 --> 00:46:38,139
can't. So I agree with you. I think

1406
00:46:38,139 --> 00:46:39,635
it's important to try to make this as

1407
00:46:39,635 --> 00:46:41,394
user friendly as possible for the benefit of

1408
00:46:41,394 --> 00:46:43,474
everybody, you know? Everyone has their gifts, you

1409
00:46:43,474 --> 00:46:45,635
know? I'm not I'm not the mastermind behind

1410
00:46:45,635 --> 00:46:47,609
my garden. I I needed I needed a

1411
00:46:47,609 --> 00:46:49,309
lot of help with that one. Right? Right.

1412
00:46:49,529 --> 00:46:51,289
One thing I do wanna say is is,

1413
00:46:52,009 --> 00:46:54,250
so the the the computer is special, and

1414
00:46:54,250 --> 00:46:56,375
we're we're kind of building this ecosystem. So

1415
00:46:56,375 --> 00:46:58,315
we we have the email, the VPN,

1416
00:46:59,175 --> 00:47:01,355
the calendar service, our search engine,

1417
00:47:01,894 --> 00:47:04,010
and our video conferencing. And the reason it's

1418
00:47:04,010 --> 00:47:05,769
special is because all of these are something

1419
00:47:05,769 --> 00:47:08,889
I call universal Internet utilities. So usually when

1420
00:47:08,889 --> 00:47:10,989
you use even something like ProtonMail

1421
00:47:11,610 --> 00:47:13,469
or Apple Mail or Imessage,

1422
00:47:13,894 --> 00:47:16,054
you're in this ecosystem where you can only

1423
00:47:16,054 --> 00:47:18,054
use those apps. Right? It's not it's not,

1424
00:47:18,295 --> 00:47:20,135
it's not open. You can't use a different

1425
00:47:20,135 --> 00:47:22,054
device. That's not allowed. You can't use anything

1426
00:47:22,054 --> 00:47:22,869
besides the app.

1427
00:47:23,349 --> 00:47:25,269
There was a time where you can you

1428
00:47:25,269 --> 00:47:27,829
could use any different app, as long it

1429
00:47:27,829 --> 00:47:29,885
was if as long as it was compatible

1430
00:47:30,445 --> 00:47:32,605
with that communication method. So when you use

1431
00:47:32,605 --> 00:47:34,945
our messaging system, it works on your computer.

1432
00:47:35,164 --> 00:47:37,244
It works on your phone. And because we

1433
00:47:37,244 --> 00:47:39,449
do things like, we're working with this company

1434
00:47:39,449 --> 00:47:42,190
called GMP to bridge our encrypted messenger

1435
00:47:42,650 --> 00:47:44,730
with the phone network, you can actually send

1436
00:47:44,730 --> 00:47:46,510
text messages from your computer

1437
00:47:46,875 --> 00:47:48,474
and they show up on your phone and

1438
00:47:48,474 --> 00:47:49,295
and vice versa.

1439
00:47:49,835 --> 00:47:51,594
So you can do all these special things

1440
00:47:51,594 --> 00:47:53,755
and and have your computer and phone completely

1441
00:47:53,755 --> 00:47:56,640
synced. You can also sync the files between

1442
00:47:56,640 --> 00:47:58,719
your computer and phone as well. So now

1443
00:47:58,719 --> 00:48:01,199
you are kind of, circumventing the need for

1444
00:48:01,199 --> 00:48:03,485
any cloud system Right. And your computer and

1445
00:48:03,485 --> 00:48:05,164
your phone are literally just talking to each

1446
00:48:05,164 --> 00:48:07,244
other peer to peer. So synced all the

1447
00:48:07,244 --> 00:48:08,684
time even when you're apart? Or is it

1448
00:48:08,684 --> 00:48:10,465
have to update when it comes back into

1449
00:48:10,619 --> 00:48:12,380
same network? They have to be connected to

1450
00:48:12,380 --> 00:48:13,579
the Internet. Right. But as long as they're

1451
00:48:13,579 --> 00:48:14,860
connected to the Internet. Yeah. You can Well,

1452
00:48:14,860 --> 00:48:16,300
that that's fantastic, though. That was one of

1453
00:48:16,300 --> 00:48:17,739
the things that I think is what the

1454
00:48:17,739 --> 00:48:18,239
conveniences

1455
00:48:18,539 --> 00:48:20,875
of what these current devices are selling people

1456
00:48:20,875 --> 00:48:22,655
on. You know? And so it's the the

1457
00:48:22,795 --> 00:48:24,394
the more that you clearly are advancing with

1458
00:48:24,394 --> 00:48:25,994
this, you know, it seems like all the

1459
00:48:25,994 --> 00:48:27,355
same features are there if you just go

1460
00:48:27,355 --> 00:48:29,369
through the steps. Absolutely. As long as you

1461
00:48:29,369 --> 00:48:30,730
go through the setup. Yeah. So it's like,

1462
00:48:30,730 --> 00:48:32,170
okay. Can we take that setup out of

1463
00:48:32,170 --> 00:48:33,929
the equation and give it you know, get

1464
00:48:33,929 --> 00:48:35,369
it out of the box? So Yeah. Yeah.

1465
00:48:35,449 --> 00:48:37,194
I'm really interested just because I know you're

1466
00:48:37,194 --> 00:48:38,675
you're an Apple user for the time being.

1467
00:48:38,675 --> 00:48:40,195
So I wanted to I I wanna see

1468
00:48:40,195 --> 00:48:41,954
how how easy you think it is. Yeah.

1469
00:48:41,954 --> 00:48:43,155
Let's do it. Give me give me what

1470
00:48:43,155 --> 00:48:45,029
demonstration you got. What are we doing? Alright,

1471
00:48:45,029 --> 00:48:46,949
Ryan. I'm gonna give you a quick tour

1472
00:48:46,949 --> 00:48:48,469
of the above book and all the different

1473
00:48:48,469 --> 00:48:50,230
things that it can do. But first, we

1474
00:48:50,230 --> 00:48:52,375
have to start with its security. So I'm

1475
00:48:52,375 --> 00:48:54,055
turning it on, and you'll notice that I'm

1476
00:48:54,055 --> 00:48:57,335
presented with this, encryption page. And that is

1477
00:48:57,335 --> 00:48:59,195
because the above book is protected

1478
00:48:59,800 --> 00:49:02,119
by the, best form of encryption in the

1479
00:49:02,119 --> 00:49:03,019
Linux ecosystem

1480
00:49:03,400 --> 00:49:04,940
known as a lux encryption.

1481
00:49:05,559 --> 00:49:08,119
And, so that is going to prevent anyone

1482
00:49:08,119 --> 00:49:10,074
who, if they if they take your laptop

1483
00:49:10,074 --> 00:49:12,574
or otherwise sees your laptop, it's gonna protect

1484
00:49:12,875 --> 00:49:15,755
you from having your data taken. So that's

1485
00:49:15,755 --> 00:49:17,934
a really important security baseline

1486
00:49:18,349 --> 00:49:20,849
that we, we implemented on our computers.

1487
00:49:21,710 --> 00:49:24,190
And throughout the process of creating this, we

1488
00:49:24,190 --> 00:49:26,289
we really tried to learn from

1489
00:49:26,750 --> 00:49:29,625
the, the the Linux ecosystem, of course, but

1490
00:49:29,625 --> 00:49:31,945
also the Windows and and Mac ecosystems so

1491
00:49:31,945 --> 00:49:32,684
you can see

1492
00:49:32,985 --> 00:49:33,485
inspiration

1493
00:49:33,864 --> 00:49:36,460
from the the better parts of them, of

1494
00:49:36,460 --> 00:49:39,119
course, leaving the surveillance and tracking behind.

1495
00:49:39,659 --> 00:49:40,940
So this is what it looks like when

1496
00:49:40,940 --> 00:49:42,779
you're when you're logged in. You'll notice a

1497
00:49:42,779 --> 00:49:44,835
few things are just different. You've got this

1498
00:49:44,914 --> 00:49:46,835
top, top menu bar as we like to

1499
00:49:46,835 --> 00:49:49,234
call it. You've got your system tray where

1500
00:49:49,234 --> 00:49:50,994
you've got you'd be able to control things

1501
00:49:50,994 --> 00:49:51,734
like sound,

1502
00:49:52,034 --> 00:49:52,775
your Internet,

1503
00:49:53,369 --> 00:49:55,690
even, even your night light to to to

1504
00:49:55,690 --> 00:49:58,410
help color the screen red so that, the

1505
00:49:58,410 --> 00:50:00,570
the blue light isn't as harmful on your

1506
00:50:00,570 --> 00:50:01,869
eyes late at night.

1507
00:50:02,324 --> 00:50:04,005
And you can also control a battery from

1508
00:50:04,005 --> 00:50:05,844
there. At the bottom, we we have a

1509
00:50:05,844 --> 00:50:08,565
way to launch apps and to search anything

1510
00:50:08,565 --> 00:50:10,585
on the computer literally by

1511
00:50:11,119 --> 00:50:14,079
hitting the start key and beginning to type.

1512
00:50:14,079 --> 00:50:16,099
You can search anything on your computer.

1513
00:50:16,400 --> 00:50:18,099
I could look up

1514
00:50:18,574 --> 00:50:21,775
ways to run local language models or I

1515
00:50:21,775 --> 00:50:24,015
can pull up any app that I have

1516
00:50:24,015 --> 00:50:24,515
installed.

1517
00:50:25,054 --> 00:50:27,295
And here's how you can actually install an

1518
00:50:27,295 --> 00:50:27,795
application

1519
00:50:28,369 --> 00:50:30,849
using the software store. So on a normal,

1520
00:50:31,089 --> 00:50:31,589
Linux,

1521
00:50:32,049 --> 00:50:32,549
distribution,

1522
00:50:33,009 --> 00:50:35,250
you might be using the terminal to install

1523
00:50:35,250 --> 00:50:35,989
your packages.

1524
00:50:36,335 --> 00:50:38,335
That is hard for some people. It's it's

1525
00:50:38,335 --> 00:50:39,934
really not that hard, and and we do

1526
00:50:39,934 --> 00:50:41,855
teach you on our videos. But if you

1527
00:50:41,855 --> 00:50:43,775
wanted to use a menu, this one is

1528
00:50:43,775 --> 00:50:45,969
really nice and easy to use, and you

1529
00:50:45,969 --> 00:50:47,650
can see how easy it is. I'm gonna

1530
00:50:47,650 --> 00:50:50,789
search for Creda, which is a digital illustrations

1531
00:50:51,010 --> 00:50:53,250
tool. So I would just click on, the

1532
00:50:53,250 --> 00:50:55,085
download arrow, and it would walk me through

1533
00:50:55,085 --> 00:50:57,644
the process of installing it, which is fairly

1534
00:50:57,644 --> 00:50:59,565
easy. And then I also wanna point out

1535
00:50:59,565 --> 00:51:00,864
you can get things that,

1536
00:51:01,405 --> 00:51:04,684
would normally not be, not be private apps,

1537
00:51:04,684 --> 00:51:06,590
but you can still use them on the

1538
00:51:06,590 --> 00:51:08,349
above book. You have the freedom to. So

1539
00:51:08,349 --> 00:51:10,190
for those of you who use Zoom and

1540
00:51:10,190 --> 00:51:11,869
don't wanna use the web browser, you can

1541
00:51:11,869 --> 00:51:13,855
still get it installed on your computer. There's

1542
00:51:13,855 --> 00:51:14,755
also Spotify.

1543
00:51:15,215 --> 00:51:16,974
And so it's just getting you thinking, hey,

1544
00:51:17,215 --> 00:51:19,454
I'm using I'm using I'm used to using

1545
00:51:19,454 --> 00:51:21,739
these programs on my other device. You there's

1546
00:51:21,739 --> 00:51:23,500
a pretty good chance you'll be able to

1547
00:51:23,500 --> 00:51:25,260
use it on the above book. And, of

1548
00:51:25,260 --> 00:51:27,599
course, you can always ask us directly

1549
00:51:28,139 --> 00:51:30,559
using the chat on the above phone.com website

1550
00:51:30,914 --> 00:51:33,235
whether an application will work or not or

1551
00:51:33,235 --> 00:51:34,375
or if it's supported.

1552
00:51:34,755 --> 00:51:37,155
And, all of these, these pieces of software

1553
00:51:37,155 --> 00:51:37,894
are being

1554
00:51:39,369 --> 00:51:41,789
packaged through a user repository.

1555
00:51:42,250 --> 00:51:44,009
So there's people around the world just like

1556
00:51:44,009 --> 00:51:44,509
you,

1557
00:51:45,449 --> 00:51:47,849
packaging this software for you to use. That's

1558
00:51:47,849 --> 00:51:48,829
what gives you,

1559
00:51:49,434 --> 00:51:52,554
like, literally thousands and thousands of different types

1560
00:51:52,554 --> 00:51:54,795
of open source software to choose from. It

1561
00:51:54,795 --> 00:51:56,760
gives you the biggest library of open source

1562
00:51:57,000 --> 00:51:59,099
software that I have seen myself personally.

1563
00:52:00,440 --> 00:52:00,840
And,

1564
00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:03,400
with that, there's a bunch of awesome tools.

1565
00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:05,674
Of course, you've got your browser. This is

1566
00:52:05,674 --> 00:52:08,494
a d googled browser. It's called Ungoogled Chromium.

1567
00:52:08,795 --> 00:52:10,074
You can see it's set up to use

1568
00:52:10,074 --> 00:52:12,394
our search engine by default, but it has

1569
00:52:12,394 --> 00:52:15,135
a number of different things that protect you,

1570
00:52:15,730 --> 00:52:18,389
like our ad blocker that's already built in,

1571
00:52:19,489 --> 00:52:22,425
these different browser extensions that that

1572
00:52:22,824 --> 00:52:23,965
improve your privacy,

1573
00:52:24,824 --> 00:52:26,905
while you're you're browsing the Internet. You've got

1574
00:52:26,905 --> 00:52:29,485
things that will delete cookies automatically so

1575
00:52:29,785 --> 00:52:32,739
sites can't track you. Our analytics providers can't

1576
00:52:32,739 --> 00:52:34,820
track you over different websites. And of course,

1577
00:52:34,820 --> 00:52:36,360
you have things that just block,

1578
00:52:37,059 --> 00:52:39,140
just block ads and third party scripts, so

1579
00:52:39,140 --> 00:52:40,920
I can just turn that on like that.

1580
00:52:42,324 --> 00:52:45,125
So again, a normal browser would make connections

1581
00:52:45,125 --> 00:52:47,844
to Google. This this browser makes 0 connections

1582
00:52:47,844 --> 00:52:48,585
to Google.

1583
00:52:49,280 --> 00:52:51,119
And that and that's a very important thing

1584
00:52:51,119 --> 00:52:52,960
that we wanted. We wanted this laptop to

1585
00:52:52,960 --> 00:52:55,199
make zero connections to big tech. So you

1586
00:52:55,199 --> 00:52:57,539
can still visit all the, the the

1587
00:52:57,914 --> 00:52:59,295
websites you're expecting,

1588
00:52:59,755 --> 00:53:02,335
but you're not dealing with, the same tracking

1589
00:53:02,394 --> 00:53:04,094
that you would be on a normal laptop.

1590
00:53:04,394 --> 00:53:06,655
So, yeah, the browser is what you would

1591
00:53:06,679 --> 00:53:08,380
expect. This is our website, abovephone.com.

1592
00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:10,599
Here's how you can chat with us right

1593
00:53:10,599 --> 00:53:11,099
there.

1594
00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:13,319
So I encourage you to reach out to

1595
00:53:13,319 --> 00:53:15,284
us if you have further questions, But let's

1596
00:53:15,284 --> 00:53:17,224
look at some of the other awesome features.

1597
00:53:17,844 --> 00:53:19,065
We've got our

1598
00:53:19,364 --> 00:53:21,605
a way for you to do your work.

1599
00:53:21,605 --> 00:53:23,784
Right? Because a lot of us come from

1600
00:53:24,159 --> 00:53:26,179
a, maybe a Windows background

1601
00:53:26,799 --> 00:53:28,639
and are wondering, alright, am I still gonna

1602
00:53:28,639 --> 00:53:30,000
be able to get my work done? Well,

1603
00:53:30,000 --> 00:53:31,699
yes, you will because we have

1604
00:53:32,014 --> 00:53:34,734
editors like only Office, which will use native

1605
00:53:34,734 --> 00:53:36,674
Microsoft formats for their documents,

1606
00:53:37,534 --> 00:53:39,614
but, allow you to do all the same

1607
00:53:39,614 --> 00:53:41,639
things, right, even even kind of looks like

1608
00:53:41,719 --> 00:53:43,719
Microsoft Office. So, yeah, you have a lot

1609
00:53:43,719 --> 00:53:43,880
of,

1610
00:53:44,599 --> 00:53:46,219
excellent things that you can do,

1611
00:53:46,920 --> 00:53:48,679
and you can build PowerPoints, and you can

1612
00:53:48,679 --> 00:53:50,394
save them in native formats, and you can

1613
00:53:50,394 --> 00:53:52,555
actually collaborate with people who would be working

1614
00:53:52,555 --> 00:53:53,614
on Windows systems.

1615
00:53:54,074 --> 00:53:55,755
So just to give you a few examples

1616
00:53:55,755 --> 00:53:57,055
of these, we've got spreadsheets.

1617
00:53:57,755 --> 00:53:58,815
You can see here

1618
00:53:59,170 --> 00:54:01,250
that looks like you still have the nice

1619
00:54:01,250 --> 00:54:02,869
formulas that you would expect.

1620
00:54:03,250 --> 00:54:04,150
I can set,

1621
00:54:05,489 --> 00:54:06,950
France here. I'll give France

1622
00:54:07,489 --> 00:54:07,989
0

1623
00:54:08,454 --> 00:54:11,114
gold medals for that horrible opening ceremony.

1624
00:54:11,655 --> 00:54:12,155
And,

1625
00:54:12,934 --> 00:54:14,295
yeah, you can see that you can have

1626
00:54:14,295 --> 00:54:16,339
graphs, you can have formulas, You can still

1627
00:54:16,339 --> 00:54:16,839
do

1628
00:54:17,300 --> 00:54:19,380
exactly what you were used to doing on

1629
00:54:19,380 --> 00:54:21,300
your Windows environment, but, hey, you're doing it

1630
00:54:21,300 --> 00:54:22,679
in a more private manner.

1631
00:54:23,734 --> 00:54:24,234
So,

1632
00:54:24,614 --> 00:54:26,614
so that's a little bit about document editing

1633
00:54:26,614 --> 00:54:28,534
and getting your work done. And, of course,

1634
00:54:28,534 --> 00:54:30,375
there's a lot of other things, but I

1635
00:54:30,375 --> 00:54:32,550
would just wanna show you features that are

1636
00:54:32,550 --> 00:54:33,530
specific to

1637
00:54:33,989 --> 00:54:35,989
the Above suite, which is a suite of

1638
00:54:35,989 --> 00:54:36,890
software services.

1639
00:54:37,269 --> 00:54:39,430
So this is the email account. You'll notice

1640
00:54:39,430 --> 00:54:40,329
that it says,

1641
00:54:40,824 --> 00:54:41,324
atabove.im.

1642
00:54:42,025 --> 00:54:43,864
So you can use this account on your

1643
00:54:43,864 --> 00:54:45,625
phone. You can use this account on your

1644
00:54:45,625 --> 00:54:47,644
laptop. You can use it pretty much anywhere.

1645
00:54:47,719 --> 00:54:49,480
You can see I've subscribed to a few

1646
00:54:49,480 --> 00:54:51,400
email lists. I think T Lab is supposed

1647
00:54:51,400 --> 00:54:52,840
to be on here, but I'm not getting

1648
00:54:52,840 --> 00:54:54,139
the emails quite yet.

1649
00:54:54,599 --> 00:54:56,359
So you can add your email on there.

1650
00:54:56,359 --> 00:54:58,425
This is private way to browse your emails.

1651
00:54:59,684 --> 00:55:01,605
I am also going to show you our

1652
00:55:01,605 --> 00:55:03,144
encrypted messaging service.

1653
00:55:04,005 --> 00:55:06,440
The program you use on on the above

1654
00:55:06,440 --> 00:55:08,840
book is called Gagium, but the cool part

1655
00:55:08,840 --> 00:55:11,640
about Gagium is you'll notice that this person

1656
00:55:11,640 --> 00:55:14,780
here, Alice, is actually a cell phone number,

1657
00:55:14,934 --> 00:55:17,815
and so with this, with, our with our

1658
00:55:17,815 --> 00:55:20,934
XMPP service and also through a collaboration with,

1659
00:55:21,175 --> 00:55:24,889
JMP Chat, We can bridge these encrypted messages

1660
00:55:25,109 --> 00:55:26,789
over through the phone network, and we can

1661
00:55:26,789 --> 00:55:29,269
text people. So I can literally start sending

1662
00:55:29,269 --> 00:55:31,695
Alice text messages. She can text me back,

1663
00:55:31,695 --> 00:55:33,795
and it's all synced between my computer

1664
00:55:34,255 --> 00:55:36,355
and my phone. So that's really, really cool,

1665
00:55:36,414 --> 00:55:37,695
and I encourage you to try it. I

1666
00:55:37,695 --> 00:55:40,210
encourage you to, buy Above Suite when you're

1667
00:55:40,210 --> 00:55:41,510
getting your Above Book.

1668
00:55:41,809 --> 00:55:43,650
So we've got the encrypted messaging. We've got

1669
00:55:43,650 --> 00:55:44,309
the email.

1670
00:55:44,690 --> 00:55:46,389
We've got ways to install packages.

1671
00:55:46,965 --> 00:55:49,445
You've also got a ton of settings, way

1672
00:55:49,445 --> 00:55:51,845
more than a normal computer would have for

1673
00:55:51,845 --> 00:55:52,744
you to look through.

1674
00:55:53,045 --> 00:55:56,105
And then, as you're going through the device,

1675
00:55:56,569 --> 00:55:58,589
you will be presented with

1676
00:55:58,889 --> 00:56:01,690
videos learning how to use the device. So

1677
00:56:01,690 --> 00:56:04,010
you'll see me talking there, and it's just

1678
00:56:04,010 --> 00:56:06,034
a number of different videos to teach you

1679
00:56:06,034 --> 00:56:08,034
how to use the the computer. And, of

1680
00:56:08,034 --> 00:56:10,514
course, you get a free 45 minute call

1681
00:56:10,514 --> 00:56:11,815
with a real live person

1682
00:56:12,389 --> 00:56:12,789
to,

1683
00:56:13,190 --> 00:56:14,969
actually learn how to use a computer.

1684
00:56:15,269 --> 00:56:16,949
So that's a very quick first look. I

1685
00:56:16,949 --> 00:56:18,710
mean, there's so much there I couldn't pack,

1686
00:56:18,710 --> 00:56:20,235
but I'm gonna leave it at at this

1687
00:56:20,235 --> 00:56:21,755
for now. And I wanna thank you for,

1688
00:56:21,994 --> 00:56:24,155
letting me demo it to your audience. And,

1689
00:56:24,155 --> 00:56:26,335
again, you can purchase it at abovephone.com/book.

1690
00:56:29,309 --> 00:56:31,389
Other than what you just demonstrated and all

1691
00:56:31,389 --> 00:56:33,089
the changes, you know, is there anything else

1692
00:56:33,389 --> 00:56:36,029
that is going to be changed, added? You

1693
00:56:36,029 --> 00:56:37,309
know, like, what give me the the next

1694
00:56:37,309 --> 00:56:38,829
steps in regard to that, the computer or

1695
00:56:38,829 --> 00:56:39,135
the phone.

1696
00:56:39,775 --> 00:56:42,414
Yeah. Absolutely. Right now, we, we're just trying

1697
00:56:42,414 --> 00:56:44,335
to make the best computer possible. So it's

1698
00:56:44,335 --> 00:56:45,934
all about it's all about the back and

1699
00:56:45,934 --> 00:56:48,519
forth between us and our our customers or

1700
00:56:48,519 --> 00:56:49,019
community

1701
00:56:49,320 --> 00:56:51,320
looking at what they want. An exciting thing

1702
00:56:51,320 --> 00:56:53,880
that we did recently is we're experimenting with

1703
00:56:53,880 --> 00:56:56,360
local language models. So local AI on the

1704
00:56:56,360 --> 00:56:58,105
device itself and it coming out of the

1705
00:56:58,105 --> 00:57:00,264
box like that. What does that mean exactly?

1706
00:57:00,264 --> 00:57:01,864
So it's like, you know, if you've ever

1707
00:57:01,864 --> 00:57:04,425
used chat gpt, it can be super helpful.

1708
00:57:04,425 --> 00:57:06,000
It can, you know, draft up I'm pretty

1709
00:57:06,079 --> 00:57:07,599
pretty resistant to all that, but go ahead.

1710
00:57:07,599 --> 00:57:08,099
Yeah.

1711
00:57:08,719 --> 00:57:10,400
I am personally just because I think it's

1712
00:57:10,400 --> 00:57:11,920
a you know? I mean, not they I

1713
00:57:11,920 --> 00:57:13,835
mean, I'm I'm like anything, I'm open to

1714
00:57:13,835 --> 00:57:15,275
the idea that these things could be used

1715
00:57:15,275 --> 00:57:15,934
in ways

1716
00:57:16,235 --> 00:57:17,835
that might be able to push back on

1717
00:57:17,835 --> 00:57:19,355
certain you know, like, if it's not but

1718
00:57:19,355 --> 00:57:20,954
I think the the way it's being used

1719
00:57:20,954 --> 00:57:22,555
in the mainstream right now is very kind

1720
00:57:22,555 --> 00:57:25,199
of, you know, using us to help Mhmm.

1721
00:57:25,359 --> 00:57:26,960
Create what they wanna use against us. You

1722
00:57:26,960 --> 00:57:28,639
know what I mean? But Most definitely, which

1723
00:57:28,639 --> 00:57:30,239
which they would it's kind of like,

1724
00:57:31,055 --> 00:57:32,974
which they would do anyways. Right? Even if

1725
00:57:32,974 --> 00:57:34,815
you you spend the time and you do

1726
00:57:34,815 --> 00:57:36,255
your own research and you publish it out

1727
00:57:36,255 --> 00:57:38,769
there immediately scraped. Right. And I I think

1728
00:57:38,769 --> 00:57:40,449
the thing is is, like, is there a

1729
00:57:40,449 --> 00:57:41,269
way that,

1730
00:57:41,809 --> 00:57:44,369
is there a holistic way to to use

1731
00:57:44,369 --> 00:57:46,230
AI? And I I I wanna be optimistic

1732
00:57:46,289 --> 00:57:47,429
and say that there is.

1733
00:57:47,795 --> 00:57:49,094
So they are, there's,

1734
00:57:49,954 --> 00:57:52,034
just to mention the one collaboration we did

1735
00:57:52,034 --> 00:57:54,194
we did with, Mike Adams of Brighteon, and

1736
00:57:54,194 --> 00:57:56,275
he's working on a large language model, which

1737
00:57:56,275 --> 00:57:58,920
he fed a whole bunch of survival books

1738
00:57:58,920 --> 00:58:01,079
and also natural health books. And this AI

1739
00:58:01,079 --> 00:58:03,159
can can give pretty good answers to if

1740
00:58:03,159 --> 00:58:04,764
you have, like, questions about your health and

1741
00:58:04,844 --> 00:58:06,525
stuff. Interesting. And and I think And there's

1742
00:58:06,525 --> 00:58:07,964
clearly benefits to it. Right? I mean, it's,

1743
00:58:07,964 --> 00:58:09,964
like, it's it's something that an average person

1744
00:58:09,964 --> 00:58:11,904
by themselves couldn't do. Right? So it's definitely,

1745
00:58:12,219 --> 00:58:14,299
you know, a a powerful tool. And I

1746
00:58:14,299 --> 00:58:15,339
I might point to, like, if, you know,

1747
00:58:15,339 --> 00:58:17,659
you make something that's on here, privacy. You

1748
00:58:17,659 --> 00:58:19,199
know? I mean, it's it's a tool. Completely.

1749
00:58:19,579 --> 00:58:21,339
Yeah. But I I I my point is

1750
00:58:21,339 --> 00:58:23,184
that I am worried about where that goes

1751
00:58:23,184 --> 00:58:24,784
in a large sense for the mainstream. Right?

1752
00:58:24,784 --> 00:58:26,224
So same thing. On this side of it,

1753
00:58:26,224 --> 00:58:27,925
yeah, I mean, these things are definitely beneficial.

1754
00:58:28,144 --> 00:58:29,664
But, you know, I just do you do

1755
00:58:29,664 --> 00:58:31,284
you see any negative

1756
00:58:32,230 --> 00:58:33,929
pause possible side to

1757
00:58:34,230 --> 00:58:35,750
you know, like, so let's say you're using

1758
00:58:35,750 --> 00:58:37,829
your computer and you're using these things. Mhmm.

1759
00:58:37,829 --> 00:58:39,324
And then that you know, is that being

1760
00:58:39,324 --> 00:58:41,484
stored anywhere in your computer? Like, that information,

1761
00:58:41,484 --> 00:58:42,525
like, that is there a way that could

1762
00:58:42,525 --> 00:58:44,045
end up being used in some way if

1763
00:58:44,045 --> 00:58:45,869
you like, somebody takes your computer from you?

1764
00:58:45,950 --> 00:58:48,210
Well, it's it is. So it's completely offline,

1765
00:58:48,349 --> 00:58:50,369
so it's not stored in any other computers.

1766
00:58:50,430 --> 00:58:51,650
The other thing is that

1767
00:58:52,349 --> 00:58:54,510
these, these computers, you have them with the

1768
00:58:54,510 --> 00:58:56,855
option of full disk encryption. So even if

1769
00:58:56,855 --> 00:58:58,375
someone gets their hands on them There you

1770
00:58:58,375 --> 00:58:58,875
go.

1771
00:58:59,974 --> 00:59:01,880
Even if someone gets their hands on them,

1772
00:59:02,119 --> 00:59:04,119
you cannot break in and see the data.

1773
00:59:04,119 --> 00:59:05,559
I love it. So you have the option

1774
00:59:05,559 --> 00:59:07,000
of doing that when you purchase one of

1775
00:59:07,000 --> 00:59:08,920
these things. So we did we did follow,

1776
00:59:08,920 --> 00:59:10,784
you know, all the standard security practices when

1777
00:59:11,184 --> 00:59:12,565
when developing this thing.

1778
00:59:12,864 --> 00:59:15,025
And, this I mean, this computer can do

1779
00:59:15,025 --> 00:59:16,864
anything your your normal one could. You could

1780
00:59:16,864 --> 00:59:19,344
do Wi Fi, you could do hotspots, Bluetooth.

1781
00:59:19,344 --> 00:59:22,109
It has all that. It's beautiful. It's sleek.

1782
00:59:22,650 --> 00:59:25,469
Even the browser that you're using is already

1783
00:59:25,530 --> 00:59:27,690
way more private. So you can do things.

1784
00:59:27,690 --> 00:59:30,635
It's like already blocking ads. The VPN side

1785
00:59:30,635 --> 00:59:33,195
is also blocking ads and trackers. There are

1786
00:59:33,195 --> 00:59:35,914
multiple layers of technology working to protect you.

1787
00:59:35,914 --> 00:59:37,960
Mhmm. And if you're, you know, as I

1788
00:59:37,960 --> 00:59:39,960
think the only people that might have trouble

1789
00:59:39,960 --> 00:59:41,960
with it, if if they're, like, be creatives,

1790
00:59:41,960 --> 00:59:43,480
people who do a lot of video editing,

1791
00:59:43,480 --> 00:59:45,494
those people tend to be locked into things

1792
00:59:45,494 --> 00:59:46,275
like Photoshop,

1793
00:59:46,574 --> 00:59:48,815
which there are alternatives for this. In fact,

1794
00:59:48,815 --> 00:59:50,494
the computer I brought with me today, it's

1795
00:59:50,494 --> 00:59:52,494
got a, it's like, this one is called

1796
00:59:52,494 --> 00:59:54,750
the aluminum. We have 4 different models. There

1797
00:59:54,910 --> 00:59:56,829
there's the carbon which is the the most

1798
00:59:56,829 --> 00:59:58,050
the best of both worlds.

1799
00:59:58,349 --> 01:00:00,110
And then there's magnesium which is like the

1800
01:00:00,110 --> 01:00:01,789
business class, which you can you can see

1801
01:00:01,789 --> 01:00:03,809
all the the differences between the models

1802
01:00:04,175 --> 01:00:05,394
on the web page.

1803
01:00:05,775 --> 01:00:07,855
But, this one, the aluminum comes with a

1804
01:00:07,855 --> 01:00:09,875
stylus, so you can actually draw on it,

1805
01:00:09,934 --> 01:00:11,510
which is which is really cool. And there's

1806
01:00:11,510 --> 01:00:13,430
a lot of amazing open source software you

1807
01:00:13,430 --> 01:00:15,510
can use to create great graphics even to

1808
01:00:15,510 --> 01:00:17,670
edit videos, like do rough cuts and stuff.

1809
01:00:17,670 --> 01:00:19,485
Yeah. So I think that's just part of

1810
01:00:19,485 --> 01:00:22,045
the exploration is we we just wanna focus

1811
01:00:22,045 --> 01:00:24,125
on creating a really good base for for

1812
01:00:24,125 --> 01:00:26,925
people. Mhmm. And if people start to use

1813
01:00:26,925 --> 01:00:27,360
the laptop

1814
01:00:31,440 --> 01:00:33,119
roadmap ahead is, like, alright, what can we

1815
01:00:33,119 --> 01:00:35,840
do next? Can we do a, can we

1816
01:00:35,840 --> 01:00:38,135
do so here's one thing. Right?

1817
01:00:38,514 --> 01:00:41,315
When people switch from an iPhone to an

1818
01:00:41,315 --> 01:00:43,155
above phone, first thing they say one of

1819
01:00:43,155 --> 01:00:44,929
the first things they say is, I can't

1820
01:00:44,929 --> 01:00:46,369
text videos. How do you how do you

1821
01:00:46,369 --> 01:00:47,109
text videos?

1822
01:00:47,570 --> 01:00:49,489
You can't you were never able to text

1823
01:00:49,489 --> 01:00:50,789
video. Just Apple,

1824
01:00:51,170 --> 01:00:53,355
kind of did a, black magic trick and

1825
01:00:53,355 --> 01:00:56,414
on Imessage ecosystem. Right? All of your communication

1826
01:00:56,554 --> 01:00:58,394
goes through Apple servers. So they'll send a

1827
01:00:58,394 --> 01:01:00,315
big video over the Internet. Right? That's just

1828
01:01:00,315 --> 01:01:02,094
Internet, Internet based communication.

1829
01:01:02,519 --> 01:01:04,380
So we want to do things like, okay,

1830
01:01:04,519 --> 01:01:06,119
what if I tell what if I want

1831
01:01:06,119 --> 01:01:08,199
to send a video to Ryan? Mhmm. And

1832
01:01:08,199 --> 01:01:10,199
I text him and it actually gets up

1833
01:01:10,359 --> 01:01:12,139
I send a file, I guess, upload into

1834
01:01:12,585 --> 01:01:15,065
cloud. You get a link back, and this

1835
01:01:15,065 --> 01:01:15,565
link,

1836
01:01:15,945 --> 01:01:17,644
will delete on the first download.

1837
01:01:18,184 --> 01:01:20,025
So the other person gets it and they

1838
01:01:20,025 --> 01:01:21,965
pull the video down and then it's deleted.

1839
01:01:22,250 --> 01:01:24,489
So there's really been no trace of that

1840
01:01:24,489 --> 01:01:26,170
video. Yeah. There's not even a trace to

1841
01:01:26,170 --> 01:01:27,929
that video on our servers. Right? So there's

1842
01:01:27,929 --> 01:01:29,210
a lot of really cool things we could

1843
01:01:29,210 --> 01:01:31,355
do there. We wanna run a translation

1844
01:01:31,734 --> 01:01:34,135
service as well. Nice. So, you know, it's

1845
01:01:34,135 --> 01:01:36,295
it's it's saying, like, alright. How far how

1846
01:01:36,295 --> 01:01:38,054
far can we take this? And eventually, we

1847
01:01:38,054 --> 01:01:39,980
wanna do cloud storage and stuff. But Mhmm.

1848
01:01:40,219 --> 01:01:43,039
It it's we're already we're already, like, relatively

1849
01:01:43,260 --> 01:01:45,260
competitive with something like Google and Apple, the

1850
01:01:45,260 --> 01:01:47,500
amount of different services we have. And and,

1851
01:01:48,139 --> 01:01:50,315
yeah. Yeah. So So for the average person

1852
01:01:50,315 --> 01:01:52,574
listening who doesn't know you, this company,

1853
01:01:53,034 --> 01:01:54,875
and, you know, in senses that you know,

1854
01:01:54,875 --> 01:01:56,335
we we talk about AI,

1855
01:01:56,750 --> 01:01:59,390
cloud service. Like, why why would they see

1856
01:01:59,390 --> 01:02:00,829
this as different? You know? I mean, you've

1857
01:02:00,829 --> 01:02:02,510
already explained the obvious. Right? The idea of

1858
01:02:02,510 --> 01:02:03,090
the privacy.

1859
01:02:03,390 --> 01:02:05,070
But, like, for the average person that doesn't,

1860
01:02:05,070 --> 01:02:06,285
you you know, what what's to stop them

1861
01:02:06,285 --> 01:02:07,565
from thinking, well, how do I know that

1862
01:02:07,565 --> 01:02:09,324
cloud's gonna be, you know, just as, you

1863
01:02:09,324 --> 01:02:11,005
know, used for your own purposes? You know

1864
01:02:11,005 --> 01:02:12,925
what I mean? Like, what makes them how

1865
01:02:12,925 --> 01:02:14,204
do they know that that's not the same

1866
01:02:14,204 --> 01:02:16,329
thing? Great question. I mean, it it it's

1867
01:02:16,329 --> 01:02:18,670
just, you do have to trust your provider

1868
01:02:18,730 --> 01:02:20,170
at the end of the day. Whoever they

1869
01:02:20,170 --> 01:02:22,170
are, there's only so much your technology can

1870
01:02:22,170 --> 01:02:24,295
do, but we've tried to take all steps

1871
01:02:24,375 --> 01:02:24,875
possible

1872
01:02:25,255 --> 01:02:26,614
so that there is,

1873
01:02:27,014 --> 01:02:29,494
there so there's zero trust or minimal trust.

1874
01:02:29,494 --> 01:02:31,255
So, right, when you're using our messaging app,

1875
01:02:31,255 --> 01:02:31,755
XMPP,

1876
01:02:32,260 --> 01:02:34,019
all that is encrypted before it leaves your

1877
01:02:34,019 --> 01:02:35,780
device. Even if the messages are on our

1878
01:02:35,780 --> 01:02:37,539
servers, which they are for a period about

1879
01:02:37,539 --> 01:02:39,460
30 days before they get deleted Mhmm. They're

1880
01:02:39,460 --> 01:02:40,844
end to end encrypted. So they just look

1881
01:02:40,844 --> 01:02:42,925
like a gibberish on our servers. There's nothing

1882
01:02:42,925 --> 01:02:44,445
to seize. There's nothing to take.

1883
01:02:45,085 --> 01:02:47,965
Similarly with the internet traffic with our VPN,

1884
01:02:47,965 --> 01:02:50,380
all of that gets encrypted Mhmm. On phone.

1885
01:02:50,380 --> 01:02:50,880
And,

1886
01:02:51,739 --> 01:02:54,380
so there are really smart things that you

1887
01:02:54,380 --> 01:02:56,619
can do to protect your data from us

1888
01:02:56,619 --> 01:02:59,055
even. But Right. If you wanna be completely

1889
01:02:59,055 --> 01:03:01,454
responsible for your own services, you should you

1890
01:03:01,454 --> 01:03:02,515
should host them yourself.

1891
01:03:03,375 --> 01:03:05,135
And I think it comes down to,

1892
01:03:06,099 --> 01:03:07,780
we don't work with 3rd parties. So we're

1893
01:03:07,780 --> 01:03:09,859
we're actually working with our own data center.

1894
01:03:09,859 --> 01:03:11,699
Whereas if you were look at Google or

1895
01:03:11,699 --> 01:03:13,914
Apple or even Signal, you look at these

1896
01:03:13,914 --> 01:03:15,994
cloud service providers you're using. They're using things

1897
01:03:15,994 --> 01:03:18,235
like Amazon Web Services. Right? Right. So there's

1898
01:03:18,235 --> 01:03:19,594
a lot of different ways that they can

1899
01:03:19,594 --> 01:03:20,175
be attacked.

1900
01:03:20,795 --> 01:03:22,735
We don't use any big tech

1901
01:03:23,269 --> 01:03:25,510
server providers. We have our own data center.

1902
01:03:25,510 --> 01:03:27,030
Mhmm. And so we're trying to we have

1903
01:03:27,030 --> 01:03:29,510
this, we're trying to be completely responsible for

1904
01:03:29,510 --> 01:03:30,570
everything we're doing.

1905
01:03:30,885 --> 01:03:32,485
That's the point. That's that's what that's what

1906
01:03:32,485 --> 01:03:33,525
stands out to me is that, you know,

1907
01:03:33,525 --> 01:03:34,724
at the end of the day, like you

1908
01:03:34,724 --> 01:03:36,485
said, it this is the reality. At some

1909
01:03:36,485 --> 01:03:38,244
point, you have to essentially say, I'm gonna

1910
01:03:38,244 --> 01:03:39,684
go with them, and I I believe that

1911
01:03:39,684 --> 01:03:42,389
they're the best choice. But you're the only

1912
01:03:42,389 --> 01:03:44,630
one the buck stops with you. Yep. Right?

1913
01:03:44,630 --> 01:03:46,230
And I think that is just that doesn't

1914
01:03:46,230 --> 01:03:48,069
exist anywhere right now. You know? And so

1915
01:03:48,069 --> 01:03:49,509
other than you guys and things, you know,

1916
01:03:49,509 --> 01:03:51,574
in this direction. So I think that's important.

1917
01:03:51,635 --> 01:03:52,994
So if you have a problem, you can

1918
01:03:52,994 --> 01:03:54,755
reach out, and it's not that there's some

1919
01:03:54,755 --> 01:03:56,355
third party you have to talk to. Right?

1920
01:03:56,355 --> 01:03:57,735
And so I think that's powerful.

1921
01:03:58,219 --> 01:04:00,460
I I definitely think this is a a

1922
01:04:00,539 --> 01:04:02,219
the obvious direction that we should all be

1923
01:04:02,219 --> 01:04:04,059
taking. Right? And I I really I think

1924
01:04:04,059 --> 01:04:05,885
what you're doing is important, and I'm happy

1925
01:04:05,885 --> 01:04:07,164
to see it continue to grow, man. And

1926
01:04:07,164 --> 01:04:09,005
I hope it continues to spread. And we

1927
01:04:09,005 --> 01:04:11,644
need to talk offline about help using, you

1928
01:04:11,644 --> 01:04:13,345
know, something to help

1929
01:04:13,805 --> 01:04:15,840
whether it's another like, honestly, what I'm I'm

1930
01:04:15,840 --> 01:04:17,219
looking to now is potentially,

1931
01:04:17,679 --> 01:04:19,519
you know, I I'm not potentially I'm gonna

1932
01:04:19,519 --> 01:04:21,199
have to get away from HostGator, which I'm

1933
01:04:21,199 --> 01:04:24,164
absolutely not happy with at all. New servers

1934
01:04:24,164 --> 01:04:25,364
and so on. And and so, you know,

1935
01:04:25,364 --> 01:04:26,644
we can set something up here and do

1936
01:04:26,644 --> 01:04:28,164
our own hosting kind of situation. I'm I'm

1937
01:04:28,164 --> 01:04:29,684
up for that. Yep. I'm I'm happy to

1938
01:04:29,684 --> 01:04:31,420
connect you with with all of our resources

1939
01:04:31,420 --> 01:04:33,339
and and with software too. Mhmm. And I

1940
01:04:33,339 --> 01:04:35,420
just wanna leave we leave people with with

1941
01:04:35,420 --> 01:04:38,300
one thing. Right? This this this technology is

1942
01:04:38,300 --> 01:04:40,375
so so important because it's it's it's how

1943
01:04:40,375 --> 01:04:42,295
we interact with the real world, and it'll

1944
01:04:42,295 --> 01:04:43,114
bring us together.

1945
01:04:43,414 --> 01:04:45,414
So you have to realize with certain pieces

1946
01:04:45,414 --> 01:04:47,414
of technology, you don't control it. It's just

1947
01:04:47,414 --> 01:04:49,109
a flip of the switch, and it can

1948
01:04:49,109 --> 01:04:50,949
be taken from you. Right. A really good

1949
01:04:50,949 --> 01:04:53,509
example of this is, the contact tracing Right.

1950
01:04:53,589 --> 01:04:55,670
Which, you know, they they rolled out an

1951
01:04:55,670 --> 01:04:56,889
update to 7,000,000,000

1952
01:04:57,190 --> 01:04:58,945
phones at once, and you could opt in

1953
01:04:58,945 --> 01:05:01,845
to contact tracing unless you lived in Massachusetts

1954
01:05:02,065 --> 01:05:03,505
where I don't know if you heard about

1955
01:05:03,505 --> 01:05:06,224
this story, but, Massachusetts Department of Public Health

1956
01:05:06,224 --> 01:05:09,030
with Google, they just deployed and they enabled

1957
01:05:09,030 --> 01:05:10,409
the contact tracing app,

1958
01:05:11,030 --> 01:05:13,269
for millions of people in the state. And,

1959
01:05:13,269 --> 01:05:15,670
you know, they're being they're being sued for

1960
01:05:15,670 --> 01:05:17,605
it. But they have a they that that's

1961
01:05:17,605 --> 01:05:19,684
what you would classify as a backdoor. Someone

1962
01:05:19,684 --> 01:05:21,605
installing an app on your phone without your

1963
01:05:21,605 --> 01:05:24,164
consent, turning Bluetooth on, and then seeing how

1964
01:05:24,164 --> 01:05:26,309
close you are to people. So people don't

1965
01:05:26,309 --> 01:05:28,329
have as much control of their phones and

1966
01:05:28,789 --> 01:05:31,429
these big tech software services that are responsible

1967
01:05:31,429 --> 01:05:34,684
for things like Google Pay, Apple Pay, contact

1968
01:05:34,684 --> 01:05:35,184
tracing.

1969
01:05:35,485 --> 01:05:38,364
Eventually, why wouldn't it be iris scanning? Right.

1970
01:05:38,364 --> 01:05:39,965
Why wouldn't it be all the safety stuff

1971
01:05:39,965 --> 01:05:41,485
that we're seeing in things like the UN

1972
01:05:41,485 --> 01:05:43,450
Digital Compact? The the humble, the, the obedient

1973
01:05:43,450 --> 01:05:44,030
servants to carry

1974
01:05:44,410 --> 01:05:44,730
all this out. And it's going to be

1975
01:05:44,730 --> 01:05:45,630
deployed on your phone at one time. So

1976
01:05:51,315 --> 01:05:53,075
if you really wanna divest yourself, you need

1977
01:05:53,075 --> 01:05:55,795
to detoxify your phone and and either use

1978
01:05:55,795 --> 01:05:58,135
a better phone or maybe ditch technology altogether,

1979
01:05:58,329 --> 01:06:00,809
which is totally an option. But we wanna

1980
01:06:00,809 --> 01:06:02,250
give you the best of both worlds, a

1981
01:06:02,250 --> 01:06:04,489
phone that works, a laptop that works, does

1982
01:06:04,489 --> 01:06:07,070
everything you need it to while being completely

1983
01:06:07,210 --> 01:06:07,710
detached

1984
01:06:08,034 --> 01:06:10,994
from this, corrupt yeah. From this corrupt infrastructure.

1985
01:06:10,994 --> 01:06:12,994
Yeah. Absolutely, man. I mean, I think, like,

1986
01:06:12,994 --> 01:06:14,434
I I don't know. I know people that

1987
01:06:14,434 --> 01:06:15,795
are barely paying attention to this stuff that

1988
01:06:15,795 --> 01:06:17,210
feel exactly the same way. You know, like,

1989
01:06:17,210 --> 01:06:19,309
it's just it's it is everywhere right now,

1990
01:06:19,369 --> 01:06:20,809
so it's nice to see that somebody is

1991
01:06:20,809 --> 01:06:23,230
truly trying to provide solutions to people that

1992
01:06:23,369 --> 01:06:24,664
seem to all want the same thing, but

1993
01:06:24,664 --> 01:06:27,224
your governments and corporations are all screaming that

1994
01:06:27,224 --> 01:06:28,585
you have to go a different direction. So

1995
01:06:28,585 --> 01:06:30,184
I appreciate what you're doing, man. And I

1996
01:06:30,265 --> 01:06:31,545
I'm I'm hoping to give you guys some

1997
01:06:31,545 --> 01:06:32,920
updates in the near future about what we

1998
01:06:32,920 --> 01:06:34,460
were talking about, and I I really,

1999
01:06:34,920 --> 01:06:37,000
really genuinely need to make these steps. And

2000
01:06:37,000 --> 01:06:38,559
so thank you for, you know, pushing me

2001
01:06:38,559 --> 01:06:40,219
a little further. I need to do that.

2002
01:06:40,679 --> 01:06:42,039
Well, anything else you wanna leave us with

2003
01:06:42,039 --> 01:06:42,744
on the way out?

2004
01:06:43,625 --> 01:06:45,785
Yeah. So so yeah. Well, first of all,

2005
01:06:45,785 --> 01:06:47,144
thank you for having me, and thanks for

2006
01:06:47,144 --> 01:06:49,144
for giving giving us a voice here. We

2007
01:06:49,144 --> 01:06:50,744
really I mean, this is why we do

2008
01:06:50,744 --> 01:06:53,030
it. We wanna help protect our content creators.

2009
01:06:53,030 --> 01:06:54,550
And I know sometimes you're in the flow,

2010
01:06:54,550 --> 01:06:55,989
so it doesn't it takes a little bit

2011
01:06:55,989 --> 01:06:58,250
more time with y'all. We totally understand it.

2012
01:06:58,390 --> 01:07:00,565
With with everyone at home, even if you're

2013
01:07:00,565 --> 01:07:03,224
feeling a little bit of hesitation or, anticipation

2014
01:07:03,285 --> 01:07:05,125
about the journey, we're gonna make it as

2015
01:07:05,125 --> 01:07:07,045
easy as possible for you. We've got the

2016
01:07:07,045 --> 01:07:08,640
best support in the game. I mean, the

2017
01:07:08,640 --> 01:07:10,720
education is a one major pillar to our

2018
01:07:10,720 --> 01:07:12,960
organization. So whether you're getting a book, whether

2019
01:07:12,960 --> 01:07:14,720
you're getting a phone, you're gonna get to

2020
01:07:14,720 --> 01:07:16,559
be on a very live, like, a live

2021
01:07:16,559 --> 01:07:18,655
video conference with a support engineer, and we're

2022
01:07:18,655 --> 01:07:20,815
gonna help you move all of your data,

2023
01:07:20,815 --> 01:07:22,574
all of your apps to your new device

2024
01:07:22,574 --> 01:07:24,094
and teach you how to use it, which

2025
01:07:24,094 --> 01:07:26,094
is unheard of. Right? Try and get AT

2026
01:07:26,094 --> 01:07:28,099
and T on a phone call. Try and

2027
01:07:28,099 --> 01:07:29,860
get Apple on a phone call. Right. And

2028
01:07:29,860 --> 01:07:31,460
you're not gonna get anywhere. So this is

2029
01:07:31,460 --> 01:07:33,619
community led support. It's and we're working with

2030
01:07:33,619 --> 01:07:35,394
people in the movement too. Nice. And that's

2031
01:07:35,394 --> 01:07:37,155
what it's gonna take, just all of us

2032
01:07:37,155 --> 01:07:38,755
fanning together. So I hope to be able

2033
01:07:38,755 --> 01:07:40,114
to support you. I I hope to be

2034
01:07:40,114 --> 01:07:41,335
able to support TLab

2035
01:07:41,715 --> 01:07:43,019
too, and I would love to chat with

2036
01:07:43,019 --> 01:07:45,019
you about maybe getting a special discount code

2037
01:07:45,019 --> 01:07:45,760
for your community.

2038
01:07:46,220 --> 01:07:48,619
And, yeah, let's do the thing. Absolutely, man.

2039
01:07:48,619 --> 01:07:51,019
Yep. Well, awesome. I've enjoyed the conversation, brother.

2040
01:07:51,019 --> 01:07:52,574
And, you know, as as always, everybody out

2041
01:07:52,574 --> 01:07:55,315
there, question everything. Come to your own conclusions.

2042
01:07:55,695 --> 01:07:56,434
Stay vigilant.