



# ★ FORTRESS ON A HILL

## Ep 131 - The Reid technique w/ Dr. Jeff Kaye

**Henri:** [00:00:00] Welcome everyone to Fortress On A Hill, a podcast about U.S. Foreign policy, anti imperialism, skepticism, and the American way of war. I'm Henri. Thank you for joining us today. Uh, with me is my co-host, Jovanni. Jovanni. How, uh, how are you doing this evening? How are things in Texas?

**Jovanni:** Everything, everything is lovely out here. We had a great weather today and, uh, um, everything just peachy here. Nice sun and everything. I don't know where you at, but, um, yeah. But, but yeah, we're having a great time out here.

**Henri:** I am in, in rainy Portland, Oregon, and it has been cold and wet and, and pretty gross. With us, our guest today is, uh, Dr. Jeffrey Kaye. As a retired psychologist and who studies, um, classified [00:01:00] documents related to the Korean War, specifically about the biological and chemical use of, of, uh, weapons during that time.

Dr. Kaye how are you doing this evening?

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Thank you. Um, I'm doing fine. It's, um, I'm out in Hawaii and of course the weather here is great

**Henri:** Lucky duck. We're, uh, we're here today to talk about the Reid interview and interrogation technique that was, uh, created by John E. Reid back in the 1940s and fifties. But before we do that, we are going to take a minute and let Dr. Kaye take us through his, uh, most recent article, uh, Dr. Kaye.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yeah, thank you. Yeah, I, I just published, uh, an article, uh, titled The Secret Plan Revealed. CIA Told to Destroy those supporting Communist germ warfare Myth. As some of your listeners may know, you know, in the early 1950s, North Korea and China and the Soviet Union had begun [00:02:00] accusing the United States of large scale use of biological weapons, um, that they were dropping weapons, particularly weapons that were using insects, um, infected insects, uh, to spread, uh, diseases like plague and cholera and glanders near military units and behind the lines and on civilian areas. Of course, the United States, uh, denied this vociferously and claimed that they would never do such a thing. But, um, what happened was that in, uh, uh, May of 1952, uh, the world was kind of shocked when two or uh, two US, uh, officers who have flyers, testified publicly, uh, on, uh, broadcast radio and I think, uh, film and, and written confessions that they in fact had been involved in, uh, the, their units, their planes had been involved in the dropping of germ weapons on. And in China, and, uh, [00:03:00] um, and this, uh, only accelerated over the next, uh, couple of years. Um, in the sense of more revelations coming out. All told there were 25 different written confessions by US officers, um, airmen and, uh, a couple of high ranking Marines. Uh, two of the officers were very high ranking. They were Colonels had worked in the Pentagon, and, uh, one of them was the chief of staff of the Third Marine Air Wing.

And the other was, uh, uh, had previously been working in the Secretary of Defense, uh, of the Air Force's Office, uh, um, and had, and both of them were, had been considered world War ii. Flying ACEs were heroes, and here they were testifying to this. So this was one of the biggest controversies of the 1950s.

And, uh, we still hear echoes today. Those of you who watched the Netflix documentary Wormwood might remember how, um, for Dietrich researcher and, uh, connected the CIA by the name of Frank Olson, um, had been murdered, uh, by, allegedly by the [00:04:00] cia.

And, uh, precisely because he had become a security risk because he was expressing, uh, that he had doubts about this program and also the interrogation program that they were involved in United States government. And, uh, we were also using drugs, you know, new in those days, novel drugs like L LSD and other drugs and other techniques, um, to interrogate, uh, people for national security or military reasons.

So this, this will touch into the Reid issue because, uh, John Reid, who you mentioned of course, uh, became famous for developing a paradigm of interrogation, um, which I guess we'll talk about. But, uh, but, but Reid himself

apparently, um, it's not known if he was involved in, in the research, but the researchers knew of him and were funding some of his work. The Department of Defense in the early fifties around the same time, doesn't mean Reid knew anything about the germ [00:05:00] warfare in Korea. I'm not saying that that's not true, you just asked me. So my latest article looks at a, a plan that came and it finally came to fruition in October of 1953 after, uh, um, after, um, another 19 or so, uh, confessions were published by the Chinese about us German warfare, and it kind of, uh, The US National Security establishment went, you know, ape shit

They were freaking out really. And, uh, they were angry, you know, and they were, uh, doing their best to, to come up with some way to, to deal with all this. And they had to admit to themselves that the propaganda they put out in the previous year hadn't worked very well. So they now were proposing more propaganda, but also covert actions now, which the CIA would be in charge, that would use what they, to quote, personalize seduction and coercion urgently, urgently against persons or groups who were propagating what they were calling [00:06:00] the communist biological warfare myth.

Um, part of what they were also calling internally a Hate America campaign being run. And all of this from their mind was all being run from Moscow. You know, the fact that the North Koreans and the Chinese independently were investigating this and writing about it and talking about it, um, you know, uh, uh, seemed to go past their fly over their heads.

And in 19, in, in the height of the early Cold War, the Korean War to the Cold Warriors in the United States government, everything came outta Moscow. You know, north Korea invaded South Korea because Moscow told them too. Right now, did whatever Moscow told him to do today, we know that that's not true, but, um, in those days, Martin Luther King,

**Jovanni:** what it's including Martin Luther King, Martin Luther King Moscow, he was the agent of Moscow.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** That's right. Martin Luther King, another agent of Moscow. Right? Yes. Interestingly enough, John Reid, uh, turns out there is a link between John Reid and the, uh, assassination of [00:07:00] Martin Luther King, really tangentially that Playboy magazine, um, hired John Reid. I know we're skipping around here, but I just, I might forget otherwise.

Playboy Magazine at one point hired John Reid to, uh, give a lie detector test to, um, you know, what's his name? The, the alleged assassin of, uh, Martin Luther King, um, uh,

James Earl Ray

James Earl Ray. Yes. And of course, he came out and saying, yes, of course, Reid said that he was validated that Reid, uh, that, uh, that Ray was lying about not killing King, and that he was, you know, therefore he must have, uh, he failed the lie detector test and he therefore had to be the assassin.

So it's just kind of an interesting thing where these people pop up in certain places. Uh, um,

**Henri:** There has to be more substantial history about John Reid and his involvement with all of this separate from the Reid Technique.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** As I said, you asked me about John Reid before, and I'd, I'd come across him because of my earlier [00:08:00] work about Guantanamo and interrogations and torture. Your listeners may or may not know that I, I worked at a torture rehab facility in the United States called Survivors International in the San Francisco Bay Area. I interviewed many torture victims, not American torture victims, by the way, the torture victim. Uh, sad to say, torture is not just some sort of American evil or problem, but almost every country in the world apparently practices or has practiced torture.

And the United States, with all of the problems it has with its own asylum policies and system is still in many ways, uh, so far better than most other countries. And so many people will come to the United States seeking asylum. And, um, of course, the United right now, they're trying to and under Trump started and they're trying to keep people from coming here. I worked for, you know, and did evaluations of, of, of torture victims, and I did some psychotherapy with torture victims as well.

So I got to know and identify somewhat with what it's like to be tortured, uh, and also what it's like to interrogate [00:09:00] someone. Because when you do an in depth evaluation, psychological evaluation of a torture victim, it's kind of like an interrogation. Um, I try to make it as little like it as possible, but how do I say it's like it because like the, uh, interrogation that John Reid advocates, uh, his style is the, the interrogation is done in private, and yes, my evaluation is done in private.

And, um, but the difference is the John Reid version of interrogation, they predetermine whether you're guilty or not, they do an evaluation, and if they're interrogation or the cops, in other words, or the prosecutor decides that you're guilty or reasonably sure that you're guilty, then they're going to do a style of interrogation, which unfortunately, often seems to produce false confessions.

**Jovanni:** I was reading on this, what is it? The, uh, the New Yorker article called, the Interview talks about that, and it was saying there's a high percentage of convictions being overturned because of, you know, false confessions. People have been [00:10:00] exonerated because of false confessions, like years.

I mean, one of the examples that this article gives is a person that, um, that was sent to prison. He went through the Reid, uh, technique. Uh, he was murdering his wife. Uh, he went to prison and took him about 50 years to get exonerated.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Darrell Parker. Yes. In 1950s. Yes. Yes.

**Jovanni:** And, even though there is a high, there's a high rate of of cases of false confession, it's still a preferred method within the police department. And one of the things that I've noticed as I was reading this article is , when they were talking about the technique that is used, like, you know, how you know the interview, then the interrogation, then you start establishing this, this rapport with, with with the person you are, you know, you're, you're interviewing, you know, you making him feel like, like you're on his side, you're trying to help him out.

You start, you know, you start planting, seeding, you know, different type of, you know, uh, ideas in this person, and at the end of the day, the person, you know, under pressure and everything just end up pretty much adopting, [00:11:00] internalizing what pretty much you, what you've been feeding.

And when you look at these a lot of these police shows, right, they use the exact same technique, you know, particularly if you ever, if you ever watched the law in order show, you know, it always ends. And, and the, the, uh, the person, the cues, uh, um, just opening up and just confessing , you know, and they use the same technique. So, I just, I just wanna throw that in there.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yeah. I think believe that article, you know, quotes, the Innocence Project, which some of your listeners out there, uh, may be familiar with. There was, uh, Barry Shek, I think from OJ Simpson Trial Fame many years ago. Anyway, he runs a, um, a project using DNA samples to exonerate people who were wrongly convicted. And, uh, according to the Innocence

Project figures, one third of those that are exonerated had confessed to the crime. In other words, they falsely confessed to the crime, proven by DNA evidence, they couldn't have done it.

And yet they confessed. And you know, it's, people will say, why would [00:12:00] somebody falsely confess to, to murder or some other terrible crime, um, let's say. It's a very good question but as it turns out, you know, uh, everybody on some level has their breaking point. In the case of of the guy you mentioned Darrell Parker, you know, he broke after nine straight hours of interrogation. Nine hours, okay? Some people can take nine hours and they're not gonna falsely confess, maybe the majority of people, but it has to do with, um, you know, everybody carries around with them, uh, feelings of guilt.

Everyone can tolerate only so much stress, you know, depending on who they are and things that have happened to them in their life. I'm, I would imagine many of your listeners, if they think about it, have probably on a very small scale, in fact, admitted to things they haven't done. But, but, but just on a very small scale, right?

Just because, well, it was easier to do at the time, but, um, the Reid Technique uses, I would say [00:13:00] non-scientific, they're not, not rigorously scientific. In fact, over the years, the Reid technique has Evolved and they've become sensitized to their critics, and they occasionally, you know, they've come up with some scientific, based responses to the critics against them, you know, such as, what is the validity of studying ostensibly false confessions among a bunch of college students in a lab and some college campus have to do with an interrogation room where I'm bringing in, you know, somebody for mass murder. So they're saying it, it doesn't transfer over, but that doesn't change the fact that the Reid technique is based a lot of anecdotal police culture pass down over generations kinds of things.

It certainly was a step up from the third degree where you take a, a lamp, you know, shine somebody's face, don't let 'em eat, don't let 'em drink, shout in their face for hours on end, uh, and, uh, until they confess to something, maybe you beat 'em up a little bit or threaten to beat them up, or threatened to hurt them.

You know, the Reid [00:14:00] technique, even at the beginning specifically said, you don't use coercion force like that, but they were doing other things that were kind of dubious and that psychologically were contributing to false confessions or appeared to be contributing to false confessions, such as keeping people isolated, you know? Sympathize, you know, kind of, uh, telling them that we know that you did it. We have all the information, we're just gonna fill in

some of the gaps. It wasn't always, uh, being sympathetic. They also, uh, use the good cop, bad cop routine, you know, sometimes, which is also known as mutton Jeff, which is a bad cop, comes in and says, you know, you piece of crap. We know you did it. I should beat you to a, you know, you're not supposed to say that in the beat technique. You're not supposed to say I should beat you up. But you would say, you know, you're just the lowest form of scum.

And, you know, what will your parents think of you when they find out that you're a rapist, you know, and all this stuff. And, um, you know, and just keep them at that. And then the good cop comes in and says, what are you doing? [00:15:00] Get outta here. Get the guy, go in the other room. And the good cop will sit down and say, you know, that guy, I'm so sorry. I, you know, really, I, he is probably a lot of stress in his life. He shouldn't be saying these things. I get it. I get it. That the woman who in a way was asking for it, right? She was wearing this scopy dress and everything and teasing you a lot. And, you know, I think anybody might've done what you did.

Meanwhile, if the person is innocent, this is, you know, by presenting them with a false dichotomy of one way to go where the other way to go, leaves them almost no out, except to choose one of the two ways, either of which ends up in a false confess. And that's that kind of subtle psychological manipulation, whether meant to be manipulative or not.

I don't believe that all the false confessions were false because, um, they said that the cops or the interrogators set out to produce a false confession. Sometimes I think that did happen, but I think probably more often you would get what's called confirmation bias. [00:16:00] They would look at you and say, well, because you're a black man or because you're, you know, homosexual or because we don't like your looks, or because we found a couple pieces of evidence and we're a lot of under a lot of stress to solve this crime. You know, in my mind, I've already decided you're guilty and I'm going.

And when you do that, you know, this is true in life in general. In my mind. I've already decided that, uh, Putin's invasion of Russia is evil and there could be no possible reason to, to, to make that, that there's another side to that story at all. Right? Confirmation bias. And anything I hear gets screened out based on that.

And the same when someone in the interrogation room. The one case that I looked at in any detail was the case of and it wasn't specifically a Reid technique, but it was very similar, probably informed by that kind of, uh, training, um, on some level of a, of a navy crypt analyst back in the late 1990s by the name of Daniel King.

He was a, uh, he worked for the NSA real. He was, [00:17:00] he, he was a navy, he was a navy petty officer, I believe. But he was assigned to the NSA to do Krypton crypto analysis. And, um, they accused him of giving information. I forget it was due to the Russians or the Chinese or somebody. And, uh, they did the same.

They, they didn't take, they took him to a hotel room somewhere and just kept him under interrogation all day long and, and used that kind of good cop, bad cop. And, uh, until finally there, he was saying to himself, I, I don't remember myself. If you're saying I did this, then maybe I must have done it. You know, let me speak to a psychologist.

Maybe you can hypnotize me and that will get to the truth, you know? Of course. And, and then finally he confessed.

**Jovanni:** Going back to that, going back to the, uh, example you gave about the good cop, right? It's also linked to that, also to the whole, you know, prisoner's dilemma. The same, the same technique.

The whole thing about the prisoner's dilemma, you know, [00:18:00] um, you separate the two prisoners or two long and then, you know, you pretty much play 'em against each other and whatnot.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** I've come crop that before, but I, I don't know that they used that particularly.

I think that was often used as a logic thing. I mean, maybe I, I don't know. I'm not familiar enough to know if that has fit in or was used as part of their, how that fits into this paradigm that they've used. I in, in, you know, I read recently, you know, read partly in preparation, went back and reviewed. I had a copy, luckily of John Reid's criminal interrogation book.

It's all blurred out, but it's what's what it is, from the second edition, and there was nothing in it like that. So they almost don't rely on any, um, academic or, uh, um, very little, at least, at least in their heyday. Maybe today they do more, but, uh, I'm not familiar with enough to, to, to comment on more on that, I'm afraid.

Yeah, it's possible. It's possible. You know what they, what they looked at a lot, of course, and when I was doing the research on the [00:19:00] biological warfare in Korean War, and there was a, um, Organization called the Research

and Development Board of the Pentagon, and its job was to assess technologies that the United States government, military might want to use.

And oftentimes those were things like, you know, obviously bombers and the kinds of planes and submarines, but also interrogation techniques. And they joined up with the c i in the early fifties on something called Project Artichoke. And Project Artichoke was a precursor to, um, MK Ultra Program and the successor as well, to an earlier CIA program program called Operation Bluebird.

And this was about interrogation and trying to control people and to induce if they could amnesia. And, um, they were, this was all kind of elaborate spy thing in which, you know, we're talking about dealing with double agents and sending people into the field and, you know, protecting them from giving up secrets and ferreting out [00:20:00] secrets from other double agents of, anyway, crazy stuff.

And they, you know, this was the stuff when the CIA famously became involved in experimenting with L S D and, and stuff like that in interrogation and other drugs. But the artichoke people, they had, um, for a while they had developed a, uh, a, um, a paradigm of, of CIA style interrogation, which was essentially to give people, um, what do they call them?

Speed balls. You give them benzo. And you give them barbiturates, which were heavy downers, and then you, um, subject them, give them also hallucinogens or you hypnotize them or you give them electric Shock. There were different variations and the idea was to regress the person and to make them talk of course.

And, um, and to be able to maybe implant ideas in their minds to control them, um, and to turn them perhaps, or to make them even as the famous movie, the mentor [00:21:00] in book the Manchurian candidate said perhaps even to program to be assassins assassins, who would forget what they did once they assassinated the person.

That's, uh, allegedly some people believe that's what Sirhan Sirhan did to Robert Kennedy. So, um, in, in, in one of their reports that I ferreted out from the early fifties, they're talking about the kinds of research. This, this joint board of the, of the Department of Defense and the c i a kind of research that they're looking at to justify, um, the work they're doing on the artichoke.

Project. And one of the, um, things I have made sure that I wrote it down, cause I don't want to get it wrong, is, uh, I was kind of surprised. I mean, there were other groups, there was a University of Rochester was doing, um, working on drugs that might affect psychological pressures. And Indiana University was involved.

And, and then I looked and I saw John [00:22:00] E. Reid and Associates. This is in 19 January, 1953. And, um, uh, under Navy contract project number 1 73, 180 1 for \$34,000. That's in, for fiscal year 1952. 1950 \$2, \$34,000 according to what I looked up, is equivalent in today's money of about \$385,000. A fair amount of money to give for an interrogation project to, uh, little Johnny Reid, who's, uh, uh, Johnny Reid and Associates, uh, uh, company in Chicago.

And what was the project supposed to be on, on interrogation devices and procedures? Um, the project was to develop novel and easily used methods of causing lying subjects to think they have betrayed themselves. So first of all, how do you know someone's lying? [00:23:00] Right? Isn't the whole point of the interrogation to determine whether or what a person is telling you is true or not, but if you already presume that they're lying, this is the whole methodological problem with the Reid technique in general, is they have these methods and they claim mostly, they claim that, uh, they use nonverbal evidence to tell that you're, you know, that, uh, I'm swallowing too often, or I'm, I might, we can't see, or I'm tapping my head, I'm a little ner, I seem nervous.

Oh, you seem nervous. Uh, you must be guilty. , my mouth is dry. All of these nonverbal or physiological things. But the research over and over shows scientific research, which means looking at things under control and comparing groups, et cetera. That, that there is no reliable correlation between all of these different nonverbal and uh, uh, and physiological [00:24:00] responses.

Purely physiological responses to the, to prove that someone is lying, right? Mm-hmm. , just because I'm, um, when you say, uh, did you kill somebody and I look up like this? Uh, no. Ah, he looked up into the left. That means he's lying. My cop's instinct tells me he is lying. I mean, they've done research to show, you know, where they, uh, you know, they looked at what a police officer thinks and feels about somebody's guilt or innocence and then, uh, what it later turned out to be.

And it's no better than flipping a coin. In other words, you know, cops are no better, even with all the experience they've had with bad people, and they do deal with bad people, did that make them better able to tell whether somebody is

being deceptive or not? So, um, anyway, so here's John Reid back in 1953, you know, uh, doing research for the Navy.

And the Navy was often used, by the way, as a cutout for projects, be for the cia. And so the question arises whether this just wasn't for the CIA anyway, [00:25:00] and certainly 10 years later, 1963 or so, when, uh, uh, the CIA internally put out a manual for interrogation, which today's seems is known as the QBARK manual.

QBARK was the CIA's own name for itself. It's counterintelligence, uh, interviewing and interrogation, um, in which they, um, spent about a third of that manual describing coercive techniques of interrogation, use of drugs, sleep deprivation, you know, uh, threats of harm. Uh, so sensory deprivation, other kinds of things, solitary confinement, um, as ways to, uh, to coerce people to confess.

**Jovanni:** That's what they call, uh, enhance, um, interrogation technique.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yes. And then, and in fact, I, when I saw that, I said to myself, this has to be. To the earlier work that was done in QBARK and MK Ultra. And sure enough, that [00:26:00] was finally validated in a document that was released via an A C L U lawsuit.

And there was a, a, a memoir, an internal memoir by, um, the head of the CIA's Medical Services Division. And they were involved in the Enhanced Interrogation program and his memoirs, his memory to some kind of internal board about what, uh, what went on, what went down after nine 11. And, uh, yeah, he made it quite clear that there was a group of people who were quite enamored with MK Ultra.

And there was even one figure who was, uh, kind of connected all the way back to the 1980s into using those kind of techniques and had been reprimanded for it supposedly many years before. And who was put in charge of the interrogations after nine 11. So there are a lot of direct links, and we don't even know all the, you know, we, we can't know all the, uh, the ins and outs of it.

But I, I, one thing I, I always bring this up and I, I seem to be the only one who, who thinks this is odd, but, um, [00:27:00] the two major cases of, uh, um, that were used as paradigms, one by the CIA and one by the Department of Defense, the cia, uh, their victim, or their Guinea pig was a man by the name of Abu Zubahdah, who's still in Guantanamo today. And the other was a man who recently released only just I think earlier this year from Guantanamo,

Muhammad Al Qatani who people might remember Time Magazine publishing the interrogation logs, um, of Al Qatani's interrogation, where he was, you know, spun around in a chair and, you know, uh, forced nudity and dogs, you know, threatening him and all sorts of stuff.

Um, he was their first, you know, he was their model prisoner. Uh, they were first testing out their theories of coercive interrogation after nine 11. Both of these men had had experienced serious head trauma in their, as when they were younger. And, uh, Qatani, in fact, apparently had been, [00:28:00] was, had become schizophrenic.

And, and they knew this all along and covered it up. Um, Abeta, um, had, had, uh, te epilepsy, um, uh, seizures as a result of his terrible head injury. So is it just coincidence or what are the chances that the two primary figures used to, to begin and to, and to test out their new theories of torture?

Both were people who had had s severe head trauma, the history of severe head trauma, history of severe head trauma is not a typical thing. You know, if you think about in your lives yourselves and your listeners, how many people do you know really who've had serious head trauma, not, you know, maybe very one or two, but you probably know, you know, dozens if not hundreds of people.

**Jovanni:** Going back to what you were saying about the, uh, Guantanamo Bay, I remember, I recall two while you, while I was hearing you, I recall two incidents, from that time. Um, one was, uh, Jose Padilla, I don't know if you remember him.

He was a former, uh, former gang member [00:29:00] from Yes. From Chicago, I believe. Uh, convert to, uh, Islam. And yes, apparently he got picked up by the fbi. You know, he was, um, he was about to go to, uh, believe he was about to go to Iraq or Afghanistan to join the, uh, the Mujhadeen and, and fight and whatnot. Anyway, um, so he got picked up and, and he just kind of disappeared and you didn't hear, you didn't hear him, you didn't hear him, the president talking about him again, you know, at the time when he got picked up was a real sensation, but you just didn't hear him again until like months later, probably a year later.

Uh, he was in trial. He was in trial, and then he was kind of, uh, during the trial, I, I recall seeing, uh, like images. He was kind of like in, uh, in the infantile stage, you know, he was in kind, disoriented mm-hmm. , he was all there, you

know. Mm-hmm. . Um, that's one, and that's one of the things I was, you know, that came to my mind as I was hearing you about, you know, yes.

About the epilepsy and all that. And that's another case that also from that era, was about this woman. Uh, [00:30:00] she was in, uh, American, um, American Muslim woman, I believe, uh, Arab woman. I said she was, um, um, apparently she was gonna join via the fight, and also she got picked up, got arrested, um, and then she disappeared from the media.

You hear from her again. Mm-hmm. , and all of a sudden she disappeared somewhere like in Qatar, somewhere in a, in a CIA interrogation, uh, thing. And then she shot the, she shot the agent and she got killed. Uh, yeah. Uh, do you remember, do you, do you recall those cases?

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yeah. Her name was Aia Sidiqi. Sadiq.

And she is, uh, related to Mohamed, uh, uh, um, um, what's his name? Supposedly the Mastermind of nine 11, uh, in Guantanamo today. Uh, um, KSM Qaim Mohammed. Yeah. So she's related to him and her children were taken from her. Yes. I don't know that, that, that whole story is, is very mysterious and obscure and I don't have enough information about it.

I know [00:31:00] more about. Jose Padilla, because I file, filed a Freedom of Information Act request. He was of course, imprisoned in the naval, uh, brig in Charleston, South Carolina, along with another American Muslim by the name of Ali Al Omar, um, Al Omar, who, uh, has claims today that he was tortured by the fbi, um, at the time.

But, uh, um, that's another story, . But the, uh, but, um, Padilla, uh, you know, claimed that, that, that, you know, yeah, he, he was really messed up. He course claimed that they ever gave him LSD or some other kind of hallucinogen. Um, the, um, the Department of Defense owned up to, they, they claimed that they did not use hallucinogens on him, but one thing that they did admit to, which was odd, they claimed that they told him that they gave him hallucinogens when really they were giving him a flu shot.

Well, first of all, that's, that itself is, is, is, is torture and admission [00:32:00] of criminal activity. You know, you know, imagine you went to, uh, the doctor and the doctor told you, um, uh, you get a flu shot and they gave you the flu shot. And I dunno if you guys get flu shots. I do. I'm an older person, and they gave you the flu shot and the doctor says like, guess what? I didn't give you a flu shot. I just injected you with LSD. I'm serious. That's what I did. And he held to

that story. I mean, that guy would be, if it ever came out, of course, that guy would lose his license and maybe even be prosecuted for criminal, you know, behavior. So, um, anyway, they did that. They admitted doing that to Jose Padilla and who, who knows what else they did to regress this guy.

And that's the behind all of this. There was a, uh, a theory to the interrogation that's used by the US government. Um, the coercive interrogation, the psychologically coercive, and that, um, it was, uh, um, developed by, you know, some famous psychologists. Um, and it was published in a [00:33:00] journal actually called Soci Geometry in the mid fifties.

And the paradigm they came up with was called d d d three Ds because that kind of made like a formula and it was, uh, dependency, uh, um, debility and dread. What are these things? Dependency, of course, is to, to, to re they want to regress you to which you're totally dependent on your captor, right? No matter what you say or do.

You can't even, you know, go to the bathroom unless they tell you, right? And, you know, you can't do anything. You're totally dependent on them for your life and for everything. Dread, of course, is fear. I dread, you know, to instill a sense of dread in somebody. Constant dread breaks a person down. And then finally, debility is just a fancy word for weakness.

To instill weakness by making them weak, by keeping them from sleeping, sleep deprivation, uh, using stress positions. And also, [00:34:00] uh, um, kind of partially starving people. Uh, kind of that's what they do. They, you know, give you a a and, and we, they do this at Guantanamo, they did this, and they've admitted to doing it.

Col caloric, a restriction of caloric intake. Not enough. They say to harm you, but why are they doing that at all? They're, are they doing it to save money? ? No, they're doing it because they're trying to break you down to re and to regress you. And what happens is all those things affect physiological brain functioning.

Um, and this was recognized by the CIA's own researchers back when they were doing MK Ultra. They looked at all this stuff and they said, well, if you do these kind of things to people, they won't be able to function too well. And there's an, uh, an Irish researcher, uh, SHA Shane Ohira, I think, who's written about this saying, yeah, these aren't serious interrogation techniques.

Because what they do is they reduce your ability to remember, they inhibit your [00:35:00] ability to recall. If you're starving and you're tired and you're, you're you're living in fear of, of something, um, it's gonna be really hard to remember things. So what are they really doing? Um, as, as you know, so there's a, a weird line between interrogation and, uh, manipulating people to control them, or in the military parlance, to exploit them for propaganda purposes, for show trials, you know, uh, or for, uh, perhaps to turn them into be, this happens a lot more than talked about.

And to turn them for intelligence purposes and make them into double agents or just their own agents if they weren't double agents, right? Um, and you've heard this over and over where the, uh, F B I, for instance, will, you know, catch some kind of young person, you know, they're like 17, 18 years old in the chat room and then kind of lead them on to say crazy stuff and [00:36:00] then, you know, tell them, oh, you'll meet with us, you meet with them.

And anyway, they, they, they kind of set 'em up and then they say, well, you know what, uh, we can put you away for a long time for terrorism, or you can work for us. Why don't you go to this mosque and just report on us what people are saying. What they're doing. Tell us about this person. Now, Guantanamo one reason that they hate or they hated, uh, Julian Assange so much for so many different reasons, but in, in terms of Guantanamo, um, WikiLeaks released a, a slew of all of the, um, of what they had anyway, of, uh, um, of the detainee files of what, you know, what they supposedly did, who said what to who, and their footnoted and everything.

And what you, what the people did. Like Andy Worthington researcher who looked at this and others is you could see that they were setting up a crazy quilt system in which, and this can happen, [00:37:00] this kind of bleeds back into the re technique too, in which somebody says something, it's a false confession, and now you've implicated somebody else.

And then they take that up and go, that's fact. So let's say that, uh, you know, we tortured, um, detainee X and Detainee X said, you know, gee, on re told me that, you know, he wanted to place a bomb on a train. And so now we go to, we go to Enri and we have him in our interrogation booth, and we say, Enri, we know that you, um, wanted to put a bomb on that train.

We have people who've told us that. No, no, that's a lie. Now here's the Reid technique, by the way. You don't allow denial. You, you could have stopped to that as quickly as possible cuz you're gonna convince them to confess. The three you have and what you had in Guantanamo were hundreds of people. And, and

many, you know, many of them had been flipped to, to uh, uh, um, I don't know how many, [00:38:00] well, we, we can't know, but some of them anyway, had been flipped to inform on others.

And some of them just gave false testimony to, because they were scared or to get better, you know, to get better treatment and all sorts of reasons. And it's, it's also possible, a few of those reasons were that someone actually knew something that, you know, that was true about somebody else. And they said it under interrogation.

But we, but, uh, but what seemed overwhelming was how many people were framed up out of a cloud, of a mass of different false confessions or false admissions or implications about other people's behavior. It went under coercion. So coercion, if I was a central theme of what I'm saying, it's really the use of con of coercion, psychological coercion, sometimes physical coercion.

And the line can be blurry there. It often is to make people do what you want, to control them and to, uh, for your own purposes. And the United States isn't alone in this by, by the [00:39:00] way, of course, but I live in the United States. It's the material, you know, I read English, I don't read a lot of other languages or any really, except some Spanish, some French.

But, uh, uh, You know, my access is to the American is story here. And, and, and, uh, and of course America has the distinction of being the first country to set up a worldwide torture network. They set up secret torture centers, you know, in prisons, in, in many countries, you know, um, around the world, in Thailand, in Poland, in Lithuania, you know, in Afghanistan, um, and, uh, and elsewhere.

And, uh, and they got other countries from around the world, uh, to participate and help them out in a, in a mass program of kidnapping people to these torture centers, Secker, torture centers where they would, you know, torture them. They use various sorts of, uh, you know, even if they weren't water, you know, and the waterboard, [00:40:00] well, we only waterboarded three people.

Yeah. Well, waterboarding isn't the only kind of torture. And in fact, the people who had been waterboarding, like Abu Zubaydah said that was not the worst sort of torture that they endured, right? That far worse, you know, was, uh, the use of, uh, uh, isolation, sleep deprivation, isolation and uh, um, sensory deprivation.

And I mentioned those three because guess what? The United States still uses it today. The, um, army Field Manual on interrogation, um, FM two dash 22, I think, um, uh, which is, uh, on human intelligence interviewing and interrogation, um, which was, uh, rewritten. Uh, we're now, this is, uh, was rewritten in 2006 and, and has been used ever since, has a special provision.

And not only does it use call for techniques such as Mutt and Jeff, good cop, bad cop, or, um, [00:41:00] uh, something called Fear Up, where we try and, you know, make you afraid in which, you know, pull up, make people feel dread. Um, futility make people feel hopeless. Um, but also there's a special provision that, uh, for people who supposedly don't fit Geneva Protections and who are those, of course, the people they held at Guantanamo or the so-called terrorists or people who the they claim are non-privileged combatants by privileged, meaning they don't carry the privilege of being under the Geneva protections.

They're not prisoners of war carrying prisoners of war. And those people you can do other things to. What can you do? You can put them in solitary confinement 30 days at a time and keep renewing it potentially forever. Or you can put them under, um, sensory deprivation. They put blackout goggles and mittens on you.

And big, you know, if you saw those, uh, Pictures from the very early days of [00:42:00] Guantanamo where they were in the orange suits and they had the big earmuffs on and the goggles, and they couldn't see. That's, that's called field expedient separation. There was, it's a form of sensory deprivation, which in fact can induce psychosis in people who don't have it.

Some of the earliest research, and I, I did a talk on this, uh, the American Psychological Association back in 2007, and, uh, when I went back and looked at the, the history of the research of this, and, uh, it's, it's quite astounding. You know, the, the, the human, you know, the CIA scientists looked at the human organism and they tried to de kind of deconstruct it and figure out what can really mess it up.

And one of the things they found was that every human being has a need for stimulation. Every organism really does, whether you're a little one cell protoplasm or you're a human being, you're, we evolved for a certain environment, for a certain set of circumstances, [00:43:00] right? So we need to eat. That's genetic, right?

I mean, that's built into us. It's not like no one can just stop breathing or eating right. And we also, we need to feel connected to other people. We're a social animal. We're not. Somebody who just, you know, hatches out of an egg and then goes off and, uh, uh, lives, you know, in solitary and then one time in its life goes out and, uh, meet with somebody you find out in the, uh, in the wild and then die

No, we, we, we're social animals. We live in social communities. You know, if, uh, um, if you're, um, I mean, all you have to do is look at all the literature there is lately about people being, uh, bullied online and, and how terrible it feels to have people ganging up on you in an internet chat room. And why does it feel terrible?

Well, because human nature tells us we wanna belong and we don't like being, you know, Qaim cast into some kind of bad, you know, person and, [00:44:00] and, uh, um, ostracized, right? To be ostracized is a bad thing. It's not a good thing. So anyway, um, the, uh, the Army field manual, you know, allows for this kind of isolation, separation and sleep deprivation.

You know, there's the durability, right? I mentioned the D d D, um, the CIA's form, uh, enhanced interrogation said we can keep somebody from sleeping for like six, seven days, right? We can do that at first. That's gonna, you know, you know, we're gonna, you can chain 'em up there. The form of sleep deprivation was to chain people up, like and hang them, suspend.

And then if they started to fall asleep, go wake 'em up. And then, and, and, you know, there were, it was pretty horrible. And, uh, so the, the army field manuals a little bit more sophisticated, so they're not chaining people up and keeping 'em up for six, seven days. What they said was, we can keep someone from ha only from having, um, [00:45:00] no more than four hours sleep a day for 30 days.

And that's renewable, you know, so anyone here who's gone on four hours sleep knows that, eh, the next day you're gonna not feel so great. And if you do that again, and again, and again, and again, and again and again, and I could just go on 30 times a bore your listeners, but if I could do that, you're gonna be a mess.

You're, you start breaking down. Um, so that's allowable under the current Army Field Manual. An army field manual, which by the way, the liberals in Congress, the Democratic Party championed as an alternative to the CIAs in enhanced interrogation techniques and wrote it into law, mandating this manual, putting it in and saying, this is u this is what we use so we can keep people, you know, also, the manual includes reduced caloric intake, manipulation of the

environment, meaning we can make it, you know, pretty cold in your cell [00:46:00] and we'll make sure you don't get hypothermia, but you're gonna be uncomfortable.

All of these are ways to destabilize and break down a person. D d D, make them afraid. Fear. They have a technique also called, um, ego down, which is to insult you, make you feel terrible. Um, they even changed the, the wording of the fear up in the 2006 manual from what it used to be. Cause it had been an earlier versions of the manual.

But in this manual, they now said, guess what? We can, um, use, uh, uh, we can form new fears. Before the idea was that we leverage o uh, fears that we already learned you have. So if we like Abeta, you're afraid of insects, well we're gonna make you afraid that maybe we're gonna put you in a box with insects.

But, uh, the new Army Field Manual, the one that came in in 2006 now said You can create whole new phobias and fears that people never even had before. So that, that allows for a lot more [00:47:00] creativity by the interrogator. And of course, they were encouraged to mix all of these together in all sorts of different ways.

So it's pretty horrific. I mean, uh, and today this has fallen off of the, you know, the human rights groups used to talk about this, and they used to make a big deal at Whitman once Obama became president. To be honest, they kind of dropped it because, uh, either they hoped he would do something. He said he would, he had an executive order.

He, he started a new group called the High Value Interrogation Group that was gonna research humane interrogation and do all this. But the Army Field Manual is still. And there's some good people in government who, who continue to keep trying to change that and bring this out. But it never really gets any traction.

And here I wrote about it first, uh, about 12 years ago, and here we are, 12 years later. Nothing's changed. Nothing.

**Jovanni:** There's a film, there's a film called, uh, my name is Khan I dunno if you, you heard about it. Um, came out in 2010 and, and, and it's [00:48:00] about a, uh, um, it's like a romance drama. Romance, right. Um, um, it was, uh, they're like Pakistani, I believe.

And the, uh, the protagonist, he's kind of little, uh, conve challenged. Um, and, uh, and he falls for, for, for, uh, this other woman. Anyway, long story short is that, uh, um, he get picked up as a, a terrorist suspect, right. And he get taken to, to the police or get taken to, to, uh, whoever picks him up, the b i and whatnot.

And they do. And, and the, and the part of the film shows exact, so everything you just said right there about sleep deprivation and mm-hmm. making it real cold and, you know, uh, keeping him up. Mm-hmm. , um, showed him that film and, and, and it, all, the techniques and everything. He just keep Khan he keeps saying, I am Khan my name's Khan.

My name is Khan. Because, uh, apparently they, they, um, The whole thing [00:49:00] is that they were looking for another person with, with the same name and they just picked him up and they just mm-hmm. , they did all that technique on him towards technique on him. Um, and that's one of the points I wanted to bring cuz this, um, I saw this film on, I think, uh, Netflix, I'm not sure.

But, uh, um, you mentioned Netflix earlier about this, other incidents and other mm-hmm. , uh, cases that happened and everything like that. I just wanted ask you, what is the relations between, you know, all this covert, uh, spy stuff and everything, but then it shows in film, you know, what's the purpose of showing in film?

Is this supposed to be covert? You know, is it some, is a way to des desensitize the public or, you know, what, what's your...

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** right? I mean, are you saying Well, how, how do these things even come out?

**Jovanni:** Yeah, those come out in movies, a movie about it. Yes. You know, like, oh, you know, there was something happened and they make a movie about it.

What's the other one? The, uh, the zero dark hundred and you know how

Dark 30? Yes.

And then 24, you know, and they just make news about it, you know. Um,

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** [00:50:00] well that, I, I'd say a lot of it comes under the, the dread part of D d D. In other words, they, they're quite specific.

They've said they, they don't want people to know or be sure exactly what the government's gonna do to you when they get you. Now we're talking about national security, by the way, interrogations, and I have to say John Reid and all of this was. So far as we know, is mostly about criminal interrogations.

And while there's a lot of similarities, uh, and even a lot of byplay between them, so for instance, uh, Richard Zuli, who was a Chicago policeman, um, and uh, later was put in charge or was one of the leading figures in the interrogation of, uh, ma Mohamedou Slahi, who they made the movie out of his famous today, uh, uh, Guantanamo figure and was in charge of, uh, you know, some pretty intense national security interrogation.

So there's bleed over between the criminal cop world and the in, you know, national security interrogation world. But to get to your point [00:51:00] though, I, I think some of this stuff does get leaked, I think even waterboarding to some extent was that, I mean, I think there were people who wanted to use and test out this waterboarding stuff, but, um, it got out there and, and there were leaks.

Now it's hard for me to say there were definitely people inside the government who were really, uh, uh, upset over what the US government was doing, and they leaked this material out. And the, um, international Red Cross was interviewing some of these detainee. They were upset too. Now they're not supposed to talk about it, but I think after a while they got upset and some leaks may have come out of there.

So some of this material came to us from leaks by people who, um, were trying to be whistleblowers, really, that the US was using torture. But I don't discount the idea that you might be hinting at that some of this material is allowed out there because yeah, they, they would like the bad guys or who they think are the bad guys to think [00:52:00] that, um, if we get you, who knows what we'll do to you?

We're barbaric. Right? Um, you don't know whether or not, um, you know, how you're, you know, what you're gonna be treated. They might, you know, you're gonna be sitting in that cell wondering if they're gonna come in and throw you up against a wall and then waterboard you, right? That's gonna make you very nervous.

And in reality, just fear alone is enough to make a, break a person down and make 'em talk. So, yeah, I don't know, uh, how much of this, uh, uh, is, you know, leaked so that they could, uh, uh, you know, make people fear the

government and uh, um, and when they get captured, want to talk because they fear something worse or.

Or we're hearing about it in the media because, you know of whistleblowers. I mean, it's, it's hard to say, uh, a lot of these films,

**Jovanni:** a lot of these films, they, they have consultants, they have, uh, DD consultants, they have military consultants, you know, like, [00:53:00] like 24 and zero, you know, doc 30. And, and one of the things, one of things I think it does also, it, it trivializes, it trivializes the, the incident, you know, for the American public, you know, um, and, uh, um, yeah.

You know, it just trivializes it and then the American public just desensitizes them, you know?

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yes, definitely. And it dehumanizes the people who were victimized by this. Exactly. Exactly.

**Jovanni:** And re and reinforces that, the humanization as well.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yes, absolutely. I totally agree. And it's, it's horrible. It's horrible.

Uh, uh, you know, uh, and most Americans just aren't aware. Uh, well, they thought about it. They go, yeah, I guess so. But just, you know, how, how damaging the torture and these kind of things are to people. Uh, um, right now, I know in the press, just right now, uh, um, the p detainee at Guantanamo, I'll, I'll, um, uh, UCCI, I believe his name is a Libyan prisoner who was tortured by the cia.

Now he's at Guantanamo. [00:54:00] And, uh, um, has been asking for years to get medical treatment for the res, you know, re uh, tortured with, they call torture rehabilitation. Remember I worked at a place, it was a torture rehabilitation center. What does that mean? You book people. With doctors and psychologists or therapists who can help them work through the trauma of torture, most torture victims.

Um, most, probably most, but I would say many, if not most, end up with severe PTs d and depression. And, and many of them, of course, have also physic, you know, can have physical problems as well. And, uh, uh, they've been, you know, the US has with been withholding that kind of, you know, necessary treatment to former torture victims at Guantanamo.

And, um, uh, so that, that's just in the news today. I, I, I mean, today, past couple days, there's articles on that in the New York Times, uh, Carol Rosenberg wrote some articles about this, so New York Times reporter. So, um, [00:55:00] yeah, this kind of stuff is, it happens and, uh, most, uh, most Americans don't know they're not gonna, they don't come on 24 and then have a whole episode about how the guy who, uh, what was the guy's character's name on 24?

**Henri:** Jack Bauer.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Jack Bauer, you know, they don't do another whole episode on how the guy Jack Bauer held a gun to his head and put it in his mouth and threatened to blow his head off. How, you know, he's, you know, turned into a total mess and, and can't function in the world afterwards. , no, it just moves on. Like, that's nothing.

Right? Yeah, it's, it's really, uh, really a shame, uh, really a bad evil aspect about our culture, that this is minimalized the way that you're talking. or sensa, you know, sensationalized and then minimized. Yeah.

**Henri:** So, um, I'd like to, I'd like to, uh, get back to a few more specifics about the, um, about the Reid technique. Um, I wanted to add to what you mentioned earlier, doc, about, uh, about Daryl Parker, [00:56:00] because Daryl Parker's story goes hand in hand with the cr with, not with specifically with the creation of the technique, but with the legend around its use.

So Daryl Parker's, the dude wa, was the dude from Lincoln, Nebraska. He was accused of murdering his wife. The Nebraska cops tried to get him to confess, and then they ended up calling in John Reid, who was a, a relatively new addition to the Chicago police and a a, a new attorney. But he had been, uh, known by word of mouth that he was able to get people to confess.

So he went there. He was able to get Darrell Parker to confess, but Darrell, uh, recanted his story immediately the next day, um, he ended up being convicted of the murder despite recanting. And that particular, the, the info around that was used to cement John Reid as somebody who was capable of doing these kind [00:57:00] of interrogations, of bringing people in who hadn't been able, uh, who other investigators or cops were not able to get them to, uh, confess.

So many years later, a, um, a guy that was already serving time in prison for other violent crimes after he died, his attorneys notified, um, the authorities there in, in Lincoln that he had actually confessed to the crime that Darryl Parker was convicted of. And, um, he went, he's, you know, gone through a

year's long journey to, to get justice for himself, but eventually his conviction was thrown out and they were able to, to, um, to, to help with his situation.

But despite the fact that he recanted his statement, John Reid and John E. Reid and Associates, the firm that he founded, used these kind of, these kinds of legends, these kind of stories about being able to get people to. To give more backing to the [00:58:00] Reid Technique. Now, the, the Reid Technique came, um, after years of, of changes within law enforcement that, um, started with, uh, something called the, the Wickersham Commission in, uh, in 1931.

And they specifically dealt with this term called the third degree, which what Dr. Qaim mentioned earlier about, you know, shoving bright lights in people's faces, keeping them isolated, um, lots of, you know, diff different ways of, of psychologically messing with someone up to and including physical violence.

Um, the report said that they, the people, the experts that they talked to back in the thirties, the police investigators and captains and stuff, they all kind of poo-pooed the whole, the third degree is gone. We've done away with it. We don't even use it anymore, but obviously it, it, it hadn't gone away. And so two things developed in the, in the path of that.

The first was, uh, polygraph examinations, which is something we'll touch on, uh, briefly today. But we need, we will probably talk about that [00:59:00] more in a, uh, in a future episode. But a, a way to try to figure out and through polygraph, through scientific determination, who is actually lying, actually hooking somebody up to a machine, measures the respiration, measures their, how much they're sweating and it.

It, it has no scientific backing whatsoever. It does not tell you whether or not a person is being truthful or not, essentially. You might wanna look at it as, as a, as a prop. It's a prop that investigators and interrogators use to say that the machine told me, sir, that you have lied to me. And by having that backing that they could get more information out of, uh, who they were speaking to.

So what happened with John Reid is that in, in that same time, John Reid developed what we're, what is now referred to as the Reid Technique. And it has, it has still does to a certain extent, the, the, the trappings of science to say that it is still scientific, that there are measurable things that a person [01:00:00] does that can be seen, like what you mentioned earlier, doc, that if I shift in my seat, if I look a certain direction, if I'm sweating a lot, if I do certain things, that that means definitively that someone is lying.

Again, no scientific backing. There is no way that, that you can possibly know that. So, um, to get onto the, to the Reid technique specifically, and, and break it down a little bit, this was a course that I went through as a drug investigator in the Army. Um, it is the most widely taught interrogation technique in the world.

Police officers, investigators, federal agents, the world over use a this technique or an approximation of it to get lots of different kinds of confessions. Um, and that's not to say that every confession the Reid technique gets, could have been coerced or false, but it does have very specific parts of it that can really bring that forward.

Um, so the, the, [01:01:00] and this is part of, this was some of the stuff that I was trained in, you know, kind of the basics. When I became a drug investigator, I had been a, a combat MP for lack of a better way to put it. Up until that point. I taught Iraqi police in Iraq and, and did other things like that. But I didn't deal really in, um, day-to-day law enforcement as far as the military was concerned up until that point.

So this was taking this course along with the training I got, then kind of began all that together. So the first step is that you're, you want to establish a rapport. And when doing that, we used to use our, our c i D form that we would fill out for an, a person's name, address, their unit, their, their birthday, you know, maybe some parents' info, but essentially something, you know, you make it nice and casual.

You're trying to make them comfortable. You want them to, you want them to eventually, when questions begin, you know, to be open to answering. So you're, you're trying to make it as, uh, non [01:02:00] accusatorial as you can at that point. Um, and then, then the next step, and this is really important for all law enforcement, but in the, in the Army we use a form called, uh, department of the Army Form 38 81, which is giving someone their Miranda rights.

And it is a very simple by the book. You go down each step and you let people know that they, they don't have to answer any of your questions, that they can ask for an attorney at any time during the, at that particular moment. And we have them, they initial by each specific, right, that they get, and they sign at the bottom swearing that, that this is what they want to do.

And at the bottom you can, people can sign it by waiving their rights and then, or they cannot sign it and say, I'm sorry, I, I don't wish to be questioned, or I want to have an attorney. Um, it's important to note about Miranda Rights just in general, that, um, It's, it's, there's reason to believe that innocent suspects are

much [01:03:00] more readily willing to surrender their Miranda rights than other people, because they make the, the simple assumption that most of us would is I don't have anything to hide.

So I'm gonna say yes. I'm gonna, I'm gonna answer your questions because I don't, I don't have anything to hide. Um, I have a quote here from, uh, professor uh, Sal Cason, who's someone who has studied police interrogations in great depth. He said, uh, quote, it appears that people have a naive faith in the power of their own innocence to set them free.

Um, so assuming that they have, now, they've, they've waived their rights, they've said yes to you as an investigator, and they're willing to sit down and have this discussion. Then you begin, what under the Reid technique is called the behavioral analysis interview. Right? And it's a series of pretty straightforward questions, and they're designed to give the interrogator a framework to work with in speaking to you.

So they'll ask things about, you know, they'll say, you know, do, do you know anything [01:04:00] about the offense in question? Do you know anything about this crime? Murder? I dealt with drug offenses, so we didn't. Victims per se, aside from the state or the, the government. They were the only victims that we were representing, which can kind of make things kinda shady, but we could save that for a, for a different time.

Um, and that at that time, going through that behavioral analysis interview, that that is the time when you as the investigator are looking for cues. You're looking for the cues of touching the face, of shifting in their seat of sweating a lot. There's so many different ones that people give, give, uh, backing to, again, no scientific reliability whatsoever, but for someone as an investigator who's been told they have value, it can be, uh, uh, it can be something that is very powerful as far as what the investigator is, uh, is looking for.

Um, so I'll ask the person, can you please share about what you know about this crime? Um, you'll directly ask [01:05:00] the person very bluntly if they committed the crime. And in doing so specifically about this question, you wanna make it seem as blase as possible. They say yes. They say no. You act like you don't care.

You're, you're just writing things on a form at this particular point. And so then you get into a different set of questions that are more about coercion. Um, and they usually relate to a person's family, um, how they were raised, how their family would feel, uh, and family being, spouse, parents, friends, people in their

world, how they would feel if they knew that this person being interrogated, committed the offense in question.

And essentially you're giving the interrogator what your cue is about guilt. How do you feel about guilt? How does guilt play a role in your life? Um, ask them who would be most disappointed if they knew you did something wrong? If you committed a serious offense, who's the person in [01:06:00] the world that you would most hate to disappoint?

Um, and lastly, and certainly this isn't all inclusive, I did a lot of this from, from what I remember, they asked the person what should happen to the individual who committed the offense? You know, if this especially horse, if they said no. And the, the basic logic about that, and Doc I'd, I'd love for you to chime in on this one, is that you know, that, that generally speaking, a person who is innocent or feels that they're innocent is going to say, punish them. You know, whatever punishment is, is appropriate, whatever fits within line of what they did. Okay. If they are guilty, then they're going to have, um, addendums and they're going to say, well, maybe if this happened, or maybe if that happened, we don't understand what the person went through and that's, you know, the traditional wisdom is that, that that means that person is worried about guilt, potentially their own guilt.

Mm-hmm. But the guilt of, of someone, because the, [01:07:00] given these are open-ended questions, they're not all about the person. It kind of, you know, it, it's supposed to just give you a general air of how they see those kind of things.

Um, so then, then you're supposed to, I, I was trained that you leave the interrogation room, the interview room.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Mm-hmm.

**Henri:** So leave the inter interview room. I go back to my desk and I sit there for about 10 minutes or so, and I watch them on our little monitor thing and kind of seeing how they're responding to what just happened and.

None of those questions were supposed to be really director accusatory. They're supposed to just be as blase, simple filling out a form as as possible for the most part. Then after that 10 or 15 minutes, and, and, and some of this is stuff that I was taught to, it's not all exactly specific to the read technique.

Then you return to the interview room and you, uh, you give the, the person [01:08:00] being interviewed something called a theme. And essentially what

you do is you develop a theme based upon what you have learned about them. How they take in guilt, how they, if they a and, and of course if they already admitted to it, like for my instance, did you use marijuana?

You know, and they say, yes, none of this has to happen. They say, yes. We fill out the details. We go through the thing, they get punished. Life goes on. That's as far as the Reid technique is concerned. But if they say no, you come in with this theme and you're trying to convince them that. It's okay. It's okay that they did the thing that they did, right?

As long as you don't give them any kind of, uh, reprieve of legal culpability, you can morally and ethically tell them, Hey dude, this is bullshit. I'm sorry. You know, you, this is, this is, this isn't right. I can't believe this is happening to you. I, I, you know, but the thing is, is you're trying to slow walk them into admitting what [01:09:00] actually happened.

And it can get so dense at certain points. And the specific, I remember the specific example given in the course because it's floored me at that time. And it had to do with someone being questioned about child abuse, about actually putting their hands on a kid and, and sexually abusing them in some way.

And the tech, and the, the idea that they gave is that you, you, you essentially empathize with them as deeply as you can, and you tell them that it's, it's not such a big deal. It's not such a big deal. And in whatever way that you wanna come around with that, that, that, you know, maybe, maybe in your own weird way you were trying to protect this child that instead you were actually abusing, but you give someone the ethical and moral space.

To let go of their angst a little bit to, to get it out there. Um, and so at that point, assuming that they have confessed, you'll, uh, you'll make [01:10:00] a statement. And generally speaking, and I'm, I'm for c i d we didn't record interviews, but, um, generally speaking, these days, if any aspect of a police interrogation is recorded, it's usually only the creation of the statement.

It's not the long, long hours. Right. And, and it could be short, it could be an hours of many, many hours of the beginning of the interview. All the different questions that were asked up until this point, it leaves out a whole bunch of context for anyone trying to look back and say, what actually happened in these hours when you were in this room being interrogated?

So you'll create the statement. And generally speaking, when I was doing that, I wrote the statement for them. They would dictate to me what they wanted to

say, and I would type it out. And then I would add in little questions if there were little clarifications I needed to make about what, what they had happened.

Um, And as far as [01:11:00] like for CID, that statement and the, and the, the rights waiver, the DA form 38 81, those are the only evidence of the discussion. Those are the only things that are come out of that room. So whatever actually happened, if anything was actually threatened, if anything was not fitting within what the, the parameters of things, there's no record of it.

You know, at, at best there was a, another detective or an investigator watching on a, um, a monitor or something like that. Um, so that's just, and so I, I, I, I wanted to throw that out for everybody just to kind of have an understanding of what this is really about. Um, this is something that ordinary people can, can get approached with in their life that, you know, that police do.

Investigations ending up at a police station, having to have this kind of discussion is not out of the realm of possibility. And like I mentioned about Miranda rights, is that most people who see [01:12:00] themselves as innocent and unaffiliated are much more willing to waive their rights.

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** Yeah. Well, what I've always heard is you should never have been told over and over again, I attorneys say this, you know, do, do not speak to the police.

No. Without an attorney present, ever. Even, I don't care how innocent you are, you know, you could be the most you. You could have just come down from heaven, have a, an attorney there with you. Yeah. These, um, because you don't know any, I I truly believe that anybody just about could be susceptible to making a false confession if the circumstances were right.

Absolutely. Absolutely. Because of human psych, human psychology that allows this to happen. Um, and it may not happen on a given day. It may be that on a different day, Darryl Parker, let's say, wouldn't have confessed mm-hmm. , or it could have been a [01:13:00] different victim. He might not have confessed, who knows?

You know what, you know, uh, uh, you know, kinds of, I know they, they try to leverage guilt, the idea of guilt. Yep. And they, they truly believe in the urge to confess, which was a psychoanalytic, um, concept by the way, um, uh, that was propagated a lot in the early 20th century, is that, you know, criminals, there's an urge to confess.

Uh, you, you see this, uh, even in popular fiction, the tell books of Edpo, for instance, the telltale heart, the guy, you know, the people do feel guilt and they do want to confess. Um, but thank you for, I haven't really, uh, been able to hear somebody who's been through some of this training. It's very enlightening to hear what you were told.

Steps and, and how you went through it. And, uh, I know that they claim there's nine steps, you know, but they don't have to be followed religiously. But the whole idea is to get, to produce a pro, as I see it, to produce a product.

[01:14:00] That product is the, the written confession. Mm-hmm. written confession for court.

You're gonna get it by Booker, by crook. Uh, the, the Reid people claim that when there are false confessions, of course they, this is still what they claim today. Anytime there was a false confessions, because people just didn't follow the Reid technique properly. Mm-hmm. . Yeah. They were misusing it. They, you know, um, they didn't understand it.

They had stepped outside the boundaries to do something else, contaminated it, you know, whatever. But, uh, you know, and, uh, a lot of other people, of course, believe that, no, it's all casting. The researcher you mentioned and others that, you know, no, there's something inherently coercive about it, you know?

Mm-hmm. , um, and, um, and I, I, I'm in that camp myself, and there is something inherently con and I know that a lot of interior, uh, people today, um, that high value interrogation group that works under the, the auspices of the F B I, I believe mostly today, but it includes people from the CIA and Department of [01:15:00] Defense.

They, you know, they're pushing something called the Mendez principles of non-coercive interrogation. This is, hmm, you can look it up online, named after Juan Mendez, who had been the U N United Nations special repour on torture for a while. Uh, I dunno, 10 years ago or so. And he, he worked on this and it's a, it's inherently non, uh, data driven, you know, uh, content driven versus, you know, you're not, you're not informational interviewing, you know, you're not seeking a confession per se.

You're, you're just trying to solve a problem. Um, and of course, with a lot of attention to the vulnerability of the suspect in police custody, you know, uh, anybody already who's in the custody of the police or the army or whatever, a military police or a foreign government, whatever, uh, is already vulnerable, right?

You're already in their power and they, they hold power over you of some sort and that, you [01:16:00] know, that has an effect, um, that can't be ignored. So, um, uh, I remember, you know, I, I said I interviewed torture victims and one of the first things I did before I began such an interview, and then periodically during the interview would be to check in with the, the client and, and to certainly first at the beginning to explain to them how they were in really in control here.

If they wanted to get up at any time and say, stop, they could, right? If they wanted to go and smoke a cigarette, they. Make sure that they're able to have their, their agency through the entire thing. Right, right. That they had agency. Exactly. And if they didn't want to talk about something, they didn't have to talk about something.

And I didn't impose my view on something and I didn't, you know, it's, we're, you know, we're very, uh, susceptible to other people's opinion of us. Even, you know, it can be, if you got under the street and I've had this happen to me, or maybe I listen, somebody, uh, crazy person on the street comes up to you and says, you look [01:17:00] like a, you know, an idiot and walks on, you know, well, I shake it off, but, you know, a little tiny piece of me goes, I look like an idiot.

Maybe I, look, there's something how I look. You know? I mean, it's just, you know, we're very susceptible to this. Uh, um, and, um, you know, it's important. I, and today I think the Reid, the Reid people have taken a hit over the years. I know some former Reid people left the Reid, uh, I forget their names, just a few years ago, um, another major training institute broke and said they're not gonna use the weed technique at all.

They've decided it too leads to false confessions. And it was a big deal. I'm sorry. Zacker, I think was the name of one of the guys. And they, they trained under Reid and. So it was like an apostasy, it was like a betray hill from the Reid people, you know, and the Reid people, you know, they really try to, you know, they're, they're kind of litigious and, uh, you know, they went after Netflix for some, uh, you know, something that happened [01:18:00] a few years ago that was set on a Netflix documentary.

And, you know, they try and preserve their legacy and of course, their business. Um, because training is, is big business. They train cia, uh, foreign diplomats, you know, police departments, of course the fbi, and there's a lot of money in that. And, uh, you know, and, and not everything they said about them is truly fair.

But on the other hand, uh, there are some serious problems that they don't really own up to from my, in other people's opinion that, uh, um, have to do with the kind of inherent coercion to this process. And, um, uh, I know we started out talk, you know, it would be helpful to know what other work the Reid and Associates people have done for the government, particularly for the FBI and the CIA over the years.

I'm not talking about the training, I'm talking about any kind of research that may have been done, because it might help us understand, uh, more about the history of all [01:19:00] this, which is helpful. But also, uh, it would speak to, you know, you know, some of, uh, you know, why they've stuck to certain. Positions that they have or, you know, they hated.

By the way, the Miranda, the second edition that I have of the read Inba book, a Criminal Interrogation and Confession, uh, was put out right after Miranda decision in the sixties. And they are just, the book almost is like a diatribe against the Miranda decision. Hmm. The Miranda decision, if you read, it's really worth reading.

It's, it reads, uh, the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. It's fascinating reading in and of itself. It's, it's, uh, very well written and, uh, they do go after the read. People at one point specifically, hence the Reid People's, you know, animus perhaps towards that decision. But, you know, they, they, they thought it was, it was really, and a lot of, you know, people today, and I'd say with what's going on with the Supreme Court, I haven't heard about any further attacks on Miranda.

It has been shipped away over the years, you know, [01:20:00] but, uh, I know there are people who would like to see that go away. You know, to see it, uh, uh, destroyed and so that you don't warn people anymore about this kinda thing.

**Jovanni:** Doctor, there's a, there's also alternative, uh, methods as well to read, right? Um, reading one, uh, call the, uh, the preparation and planning, engage and explain account closure, evaluate, um, that the, uh, that is used in the, the uk, um mm-hmm.

Um, is that a, um, in your opinion, is that, is that a, um, is that a fair alternative or to, to the,

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** to read? I, you know, I'm aware of it. I, I, you know, I, it sounds like it is, but I haven't investigated it. You know, the more I look at things sometimes, you know, the people who run, uh, these kind of things in the world,

uh, particularly in the military intelligence side, they're always, you know, kind of protecting themselves and they're always [01:21:00] looking for, you know, they don't give up their, they want to control.

And, and so, I don't know, this may be a very humane technique. I, my, my, I'm sorry. I, I just really haven't investigated it enough nor these new Mendez techniques that they're talking about. Um, um, I do know that when the high value interrogation group. Who, uh, is against the army field manuals, techniques, and putting forth these humane techniques, nevertheless, in their own research on false confessions, seemed to me to have engaged in some, uh, questionable research behaviors when they went, um, uh, some years ago, uh, not that long ago, uh, but into college campuses and, and did, uh, research on false confessions in which they took college students and divided them up and put 'em, uh, uh, you know, to prove how easily false confessions can have.

But put people, uh, in a situation where they had admitted that they were cheating when they weren't, you know, and, and, and told [01:22:00] them that, you know, uh, would say things to them, well, how will your family feel when they find out that you were cheating in college and got expelled, right. To make them confess college student.

Right. And they were, they were not read into this. And then later of course, they were told afterwards, oh, this was all just a research thing there. But, you know, you know, uh, that kind of, that kind of stuff can harm people. So it's very difficult to do research that replicates and, um, uh, helps illuminate the, the kind of dilemmas that occur around all of the things we're talking about.

Um, because of the dan, the potential dangerousness and the vulnera, we are so vulnerable, you know, the vulnerable, uh, ability to, uh, uh, . So, um, that's why it's hard to assess, you know, so if I were to look at that piece thing that you brought up, it's used in the UK or the Mendes, I'd have to do an awful lot of reading and thinking and talking and, uh, I, I just, my own research has taken me elsewhere.[01:23:00]

You know, the, the fact that I know something about the read technique comes out of my interest in interrogation in general. What I found out in the Daniel King case and what, you know, what, what I was felt, I needed to become somewhat aware of what was considered the mainstream interrogation so I could better understand the things that weren't mainstream or that were inherently abusive.

Like the Appendix M of the Army Field Manual, which uses those techniques I talked about, or the enhanced interrogation techniques, you know, how are they really different? Well, okay, I better study and see, you know, what, you know, what is the control question technique of tech, you know, Reid and Umba and, uh, you know, what is the behavioral analysis interview, you know, that you were speaking to Andre, you know, and those kind of things.

So I had a sense, you know, and of course there's a, you know, it turned out, of course there was overlapping aspects to these, to all of these things. But, uh, definitely the Reid technique is not the [01:24:00] enhanced interrogation technique. Um, you know, that's of, of another whole. Um, and it wasn't the third. You know, but it, it's its own thing and it, it uses, you know, it, it, it, it, it uses a form of psychological manipulation and, uh, you know, isolation of the, of the person in a, in a, in a controlled setting that makes some vulnerable people confess falsely to under, under, under, under pressure and manipulation, to, to something, to, to end that dilemma that they're in.

Like you mentioned, the prisoner's, not the prisoner's dilemma, it's just the personal dilemma they're in of being, you know, in this interrogation and being accused over and over again. Um, they say, we don't accuse, don't accuse them, but what they say do accuse them. I don't understand why they can say they don't accuse them, but they are, they're saying, we have the information.

Or we'll even say, you know, in the case of Daniel King, they knew, they [01:25:00] gave him polygraph tests and they knew that the results of the polygraph tests were both, um, inconclusive. But they went to him and they said, polygraph shows that you're lying. You know, and if, and the courts have allowed the police to, to decide, you know, to decide to lie, really.

And in the service mention that, yeah.

**Jovanni:** Was the Supreme Court, was it a Supreme Court decision that they can

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** lie something like that? There was a, i, I don't have it in my at hand, but there have been, there have been of course, different court decisions and some of them contradict each other. But, uh, yeah, I believe there was a decision that allowed a certain kind of deception.

Yeah. Cause it was allowable. I can't think of the

**Henri:** name right now, but I

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** can't think of the name and I can't think of the boundaries of deception that were allowed. But, uh, it was quite disturbing to read that any deception was allowed. What, why we're trying to get to the truth, you know? Um, you know, uh, we're a lot more, we understand more today about what [01:26:00] happens when people are in position of power.

We've seen this with the, the Me Too movement and, you know, uh, you know, abuse in the workplace or, or making a, uh, an unsafe workplace, you know, for people in various ways. And that people in positions of power can misuse that power and sometimes without even realizing they're doing it, they need to be made aware of it because power differentials a real thing.

But in, but nowhere is that I think really, uh, uh, brought home as, as, as important as in either a prison, inside a jail or a prison itself, or in an interrogation room where there you are, you know, um, uh, presuming you've been put under arrest, but even if you haven't put under arrest, you've just fallen under suspicion.

Um, that itself is a very powerful, um, by the state apparatus, you know, a very powerful. Um, situation and scary situation to be in. It's right. Again, if your listeners are listening, what do I [01:27:00] do? You get an attorney, whatever you do. Yep. Get an attorney. Just remember that. Don't say anything. Get an attorney and they will help you through it.

**Jovanni:** I'll call Henri. Yeah.

**Henri:** I'll at least come bail you out, man. Well, I think that's a, uh, I think that's a good place for us to, uh, to wrap it up for today. Um, Dr. Qaim, thank you for coming and, and joining us and giving us your time and your, your experience. Um, I know you and I have gone back and forth about a, a whole slew of other topics to, uh, to discuss, to go along with these lines.

I'm sure at some point, hopefully soon, we'll do an episode specifically on the, uh, Army's Field manual on interrogation. Yeah, I think, I think that would be a, a good, a good breakdown for our, uh, for our audience. But

**Dr. Jeff Kaye:** yeah, and given that, I, I never would've thought years ago that this would still be an issue in 2020 2, 23.

Now we're going [01:28:00] into, and, uh, but it is, it's amazing now, people, not the United Nations in 2014 told the United States government, you know, United States government is a signatory. I know we're going over, but the

United States government is a signatory, and it was, uh, ratified by Congress of a treaty called the Convention Against Torture, United Nations Treaty.

Most countries in the world are signatories to this and say, we don't torture and we don't do this. And one of the ways they, they put, and a mechanism was set up via the treaty to police that, because torture is such a problem. And, and so that means that every so many years, each country comes up for review and the United Nations reviews their policies and practices and what they, you know, report new reports of torture in that country.

And they came to the United States back in 2014 for their review, and they said, guess what? Your Army Field Manual uses things that cause psychosis that could be construed as torture. You need to change that. All right? You need to [01:29:00] rewrite that and change that. They were mandated to do that by law because something, I mean, this is serious.

The Constitution says if you have a treaty and it's ratified by Congress, that has the force of law in the United States, that is US law. And the, you know, in the, and, and whether it's the Obama administration or the Trump administration, or the Biden administration, or much earlier the Bush Cheney administration, they are breaking those slots repeatedly over and over and over again.

That thing should have been rewritten and addressed. You know, wait, you know, 8, 8, 9 years ago, um, almost 10 years ago now, and, uh, wait a minute, maybe it was longer than 2004. I'd have to go back. It was a long time ago. I think it might have even been 2009 now that I think about it. Um, so anyway, That's how, so yeah, we should do that. I'd be happy to talk about it.

**Henri:** Sounds great, doc. Well, well, thanks to, uh, thanks to [01:30:00] everyone for, uh, for joining us today. I hope the discussion was, uh, educational. I know, I, I really enjoyed going back over it and lots of little questions and things. And, um, hope to see you guys again next time. Take care.