1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:02,020 Join us at The Hedge for a conversation 2 00:00:02,159 --> 00:00:03,060 about engineering, 3 00:00:03,439 --> 00:00:06,960 technology, and business. In this episode, Russ White, 4 00:00:06,960 --> 00:00:09,839 Tom Ammon, and Nash King dig into ethics 5 00:00:09,839 --> 00:00:10,580 and IT. 6 00:00:21,244 --> 00:00:23,564 Well, hello, Tom. I'm glad that you're back 7 00:00:23,564 --> 00:00:25,564 as co host. You know, sometimes I have 8 00:00:25,564 --> 00:00:27,324 to fault a secondary co host and, you 9 00:00:27,324 --> 00:00:27,724 know, it's 10 00:00:30,399 --> 00:00:32,320 I'm just a secondary too. I see how 11 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:35,520 it works. No. No. No. No. No. No. 12 00:00:35,520 --> 00:00:38,719 So and tonight, we have Nash with us, 13 00:00:38,719 --> 00:00:40,880 which you have never been on the hedge 14 00:00:40,880 --> 00:00:42,719 before. Have you ever been on any of 15 00:00:42,719 --> 00:00:45,039 these podcasts, Nash? You sound very professional, by 16 00:00:45,039 --> 00:00:47,814 the way. Thanks. I have literally never done 17 00:00:47,814 --> 00:00:48,875 a podcast before. 18 00:00:49,655 --> 00:00:50,795 Oh my goodness. 19 00:00:51,734 --> 00:00:54,375 Very first pot and your audio sounds awesome 20 00:00:54,375 --> 00:00:56,394 for having never done a podcast before. 21 00:00:57,174 --> 00:00:59,760 Yeah. I was singing at my computer to 22 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:01,700 make sure it sounded good. Oh, 23 00:01:02,240 --> 00:01:02,740 well 24 00:01:03,440 --> 00:01:05,380 Wow. We could do that. We'll just listen. 25 00:01:05,760 --> 00:01:06,740 No. That's okay. 26 00:01:10,000 --> 00:01:12,385 So tonight or this afternoon or where? I 27 00:01:12,385 --> 00:01:13,744 don't know. I always say tonight because that's 28 00:01:13,744 --> 00:01:15,604 what it is for me right now. But, 29 00:01:16,944 --> 00:01:18,704 we're talking about ethics in IT, and we 30 00:01:18,704 --> 00:01:20,244 have some very problematic. 31 00:01:21,265 --> 00:01:23,344 I said that word again, Nash, and you 32 00:01:23,344 --> 00:01:25,524 know I shouldn't even say that. Anyway, 33 00:01:26,530 --> 00:01:28,129 you know, we always have these issues with 34 00:01:28,129 --> 00:01:30,129 ethics in IT. And for me, it's particular 35 00:01:30,209 --> 00:01:31,650 I mean, I'm doing a a PhD in 36 00:01:31,650 --> 00:01:33,569 philosophy, which some people know and some people 37 00:01:33,569 --> 00:01:35,650 don't. And so this this is in in 38 00:01:35,650 --> 00:01:38,310 my area of study is technology and culture. 39 00:01:38,849 --> 00:01:40,984 And so, you know, it is it is 40 00:01:40,984 --> 00:01:41,564 a very 41 00:01:42,424 --> 00:01:44,584 rough area to get into is to think 42 00:01:44,584 --> 00:01:45,084 about 43 00:01:45,385 --> 00:01:48,584 personally the decisions you make and how they 44 00:01:48,584 --> 00:01:50,825 impact your larger world view and how they 45 00:01:50,825 --> 00:01:53,704 get us. So so if anybody's listening, this 46 00:01:53,704 --> 00:01:55,064 is gonna be a little bit different of 47 00:01:55,064 --> 00:01:57,450 a hedge because we usually talk about less 48 00:01:57,450 --> 00:01:58,989 heavy topics than this. 49 00:01:59,849 --> 00:02:02,329 Tom, Nash, I mean, any thoughts of where 50 00:02:02,329 --> 00:02:05,769 to start thinking about this particular problem or 51 00:02:05,769 --> 00:02:06,989 this particular space? 52 00:02:07,370 --> 00:02:08,169 Well, I think the, 53 00:02:09,335 --> 00:02:12,135 the idea of what personal what personal choices 54 00:02:12,135 --> 00:02:13,754 do you make in your career 55 00:02:14,375 --> 00:02:16,075 as you do the work that we do, 56 00:02:16,775 --> 00:02:17,895 I don't know. I think that's a good 57 00:02:17,895 --> 00:02:19,895 place to start. I think we working in 58 00:02:19,895 --> 00:02:22,375 technology, we enable all sorts of things. We 59 00:02:22,375 --> 00:02:24,750 enable all sorts of different businesses and different, 60 00:02:26,030 --> 00:02:27,409 choices for other people. 61 00:02:27,789 --> 00:02:29,969 So, I think it's a really interesting realm, 62 00:02:30,509 --> 00:02:32,750 ethically speaking. And there's a lot of a 63 00:02:32,750 --> 00:02:34,349 lot of things we can do that, you 64 00:02:34,349 --> 00:02:36,189 know, we could get ourselves into a place 65 00:02:36,189 --> 00:02:38,155 where we didn't wanna be, if we look 66 00:02:38,155 --> 00:02:39,754 back and say what kind of person do 67 00:02:39,754 --> 00:02:40,875 I wanna be and what kind of choices 68 00:02:40,875 --> 00:02:41,775 do I wanna make. 69 00:02:42,395 --> 00:02:42,895 So, 70 00:02:43,514 --> 00:02:44,715 yeah, I think that's I think it's a 71 00:02:44,715 --> 00:02:47,034 pretty interesting discussion. Well, I'll give you an 72 00:02:47,034 --> 00:02:48,840 example of a couple of things I've run 73 00:02:48,840 --> 00:02:50,360 into, and, these are out of books that 74 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:51,800 I've read, and I'm not gonna go deep 75 00:02:51,800 --> 00:02:54,199 into the names of the authors and stuff. 76 00:02:54,199 --> 00:02:54,519 But, 77 00:02:55,319 --> 00:02:58,120 the idea that technology sometimes makes things possible 78 00:02:58,120 --> 00:03:00,459 and makes other things either difficult or impossible. 79 00:03:00,519 --> 00:03:03,724 And one very specific example is used to 80 00:03:03,724 --> 00:03:05,885 be in The United States all the all 81 00:03:05,885 --> 00:03:08,685 the the cities were built on Rivers and 82 00:03:08,685 --> 00:03:10,685 if you grew up, you knew where all 83 00:03:10,685 --> 00:03:12,605 the rivers were you I mean you that 84 00:03:12,605 --> 00:03:14,125 was part of your life You knew where 85 00:03:14,125 --> 00:03:15,629 all the rivers were you knew where all 86 00:03:15,629 --> 00:03:17,150 the streams were you knew where all the 87 00:03:17,150 --> 00:03:20,349 oceans were and you basically knew where the 88 00:03:20,349 --> 00:03:22,669 prevailing winds were and what the what the 89 00:03:22,669 --> 00:03:24,269 tides look like and everything else because that 90 00:03:24,269 --> 00:03:25,969 was the primary mode of transportation 91 00:03:27,069 --> 00:03:28,364 now with 92 00:03:28,824 --> 00:03:31,064 the construction of the interstate highway system, which 93 00:03:31,064 --> 00:03:32,985 is, of course, a technology. Now, not it's 94 00:03:32,985 --> 00:03:35,864 not Internet technology per se, but just just 95 00:03:35,864 --> 00:03:37,564 talking about technology in general, 96 00:03:38,185 --> 00:03:40,604 all the and and because of the railroad 97 00:03:40,664 --> 00:03:41,759 system that was built, 98 00:03:42,319 --> 00:03:44,799 all the cities started being built inland away 99 00:03:44,799 --> 00:03:46,560 from the rivers. And now there are very 100 00:03:46,560 --> 00:03:48,400 few people in the world who can tell 101 00:03:48,400 --> 00:03:50,239 you where any river is or what the 102 00:03:50,239 --> 00:03:52,159 nearest river to their house is or what 103 00:03:52,159 --> 00:03:53,759 direction it flows at any time of the 104 00:03:53,759 --> 00:03:55,539 year or any of that information. 105 00:03:56,239 --> 00:03:56,739 So 106 00:03:57,075 --> 00:03:59,254 it's made possible to build 107 00:03:59,715 --> 00:04:01,635 towns and cities, big cities where we didn't 108 00:04:01,635 --> 00:04:02,455 have them before, 109 00:04:02,754 --> 00:04:04,995 but yet it's kind of culturally we've lost 110 00:04:04,995 --> 00:04:07,495 something because of that technology in some sense. 111 00:04:08,514 --> 00:04:11,509 So just that concept of the technology is 112 00:04:11,509 --> 00:04:13,830 not technology isn't really neutral like we might 113 00:04:13,830 --> 00:04:15,909 think of it. We immediately wanna say, oh, 114 00:04:15,909 --> 00:04:17,430 it's just neutral. People just use it for 115 00:04:17,430 --> 00:04:19,529 whatever they're going to. That's not really true. 116 00:04:19,750 --> 00:04:21,850 And that that's that's kind of an issue 117 00:04:21,910 --> 00:04:23,769 that you deal with as a network engineer, 118 00:04:24,704 --> 00:04:27,024 in your daily life. Right? I mean, I 119 00:04:27,024 --> 00:04:28,865 don't know. Nash, any thoughts? I mean, you're 120 00:04:28,865 --> 00:04:29,504 you're kind of 121 00:04:31,504 --> 00:04:33,024 I'm just kind of blown away by the 122 00:04:33,024 --> 00:04:35,264 whole river thing. I grew up in a 123 00:04:35,264 --> 00:04:37,439 watershed. I live by a river now. 124 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:39,680 The idea of not knowing where the rivers 125 00:04:39,680 --> 00:04:41,360 and the creeks and the winds are, that 126 00:04:41,360 --> 00:04:41,860 just 127 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:43,459 I can't imagine. 128 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:47,800 Well, but but it's true. Right? I mean 129 00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:48,819 No. It is. It's 130 00:04:49,439 --> 00:04:51,220 people don't know where they are anymore. 131 00:04:51,964 --> 00:04:53,564 Yeah. They don't know where they are, and 132 00:04:53,564 --> 00:04:56,045 we have so much access to each other 133 00:04:56,045 --> 00:04:56,785 as well. 134 00:04:57,725 --> 00:04:59,564 So we start think we start talking about, 135 00:04:59,564 --> 00:05:00,064 like, 136 00:05:00,764 --> 00:05:01,745 changing technology 137 00:05:02,125 --> 00:05:04,444 and just because this might be a little 138 00:05:04,444 --> 00:05:06,444 bit tangent, but just because I've been a 139 00:05:06,444 --> 00:05:07,824 young woman on the Internet. 140 00:05:08,310 --> 00:05:10,149 I just start thinking about the fact that 141 00:05:10,149 --> 00:05:11,909 it's really easy for people to find you 142 00:05:11,909 --> 00:05:12,409 now. 143 00:05:13,189 --> 00:05:15,829 And no one who developed that technology really 144 00:05:15,829 --> 00:05:17,669 thought about how easy it would make it 145 00:05:17,669 --> 00:05:19,449 to do things like stalk people 146 00:05:19,909 --> 00:05:21,345 and harass them. 147 00:05:21,824 --> 00:05:23,504 And and privacy is a big part of 148 00:05:23,504 --> 00:05:25,345 this. Right? Privacy is a big part of 149 00:05:25,345 --> 00:05:27,504 this. And so, like, even just so bringing 150 00:05:27,504 --> 00:05:29,985 this back to the network, like Sorry. No. 151 00:05:29,985 --> 00:05:31,745 It's fine. Say say that you're a network 152 00:05:31,745 --> 00:05:34,064 operator. Right? And you are the IT guy 153 00:05:34,064 --> 00:05:35,904 that or IP IT person. I shouldn't say, 154 00:05:35,904 --> 00:05:38,970 you know, guys. But anyway, the IT person 155 00:05:39,189 --> 00:05:40,009 who is 156 00:05:40,629 --> 00:05:43,189 managing that network, what are you doing to 157 00:05:43,189 --> 00:05:45,050 protect the information of those people? 158 00:05:45,350 --> 00:05:46,810 Like, as a daily decision, 159 00:05:47,509 --> 00:05:49,269 the people who work for the company that 160 00:05:49,269 --> 00:05:51,294 you run ops for, what are you doing 161 00:05:51,294 --> 00:05:52,194 to protect them? 162 00:05:53,774 --> 00:05:55,154 And I don't know. I mean, 163 00:05:55,615 --> 00:05:57,794 I'll bring it current moment for a second. 164 00:05:58,014 --> 00:06:00,495 DNS over HTTPS, I was just talking to 165 00:06:00,495 --> 00:06:02,675 a friend of mine who lives in Thailand, 166 00:06:03,259 --> 00:06:05,740 and the privacy implications of something as simple 167 00:06:05,740 --> 00:06:06,399 as that 168 00:06:07,019 --> 00:06:08,560 And where does that go? 169 00:06:09,660 --> 00:06:12,300 It's very hard that brings up an interesting 170 00:06:12,300 --> 00:06:13,040 point of, 171 00:06:14,459 --> 00:06:17,279 the those who like if you have the 172 00:06:17,615 --> 00:06:20,415 capability to help protect somebody and they are 173 00:06:20,415 --> 00:06:22,495 not as knowledgeable or they're not as empowered 174 00:06:22,495 --> 00:06:24,035 as you are to protect themselves, 175 00:06:24,814 --> 00:06:26,735 is there a moral obligation there for you 176 00:06:26,735 --> 00:06:27,555 to do so? 177 00:06:28,095 --> 00:06:30,960 I I personally believe that, it is the 178 00:06:30,960 --> 00:06:33,520 responsibility of the strong to help protect the 179 00:06:33,520 --> 00:06:35,600 weak just in general. That's that's my personal 180 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:37,120 feeling about it. And so if you take 181 00:06:37,120 --> 00:06:38,800 it into a technology context and you have 182 00:06:38,800 --> 00:06:40,879 the privacy of all these users, for the 183 00:06:40,879 --> 00:06:42,420 DNS over h t HTTPS, 184 00:06:42,960 --> 00:06:44,375 thing. So, you know, 185 00:06:45,314 --> 00:06:46,514 Chrome is or sorry. 186 00:06:47,235 --> 00:06:49,154 Firefox is gonna be turning that on pretty 187 00:06:49,154 --> 00:06:51,235 soon. And you had a whole crowd of 188 00:06:51,235 --> 00:06:52,914 users at your company that probably don't even 189 00:06:52,914 --> 00:06:55,235 know what that is. So as the IT 190 00:06:55,235 --> 00:06:56,995 person, do you go in and do the 191 00:06:56,995 --> 00:06:58,860 stuff you need to do to override that? 192 00:06:58,860 --> 00:07:00,379 Or do you say, I don't wanna deal 193 00:07:00,379 --> 00:07:01,979 with it. They don't really care anyway. They 194 00:07:01,979 --> 00:07:03,579 probably don't they probably don't care about their 195 00:07:03,579 --> 00:07:05,659 privacy. Doesn't matter. I don't wanna go do 196 00:07:05,659 --> 00:07:07,339 the work to override that. I mean, I 197 00:07:07,339 --> 00:07:09,099 think that's an example of a choice that's 198 00:07:09,099 --> 00:07:10,159 kind of in this realm. 199 00:07:10,459 --> 00:07:10,875 And 200 00:07:11,834 --> 00:07:12,875 may not even be a choice that an 201 00:07:12,875 --> 00:07:13,375 individual 202 00:07:13,915 --> 00:07:16,654 engineer gets to make. Like, if you're using 203 00:07:16,954 --> 00:07:17,115 a, 204 00:07:18,795 --> 00:07:21,055 content filter that's predicated on DNS. 205 00:07:22,714 --> 00:07:23,454 Your management 206 00:07:23,915 --> 00:07:24,062 might say, no, you have to disable that. 207 00:07:24,062 --> 00:07:25,520 We don't care about privacy, because at, to 208 00:07:25,520 --> 00:07:28,180 disable that. We don't care about privacy because 209 00:07:29,040 --> 00:07:30,960 at work, at least, we view the content 210 00:07:30,960 --> 00:07:32,420 filter as being more important. 211 00:07:33,759 --> 00:07:36,240 But so again, it's kind of I guess, 212 00:07:36,240 --> 00:07:38,080 there you run into how much privacy can 213 00:07:38,080 --> 00:07:39,620 you expect to have in the workplace. 214 00:07:40,165 --> 00:07:42,085 And and then even the question of trade 215 00:07:42,085 --> 00:07:43,845 offs. I mean, I always say, if you 216 00:07:43,845 --> 00:07:45,285 haven't found the trade offs, you haven't looked 217 00:07:45,285 --> 00:07:47,465 hard enough. There are people who are arguing 218 00:07:47,845 --> 00:07:50,324 that are making, I think, a a cogent, 219 00:07:50,324 --> 00:07:53,365 coherent, good argument that DNS over HTTPS doesn't 220 00:07:53,365 --> 00:07:56,209 really solve any privacy issues. It actually can 221 00:07:56,209 --> 00:07:58,050 make things worse. What do you do with 222 00:07:58,050 --> 00:08:00,370 that? Right? How do you how do you 223 00:08:00,370 --> 00:08:02,850 educate? How do you adjudicate that? How do 224 00:08:02,850 --> 00:08:04,870 you understand that as a technical person, 225 00:08:05,170 --> 00:08:06,930 as an engineer? How do you deal with 226 00:08:06,930 --> 00:08:08,449 that type of problem? Do you guys spend 227 00:08:08,449 --> 00:08:10,824 your time investigating it? And there's a lot 228 00:08:10,824 --> 00:08:12,185 of there's a lot of avenues that you 229 00:08:12,185 --> 00:08:13,464 can take with that too because you could 230 00:08:13,464 --> 00:08:15,384 say, well, the company decides I don't. I'm 231 00:08:15,384 --> 00:08:17,384 just an individual contributor. It's not my decision. 232 00:08:17,384 --> 00:08:19,464 Oh, yeah. But but if you took that, 233 00:08:19,464 --> 00:08:20,985 I mean but you do have a personal 234 00:08:20,985 --> 00:08:23,305 responsibility to to teach the business and business 235 00:08:23,305 --> 00:08:25,305 leaders about the consequences of their choices. And 236 00:08:25,305 --> 00:08:26,959 if you throw your hands up and say, 237 00:08:26,959 --> 00:08:28,319 well, it's not my decision, so I don't 238 00:08:28,319 --> 00:08:29,699 need to worry about it. And that's, 239 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:32,240 you know, that's that's going away that's gonna 240 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:33,519 take you to a certain place, 241 00:08:33,919 --> 00:08:35,039 that you, you know, you may or may 242 00:08:35,039 --> 00:08:36,019 not wanna go. 243 00:08:36,399 --> 00:08:38,899 This might be harsh, but I feel like 244 00:08:39,360 --> 00:08:41,875 if you just automatically throw up your hands 245 00:08:41,875 --> 00:08:43,955 and say, well, the powers that be at 246 00:08:43,955 --> 00:08:45,634 my company will figure it out and their 247 00:08:45,634 --> 00:08:48,115 choice is correct. You're not gonna make it 248 00:08:48,115 --> 00:08:50,355 very far or you're not gonna be very 249 00:08:50,355 --> 00:08:51,735 happy in what you do. 250 00:08:52,274 --> 00:08:53,735 Because if you're not able 251 00:08:54,990 --> 00:08:56,529 to stand up and push back, 252 00:08:57,149 --> 00:08:59,409 then if something really bad happens, 253 00:08:59,870 --> 00:09:01,490 how are you gonna have the experience 254 00:09:02,029 --> 00:09:02,529 of 255 00:09:03,789 --> 00:09:06,269 saying, well, I think that's a bad idea 256 00:09:06,269 --> 00:09:08,350 for this reason and that reason about something 257 00:09:08,350 --> 00:09:08,850 relatively 258 00:09:10,174 --> 00:09:13,634 smaller with regards to say, a user's privacy 259 00:09:14,095 --> 00:09:14,595 or, 260 00:09:15,294 --> 00:09:16,754 protecting company data. 261 00:09:17,375 --> 00:09:19,054 If you don't have the experience of defending 262 00:09:19,054 --> 00:09:20,035 something smaller, 263 00:09:20,735 --> 00:09:22,674 what are you gonna do when it's something 264 00:09:22,735 --> 00:09:23,129 big? 265 00:09:24,169 --> 00:09:26,490 Yeah. I really like that. That's, building your 266 00:09:26,490 --> 00:09:28,730 ethical muscles. I think that's that's a really 267 00:09:28,730 --> 00:09:31,470 good great point. Yeah. Aristotelian 268 00:09:32,169 --> 00:09:34,490 virtue ethic is what that called that is 269 00:09:34,490 --> 00:09:35,629 called from the 270 00:09:36,975 --> 00:09:37,955 philosophy department. 271 00:09:39,695 --> 00:09:41,394 We're gonna get an education here. 272 00:09:42,894 --> 00:09:45,695 I have some exposure to philosophy. I just 273 00:09:45,695 --> 00:09:48,095 got it through talking to people who read 274 00:09:48,095 --> 00:09:49,475 science fiction. So 275 00:09:49,919 --> 00:09:50,659 in fantasy. 276 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:54,159 So they've all read these books. I haven't. 277 00:09:54,159 --> 00:09:56,559 I've just read, you know, people's own work 278 00:09:56,559 --> 00:09:57,940 that's drawing on it. 279 00:09:58,639 --> 00:10:01,600 Yeah. Yeah. So, you know, thinking about that, 280 00:10:01,600 --> 00:10:04,100 that that also puts from a network administration 281 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:06,294 perspective, that kind of put security in a 282 00:10:06,294 --> 00:10:08,774 different light, doesn't it? It's not just, you 283 00:10:08,774 --> 00:10:11,414 know, like these DNS over HTTPS issues, things 284 00:10:11,414 --> 00:10:14,054 like that. It's also these issues around, am 285 00:10:14,054 --> 00:10:16,855 I protecting data exfiltration? Am I taking that 286 00:10:16,855 --> 00:10:17,595 my company 287 00:10:18,214 --> 00:10:21,250 has this data on their customers seriously? 288 00:10:21,789 --> 00:10:24,590 What am I doing with that? Mhmm. Are 289 00:10:24,590 --> 00:10:26,850 you ensuring that you only have the minimum 290 00:10:27,549 --> 00:10:28,929 amount of data necessary 291 00:10:29,710 --> 00:10:31,330 to kind of both 292 00:10:31,875 --> 00:10:32,375 a, 293 00:10:33,075 --> 00:10:35,875 not basically have, like, this unexploded bomb of 294 00:10:35,875 --> 00:10:37,095 data sitting there, 295 00:10:37,634 --> 00:10:39,415 and, b, just sort of 296 00:10:40,754 --> 00:10:42,134 generally not be invasive 297 00:10:42,675 --> 00:10:44,459 for one of a better term. And and 298 00:10:44,459 --> 00:10:46,480 then how do you make those arguments? Right? 299 00:10:46,539 --> 00:10:48,059 If you're a network engineer and you see 300 00:10:48,059 --> 00:10:49,740 something going on, you're an engineer of any 301 00:10:49,740 --> 00:10:50,799 kind in your company, 302 00:10:51,179 --> 00:10:52,860 are you prepared to make those kinds of 303 00:10:52,860 --> 00:10:55,259 arguments about maybe we're collecting too much data. 304 00:10:55,259 --> 00:10:57,019 Maybe we're not doing the right thing by 305 00:10:57,019 --> 00:10:58,559 putting this data in that location. 306 00:10:59,215 --> 00:11:01,215 Maybe we're not doing the right thing, you 307 00:11:01,215 --> 00:11:04,274 know, with, our passwords. By the way, I 308 00:11:04,575 --> 00:11:06,894 I personally think changing passwords every six months 309 00:11:06,894 --> 00:11:09,394 or every three months is ludicrous. Mhmm. But, 310 00:11:09,455 --> 00:11:10,115 you know, 311 00:11:10,654 --> 00:11:12,335 who am I? I'm not a security person. 312 00:11:12,335 --> 00:11:12,835 So 313 00:11:13,534 --> 00:11:14,639 I think you're preaching to the 314 00:11:16,879 --> 00:11:18,340 choir. You know, it's 315 00:11:18,879 --> 00:11:21,460 pick a hard password and stick with it. 316 00:11:21,759 --> 00:11:24,399 It's like changing your password every three months 317 00:11:24,399 --> 00:11:26,240 is not really solving a problem that I 318 00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:28,820 can think of. But Problem is the auditors 319 00:11:28,879 --> 00:11:29,235 list. 320 00:11:29,794 --> 00:11:30,294 Yes 321 00:11:30,995 --> 00:11:33,475 Yes, I know I know so that's even 322 00:11:33,475 --> 00:11:35,954 that's even an ethical issue Isn't it like 323 00:11:35,954 --> 00:11:37,714 when do you do what the auditor tells 324 00:11:37,714 --> 00:11:39,315 you to do versus what you know is 325 00:11:39,315 --> 00:11:41,654 right? And how do you make those arguments? 326 00:11:41,875 --> 00:11:43,399 That's that's another entire 327 00:11:44,100 --> 00:11:45,159 Speaking of auditing, 328 00:11:45,460 --> 00:11:47,480 what do you guys think about this? Sometimes 329 00:11:47,940 --> 00:11:50,259 I've I've heard people talk about, especially for 330 00:11:50,259 --> 00:11:53,220 PCI audits, if you don't leave something there 331 00:11:53,220 --> 00:11:54,580 for them to find, if you don't leave 332 00:11:54,580 --> 00:11:55,879 them a couple of little breadcrumbs, 333 00:11:56,414 --> 00:11:58,575 then it's gonna go off the rails. The 334 00:11:58,575 --> 00:12:00,254 audit's gonna go off the rails. So I've 335 00:12:00,254 --> 00:12:02,095 heard some people say you have to leave 336 00:12:02,095 --> 00:12:04,654 some things unattended to. That way the auditor 337 00:12:04,654 --> 00:12:06,095 can find it. That way you can fix 338 00:12:06,095 --> 00:12:08,674 it. That way the whole system can run. 339 00:12:09,100 --> 00:12:10,299 What what do you what do you guys 340 00:12:10,299 --> 00:12:11,200 think about that? 341 00:12:13,179 --> 00:12:14,940 You know, it's funny because I've actually had 342 00:12:14,940 --> 00:12:17,019 builders tell me the same thing when they're 343 00:12:17,019 --> 00:12:19,759 building houses. Yep. That they will intentionally, 344 00:12:20,700 --> 00:12:23,565 like, not tighten a light switch. Because the 345 00:12:23,565 --> 00:12:25,404 inspector comes through and finds it and says, 346 00:12:25,404 --> 00:12:27,565 oh, I found your broken light switch. And 347 00:12:27,565 --> 00:12:29,245 they can mark it on their form and 348 00:12:29,245 --> 00:12:30,225 everybody's happy. 349 00:12:30,685 --> 00:12:32,144 Yeah. I think it's very 350 00:12:32,845 --> 00:12:34,144 it's honestly smart 351 00:12:34,524 --> 00:12:36,600 when you think about how humans work. 352 00:12:37,480 --> 00:12:40,199 You're like, here's an easy thing. Okay. I 353 00:12:40,199 --> 00:12:42,279 found the easy thing. Done. I don't need 354 00:12:42,279 --> 00:12:43,179 to keep going. 355 00:12:43,959 --> 00:12:44,459 But 356 00:12:45,079 --> 00:12:46,620 what's the purpose of the audit? 357 00:12:47,399 --> 00:12:48,299 Are you actually 358 00:12:48,615 --> 00:12:49,115 fulfilling, 359 00:12:51,575 --> 00:12:54,375 whatever need you have there? Or are you 360 00:12:54,375 --> 00:12:57,495 just passing the audit and, like, skipping out 361 00:12:57,495 --> 00:12:59,495 of class? You're putting your answers on your 362 00:12:59,495 --> 00:13:01,610 smartphone. On your smartwatch, which by the way, 363 00:13:01,610 --> 00:13:04,429 they're banning smartwatches in many classrooms now because 364 00:13:05,289 --> 00:13:07,470 people are putting their answers on the smartwatches. 365 00:13:09,129 --> 00:13:11,230 Back in my day, it was graphing calculators. 366 00:13:12,570 --> 00:13:15,289 Yeah. Or itty bitty writing under your under 367 00:13:15,289 --> 00:13:17,334 your under your palm of your hand or 368 00:13:17,334 --> 00:13:18,774 on the wrist or something, you know, they 369 00:13:18,774 --> 00:13:20,694 used to do that too. Yeah. I mean 370 00:13:20,694 --> 00:13:22,934 people have always cheated, I guess. So so 371 00:13:22,934 --> 00:13:25,014 start starting from the very beginning, well, we've 372 00:13:25,014 --> 00:13:26,774 got it. We've cost a wide circuit already 373 00:13:26,774 --> 00:13:28,794 and haven't resolved anything, have we? 374 00:13:30,879 --> 00:13:33,039 You can't resolve anything, though. You can think 375 00:13:33,039 --> 00:13:34,320 about it and you can try to do 376 00:13:34,320 --> 00:13:36,399 better, but there's no final answer on any 377 00:13:36,399 --> 00:13:37,059 of this. 378 00:13:38,320 --> 00:13:39,839 I thought it was 47, 379 00:13:39,839 --> 00:13:40,659 42. 380 00:13:41,039 --> 00:13:42,580 Sorry. 42. 381 00:13:42,720 --> 00:13:44,804 42. That was that's that's what I thought 382 00:13:44,804 --> 00:13:45,705 was 42. 383 00:13:46,565 --> 00:13:48,325 So we can just close the podcast right 384 00:13:48,325 --> 00:13:50,325 there because we found the answer. It's 42. 385 00:13:50,325 --> 00:13:50,825 No. 386 00:13:52,644 --> 00:13:55,225 The little mice will be very happy. That's 387 00:13:55,284 --> 00:13:58,230 very sad. Yes. So, yeah. So, I mean, 388 00:13:58,230 --> 00:14:00,570 starting from technology really isn't neutral. 389 00:14:00,950 --> 00:14:03,830 And thinking that you need to think about 390 00:14:03,830 --> 00:14:06,230 how your company is using technology. Are you 391 00:14:06,230 --> 00:14:08,629 comfortable with that? How are you dealing with 392 00:14:08,629 --> 00:14:11,384 that as a person? And beyond that, How 393 00:14:11,384 --> 00:14:13,625 are you dealing with security? And are you 394 00:14:13,625 --> 00:14:15,705 taking security as just a checklist? Are you 395 00:14:15,705 --> 00:14:17,325 taking security and privacy 396 00:14:17,785 --> 00:14:19,945 as real things? I mean this this impacts 397 00:14:19,945 --> 00:14:20,684 real people 398 00:14:21,144 --> 00:14:23,545 and What are you doing with that? And 399 00:14:23,545 --> 00:14:25,245 I think that's a huge ethical 400 00:14:25,629 --> 00:14:27,470 can of worms that we, as network engineers, 401 00:14:27,470 --> 00:14:28,829 we don't really like to talk about this 402 00:14:28,829 --> 00:14:30,829 stuff. We'd rather talk about how to configure 403 00:14:30,829 --> 00:14:31,329 BGP 404 00:14:32,990 --> 00:14:34,990 or not. It is easy. People don't want 405 00:14:34,990 --> 00:14:35,490 it. 406 00:14:37,709 --> 00:14:40,134 So yeah. I mean, I would just like 407 00:14:40,134 --> 00:14:41,575 to slap a firewall in front of the 408 00:14:41,575 --> 00:14:43,835 whole thing and just call it done. Right? 409 00:14:44,054 --> 00:14:46,134 And that doesn't Have you act have you 410 00:14:46,134 --> 00:14:48,134 actually, like, looked at your firewall config and 411 00:14:48,134 --> 00:14:50,455 made sure that, say, your other clients can't, 412 00:14:50,455 --> 00:14:52,309 like, cross the streams and get into each 413 00:14:52,309 --> 00:14:53,050 other's DMZs? 414 00:14:53,429 --> 00:14:54,870 How well do you know how well it 415 00:14:54,870 --> 00:14:57,269 works? Mhmm. And then knowing how if you 416 00:14:57,269 --> 00:14:58,710 don't know how well it works, you just 417 00:14:58,710 --> 00:15:00,950 know how to configure it. So this goes 418 00:15:00,950 --> 00:15:02,550 back to the whole thing of how skilled 419 00:15:02,550 --> 00:15:03,865 are you as a practitioner? 420 00:15:04,485 --> 00:15:05,784 And is there an ethical 421 00:15:06,164 --> 00:15:08,565 requirement to be better skilled in order to 422 00:15:08,565 --> 00:15:10,424 solve the problems that need to be solved 423 00:15:11,204 --> 00:15:13,524 in a good way, right, in the right 424 00:15:13,524 --> 00:15:14,024 way? 425 00:15:14,964 --> 00:15:16,964 So, yeah, I mean, it's it's, 426 00:15:18,500 --> 00:15:20,899 I think there's a, sort of a crossover 427 00:15:20,899 --> 00:15:23,160 here between, ethics and craftsmanship. 428 00:15:24,179 --> 00:15:26,820 So, I there's a lot of times when 429 00:15:26,820 --> 00:15:28,660 my personal guide is, do I wanna put 430 00:15:28,660 --> 00:15:30,820 my name on that? Do I want someone 431 00:15:30,820 --> 00:15:32,545 to know that that was my work? Sometimes 432 00:15:32,545 --> 00:15:34,384 I use that to motivate myself to finish 433 00:15:34,384 --> 00:15:34,884 something 434 00:15:35,425 --> 00:15:36,625 or or to do a good job or 435 00:15:36,625 --> 00:15:39,045 something. I think there's an intersection between craftsmanship 436 00:15:39,184 --> 00:15:40,945 and ethics because do you want your name 437 00:15:40,945 --> 00:15:42,545 on that decision? Do you want your name 438 00:15:42,545 --> 00:15:44,404 on how that was carried out? 439 00:15:44,945 --> 00:15:46,325 Can be a pretty good marker. 440 00:15:48,149 --> 00:15:49,610 Yeah. Well, that's 441 00:15:49,990 --> 00:15:51,929 by the way, Tom, now you're in platonic 442 00:15:52,389 --> 00:15:54,870 in the platonic world. Yes. And and, you 443 00:15:54,870 --> 00:15:56,790 know, this this all falls back into the 444 00:15:56,790 --> 00:15:58,618 virtue ethic as well. So if if you're 445 00:15:58,618 --> 00:15:59,054 listening to this and you don't know what 446 00:16:04,014 --> 00:16:05,875 pretty fascinating area of study 447 00:16:06,575 --> 00:16:08,414 And it makes a lot of sense. I 448 00:16:08,414 --> 00:16:09,154 mean essentially 449 00:16:09,455 --> 00:16:11,634 all Aristotle is saying is that 450 00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:14,460 you make good moral choices 451 00:16:15,480 --> 00:16:16,379 by reflex 452 00:16:16,759 --> 00:16:17,259 because 453 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:20,620 you have practiced making good moral choices 454 00:16:21,399 --> 00:16:23,580 in less than important situations. 455 00:16:24,345 --> 00:16:27,144 So, you know, the important decisions are generally 456 00:16:27,144 --> 00:16:29,384 made on a snap. You don't have time 457 00:16:29,384 --> 00:16:31,144 to think about it the way you want 458 00:16:31,144 --> 00:16:33,804 to. There's a lot of conflicting interest 459 00:16:34,345 --> 00:16:34,845 points. 460 00:16:36,105 --> 00:16:38,680 There's a lot of overriding, and, you know, 461 00:16:38,680 --> 00:16:40,519 there'll be times when you really don't wanna 462 00:16:40,519 --> 00:16:42,120 make that decision even though you know it's 463 00:16:42,120 --> 00:16:43,879 the right thing to do. And the way 464 00:16:43,879 --> 00:16:47,399 to make that decision morally is to build 465 00:16:47,399 --> 00:16:50,120 up your moral muscles through the virtue ethic. 466 00:16:50,120 --> 00:16:52,680 And so you practice making good decisions so 467 00:16:52,680 --> 00:16:54,274 that you can make good decisions when you're 468 00:16:54,274 --> 00:16:56,274 under stress. And C. S. Lewis talks about 469 00:16:56,274 --> 00:16:58,274 this as well. There's a couple of passages 470 00:16:58,274 --> 00:17:00,134 in C. S. Lewis for anybody who follows 471 00:17:00,835 --> 00:17:01,894 who is who's who that is, 472 00:17:02,434 --> 00:17:03,975 who talks about this as well. 473 00:17:04,434 --> 00:17:06,214 It's been picked up by some modern 474 00:17:06,914 --> 00:17:07,414 writers 475 00:17:08,609 --> 00:17:10,609 in the virtue ethic realm. There's a couple 476 00:17:10,609 --> 00:17:12,690 of really good books, that are more recent. 477 00:17:12,690 --> 00:17:13,190 They're 478 00:17:13,650 --> 00:17:16,789 kind of philosophical, but, they're actually really good. 479 00:17:17,250 --> 00:17:19,570 And that's actually an idea that you'll see 480 00:17:19,570 --> 00:17:20,210 a lot of, 481 00:17:21,410 --> 00:17:23,845 younger folks in the Internet generation work on. 482 00:17:23,845 --> 00:17:24,345 Just 483 00:17:25,285 --> 00:17:27,845 we've very much have this idea of if 484 00:17:27,845 --> 00:17:29,924 you make a mistake, apologize, and then do 485 00:17:29,924 --> 00:17:31,924 better next time. And what you're doing better 486 00:17:31,924 --> 00:17:34,805 at is, like, say, being respectful of someone's 487 00:17:34,805 --> 00:17:35,944 choices or 488 00:17:36,970 --> 00:17:38,970 keeping in mind your ability to hurt other 489 00:17:38,970 --> 00:17:41,230 people. The more you practice doing that, 490 00:17:41,690 --> 00:17:43,549 the less likely you are 491 00:17:46,090 --> 00:17:47,630 to stomp through something 492 00:17:48,250 --> 00:17:49,070 and just 493 00:17:50,244 --> 00:17:51,944 without even realizing it 494 00:17:52,404 --> 00:17:53,865 hurt people really badly. 495 00:17:54,484 --> 00:17:55,845 I'm trying so hard not to say the 496 00:17:55,845 --> 00:17:57,704 feminism word here, but there we go. 497 00:17:58,805 --> 00:18:00,805 Right. Well, right. And I think that's I 498 00:18:00,805 --> 00:18:03,170 think that now, I'm gonna bring you know, 499 00:18:03,170 --> 00:18:05,349 go back to the technology world and say, 500 00:18:05,490 --> 00:18:07,170 this has a lot to do with agile. 501 00:18:07,170 --> 00:18:11,109 Mhmm. You don't fix blame, you fix problems. 502 00:18:11,170 --> 00:18:13,330 And I don't think we get that a 503 00:18:13,330 --> 00:18:14,930 lot of times. We do a lot more 504 00:18:14,930 --> 00:18:15,830 fixing blame 505 00:18:16,134 --> 00:18:17,755 than we do fixing problems 506 00:18:18,535 --> 00:18:20,775 and I think that's an important point to 507 00:18:20,775 --> 00:18:21,275 make 508 00:18:22,134 --> 00:18:23,575 just in the way we deal with other 509 00:18:23,575 --> 00:18:24,794 people is just 510 00:18:25,654 --> 00:18:26,954 you know, don't don't 511 00:18:27,575 --> 00:18:29,194 Don't beat them up or whatever. 512 00:18:30,134 --> 00:18:31,515 The concept of 513 00:18:32,630 --> 00:18:35,109 failure that is not that, you know, no 514 00:18:35,109 --> 00:18:35,609 blame 515 00:18:36,549 --> 00:18:38,630 no blame follow through or no blame go 516 00:18:38,630 --> 00:18:40,089 back and figure out what happened 517 00:18:40,710 --> 00:18:41,929 is really 518 00:18:42,230 --> 00:18:43,369 a useful thing 519 00:18:43,990 --> 00:18:45,529 in helping people understand, 520 00:18:46,710 --> 00:18:48,404 or how to, you know, working in this 521 00:18:48,404 --> 00:18:50,184 in this realm that we're in now. 522 00:18:51,204 --> 00:18:53,304 Yeah. And I think accepting responsibility 523 00:18:53,684 --> 00:18:54,825 as well. Basically, 524 00:18:55,765 --> 00:18:57,944 you have to know that what you did 525 00:18:58,164 --> 00:18:59,065 caused the harm. 526 00:19:00,164 --> 00:19:02,325 And then what you do from there is 527 00:19:02,325 --> 00:19:03,660 try not to do it again, 528 00:19:04,119 --> 00:19:05,420 and other people 529 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:08,059 kind of just move on 530 00:19:08,680 --> 00:19:10,359 and give you a chance to not do 531 00:19:10,359 --> 00:19:10,940 it again. 532 00:19:12,039 --> 00:19:12,539 So, 533 00:19:13,640 --> 00:19:14,299 I mean, 534 00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:17,160 to me, this is kind of something I've 535 00:19:17,160 --> 00:19:19,054 been thinking about as I look at, say, 536 00:19:19,054 --> 00:19:20,515 work situations where 537 00:19:21,535 --> 00:19:24,335 maybe you're being asked to support something that 538 00:19:24,335 --> 00:19:24,835 you 539 00:19:25,454 --> 00:19:26,434 disagree with. 540 00:19:27,454 --> 00:19:29,375 Kind of keeping in mind the idea that 541 00:19:29,375 --> 00:19:31,694 maybe you can't at this job, but at 542 00:19:31,694 --> 00:19:32,674 a future one, 543 00:19:33,214 --> 00:19:34,319 you can do better 544 00:19:35,039 --> 00:19:36,880 and be more congruent, I guess, with your 545 00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:38,339 own internal sense of ethics. 546 00:19:38,799 --> 00:19:40,899 I'm a little bit scattered. I'm so sorry. 547 00:19:41,039 --> 00:19:42,960 No. No. It's actually that's fine. No. I 548 00:19:42,960 --> 00:19:44,740 think that's good. Yeah. I think that, 549 00:19:45,679 --> 00:19:47,679 that kinda does bring in another topic though. 550 00:19:47,679 --> 00:19:48,884 Right? Which is 551 00:19:49,285 --> 00:19:51,684 you are doing something. I mean, it's a 552 00:19:51,684 --> 00:19:52,184 struggle 553 00:19:52,884 --> 00:19:54,805 Because you know that no matter what you 554 00:19:54,805 --> 00:19:56,644 build it's being used for things that you 555 00:19:56,644 --> 00:19:59,285 don't agree with. Mhmm. And you have to 556 00:19:59,285 --> 00:20:00,900 internally figure that out 557 00:20:01,220 --> 00:20:03,720 for yourself, what that means, 558 00:20:04,019 --> 00:20:06,180 and how far you're willing to go to 559 00:20:06,180 --> 00:20:08,980 support things you don't agree with, so to 560 00:20:08,980 --> 00:20:09,480 speak, 561 00:20:10,339 --> 00:20:11,640 as a as an engineer. 562 00:20:12,259 --> 00:20:15,080 Sorry. Sorry, Aris. Especially as a network engineer, 563 00:20:15,460 --> 00:20:17,325 if you think about, you know, the people 564 00:20:17,325 --> 00:20:19,505 that build the roads in any country, 565 00:20:20,444 --> 00:20:22,045 that road can be used for all sorts 566 00:20:22,045 --> 00:20:23,804 of things, and it can also be used 567 00:20:23,804 --> 00:20:26,704 for all sorts of really terrible things. Mhmm. 568 00:20:27,724 --> 00:20:29,404 Do you do you say I am I'm 569 00:20:29,404 --> 00:20:31,630 not gonna be a builder of roads because 570 00:20:31,630 --> 00:20:34,670 somebody's going to use it? You know, someone's 571 00:20:34,670 --> 00:20:35,869 gonna use it in a way that I 572 00:20:35,869 --> 00:20:37,950 didn't intend or I didn't agree with. And 573 00:20:37,950 --> 00:20:39,869 I I get what you're saying, Russ, with 574 00:20:39,869 --> 00:20:41,549 the we can't just, you know, assume that 575 00:20:41,549 --> 00:20:43,390 we don't have any responsibility for the tools. 576 00:20:43,390 --> 00:20:45,150 But but there is also another dimension of 577 00:20:45,150 --> 00:20:47,355 this where if you say I'm not gonna 578 00:20:47,355 --> 00:20:48,795 allow my work to be used for anything 579 00:20:48,795 --> 00:20:50,075 other than what I think is the right 580 00:20:50,075 --> 00:20:52,475 thing, then you'll ultimately end up doing nothing 581 00:20:52,475 --> 00:20:52,975 professionally. 582 00:20:53,755 --> 00:20:54,255 And, 583 00:20:54,795 --> 00:20:56,475 you know, I'm not saying you should, you 584 00:20:56,475 --> 00:20:58,555 know, people should say, whatever. I don't have 585 00:20:58,555 --> 00:21:00,315 to have any responsibility here. But I also 586 00:21:00,315 --> 00:21:02,230 think there's the people have to make their 587 00:21:02,230 --> 00:21:04,390 own choices and the way people use their 588 00:21:04,390 --> 00:21:05,210 own agency. 589 00:21:05,669 --> 00:21:07,669 That that's the interplay there is how how 590 00:21:07,669 --> 00:21:09,690 do you how do you let your 591 00:21:09,990 --> 00:21:12,809 your interaction with their agency determine your choices? 592 00:21:14,230 --> 00:21:16,125 Right. And I think there what you run 593 00:21:16,125 --> 00:21:16,625 into 594 00:21:17,005 --> 00:21:19,325 is trying to do the best you can 595 00:21:19,325 --> 00:21:21,585 to understand the unintended consequences 596 00:21:22,365 --> 00:21:23,904 of what it is you're doing. 597 00:21:24,605 --> 00:21:26,865 Just in the back of your mind, realize 598 00:21:27,565 --> 00:21:28,065 that 599 00:21:28,765 --> 00:21:29,265 you 600 00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:31,839 don't know. I mean the way we put 601 00:21:31,839 --> 00:21:34,099 it in just thinking in terms of, 602 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:37,759 the way we think of it in terms 603 00:21:37,759 --> 00:21:39,440 of technology or at least I think of 604 00:21:39,440 --> 00:21:41,599 it in terms of technology is when I 605 00:21:41,599 --> 00:21:43,325 when I develop any protocol or I work 606 00:21:43,325 --> 00:21:45,565 on something new and that in the protocol 607 00:21:45,565 --> 00:21:46,065 world. 608 00:21:47,404 --> 00:21:49,904 I need to think in terms of 609 00:21:51,484 --> 00:21:53,325 Not what I intend to do with this 610 00:21:53,325 --> 00:21:56,045 technology, but the maximum range of things that 611 00:21:56,045 --> 00:21:56,910 can be done with it 612 00:21:57,789 --> 00:21:59,470 it. Mhmm. Right? Because that's where it's gonna 613 00:21:59,470 --> 00:22:00,990 be used. That's how it's gonna be used. 614 00:22:00,990 --> 00:22:02,590 It's the maximum range of things that you 615 00:22:02,590 --> 00:22:03,890 can do with it. Mhmm. 616 00:22:04,190 --> 00:22:05,730 Now, on the other side, 617 00:22:06,029 --> 00:22:07,950 I can't change the way other people use 618 00:22:07,950 --> 00:22:10,305 it, but I can think about things like 619 00:22:10,305 --> 00:22:12,785 if I'm building roads, what is this gonna 620 00:22:12,785 --> 00:22:13,285 do 621 00:22:14,065 --> 00:22:14,565 to 622 00:22:15,105 --> 00:22:16,644 the way people see their world? 623 00:22:16,945 --> 00:22:19,365 So you're saying you're saying there's virtue in 624 00:22:19,744 --> 00:22:20,884 in simply considering 625 00:22:21,585 --> 00:22:23,424 that this might be used for something that 626 00:22:23,424 --> 00:22:25,505 is that is utterly wrong. You're saying that 627 00:22:25,505 --> 00:22:27,470 there is it is that a redeeming? I 628 00:22:27,470 --> 00:22:29,149 mean, is that is that is it good 629 00:22:29,149 --> 00:22:30,849 enough to to make that consideration? 630 00:22:31,470 --> 00:22:32,769 I don't think it's redeeming. 631 00:22:33,549 --> 00:22:34,690 I think that 632 00:22:35,230 --> 00:22:36,829 there are things that are inside your control 633 00:22:36,829 --> 00:22:38,190 and things that are outside your control. And 634 00:22:38,190 --> 00:22:39,470 by the way, this, I think, goes back 635 00:22:39,470 --> 00:22:40,909 to the heart of the whole ethical issue 636 00:22:40,909 --> 00:22:41,889 as a network engineer. 637 00:22:42,485 --> 00:22:44,805 I can only protect my users' data so 638 00:22:44,805 --> 00:22:46,965 far. I can only protect their privacy so 639 00:22:46,965 --> 00:22:48,485 far. There are things I can do. There 640 00:22:48,485 --> 00:22:49,785 are things I cannot do. 641 00:22:50,164 --> 00:22:50,664 And 642 00:22:50,965 --> 00:22:53,365 knowing my own limits as an engineer is 643 00:22:53,365 --> 00:22:55,259 a major part of it. If you don't 644 00:22:55,259 --> 00:22:57,099 know your own limits, then you're just gonna 645 00:22:57,099 --> 00:22:59,200 stress yourself out trying to 646 00:22:59,980 --> 00:23:01,920 affect things that you just 647 00:23:02,299 --> 00:23:03,359 can't change. 648 00:23:03,740 --> 00:23:05,420 Not the same thing as there not being 649 00:23:05,420 --> 00:23:07,200 things that you can change. 650 00:23:07,820 --> 00:23:09,820 You just have to figure out, like, what 651 00:23:09,820 --> 00:23:11,855 is my locus of control? The way I 652 00:23:11,855 --> 00:23:13,694 think about this is not an ethical concerns, 653 00:23:13,694 --> 00:23:15,875 but in, you know, trying to 654 00:23:16,335 --> 00:23:18,494 develop solutions that meet requirements, as I always 655 00:23:18,494 --> 00:23:19,554 think about a ladder. 656 00:23:20,255 --> 00:23:21,774 People are gonna use ladder for all kinds 657 00:23:21,774 --> 00:23:23,534 of crazy stuff and all kinds of crazy 658 00:23:23,534 --> 00:23:25,234 stuff that they shouldn't use a ladder for. 659 00:23:25,855 --> 00:23:28,029 And when I've when I've tried to design 660 00:23:28,029 --> 00:23:30,509 networks specifically, I think about the ladder. Like, 661 00:23:30,509 --> 00:23:32,269 the people that figured that out, how to 662 00:23:32,269 --> 00:23:33,869 build a ladder, I'm sure that if they 663 00:23:33,869 --> 00:23:35,549 saw what some of us humans use that 664 00:23:35,549 --> 00:23:38,130 for, they would just be, you know, probably 665 00:23:38,190 --> 00:23:39,250 disgusted and annoyed. 666 00:23:39,869 --> 00:23:41,545 But maybe you can you know, there's there's 667 00:23:41,545 --> 00:23:42,585 all sorts of things you could do with 668 00:23:42,585 --> 00:23:43,705 a ladder that you shouldn't be doing with 669 00:23:43,705 --> 00:23:45,705 a ladder. But, you know, it probably if 670 00:23:45,705 --> 00:23:46,984 they were to think about that while they 671 00:23:46,984 --> 00:23:48,445 were building it, then it probably, 672 00:23:49,224 --> 00:23:51,625 had some consequences, some positive consequences for the 673 00:23:51,625 --> 00:23:52,984 people who were using the ladder in the 674 00:23:52,984 --> 00:23:54,789 right way. It probably made things safer for 675 00:23:54,789 --> 00:23:55,909 the people who are using it the right 676 00:23:55,909 --> 00:23:56,409 way. 677 00:23:56,710 --> 00:23:58,549 So I don't know. Maybe that's a Yeah. 678 00:23:58,549 --> 00:24:00,230 Or or you're a ladder maker and you 679 00:24:00,230 --> 00:24:02,789 just slap labels on it until people stop 680 00:24:02,789 --> 00:24:03,929 using it, you know. 681 00:24:05,109 --> 00:24:07,509 Yeah. But the labels usually come from being 682 00:24:07,509 --> 00:24:09,625 sued because someone's tried to 683 00:24:10,244 --> 00:24:11,065 chair labels. 684 00:24:11,605 --> 00:24:13,684 Someone tried to use a chair as a, 685 00:24:14,085 --> 00:24:15,845 jack for their car. So now it has 686 00:24:15,845 --> 00:24:17,605 a warning label saying don't use it as 687 00:24:17,605 --> 00:24:18,744 a jack for their car. 688 00:24:19,125 --> 00:24:22,244 You can't always predict what interesting life choices 689 00:24:22,244 --> 00:24:23,465 people are gonna make. 690 00:24:24,450 --> 00:24:26,309 Correct. You can try, but 691 00:24:27,250 --> 00:24:28,470 people are creative. 692 00:24:29,170 --> 00:24:31,009 Yep. They are. And it is and it 693 00:24:31,009 --> 00:24:32,950 is that's part of the problem. Right? 694 00:24:33,250 --> 00:24:34,769 Is that you don't know where people are 695 00:24:34,769 --> 00:24:35,625 gonna use things. 696 00:24:36,184 --> 00:24:37,785 But on the other hand again, you can 697 00:24:37,785 --> 00:24:40,125 think about those larger culture issues, right? 698 00:24:40,904 --> 00:24:42,105 If I go out and I build a 699 00:24:42,105 --> 00:24:43,164 system that collects 700 00:24:43,625 --> 00:24:45,464 I'll give you an example actually a personal 701 00:24:45,464 --> 00:24:45,964 example 702 00:24:46,424 --> 00:24:48,265 I was once asked by somebody at a 703 00:24:48,265 --> 00:24:50,390 company I worked for to build a 704 00:24:50,769 --> 00:24:53,170 system that would allow him to collect the 705 00:24:53,170 --> 00:24:53,670 names, 706 00:24:54,130 --> 00:24:56,930 the wives' names, and the children's names, and 707 00:24:56,930 --> 00:24:59,410 the dates of birth and everything for everybody 708 00:24:59,410 --> 00:25:00,710 who worked in that organization. 709 00:25:01,250 --> 00:25:03,664 Is it a valid request? Well, the position 710 00:25:03,664 --> 00:25:05,204 this person was in was, 711 00:25:06,065 --> 00:25:07,285 this was in the military. 712 00:25:07,664 --> 00:25:09,744 Mhmm. And so the position this person was 713 00:25:09,744 --> 00:25:10,484 in was 714 00:25:10,865 --> 00:25:12,384 if one of those people got in an 715 00:25:12,384 --> 00:25:15,125 accident or was killed on duty or something, 716 00:25:15,490 --> 00:25:17,029 they had to know this information. 717 00:25:17,569 --> 00:25:19,269 Okay. So it's a valid request, 718 00:25:19,890 --> 00:25:22,950 right? There's a reason they're asking for this. 719 00:25:23,329 --> 00:25:24,549 But on the other hand, 720 00:25:25,569 --> 00:25:27,569 is it really valid? Are there other places 721 00:25:27,569 --> 00:25:28,789 they could get that information? 722 00:25:29,409 --> 00:25:31,875 And is it right to build it like 723 00:25:31,875 --> 00:25:34,275 on a personal computer sitting in some office 724 00:25:34,275 --> 00:25:34,775 someplace? 725 00:25:35,075 --> 00:25:37,634 Oh, yikes. Right? You know, so so you 726 00:25:37,634 --> 00:25:39,095 so you have to think through 727 00:25:39,715 --> 00:25:41,795 the whole situation and think, what could that 728 00:25:41,795 --> 00:25:43,875 be used for? Where would that information leak? 729 00:25:43,875 --> 00:25:45,240 What would happen if that leaked? 730 00:25:46,440 --> 00:25:49,579 How can I do my best to not 731 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:50,859 have that be a problem? 732 00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:51,660 Right? 733 00:25:52,039 --> 00:25:54,119 Right. What's the potential harm? Because that's a 734 00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:56,859 significant amount of very personal information. 735 00:25:57,799 --> 00:25:59,980 Yes. Oh, yes. Definitely. Definitely. 736 00:26:00,634 --> 00:26:01,134 And 737 00:26:01,514 --> 00:26:03,514 this is why, you know, when I look 738 00:26:03,514 --> 00:26:05,595 at technology and culture, I worry a lot 739 00:26:05,595 --> 00:26:07,595 about we're just doing things and we're not 740 00:26:07,595 --> 00:26:08,815 really thinking through. 741 00:26:09,194 --> 00:26:11,194 What does that mean? Like, what's what's the 742 00:26:11,194 --> 00:26:13,034 ultimate end here? Where are we going with 743 00:26:13,034 --> 00:26:13,259 this? 744 00:26:14,380 --> 00:26:15,119 And so, 745 00:26:15,420 --> 00:26:17,500 obviously, I'm not a Luddite because I work 746 00:26:17,500 --> 00:26:20,079 in technology. But at the same time, 747 00:26:20,380 --> 00:26:21,680 I do worry about it. 748 00:26:23,420 --> 00:26:24,079 I mean, 749 00:26:24,940 --> 00:26:26,940 I saw a joke recently about, 750 00:26:27,605 --> 00:26:29,845 tech enthusiasts versus people who work in tech. 751 00:26:29,845 --> 00:26:32,325 The tech enthusiast has a smart everything in 752 00:26:32,325 --> 00:26:33,144 their house. 753 00:26:33,845 --> 00:26:36,244 The person who works in tech has, like, 754 00:26:36,244 --> 00:26:38,164 a toaster with a hammer next to it 755 00:26:38,164 --> 00:26:39,684 as a just a warning in case the 756 00:26:39,684 --> 00:26:41,065 toaster gets any ideas. 757 00:26:42,700 --> 00:26:45,099 And it was like, okay. Ouch. You don't 758 00:26:45,099 --> 00:26:47,099 need to personally attack me on the Internet, 759 00:26:47,099 --> 00:26:48,319 but alright. Fine. 760 00:26:50,940 --> 00:26:52,559 But but it's true. 761 00:26:53,019 --> 00:26:55,295 It is. It is. Most of people I 762 00:26:55,295 --> 00:26:57,055 know who work in social media don't have 763 00:26:57,055 --> 00:26:59,714 that many social media accounts. It's really funny. 764 00:26:59,934 --> 00:27:01,234 It's they just don't. 765 00:27:01,934 --> 00:27:04,195 Yeah. I recently started using Twitter, 766 00:27:04,654 --> 00:27:06,035 and it's very strange 767 00:27:06,414 --> 00:27:08,870 talking to people and having it be even 768 00:27:08,870 --> 00:27:11,130 remotely tied to my real life identity. 769 00:27:12,070 --> 00:27:12,809 Just because 770 00:27:13,430 --> 00:27:15,690 I come from a background where you don't 771 00:27:15,990 --> 00:27:16,809 social media. 772 00:27:17,509 --> 00:27:19,110 Because you look at it and it's like 773 00:27:19,269 --> 00:27:21,724 and they're getting this info and this info, 774 00:27:22,025 --> 00:27:24,345 and who knows where it's being stored and 775 00:27:24,345 --> 00:27:25,964 who has access to it. 776 00:27:26,664 --> 00:27:28,924 And it it's even I mean, 777 00:27:29,384 --> 00:27:31,305 really, once you see how the sausage is 778 00:27:31,305 --> 00:27:33,565 made, you don't want none of that sausage. 779 00:27:35,419 --> 00:27:36,940 Yeah. I learned that one when I was 780 00:27:36,940 --> 00:27:39,359 eight and watched a Julia Child cooking show. 781 00:27:39,900 --> 00:27:40,720 Yeah. You know? 782 00:27:41,019 --> 00:27:42,160 Wow. Okay. 783 00:27:42,700 --> 00:27:43,599 I think I'm 784 00:27:44,940 --> 00:27:46,559 I don't think I want that sausage. 785 00:27:46,859 --> 00:27:49,075 Yeah. So it's so it's I mean, it's 786 00:27:49,075 --> 00:27:50,835 a thing. Right? It's it's a thing, but 787 00:27:50,835 --> 00:27:51,335 yet, 788 00:27:51,794 --> 00:27:53,234 you know, you work in this area, and 789 00:27:53,234 --> 00:27:54,674 you and you gotta think about it. So 790 00:27:54,674 --> 00:27:56,515 I think it comes down to this. Be 791 00:27:56,515 --> 00:27:57,015 aware. 792 00:27:57,474 --> 00:27:59,714 Like, what are the ultimate what what what 793 00:27:59,714 --> 00:28:01,894 can you get to? What's going on here? 794 00:28:02,275 --> 00:28:04,899 And what can you do? What are your 795 00:28:04,899 --> 00:28:06,519 limits on trying to do 796 00:28:06,899 --> 00:28:09,700 the best that you can to limit any 797 00:28:09,700 --> 00:28:11,700 ethical damage that might happen because of your 798 00:28:11,700 --> 00:28:12,200 actions? 799 00:28:12,579 --> 00:28:15,139 And can you argue against your company or 800 00:28:15,139 --> 00:28:17,914 whoever it is doing unethical things? 801 00:28:18,214 --> 00:28:20,454 And can you help people who are trying 802 00:28:20,454 --> 00:28:22,375 to use this technology help them to use 803 00:28:22,375 --> 00:28:24,855 it more ethically? I think those are big 804 00:28:24,855 --> 00:28:25,355 issues. 805 00:28:25,974 --> 00:28:27,414 And I think you have to be kind 806 00:28:27,414 --> 00:28:28,075 with yourself 807 00:28:29,174 --> 00:28:29,674 because 808 00:28:30,329 --> 00:28:31,929 you may not be able to have the 809 00:28:31,929 --> 00:28:33,710 impact that you want to have. 810 00:28:34,490 --> 00:28:37,210 And you can't if you destroy yourself because 811 00:28:37,210 --> 00:28:38,669 you're not able to 812 00:28:39,849 --> 00:28:40,829 prevent something 813 00:28:41,210 --> 00:28:42,970 that you think is, you know, putting people 814 00:28:42,970 --> 00:28:45,265 at risk of harm or privacy invasion or 815 00:28:45,265 --> 00:28:45,765 whatever, 816 00:28:46,785 --> 00:28:49,125 if you destroy yourself because you failed, 817 00:28:49,505 --> 00:28:51,345 then you won't be there in the future 818 00:28:51,345 --> 00:28:52,244 to try again. 819 00:28:52,545 --> 00:28:54,785 Yeah. I think that's really important. I think 820 00:28:54,785 --> 00:28:57,025 that's a really important point, and it's very 821 00:28:57,025 --> 00:28:57,660 good point. 822 00:28:58,940 --> 00:28:59,440 So 823 00:28:59,820 --> 00:29:01,500 go ahead. Part of that. Sorry. Just one 824 00:29:01,500 --> 00:29:02,779 more thing. I that just made me think 825 00:29:02,779 --> 00:29:03,340 of was, 826 00:29:04,700 --> 00:29:06,619 a a big part of, I think, being 827 00:29:06,619 --> 00:29:09,674 successful in making ethical considerations is, 828 00:29:10,154 --> 00:29:12,795 putting responsibility where it really goes. Mhmm. Right? 829 00:29:12,795 --> 00:29:14,735 If it if it really is your responsibility 830 00:29:14,955 --> 00:29:16,154 to do this, then you should do it, 831 00:29:16,154 --> 00:29:17,674 and you should not shirk it, and you 832 00:29:17,674 --> 00:29:20,075 should make this decision and not pander it, 833 00:29:20,075 --> 00:29:21,755 but not push it off onto somebody else. 834 00:29:21,755 --> 00:29:23,455 But if it's somebody else's decision, 835 00:29:24,070 --> 00:29:25,269 and you have a part in it, but 836 00:29:25,269 --> 00:29:27,670 it's their decision, it's not it's also just 837 00:29:27,670 --> 00:29:29,830 equally as wrong for you to turn take 838 00:29:29,830 --> 00:29:31,130 that burden on yourself 839 00:29:31,430 --> 00:29:33,190 when you're not responsible for it. I think 840 00:29:33,190 --> 00:29:34,710 it just you just have to do what's 841 00:29:34,710 --> 00:29:37,350 in your sphere of influence to do. Right. 842 00:29:37,350 --> 00:29:38,664 I think it's really good. I think you 843 00:29:38,664 --> 00:29:40,265 also have to think about the, 844 00:29:41,384 --> 00:29:43,164 you're usually not actually alone. 845 00:29:43,625 --> 00:29:45,305 We have this tendency, I think, as a 846 00:29:45,305 --> 00:29:48,025 culture in The US at least, to think 847 00:29:48,025 --> 00:29:49,785 that it all has to be, like, one 848 00:29:49,785 --> 00:29:50,765 brave individual 849 00:29:51,679 --> 00:29:54,259 making the change and making the choice. But 850 00:29:54,559 --> 00:29:57,200 at least where I work, it's never just 851 00:29:57,200 --> 00:29:59,759 me. There are always other people that I 852 00:29:59,759 --> 00:30:00,259 can 853 00:30:00,720 --> 00:30:01,220 enlist 854 00:30:01,679 --> 00:30:04,720 when I need support convincing management to make 855 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:06,734 what I think is a better choice. Thanks 856 00:30:06,734 --> 00:30:09,474 Nash for coming on terrific. Thank you. Terrific, 857 00:30:09,775 --> 00:30:11,694 show. Now I assume since you're not on 858 00:30:11,694 --> 00:30:13,295 social media, nobody can get in touch with 859 00:30:13,295 --> 00:30:15,134 you any place. You just hide in a 860 00:30:15,134 --> 00:30:15,634 corner. 861 00:30:17,375 --> 00:30:20,914 I'm dealing with it. Okay? I'm trying. So 862 00:30:21,710 --> 00:30:23,789 what's your Twitter handle so everybody can follow 863 00:30:23,789 --> 00:30:24,289 you? 864 00:30:24,910 --> 00:30:26,670 Oh god. Alright. Fine. I'll give you it. 865 00:30:26,670 --> 00:30:27,170 Nice. 866 00:30:27,630 --> 00:30:28,130 Okay. 867 00:30:28,430 --> 00:30:30,670 I'll probably have to type this for you. 868 00:30:30,670 --> 00:30:31,970 It's at gamma 869 00:30:32,269 --> 00:30:32,769 capricornai. 870 00:30:33,630 --> 00:30:35,454 Okay. If you send it to me, I'll 871 00:30:35,454 --> 00:30:37,054 get it put on the show notes. Yeah. 872 00:30:37,054 --> 00:30:38,815 No one can actually spell it from hearing 873 00:30:38,815 --> 00:30:39,474 it said. 874 00:30:39,775 --> 00:30:41,615 And, Tom, where can people get in touch 875 00:30:41,615 --> 00:30:42,194 with you? 876 00:30:42,654 --> 00:30:44,414 I'm on LinkedIn. I'm also on Twitter at 877 00:30:44,414 --> 00:30:46,815 Tom Ammon. And, now I'm thinking of a 878 00:30:46,815 --> 00:30:49,315 Twitter handle that's like a random string of, 879 00:30:50,090 --> 00:30:50,990 numbers and 880 00:30:51,609 --> 00:30:53,150 It's not actually random. 881 00:30:54,250 --> 00:30:55,710 Nash is short for Nashira, 882 00:30:56,330 --> 00:30:58,490 which is the name of the star gamma 883 00:30:58,490 --> 00:30:59,950 cap gamma Capricorni. 884 00:31:00,890 --> 00:31:02,590 Oh, okay. Cool. Just teasing. 885 00:31:05,154 --> 00:31:06,595 All right. And I'm Russ White. You can 886 00:31:06,595 --> 00:31:08,515 always find me at rule11. Tech and we 887 00:31:08,515 --> 00:31:10,595 hope you join us the next time on 888 00:31:10,595 --> 00:31:12,214 another great episode of The Head. 889 00:31:32,361 --> 00:31:34,440 Thank you for joining us. You can find 890 00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:36,935 the hedge at rule11.tech.