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Hello, everybody. Welcome back to firewall, Stone stop

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dragons. I'm your host, Gary Parker. As always.

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We have episode 385

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today for 07/15/2024.

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And we got a new show for you

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today I have plenty of interesting topics to

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cover real quick though before we get to.

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I wanna give you an update on the

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book surge.

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We'd we didn't meet any of the milestones

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I'd hoped for,

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which is a shame. We got actually very

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close to cracking the top 10 in

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basically all 3 categories. I think at 1

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point we were, maybe 13 on 01:15

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on another

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very close to the top 10, and I

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think in the low twenties on the third

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category. Most of that happened on Monday and

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Tuesday, which, you know, kinda makes sense the

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I imagine most people got the podcast on

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those days. And if they were gonna do

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it, they did it because they were waiting

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to do it because I said to wait

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to do it. So

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you know, that's kinda when we spiked. I

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was hoping maybe we could get a little

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surge for the weekend, but it just definitely

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did not happen.

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So, nevertheless,

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Thank you very much for everybody who participated,

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but I'm gonna try 1 last thing

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just to see,

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and I'll tell you more about that after

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the news. So stay tuned.

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We'll we'll try once more. We're gonna focus

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on a single day this coming weekend. Front

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of you who miss it last week, this

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will be an opportunity to try

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again. And I I don't know if it's

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still going. I didn't realize this when I

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first started to but Amazon leaks currently is

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running a buy 2 get 1 free or

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buy 3 for the price of 2. That's

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how I think they phrase it You know,

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so if you wanted to buy multiple copies,

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you know, maybe give 1 away or give

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1 your local library or senior center or

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something like that,

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this would be,

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a great way to do that. I will

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say more about that after the news.

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Also as promised, I will be giving away

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a free ticket to Def con 32 in

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Las Vegas, Nevada, that will go from August

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eighth through August eleventh.

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Though, if you're gonna go all the way

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to Vegas anyway, you might wanna go a

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couple extra days and go to b sides

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as well. It's even cheaper and also fun.

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But the ticket that we have to give

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away is for Def con itself. It is

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a 480

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dollar value, the cost I gone up quite

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a bit. That's cheap for a tech conference,

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but it's kind of expensive for Del Con.

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I think when I first started going a

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few years back It was in the 300

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dollar range

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So, anyway, that may mean that they're gonna

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give a really cool electronic badge this year.

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I haven't actually looked into that to see

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if that's the deal. But regardless, it's a

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free ticket to Def con I'm basically gonna

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do a straight up raffle for this because

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I realized that, you know, not that many

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of you will both be willing and able

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to go. But if that interests you at

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all, Def con is a lot of fun,

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You might wanna go back and listen to

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some of my Def con podcast to get

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a,

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flavor for what it's like. If you just

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go to podcast podcasts that firewalls, don't dot

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dragons dot com and search on Def con,

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you'll find those episodes pretty quickly. But if

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you ever thought about going, and this would

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be 1 to go, and I will offer

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a little bit more incentive to do so,

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and I'll get into those details after the

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news. Alright. So we got a good news

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show for you today. And lots of good

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juicy topics to cover.

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We'll start off with a, an Australian man

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was charged with running a fake Wifi

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router on domestic airline flights.

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A lawsuit against Airbnb and b about hidden

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cameras has exposed some interesting data on the

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number of complaints that people staying there have

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had over the years about

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being secretly recorded.

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Some popular links,

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mesh routers

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have been shown to

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send the Wifi

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credentials and plain text across the Internet, which

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is not a good thing. There's a new

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password cracking list

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making the rounds called Rock 20 24.

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I'll explain a little bit about the history

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of that.

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But it p contains 10000000000

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unique

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plain text passwords.

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Also, there's been another At and T

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Data breach, this 1 involving call records and

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text records

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and the metadata surrounding those.

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Signal has been under fire this week on

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social media,

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Thanks to a rather

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provocative post from a security researcher and a

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mis who we've talked about here before. There's

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a lot to unpack there.

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And I've got... I have opinions.

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And we'll talk about that quite a bit.

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Mozilla has announced a trial for their privacy

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preserving ad

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attribution

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technology,

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which apparently has been going on for a

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couple years now, and I really either missed

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it or forgot about it, but it has

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come back up because they are putting it

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in Firefox

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and turning it on by default, which I

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do not appreciate. So, we will talk about

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that quite a bit as well. And then

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finally, Proton

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continues to release

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very

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welcome new features for their product line, and

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they have finally come out with a Google

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docs replacement.

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That is end to end encrypted. And finally

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from my to of the week, I'm going

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to tell you how and why

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to block

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advertisements.

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So lots of stuff to talk about. Let's

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get right to it.

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Alright. This is from the hacker

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An Australian man has been charged with running

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a fake Wifi f access point during a

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domestic flight with an aim to steal user's

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credentials and data.

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The unnamed 42 year old allegedly established fake

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free Wi Access points, which mimic legitimate networks

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to capture personal data from unsuspecting victims who

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mistakenly connected to them according to the Australian

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federal police or the A fp. The agency

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said the subject was charged in May of

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20 24 after it launched in launched an

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investigation a month earlier,

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following a report from an airline about a

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suspicious Wifi Work identified by its employees during

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a domestic flight. A subsequent search of his

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baggage on April nineteenth led to the seizure

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of a portable wireless access device, a lap

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laptop in a mobile phone. He was arrested

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on May eighth after a search warrant was

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executed at his home. The individual is said

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to have staged what's called an evil twin

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Wifi attack across various locations, including domestic flights

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and airports in Perth, Melbourne, an adelaide to

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imp legitimate Wifi f networks.

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Users who attempted to connect to the free

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pho network were prompted to enter their email

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address or social media credentials through a captive

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portal webpage page. I'll come back to that

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in a second. This is a quote from

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the F quote.

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The email and password details harvested could be

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used to access more personal information including a

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victims online communications, stored images and videos or

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bank details unquote. The defendant has been charged

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with 3 counts of

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unauthorized impairment of electronic communication and 3 counts

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of possession or control of data with the

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intent to commit a serious offense.

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Has also been charged with 1 count of

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unauthorized access or modification of restricted data, 1

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count of dishonest obtaining or dealing in personal

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financial information and 1 kind of possession of

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identification information. If convicted, he faces up to

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a maximum of 23 years in prison.

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And here's a final quote from A quote.

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To connect to a free Wi network, you

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shouldn't have to enter any personal details such

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as logging in through an email or social

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media account.

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If you do want to use public Wi

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hotspots,

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install a reputable virtual private network or Vpn

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on your devices to encrypted secure your data

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when using the Internet unquote.

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Okay. I'm... I'm gonna come back to that

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as well, But but going all the way

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back for a second. So basically what this

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person did was they carried equipment with them

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onto these planes,

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to set up a wifi Network. Battery operated

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or something. And that Wifi network probably imp,

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the Wifi Network that was available in the

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airplane because it's easy to do. All you...

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The the Ssid, the thing that says, you

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know,

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free qantas airlines, wi, or whatever,

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that's just a string that anybody can type

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into their Wifi Router, and and he named

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his the same thing or something similar, something

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that looked

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like it was supposed to be free, you

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know, airline Wi or whatever. And so people

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nearby would connect to that Wifi hotspot that

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he had control over

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And then, as part of the connection process,

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you can throw up this captive portal. And

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if you're not familiar with that, if you

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been to anyway so free public Wi,

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they often... No matter what you try to

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connect you once you, connect to the Wi

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And, you know, they throw up this starter

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page says, hey, thanks for using our free

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Wifi.

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Agree to these terms and conditions by checking

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this box, you know, read this policy here,

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what you no never does. And then click

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here to continue. And then once you do

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that once, it remembers you and you can

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go surfing the web as usual. At places

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like hotels,

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oftentimes the cap affordable have you entered maybe

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your name and or room number so they

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can kinda keep track of who you are.

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But to my knowledge, they don't actually check

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that. So you can put whatever you want

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there. But in this case, this person threw

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up a captive portal that asked for

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credentials for social media accounts and things like

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that. And then once you put those in,

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that... You've given this person your credentials to

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that account and they can do whatever they

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want with that account. So back to the

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advice given it by the, the A here,

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a Vpn would not have helped in this

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situation. You still would have had to gone

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through this captive portal. So,

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a Vpn would not have prevented that. And

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you still could have been tricked into giving

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away your credentials. The main takeaway honestly for

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me is what I'll keep telling you guys

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is that is, I I never use public

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Wi.

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So if I'm on a plane even if

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they've got free Wifi F, I just I

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just don't use it. We're we're used to

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not having Wifi an airplane. So I just...

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So I just don't use it. If I

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were, if there was some sort of emergency

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00:09:24,466 --> 00:09:26,771
situation, then, yes, I would use Vpn. But,

272
00:09:26,930 --> 00:09:28,521
again, that wouldn't protect for this particular case,

273
00:09:28,600 --> 00:09:29,793
so you still have to be careful. And

274
00:09:29,793 --> 00:09:31,482
if you sign into 1 of these Wifi

275
00:09:31,482 --> 00:09:32,999
things and I asked you to give away

276
00:09:32,999 --> 00:09:34,755
credentials for social media or something,

277
00:09:35,634 --> 00:09:37,470
that should be a huge red flag. So

278
00:09:37,470 --> 00:09:39,226
instead of public Wi, I use my phone's

279
00:09:39,226 --> 00:09:42,039
hotspot feature. Which most modern phones now have

280
00:09:42,039 --> 00:09:43,179
available and most

281
00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:45,799
cellular accounts now include, you might have to

282
00:09:45,799 --> 00:09:47,319
pay for a higher level plan to get

283
00:09:47,319 --> 00:09:49,163
that. But that's what I do now instead

284
00:09:49,163 --> 00:09:50,115
of using public Wi.

285
00:09:51,067 --> 00:09:52,733
Alright. Moving on. This one's from 9 to

286
00:09:52,733 --> 00:09:54,955
5 Mac, and it's about hidden cameras and

287
00:09:55,193 --> 00:09:56,089
Airbnb properties

288
00:09:56,398 --> 00:09:58,068
I spoke about a while back... There was

289
00:09:58,068 --> 00:09:59,975
some other new story about this. But the

290
00:09:59,975 --> 00:10:01,645
the key to this story is that,

291
00:10:02,281 --> 00:10:03,871
because of a lawsuit around this,

292
00:10:04,523 --> 00:10:04,841
some,

293
00:10:05,558 --> 00:10:08,506
internal data has been released, and it's not

294
00:10:08,506 --> 00:10:08,586
good.

295
00:10:09,701 --> 00:10:12,344
A previously un lawsuit regarding hidden cameras and

296
00:10:12,583 --> 00:10:16,343
Airbnb properties reveals that the company generated 35000

297
00:10:16,559 --> 00:10:19,581
support tickets by customers complaining about surveillance devices.

298
00:10:20,073 --> 00:10:22,383
A lengthy Cnn report says that the problem

299
00:10:22,383 --> 00:10:25,251
appears to be a substantial 1. Thousands of

300
00:10:25,251 --> 00:10:27,561
images have been recovered from short term rental

301
00:10:27,561 --> 00:10:28,755
host by law enforcement.

302
00:10:29,169 --> 00:10:31,958
Hidden cameras placed in bedrooms and bathrooms showing

303
00:10:31,958 --> 00:10:34,828
guests during their most private moments. Changing clothes,

304
00:10:35,067 --> 00:10:37,393
being with their children even having sex according

305
00:10:37,393 --> 00:10:40,020
to Cnn review of Court Police records, as

306
00:10:40,020 --> 00:10:42,169
well as interviews with nearly 2 dozen guests

307
00:10:42,169 --> 00:10:44,558
who found surveillance devices at short term rental

308
00:10:44,558 --> 00:10:45,058
properties

309
00:10:45,448 --> 00:10:47,039
or were told by police that they had

310
00:10:47,039 --> 00:10:49,346
been secretly recorded. But the scale of the

311
00:10:49,346 --> 00:10:51,493
problem had previously been unknown due to a

312
00:10:51,493 --> 00:10:53,641
number of Airbnb policies and practices.

313
00:10:54,133 --> 00:10:57,179
These include seeking to settle cases through arbitration

314
00:10:57,316 --> 00:10:59,226
and failing to notify police even when it

315
00:10:59,226 --> 00:11:01,629
seems clear a crime has been committed. And

316
00:11:01,629 --> 00:11:02,666
this appears to be a quote from the

317
00:11:02,745 --> 00:11:05,457
Cnn report. During the hours long deposition, the

318
00:11:05,696 --> 00:11:08,328
Airbnb employee also revealed that when a guest

319
00:11:08,328 --> 00:11:10,163
complains of a hidden camera, the company doesn't

320
00:11:10,163 --> 00:11:11,120
as a matter of practice,

321
00:11:11,929 --> 00:11:13,990
notify law enforcement not even when a child

322
00:11:13,990 --> 00:11:16,843
is involved. The company may, however, reach out

323
00:11:16,843 --> 00:11:18,769
to hosts about complaints

324
00:11:19,077 --> 00:11:21,775
as part of internal inquiries, a move law

325
00:11:21,775 --> 00:11:24,791
enforcement experts say could hinder criminal investigations because

326
00:11:24,791 --> 00:11:27,013
it gives suspects time to destroy evidence.

327
00:11:27,904 --> 00:11:31,260
Airbnb seeks to compel planets into arbitration, a

328
00:11:31,260 --> 00:11:33,897
process that hides cases from public view, according

329
00:11:33,897 --> 00:11:36,429
to 6 attorneys who represented clients and cases

330
00:11:36,788 --> 00:11:38,384
against the short term rental platform.

331
00:11:38,863 --> 00:11:41,416
When a settlement is reached, Airbnb has required

332
00:11:41,416 --> 00:11:44,783
users to sign confidentiality agreements which bar them

333
00:11:44,783 --> 00:11:46,541
from discussing details of the deal.

334
00:11:47,260 --> 00:11:49,976
Airbnb told Cnn, its use of arbitration and

335
00:11:49,976 --> 00:11:52,867
non disclosure agreements are standard practice within the

336
00:11:52,867 --> 00:11:54,704
industry, and that is sadly true. Okay, Back

337
00:11:54,704 --> 00:11:56,861
to the article, a court ordered the company

338
00:11:56,861 --> 00:11:59,348
to disclose how many planes it had received

339
00:11:59,348 --> 00:12:01,972
about surveillance devices in Airbnb properties in the

340
00:12:01,972 --> 00:12:05,255
past decade, and it responded that 35000

341
00:12:05,312 --> 00:12:06,187
tickets had been raised.

342
00:12:06,759 --> 00:12:09,151
Europe regulates the short term rental industry imposing

343
00:12:09,151 --> 00:12:11,702
wide ranging controls and how companies like Airbnb

344
00:12:11,702 --> 00:12:14,254
can operate, but the Us has no similar

345
00:12:14,254 --> 00:12:14,754
federal

346
00:12:15,211 --> 00:12:17,699
regulations. That can says the report allow the

347
00:12:17,699 --> 00:12:19,615
company to claim it is only a tech

348
00:12:19,615 --> 00:12:20,115
platform

349
00:12:20,573 --> 00:12:22,887
and not responsible for anything that happens at

350
00:12:22,887 --> 00:12:23,685
the rental properties.

351
00:12:24,338 --> 00:12:26,889
Airbnb makes this argument under section 02:30.

352
00:12:27,527 --> 00:12:30,419
Legislation intended to protect web publishers from liability

353
00:12:30,556 --> 00:12:33,123
from comments posted by users. And this is

354
00:12:33,123 --> 00:12:35,438
a quote from Shannon Sc, who's a Florida

355
00:12:35,438 --> 00:12:37,275
attorney who settled an Airbnb Sue for a

356
00:12:37,275 --> 00:12:40,548
client, saying, quote, they're not arguing. This didn't

357
00:12:40,548 --> 00:12:43,356
happen. Your client isn't injured. They're arguing, we

358
00:12:43,356 --> 00:12:44,254
aren't responsible,

359
00:12:44,791 --> 00:12:47,263
unquote. But 1 member of Congress hopes to

360
00:12:47,263 --> 00:12:50,054
change that. Illinois representative Jan Chi cask, who

361
00:12:50,054 --> 00:12:52,543
has introduced legislation that aims to curb big

362
00:12:52,543 --> 00:12:54,461
technologies companies use of section 02:30,

363
00:12:54,941 --> 00:12:57,019
argued that the platform would be safer if

364
00:12:57,259 --> 00:12:59,416
Airbnb were forced to take responsibility for what

365
00:12:59,416 --> 00:13:00,535
happens at its listings.

366
00:13:01,189 --> 00:13:03,415
Right now, section 02:30 is used as a

367
00:13:03,415 --> 00:13:05,245
get out of jail free card, the Democratic

368
00:13:05,245 --> 00:13:08,744
lawmaker said. Now, Airbnb responded to this article

369
00:13:08,744 --> 00:13:10,509
and they said, The company told us that

370
00:13:10,509 --> 00:13:13,373
35000 tickets does not correspond to the number

371
00:13:13,373 --> 00:13:16,396
of complaints as some complaints can generate multiple

372
00:13:16,396 --> 00:13:18,727
tickets. It also stated that the tickets related

373
00:13:18,727 --> 00:13:22,162
to surveillance devices, which can include things like

374
00:13:22,162 --> 00:13:23,920
doorbell cameras and noise sensors.

375
00:13:24,575 --> 00:13:26,495
Airbnb added that some of the tickets also

376
00:13:26,495 --> 00:13:28,894
refer to false alarms where a retro believes

377
00:13:28,894 --> 00:13:30,815
a camera is present when it isn't.

378
00:13:31,615 --> 00:13:33,226
Okay. So, yeah, That does muddy the water

379
00:13:33,226 --> 00:13:34,126
some, but

380
00:13:34,983 --> 00:13:37,537
that's still an awful lot of complaints. Now,

381
00:13:37,697 --> 00:13:39,932
this whole section 02:30 thing really doesn't make

382
00:13:39,932 --> 00:13:41,804
sense to me. I don't know how Airbnb

383
00:13:42,101 --> 00:13:43,000
claim to be

384
00:13:43,697 --> 00:13:46,091
a platform, like a social media company. It

385
00:13:46,091 --> 00:13:48,325
that just doesn't make sense. If they're talking

386
00:13:48,325 --> 00:13:51,136
about comments posted on forums that they host,

387
00:13:51,775 --> 00:13:53,613
you know, on their website, you know, maybe

388
00:13:53,613 --> 00:13:57,138
comments and reviews for properties? Okay. Then Section

389
00:13:57,138 --> 00:13:58,805
02:30 would make sense. I mean, that they

390
00:13:58,805 --> 00:14:00,630
shouldn't really be held liable if somebody posts

391
00:14:00,630 --> 00:14:02,851
a really nasty comment. But I don't know

392
00:14:02,851 --> 00:14:04,378
how in the world you try to apply

393
00:14:04,378 --> 00:14:08,208
section 02:32 their policies around hidden web cameras

394
00:14:08,208 --> 00:14:10,203
on their properties. That that that doesn't make

395
00:14:10,203 --> 00:14:11,240
any sense to me whatsoever.

396
00:14:11,734 --> 00:14:12,931
So anyway, take away here,

397
00:14:13,889 --> 00:14:14,128
again,

398
00:14:14,846 --> 00:14:17,580
be aware that when you're going to Vr

399
00:14:17,719 --> 00:14:20,781
or Airbnb or some of these other services

400
00:14:20,836 --> 00:14:23,056
that let people rent their homes out to

401
00:14:23,056 --> 00:14:25,911
other people. There are some un people who

402
00:14:25,911 --> 00:14:27,045
will hide

403
00:14:27,355 --> 00:14:29,674
you know, surveillance cameras and not tell you

404
00:14:29,674 --> 00:14:32,634
about them. Airbnb has policies that says they

405
00:14:32,634 --> 00:14:35,034
must disclose these things now, which is something

406
00:14:35,034 --> 00:14:36,714
they didn't always have, but apparently they have

407
00:14:36,714 --> 00:14:38,002
now. You're supposed to know where they are,

408
00:14:38,161 --> 00:14:39,988
and there's never supposed to be a camera

409
00:14:39,988 --> 00:14:41,973
and an and, like, bedrooms and bathrooms and

410
00:14:41,973 --> 00:14:43,721
places like that where you're likely to be

411
00:14:43,721 --> 00:14:44,833
in states of un andres.

412
00:14:45,404 --> 00:14:47,404
But it is still a problem. And 1

413
00:14:47,404 --> 00:14:48,684
that you should be aware of.

414
00:14:49,404 --> 00:14:51,404
What do you do about it? It's it's

415
00:14:51,404 --> 00:14:52,524
really kinda hard to do anything about it.

416
00:14:52,684 --> 00:14:54,365
There are some techniques that you can use

417
00:14:54,365 --> 00:14:56,924
to try to spot hidden cameras, but it's

418
00:14:56,924 --> 00:14:58,591
it's not that easy to do. These cameras

419
00:14:58,591 --> 00:15:00,971
are super tiny they're you can hide them

420
00:15:00,971 --> 00:15:03,845
just about anywhere they're very difficult to find

421
00:15:03,845 --> 00:15:04,959
if they're hidden properly.

422
00:15:05,436 --> 00:15:07,185
The other takeaway from me here is that

423
00:15:07,185 --> 00:15:10,388
this forced arbitration stuff has got to change

424
00:15:10,940 --> 00:15:13,259
I understand certainly why companies want to do

425
00:15:13,259 --> 00:15:15,259
this, but I don't know why we let

426
00:15:15,259 --> 00:15:17,259
them get away with doing it. Our court

427
00:15:17,259 --> 00:15:18,779
system isn't imperfect. It's backed up.

428
00:15:20,151 --> 00:15:22,854
Arbitration can be good, but, you know, there's

429
00:15:22,854 --> 00:15:24,683
still some transparency that needs to go along

430
00:15:24,683 --> 00:15:26,989
with that somehow. But anyway, I'm I'm not

431
00:15:26,989 --> 00:15:28,897
a lawyer, so maybe Should just stop talking

432
00:15:28,897 --> 00:15:30,049
about that because I

433
00:15:30,426 --> 00:15:32,022
don't really know what I speak So alright.

434
00:15:32,261 --> 00:15:34,336
Moving on. This next 1 is from Stack

435
00:15:34,495 --> 00:15:36,705
Diary, and it's a site that I don't,

436
00:15:37,222 --> 00:15:39,929
but 1 of my followers pointed me to

437
00:15:39,929 --> 00:15:42,158
this, and thank you to them. And it's

438
00:15:42,158 --> 00:15:44,228
about some serious security problems with Links as

439
00:15:44,228 --> 00:15:44,467
routers?

440
00:15:45,918 --> 00:15:48,796
According to tested Coup, a Belgian equivalent of

441
00:15:48,796 --> 00:15:51,673
the consumers Association. 2 types of links routers

442
00:15:51,673 --> 00:15:54,810
are sending Wi login details in plain text

443
00:15:55,123 --> 00:15:58,625
to Amazon Aws servers. This discovery involves the

444
00:15:58,705 --> 00:15:59,205
Links

445
00:15:59,581 --> 00:16:01,252
V, that's VELP,

446
00:16:02,048 --> 00:16:05,327
pro 6 e and pro 7 mesh routers.

447
00:16:05,963 --> 00:16:08,192
These look... These are little pillars that kinda

448
00:16:08,192 --> 00:16:09,943
look like about the size of a pringles

449
00:16:09,943 --> 00:16:11,933
can maybe except they're more squared often than

450
00:16:11,933 --> 00:16:12,172
round.

451
00:16:12,823 --> 00:16:14,331
So if you have a links list router

452
00:16:14,331 --> 00:16:15,284
that looks like that in your house,

453
00:16:16,475 --> 00:16:19,412
pay attention to this. During routine installation checks,

454
00:16:19,650 --> 00:16:20,419
test and coupe

455
00:16:20,779 --> 00:16:23,333
detected several data packets being transmitted to an

456
00:16:23,892 --> 00:16:26,287
Aws server in the Us. These packets included

457
00:16:26,287 --> 00:16:28,362
the configured Ss ssid name, that's the Wifi

458
00:16:28,362 --> 00:16:30,050
f name that you would see when you

459
00:16:30,050 --> 00:16:31,161
bring up your phone and say connect to

460
00:16:31,161 --> 00:16:32,589
this network and the name provided there. That's

461
00:16:32,589 --> 00:16:34,969
the Id name. So it include the Sis

462
00:16:35,207 --> 00:16:37,508
Id name and password in clear text.

463
00:16:38,079 --> 00:16:40,072
The identification tokens for the network within a

464
00:16:40,072 --> 00:16:42,862
broader database and an access token for a

465
00:16:42,862 --> 00:16:44,934
user session potentially paving the way for a

466
00:16:44,934 --> 00:16:46,784
man in the middle attack. A man in

467
00:16:46,784 --> 00:16:48,382
the middle attack is a security breach in

468
00:16:48,382 --> 00:16:50,779
which should attacker intercept the communication between your

469
00:16:50,939 --> 00:16:52,957
Lin router and the Amazon web server

470
00:16:53,496 --> 00:16:56,144
without either party's knowledge. In this context, means

471
00:16:56,144 --> 00:16:58,372
the attacker could capture your Wifi network name

472
00:16:58,372 --> 00:17:01,078
or the Ssid and password as they are

473
00:17:01,078 --> 00:17:02,692
transmitted in plain text

474
00:17:03,082 --> 00:17:05,488
allowing them to read or alter these sensitive

475
00:17:05,544 --> 00:17:08,164
details to potentially gain unauthorized access to your

476
00:17:08,164 --> 00:17:08,481
network.

477
00:17:09,117 --> 00:17:11,737
The consumer organization conducted these tests using the

478
00:17:11,737 --> 00:17:14,769
latest firmware available at the time. Despite warning

479
00:17:14,848 --> 00:17:17,548
Links in November, no effective measures have been

480
00:17:17,548 --> 00:17:17,786
taken.

481
00:17:18,500 --> 00:17:20,485
Links this released a firmware update after the

482
00:17:20,485 --> 00:17:22,730
initial warning, but it did not address the

483
00:17:22,730 --> 00:17:24,905
concerns raised, and this is a quote from

484
00:17:25,203 --> 00:17:27,596
someone at Tested coup, quote, we regret the

485
00:17:27,596 --> 00:17:29,510
lack of response from Links and expected more

486
00:17:29,510 --> 00:17:31,105
from such a renowned brand on, unquote.

487
00:17:32,157 --> 00:17:34,469
Test group suspects the security issue might stem

488
00:17:34,469 --> 00:17:36,702
from third party software used in Lin as

489
00:17:36,702 --> 00:17:39,493
firmware. However, they emphasize that this does not

490
00:17:39,493 --> 00:17:40,392
excuse the vulnerability.

491
00:17:40,864 --> 00:17:43,017
For those who already own the affected routers

492
00:17:43,017 --> 00:17:45,648
they have recommended changing the Wifi Network name

493
00:17:45,648 --> 00:17:46,388
and password

494
00:17:46,765 --> 00:17:49,795
via the web interface instead of the app.

495
00:17:50,367 --> 00:17:52,834
This precaution prevents the Ssid name and password

496
00:17:52,834 --> 00:17:54,744
from being transmitted in readable text.

497
00:17:55,619 --> 00:17:57,768
Test and coupe contacted Links us again just

498
00:17:57,768 --> 00:18:00,335
day before today's publication in response to the

499
00:18:00,335 --> 00:18:02,815
year ongoing issue, giving them a brief window

500
00:18:02,815 --> 00:18:04,974
to respond. However, they have not received any

501
00:18:04,974 --> 00:18:07,294
acknowledgment or a solution from the manufacturer.

502
00:18:07,869 --> 00:18:09,864
And again, another quote from the researchers quote,

503
00:18:10,023 --> 00:18:12,497
the vulnerability persists even in the latest Links

504
00:18:12,497 --> 00:18:16,022
7 pro highlighting a critical security lapse. While

505
00:18:16,022 --> 00:18:18,567
breaching in that requires effort and technical skill,

506
00:18:19,124 --> 00:18:22,227
the attacker can cause extensive damage once inside.

507
00:18:22,957 --> 00:18:25,422
Links list themselves recommended the V product lines

508
00:18:25,422 --> 00:18:28,364
for small offices making this issue particularly concerning

509
00:18:28,364 --> 00:18:30,431
for both personal and professional environments.

510
00:18:31,164 --> 00:18:33,025
Alright. So what what it sounds like is

511
00:18:33,085 --> 00:18:35,505
there is an app to set up these

512
00:18:35,804 --> 00:18:36,285
routers,

513
00:18:36,765 --> 00:18:39,005
which is becoming more and more common these

514
00:18:39,005 --> 00:18:40,044
days with smart devices.

515
00:18:40,699 --> 00:18:42,295
And when using that app to set up

516
00:18:42,295 --> 00:18:44,529
these devices with the password and setting the

517
00:18:44,848 --> 00:18:45,247
Ssid,

518
00:18:45,726 --> 00:18:46,923
and it looks like the app or the

519
00:18:46,923 --> 00:18:47,982
routers are sending

520
00:18:48,694 --> 00:18:51,586
some information up to some cloud server somewhere

521
00:18:51,644 --> 00:18:53,638
for links is probably or maybe for a

522
00:18:53,638 --> 00:18:56,053
third party, I'm not sure, but that that

523
00:18:56,191 --> 00:18:57,488
communication sends the

524
00:18:57,865 --> 00:19:00,853
credentials for... The credentials for your Wifi router

525
00:19:01,230 --> 00:19:03,623
uni uninterrupted. If they were really able to

526
00:19:03,623 --> 00:19:05,856
intercept this, That means the communication itself wasn't

527
00:19:05,856 --> 00:19:08,664
encrypted which today is almost unheard of. And

528
00:19:08,664 --> 00:19:11,705
if someone were able to intercept that communication

529
00:19:11,705 --> 00:19:14,105
somehow, you know, maybe you're in apartment complex

530
00:19:14,105 --> 00:19:16,357
or you're you're in a neighborhood with close

531
00:19:16,357 --> 00:19:18,526
houses and somebody in nearby just kinda of

532
00:19:19,059 --> 00:19:20,433
sniffing the air for

533
00:19:20,807 --> 00:19:21,307
for

534
00:19:21,760 --> 00:19:24,003
communications like this. If they were to intercept

535
00:19:24,003 --> 00:19:25,679
this then they would be able to get

536
00:19:25,679 --> 00:19:26,875
on your Wifi F network and then get

537
00:19:26,875 --> 00:19:28,471
up to all sorts of no good. Now

538
00:19:28,471 --> 00:19:29,668
how likely is that to happen?

539
00:19:30,226 --> 00:19:31,912
I don't know. But it really is a

540
00:19:31,912 --> 00:19:34,849
horrible mistake by Lin, and they're right. I

541
00:19:34,849 --> 00:19:37,073
mean, links is a huge name and in

542
00:19:37,073 --> 00:19:38,446
networking products and

543
00:19:39,312 --> 00:19:41,060
that this should not have happened. My guess

544
00:19:41,060 --> 00:19:43,047
is probably the same as the researchers and

545
00:19:43,047 --> 00:19:44,954
that is it may not have been links

546
00:19:44,954 --> 00:19:46,464
as code doing this, It may have been

547
00:19:46,464 --> 00:19:48,785
some third party library or or S sdk

548
00:19:48,785 --> 00:19:50,537
that they were including that is making this

549
00:19:50,537 --> 00:19:53,324
mistake. But nevertheless links this should be testing

550
00:19:53,324 --> 00:19:55,315
their products and should be... Should have caught

551
00:19:55,315 --> 00:19:57,083
this a long time ago. And should have

552
00:19:57,083 --> 00:19:59,075
fixed it right away when notified. So if

553
00:19:59,075 --> 00:20:00,589
you have these products, you could log in

554
00:20:00,589 --> 00:20:02,901
to the web interface for your router that

555
00:20:02,901 --> 00:20:04,630
is, you know, get on the Wifi network

556
00:20:04,749 --> 00:20:07,061
Or if these devices actually have an ethernet

557
00:20:07,061 --> 00:20:08,177
plug on that, I'm not sure if they

558
00:20:08,177 --> 00:20:08,336
do.

559
00:20:09,134 --> 00:20:10,329
But you should be able go to the,

560
00:20:10,967 --> 00:20:13,174
administrator page for the the router, which is

561
00:20:13,373 --> 00:20:15,992
special designated web page or, manual that comes

562
00:20:15,992 --> 00:20:17,976
with the router, which you could probably download

563
00:20:17,976 --> 00:20:20,277
online if you don't have it anymore. We'll

564
00:20:20,277 --> 00:20:21,309
give you instructions of how to do that.

565
00:20:21,467 --> 00:20:23,545
And then you change the password there,

566
00:20:24,260 --> 00:20:26,085
then apparently, that does not send it in

567
00:20:26,085 --> 00:20:27,989
the clear to to the web. So that

568
00:20:27,989 --> 00:20:28,703
would be a good idea.

569
00:20:29,753 --> 00:20:31,429
Alright. Next up, This is from Cyber news,

570
00:20:31,588 --> 00:20:33,981
and it's about the next iteration of what's

571
00:20:33,981 --> 00:20:35,040
called the Rock

572
00:20:35,817 --> 00:20:38,723
password list. Which is basically a list maintained

573
00:20:38,781 --> 00:20:40,296
by maintain and traded

574
00:20:40,694 --> 00:20:41,433
amongst hackers

575
00:20:41,970 --> 00:20:44,122
for trying to brute force passwords. And this

576
00:20:44,122 --> 00:20:44,622
1

577
00:20:45,012 --> 00:20:48,664
is now the official largest known, which contains

578
00:20:48,664 --> 00:20:49,800
10000000000

579
00:20:50,173 --> 00:20:50,888
unique passwords.

580
00:20:51,444 --> 00:20:53,919
The king is dead. Long lived the king.

581
00:20:54,316 --> 00:20:56,775
Cyber news researchers discovered what appears to be

582
00:20:56,775 --> 00:20:57,909
the largest password

583
00:20:58,282 --> 00:20:59,496
compilation with a staggering

584
00:21:00,203 --> 00:21:05,326
9948575739

585
00:21:05,702 --> 00:21:07,456
unique plain text passwords.

586
00:21:08,107 --> 00:21:10,728
The file with the data titled ro 20

587
00:21:10,728 --> 00:21:13,746
24 dot text was posted on July fourth

588
00:21:13,746 --> 00:21:15,176
by 4 user Obamacare.

589
00:21:15,653 --> 00:21:17,082
That's an odd name for a hacker, but

590
00:21:17,082 --> 00:21:20,030
okay. The team cross referenced the passwords included

591
00:21:20,030 --> 00:21:22,249
in the Rock 20 24 leak with data

592
00:21:22,249 --> 00:21:24,548
from Cyber news leaked password Checker,

593
00:21:25,118 --> 00:21:27,105
which revealed that these passwords came from a

594
00:21:27,105 --> 00:21:29,489
mix of old and new data breaches. And

595
00:21:29,489 --> 00:21:31,555
this is a quote from the researchers they

596
00:21:31,555 --> 00:21:34,201
said, quote, In its essence, the Rock 20

597
00:21:34,201 --> 00:21:36,776
24 is a compilation of real world passwords

598
00:21:36,995 --> 00:21:38,671
used by individuals all over the world.

599
00:21:39,470 --> 00:21:41,920
Revealing that many passwords for threat actors

600
00:21:42,279 --> 00:21:44,840
substantially heighten the risk of credential stuffing attacks,

601
00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:45,160
unquote.

602
00:21:46,039 --> 00:21:48,200
Credential stuffing attacks can be severely damaging for

603
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:50,759
users and businesses. For example, a recent wave

604
00:21:50,759 --> 00:21:54,046
of attacks targeting set satanic ticket master, advanced

605
00:21:54,126 --> 00:21:56,119
Auto parts, quote wizard and others was a

606
00:21:56,119 --> 00:21:58,352
direct result of credential shopping attacks against the

607
00:21:58,352 --> 00:22:00,185
victim's cloud service provider snowflake.

608
00:22:00,679 --> 00:22:02,992
Also from the researchers quote, threat actors could

609
00:22:02,992 --> 00:22:05,783
exploit the Ro 20 24 password compilation to

610
00:22:05,783 --> 00:22:08,574
conduct Brute force attacks and gain unauthorized access

611
00:22:08,574 --> 00:22:11,532
to various online accounts used by individuals who

612
00:22:11,532 --> 00:22:14,071
employee passwords included in the dataset unquote. The

613
00:22:14,150 --> 00:22:16,451
Rock 20 24 compilation did not just fall

614
00:22:16,451 --> 00:22:17,086
from the sky.

615
00:22:17,657 --> 00:22:19,487
3 years ago, Cyber news published a story

616
00:22:19,487 --> 00:22:22,350
about the Ro 20 21 password compilation, the

617
00:22:22,350 --> 00:22:24,736
largest at the time with 8400000000.0

618
00:22:24,736 --> 00:22:25,611
plain text passwords.

619
00:22:26,182 --> 00:22:28,089
According to the team's analysis of Rock 20

620
00:22:28,089 --> 00:22:28,565
24,

621
00:22:29,201 --> 00:22:31,663
attackers developed a dataset by scouring the Internet

622
00:22:31,663 --> 00:22:34,283
for data leaks, adding another 1500000000.0

623
00:22:34,283 --> 00:22:36,527
passwords from 20 20 through 20 24,

624
00:22:37,006 --> 00:22:39,161
and increasing the dataset set by 15 percent.

625
00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:41,178
The Ro 20 21

626
00:22:41,317 --> 00:22:43,312
compilation an expansion of a data breach from

627
00:22:43,312 --> 00:22:44,371
2009

628
00:22:44,683 --> 00:22:46,751
included tens of millions of user passwords for

629
00:22:46,751 --> 00:22:49,774
social media accounts. Since then, however, the compilation

630
00:22:49,774 --> 00:22:50,592
has balloon

631
00:22:50,967 --> 00:22:54,266
exponentially. Most likely, the latest Ro iteration contains

632
00:22:54,403 --> 00:22:56,334
information collected from over 4000

633
00:22:56,391 --> 00:22:58,062
databases over more than 2 decades.

634
00:22:58,634 --> 00:23:01,106
The Cyber news team believes the attackers can

635
00:23:01,106 --> 00:23:04,398
utilize the 10000000000 strong Rock q 20 24

636
00:23:04,616 --> 00:23:07,248
compilation to target any system that isn't protected

637
00:23:07,248 --> 00:23:10,053
against Brute force attacks. This includes everything from

638
00:23:10,053 --> 00:23:12,523
online and offline services to Internet facing cameras

639
00:23:12,523 --> 00:23:14,914
and industrial hardware. 1 more quote from the

640
00:23:14,914 --> 00:23:17,877
team, quote, moreover, combined with other leaked databases

641
00:23:17,877 --> 00:23:20,267
on hacker forms and marketplaces, which for example,

642
00:23:20,984 --> 00:23:23,948
contain user email addresses and other credentials Ro

643
00:23:23,948 --> 00:23:26,261
20 24 can contribute to a cascade of

644
00:23:26,261 --> 00:23:28,972
data breaches financial fraud and identity theft quote.

645
00:23:29,531 --> 00:23:31,286
While there is no silver bullet to protect

646
00:23:31,286 --> 00:23:33,040
users who had their passwords exposed,

647
00:23:33,773 --> 00:23:36,905
impacted individuals and organizations to should take up

648
00:23:36,963 --> 00:23:37,681
mitigation strategies.

649
00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:40,951
The Cyber news research team advises to 1,

650
00:23:41,350 --> 00:23:44,073
immediately reset the passwords for all accounts associated

651
00:23:44,073 --> 00:23:44,945
with leaked passwords.

652
00:23:45,421 --> 00:23:47,879
It is strongly recommended to select strong unique

653
00:23:47,879 --> 00:23:50,734
passwords that are not reused across multiple platforms.

654
00:23:51,464 --> 00:23:54,265
2 enable defect authentication or M mfa wherever

655
00:23:54,265 --> 00:23:57,785
possible, this enhances security by requiring additional verification

656
00:23:57,785 --> 00:23:58,505
beyond a password.

657
00:23:58,998 --> 00:24:01,870
And 3, utilize password manager software to securely

658
00:24:01,870 --> 00:24:03,545
generate and store complex passwords.

659
00:24:04,023 --> 00:24:06,895
Password managers mitigate the risk of password reuse

660
00:24:06,895 --> 00:24:07,932
across different accounts.

661
00:24:08,744 --> 00:24:11,137
Cyber will include data from Rock 20 24

662
00:24:11,137 --> 00:24:13,769
in the leaked password checker, allowing anyone to

663
00:24:13,769 --> 00:24:15,763
check if their credentials were exposed by the

664
00:24:15,763 --> 00:24:17,778
latest record holding exposed password

665
00:24:18,236 --> 00:24:20,320
compilation. Alright. So let me just explain what

666
00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:21,036
this what this is.

667
00:24:21,832 --> 00:24:24,139
Really, all this is is a massive text

668
00:24:24,139 --> 00:24:25,673
file full of

669
00:24:26,380 --> 00:24:27,333
breached passwords.

670
00:24:27,730 --> 00:24:29,579
Passwords that have been

671
00:24:30,269 --> 00:24:30,769
discovered

672
00:24:31,698 --> 00:24:33,047
or hacked somehow,

673
00:24:33,619 --> 00:24:36,328
over the past, basically 2 decades. These are

674
00:24:36,328 --> 00:24:39,675
gonna include things like password or password 1234

675
00:24:39,675 --> 00:24:40,951
or monkey 123.

676
00:24:41,444 --> 00:24:43,442
You know, all the really bad passwords that

677
00:24:43,442 --> 00:24:44,800
we that we know and love.

678
00:24:45,679 --> 00:24:47,696
But 10000000000 of them, 10000000000

679
00:24:47,836 --> 00:24:48,315
unique ones.

680
00:24:48,969 --> 00:24:50,719
Now I tried to download this file.

681
00:24:51,515 --> 00:24:52,629
There were a couple places I found in

682
00:24:52,629 --> 00:24:53,823
the web that had it, but they were

683
00:24:53,823 --> 00:24:55,732
really, really slow and the file was enormous.

684
00:24:56,544 --> 00:24:57,980
And a lot of people were saying that

685
00:24:57,980 --> 00:24:59,336
it's full of a bunch of junk too.

686
00:24:59,735 --> 00:25:01,729
So apparently, it's not a clean listing of

687
00:25:01,729 --> 00:25:02,687
10000000000 passwords,

688
00:25:03,165 --> 00:25:04,692
but this Rocky thing has been around for

689
00:25:04,692 --> 00:25:07,076
a while. And if you have done any

690
00:25:07,076 --> 00:25:07,712
basic hacking,

691
00:25:08,348 --> 00:25:10,733
you will be familiar with it. There are

692
00:25:10,733 --> 00:25:12,641
cyber tools like John The ripper,

693
00:25:13,373 --> 00:25:16,565
that use lists like this to automate brute

694
00:25:16,565 --> 00:25:19,038
force attacks. In other words, to take all

695
00:25:19,038 --> 00:25:19,777
these passwords

696
00:25:20,329 --> 00:25:24,317
and probably pre hash them using, several common

697
00:25:24,317 --> 00:25:25,035
hash techniques.

698
00:25:25,513 --> 00:25:27,667
And then when they get a password database

699
00:25:27,667 --> 00:25:29,262
somewhere, look at all the hash passwords and

700
00:25:29,262 --> 00:25:30,060
see if there's any matches.

701
00:25:30,714 --> 00:25:32,734
And then they would then know what your

702
00:25:32,954 --> 00:25:35,515
underlying password is. Or sometimes what they'll do

703
00:25:35,515 --> 00:25:37,355
is they'll just take these passwords and take

704
00:25:37,355 --> 00:25:39,355
a list of users that they that know

705
00:25:39,355 --> 00:25:41,463
have account on, let's say a certain bank

706
00:25:41,600 --> 00:25:43,270
or social media accounts and they may have

707
00:25:43,270 --> 00:25:44,941
gotten this from other places and just combine

708
00:25:44,941 --> 00:25:47,659
the 2 and say, okay, just start trying

709
00:25:47,659 --> 00:25:49,564
all these passwords with all these email addresses

710
00:25:49,564 --> 00:25:51,152
and see if any of those combinations actually

711
00:25:51,152 --> 00:25:53,375
get, you know, get me in. That is

712
00:25:53,375 --> 00:25:54,248
a brute force attack.

713
00:25:54,979 --> 00:25:57,313
And it's not done by hand. It's done

714
00:25:57,451 --> 00:25:59,365
by computers, so it can happen very, very

715
00:25:59,365 --> 00:26:00,982
quickly. And that's why it's important

716
00:26:01,359 --> 00:26:04,390
for sites that accept credentials over the web,

717
00:26:04,964 --> 00:26:07,122
to have protections like rate limiting, like, you

718
00:26:07,122 --> 00:26:09,359
know, you can't enter a, you know, million

719
00:26:09,359 --> 00:26:12,476
passwords per hour. If you fail 10 times

720
00:26:12,476 --> 00:26:14,164
in a row, they should cut you off

721
00:26:14,164 --> 00:26:15,753
for an hour or a day,

722
00:26:16,389 --> 00:26:17,899
but there's a lot of sites that do

723
00:26:17,899 --> 00:26:19,726
not do that. And if the thing that

724
00:26:19,726 --> 00:26:21,872
they are attacking is something that's offline,

725
00:26:22,363 --> 00:26:24,741
if they, you know, steal your laptop or

726
00:26:24,741 --> 00:26:27,461
steal your phone or something that has password

727
00:26:27,516 --> 00:26:28,784
protections on it, and they actually have it

728
00:26:28,784 --> 00:26:29,419
in their possession.

729
00:26:30,229 --> 00:26:32,307
They can lose their computer on it and

730
00:26:32,307 --> 00:26:33,665
just try as fast as possible.

731
00:26:34,144 --> 00:26:35,822
And if you're using 1 of these passwords,

732
00:26:36,382 --> 00:26:38,000
then they may eventually

733
00:26:38,314 --> 00:26:40,472
get in. So that is why you need

734
00:26:40,472 --> 00:26:42,709
a password manager to generate crazy,

735
00:26:43,108 --> 00:26:43,588
random,

736
00:26:44,547 --> 00:26:46,956
long, strong, unique passwords for all of your

737
00:26:46,956 --> 00:26:48,309
sites. And you don't have to remember them

738
00:26:48,309 --> 00:26:49,742
or even type them in because the password

739
00:26:49,742 --> 00:26:51,812
manager does all that for you. Alright. Next

740
00:26:51,812 --> 00:26:53,085
up, this is from Tech ranch, and it's

741
00:26:53,085 --> 00:26:55,154
about an, yet another At and T breach.

742
00:26:56,363 --> 00:26:57,954
On Friday, which I think was just last

743
00:26:58,034 --> 00:27:00,261
Friday. At and T said cyber criminals stole

744
00:27:00,261 --> 00:27:02,909
the phone records of, quote unquote, nearly all

745
00:27:03,299 --> 00:27:05,126
of its customers. A data breach that will

746
00:27:05,126 --> 00:27:07,032
force the company to notify around a hundred

747
00:27:07,032 --> 00:27:08,224
and 10000000

748
00:27:08,224 --> 00:27:08,542
users.

749
00:27:09,098 --> 00:27:11,004
At and T said the stolen data included

750
00:27:11,004 --> 00:27:11,504
records

751
00:27:11,893 --> 00:27:14,349
like which phone numbers a certain customer called

752
00:27:14,349 --> 00:27:16,965
and texted, the total count of calls and

753
00:27:16,965 --> 00:27:20,176
texts and call for a 6 month period

754
00:27:20,232 --> 00:27:22,853
beginning May first of 20 22 through October

755
00:27:22,853 --> 00:27:24,124
30 first of 20 22.

756
00:27:24,680 --> 00:27:26,507
At and T said the stolen data does

757
00:27:26,507 --> 00:27:29,025
not include any content of calls or tax

758
00:27:29,544 --> 00:27:31,062
nor their time or date.

759
00:27:31,701 --> 00:27:33,459
For some of the affected customers, the cyber

760
00:27:33,459 --> 00:27:35,636
criminals were also able to steal sell site

761
00:27:35,935 --> 00:27:38,099
identification numbers, linked to phone calls and text

762
00:27:38,099 --> 00:27:40,562
messages according to At and T. This means

763
00:27:40,562 --> 00:27:43,954
that potentially, someone could use this information to

764
00:27:43,994 --> 00:27:46,456
figure out the approximate location of a customer

765
00:27:46,456 --> 00:27:47,965
when they made a certain caller sent to

766
00:27:47,965 --> 00:27:51,063
text, and perhaps infer sensitive information about their

767
00:27:51,063 --> 00:27:52,810
lives. And this is a quote from Rachel

768
00:27:52,889 --> 00:27:53,287
To,

769
00:27:54,257 --> 00:27:56,888
social engineering expert and founder of Security firm,

770
00:27:57,127 --> 00:28:00,237
social proof security. And, Rachel says, quote, this

771
00:28:00,237 --> 00:28:03,040
could reveal where someone lives works spends their

772
00:28:03,040 --> 00:28:05,527
free time, who they communicate with in secret

773
00:28:05,584 --> 00:28:09,001
including affairs, any crime based communication or typical

774
00:28:09,001 --> 00:28:11,306
private sensitive conversations that require secrecy.

775
00:28:11,877 --> 00:28:14,203
This is a big deal for anyone affected

776
00:28:14,259 --> 00:28:14,418
unquote.

777
00:28:15,212 --> 00:28:16,879
At and T blamed the incident on a

778
00:28:16,879 --> 00:28:19,261
recent breach at cloud service provider snowflake that's

779
00:28:19,261 --> 00:28:21,500
the second time you've bed today. Which has

780
00:28:21,500 --> 00:28:24,602
affected dozens of companies, including Ticket master, Sa

781
00:28:24,682 --> 00:28:27,387
Bank and Lending tree subsidiary quote wizard.

782
00:28:27,959 --> 00:28:30,033
At this point, it's unclear exactly who's is

783
00:28:30,033 --> 00:28:33,384
behind the snowflake breach. Man, the cybersecurity firm

784
00:28:33,384 --> 00:28:35,001
hired by snowflake to investigate

785
00:28:35,314 --> 00:28:38,268
said a financially motivated criminal group they identify

786
00:28:38,268 --> 00:28:40,503
as Un 5537

787
00:28:40,503 --> 00:28:41,381
was responsible.

788
00:28:41,780 --> 00:28:43,217
The type of data stolen an At and

789
00:28:43,297 --> 00:28:45,387
T's data breach is tipped referred to as

790
00:28:45,387 --> 00:28:48,020
metadata because it doesn't include the contents of

791
00:28:48,020 --> 00:28:50,892
calls or texts, but only information about those

792
00:28:50,892 --> 00:28:51,690
calls and texts.

793
00:28:52,342 --> 00:28:54,327
That, however doesn't mean that there are no

794
00:28:54,327 --> 00:28:56,948
risks for the victims of this breach. To

795
00:28:56,948 --> 00:28:58,537
says that this type of data makes it

796
00:28:58,537 --> 00:29:01,078
easier for cyber criminals to imp people you

797
00:29:01,078 --> 00:29:03,405
trust making it easier for them to craft

798
00:29:03,405 --> 00:29:06,198
more believable social engineering or phishing attacks against

799
00:29:06,278 --> 00:29:07,235
At and T customers.

800
00:29:08,273 --> 00:29:10,285
Another quote from Tow back, quote, The attackers

801
00:29:10,285 --> 00:29:12,285
know exactly who you're likely to pick up

802
00:29:12,285 --> 00:29:14,765
a call from, who you're likely to text

803
00:29:14,765 --> 00:29:15,265
back

804
00:29:15,565 --> 00:29:17,644
how long you communicate with that person and

805
00:29:17,644 --> 00:29:20,076
even potentially where you were located during that

806
00:29:20,214 --> 00:29:22,048
conversation due to the metadata that was stolen,

807
00:29:22,208 --> 00:29:24,760
unquote. Rune Sand, the founder of Granite, a

808
00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:26,913
firm that helps journalists and activist be more

809
00:29:26,913 --> 00:29:28,918
secure said the, quote, Even if you don't

810
00:29:28,918 --> 00:29:30,743
do anything important or sensitive,

811
00:29:31,298 --> 00:29:33,441
who you talk to when and how often

812
00:29:33,441 --> 00:29:35,425
is still personal to you and should remain

813
00:29:35,425 --> 00:29:36,377
private to you as well.

814
00:29:36,949 --> 00:29:39,023
I think everyone should be very angry about

815
00:29:39,023 --> 00:29:40,937
this and demand better from the tel codes.

816
00:29:41,415 --> 00:29:42,692
It's not enough to say, oh, by the

817
00:29:42,692 --> 00:29:44,686
way, your data was taken. We are sorry

818
00:29:44,686 --> 00:29:47,732
and taking this very seriously on quote, Sand

819
00:29:47,732 --> 00:29:50,127
vic says it's more concerning for higher risk

820
00:29:50,127 --> 00:29:52,681
individuals affected by the breach. Again, quote, some

821
00:29:52,681 --> 00:29:54,676
may consider changing their numbers and using a

822
00:29:54,676 --> 00:29:56,841
different provider, but it just really depends on

823
00:29:56,841 --> 00:29:59,861
the circumstances end unquote. Higher risk individuals can

824
00:29:59,861 --> 00:30:01,768
include those who have a reason to shield

825
00:30:01,768 --> 00:30:04,153
their identities such as survivors of domestic abuse.

826
00:30:04,884 --> 00:30:07,201
Sand vic also says that using encrypted chat

827
00:30:07,201 --> 00:30:09,358
apps like signal, which doesn't hold the type

828
00:30:09,358 --> 00:30:11,676
of metadata At and T just lost and

829
00:30:11,835 --> 00:30:12,335
Whatsapp

830
00:30:12,809 --> 00:30:14,730
could be better for security because these companies

831
00:30:14,730 --> 00:30:16,730
have a better track record of protecting user

832
00:30:16,730 --> 00:30:19,769
data. Jake Williams, a cybersecurity expert and former

833
00:30:20,089 --> 00:30:20,829
Nsa hacker

834
00:30:21,224 --> 00:30:22,978
told Tech crunch that the risk is greater

835
00:30:22,978 --> 00:30:25,531
for businesses and intelligence targets following the At

836
00:30:25,531 --> 00:30:27,684
and T breach. And this quote from Williams

837
00:30:27,684 --> 00:30:29,758
quote, threat actors can use this data to

838
00:30:29,758 --> 00:30:30,930
create patterns of life

839
00:30:31,607 --> 00:30:33,917
Call data records provide a wealth of value

840
00:30:33,917 --> 00:30:35,294
for intelligence, analysts

841
00:30:35,670 --> 00:30:38,275
unquote. Williams also said that it's possible hackers

842
00:30:38,394 --> 00:30:40,307
can combine this data with that of data

843
00:30:40,307 --> 00:30:43,416
breaches because, quote, previous At and T incidents

844
00:30:43,416 --> 00:30:46,819
mapped customer phone numbers to other identifying information

845
00:30:47,416 --> 00:30:50,600
simplifying weapon of the newly compromised data. In

846
00:30:50,600 --> 00:30:52,748
short, this data is a gold mine for

847
00:30:52,748 --> 00:30:55,136
understanding who talks to whom, which can for

848
00:30:55,136 --> 00:30:58,013
instance be used for developing human sources unquote.

849
00:30:58,569 --> 00:31:01,348
Okay. So that's that's obviously not for you

850
00:31:01,348 --> 00:31:02,222
and me likely.

851
00:31:02,857 --> 00:31:04,939
This is more spike kind of stuff. Or

852
00:31:04,939 --> 00:31:07,017
espionage kind of stuff. But nevertheless, this is

853
00:31:07,017 --> 00:31:07,656
private data.

854
00:31:08,296 --> 00:31:10,234
And for the few people whose,

855
00:31:10,693 --> 00:31:12,611
you know, location information may have also been

856
00:31:12,611 --> 00:31:14,070
leaked with the this metadata,

857
00:31:14,623 --> 00:31:16,055
That could be a real problem, but I

858
00:31:16,055 --> 00:31:17,646
also have to just agree with this sentiment

859
00:31:17,646 --> 00:31:19,498
that it it is just no longer

860
00:31:20,589 --> 00:31:22,909
acceptable for these companies who are leaking their

861
00:31:22,909 --> 00:31:24,420
data like a sieve to come out and

862
00:31:24,420 --> 00:31:26,963
say, oh, yeah. Hey. Sorry about that. We

863
00:31:26,963 --> 00:31:29,586
really really value your privacy here is a

864
00:31:29,586 --> 00:31:30,404
year of

865
00:31:30,873 --> 00:31:33,738
you know, credit monitoring. And that's it. We

866
00:31:33,738 --> 00:31:35,728
need to somehow be able to hold these

867
00:31:35,728 --> 00:31:36,228
companies

868
00:31:36,603 --> 00:31:37,103
accountable

869
00:31:37,478 --> 00:31:40,127
for this. Because until there's a real financial

870
00:31:40,597 --> 00:31:43,777
impact to them screwing up like this. They're

871
00:31:43,777 --> 00:31:45,447
not gonna take security seriously. Like, why would

872
00:31:45,447 --> 00:31:47,434
they? So again, what this is it's for

873
00:31:47,434 --> 00:31:49,263
a 6 month period, 2 years ago,

874
00:31:50,393 --> 00:31:52,008
this is a list of

875
00:31:52,783 --> 00:31:54,775
most of At and T's customers,

876
00:31:55,572 --> 00:31:57,086
text and call logs.

877
00:31:57,737 --> 00:32:00,828
That apparently have, you know, who was talking

878
00:32:00,828 --> 00:32:03,839
with whom, but not when or where in

879
00:32:03,839 --> 00:32:04,394
most cases.

880
00:32:05,044 --> 00:32:07,112
There's no content of the text messages, at

881
00:32:07,112 --> 00:32:09,339
least from what they're saying so far and

882
00:32:09,339 --> 00:32:11,169
definitely not contents of the of the phone

883
00:32:11,169 --> 00:32:13,576
calls. But still. It's a massive data breach

884
00:32:13,576 --> 00:32:15,651
and it's related... And it's related again to

885
00:32:15,651 --> 00:32:17,109
this snowflake breach, which

886
00:32:17,567 --> 00:32:20,122
just shows you how important these quote supply

887
00:32:20,122 --> 00:32:22,615
chain attacks are. A lot of these big

888
00:32:22,615 --> 00:32:23,115
companies

889
00:32:23,735 --> 00:32:26,615
rely on a very few subset of important

890
00:32:26,615 --> 00:32:28,430
tech companies that you've never heard of

891
00:32:28,947 --> 00:32:31,731
until until these breaches occur, and then it

892
00:32:31,731 --> 00:32:33,482
becomes a real problem. So we need much

893
00:32:33,482 --> 00:32:36,505
more accountability for these security failures? Or they're

894
00:32:36,505 --> 00:32:37,301
just gonna continue?

895
00:32:38,032 --> 00:32:40,020
Alright. Just a couple more new stories and

896
00:32:40,020 --> 00:32:42,247
then, a quick note about Proton, and then

897
00:32:42,247 --> 00:32:43,043
we'll get to my tip of the week.

898
00:32:43,679 --> 00:32:45,761
But these next 2 stories in particular are

899
00:32:45,761 --> 00:32:47,351
gonna be a little bit longer and take

900
00:32:47,351 --> 00:32:48,622
a little bit more analysis.

901
00:32:49,099 --> 00:32:50,767
So this first 1 is from stack diary,

902
00:32:50,926 --> 00:32:51,824
and it's about

903
00:32:53,092 --> 00:32:55,107
a that happened on

904
00:32:55,804 --> 00:32:59,609
social media between signal and a researcher or

905
00:32:59,968 --> 00:33:02,197
or research team, both are true,

906
00:33:03,152 --> 00:33:06,814
named My, YSK, and we've mentioned Mis before.

907
00:33:07,292 --> 00:33:07,792
And

908
00:33:08,736 --> 00:33:10,243
there's a lot of nuance to this, and

909
00:33:10,322 --> 00:33:10,798
I've got a lot,

910
00:33:11,671 --> 00:33:13,574
a lot of takeaways on this. But let

911
00:33:13,574 --> 00:33:14,843
me let me read this and and then

912
00:33:14,922 --> 00:33:15,556
I'll get to my take.

913
00:33:16,209 --> 00:33:19,023
Popular encrypted messaging app signals is facing criticism

914
00:33:19,161 --> 00:33:21,178
over a security issue in its desktop

915
00:33:21,635 --> 00:33:21,795
application.

916
00:33:22,593 --> 00:33:24,999
Researchers and app users are raised concerns about

917
00:33:24,999 --> 00:33:27,486
how the app handles encryption keys on desktop

918
00:33:27,542 --> 00:33:29,687
services against, so basically on your computer, which

919
00:33:29,687 --> 00:33:31,197
is different from your smartphone.

920
00:33:32,005 --> 00:33:35,174
According to cybersecurity researchers mask the desktop version

921
00:33:35,174 --> 00:33:38,423
of signal stores encryption keys, in plain text.

922
00:33:38,914 --> 00:33:41,389
An issue that potentially exposes users to data

923
00:33:41,389 --> 00:33:41,549
theft.

924
00:33:42,267 --> 00:33:44,982
Musk detailed the problems on Twitter, highlighting that

925
00:33:44,982 --> 00:33:47,696
signals desktop app stores local chat history encryption

926
00:33:47,696 --> 00:33:50,587
keys in a plain text file accessible by

927
00:33:50,587 --> 00:33:52,905
any process on the system. And a quick

928
00:33:52,905 --> 00:33:55,622
quote from Mis said, quote, end to end

929
00:33:55,622 --> 00:33:57,595
encryption is useless if any of the ends

930
00:33:57,794 --> 00:33:59,552
get compromised on quote, which is a point

931
00:33:59,552 --> 00:34:00,991
that I've often made on this program.

932
00:34:01,630 --> 00:34:03,627
According to My, signal users who link a

933
00:34:03,627 --> 00:34:05,865
desktop app may have a false sense of

934
00:34:05,865 --> 00:34:06,105
security.

935
00:34:06,837 --> 00:34:09,170
They created a simple python script that copied

936
00:34:09,227 --> 00:34:12,255
signals local storage directory on a Mac then

937
00:34:12,255 --> 00:34:14,724
transferred this data to a fresh macos installation

938
00:34:14,724 --> 00:34:15,601
in a virtual machine.

939
00:34:16,254 --> 00:34:18,668
By placing the copy data in the appropriate

940
00:34:18,726 --> 00:34:21,119
directory and installing signal on the virtual machine,

941
00:34:21,598 --> 00:34:25,107
they successfully restored their entire signal session including

942
00:34:25,107 --> 00:34:25,666
chat histories.

943
00:34:26,318 --> 00:34:28,550
The researchers were then able to run 3

944
00:34:28,550 --> 00:34:29,050
simultaneous

945
00:34:29,507 --> 00:34:32,695
active signal sessions on the original Mac, and

946
00:34:32,695 --> 00:34:34,231
iphone and the virtual machine

947
00:34:34,622 --> 00:34:37,429
without any warning from signal about the cloned

948
00:34:37,645 --> 00:34:40,429
session. Messages were delivered to either the Mac

949
00:34:40,429 --> 00:34:43,224
or Vm With the iphone receiving all messages.

950
00:34:43,779 --> 00:34:46,795
Importantly, the phone still only showed 1 linked

951
00:34:46,795 --> 00:34:50,381
device failing to detect the unauthorized set on

952
00:34:50,381 --> 00:34:53,082
the virtual machine. The ability to transfer chat

953
00:34:53,082 --> 00:34:54,988
histories like this is not limited to Macos.

954
00:34:55,226 --> 00:34:57,053
A user on Twitter showed that the encryption

955
00:34:57,053 --> 00:34:59,436
keys and signals configuration file on linux are

956
00:34:59,436 --> 00:35:01,522
set with permissions that make them readable by

957
00:35:01,522 --> 00:35:03,993
any process the local user runs. This means

958
00:35:03,993 --> 00:35:06,326
that while a key logger might require admin

959
00:35:06,544 --> 00:35:09,660
access to install, any app script with sufficient

960
00:35:09,660 --> 00:35:12,679
permissions could access these plain text keys. Naomi

961
00:35:12,758 --> 00:35:14,824
Brock, who we interviewed here just a couple

962
00:35:14,824 --> 00:35:17,500
of months ago, recommended un linking any desktop

963
00:35:17,619 --> 00:35:20,630
service from signal accounts. Rockwell explains, quote, a

964
00:35:20,630 --> 00:35:22,715
long known problem is that signal storage your

965
00:35:22,770 --> 00:35:24,434
decryption keys on desktop and a plain text

966
00:35:24,434 --> 00:35:24,672
file,

967
00:35:25,244 --> 00:35:27,402
not your key chain, making it accessible to

968
00:35:27,402 --> 00:35:27,881
any app,

969
00:35:28,680 --> 00:35:30,119
unquote, but then she adds if you trust

970
00:35:30,119 --> 00:35:32,356
your computer, you're fine, suggesting that users who

971
00:35:32,356 --> 00:35:34,842
are cautious about their security might want to

972
00:35:34,842 --> 00:35:37,307
reconsider using the desktop version of signal. Mixed

973
00:35:37,307 --> 00:35:39,932
analysis aligns with a 20 18 report.

974
00:35:40,584 --> 00:35:42,969
By bleep computer, which also highlighted the poor

975
00:35:42,969 --> 00:35:44,956
handling of encryption keys and signals desktop app.

976
00:35:45,672 --> 00:35:48,136
Signals approach to end to end encryption focuses

977
00:35:48,136 --> 00:35:49,567
on protecting data in transit.

978
00:35:50,059 --> 00:35:52,284
However, once the data reaches the user's device,

979
00:35:52,442 --> 00:35:55,223
the responsibility for security largely falls on the

980
00:35:55,223 --> 00:35:55,541
user.

981
00:35:56,177 --> 00:35:59,054
While standard, this practice assumes the user's devices

982
00:35:59,054 --> 00:36:02,482
are secure from Malicious software or unauthorized access,

983
00:36:02,641 --> 00:36:04,794
which may not always be the case. In

984
00:36:04,794 --> 00:36:07,446
20 18, in response to Bleep computers article

985
00:36:07,757 --> 00:36:09,818
Joshua Lu who works at signal said the

986
00:36:09,818 --> 00:36:12,195
following. The database key was never intended to

987
00:36:12,195 --> 00:36:14,652
be a secret. At rest encryption is not

988
00:36:14,652 --> 00:36:17,063
something that signal desktop is currently trying to

989
00:36:17,063 --> 00:36:19,860
provide or has ever claimed to provide. Full

990
00:36:19,860 --> 00:36:22,097
disc encryption can be enabled at the Os

991
00:36:22,097 --> 00:36:23,956
level on most desktop platforms.

992
00:36:24,989 --> 00:36:27,533
So considering this context, it's questionable why signal

993
00:36:27,533 --> 00:36:29,680
stores chat history and encrypted form at all,

994
00:36:30,316 --> 00:36:32,781
particularly since media attachments remain une unavailable, and

995
00:36:32,781 --> 00:36:34,053
that's a link to another article which I'll

996
00:36:34,053 --> 00:36:35,738
need to follow and I didn't realize that

997
00:36:35,738 --> 00:36:38,045
media attachments were encrypted either. It's clear the

998
00:36:38,045 --> 00:36:40,431
signal has not altered its approach to this

999
00:36:40,431 --> 00:36:42,261
issue. We were able to confirm that on

1000
00:36:42,261 --> 00:36:45,307
a windows system Signal continues to store a

1001
00:36:45,307 --> 00:36:47,224
key to the config dot Json file in

1002
00:36:47,224 --> 00:36:48,262
the app data directory.

1003
00:36:48,981 --> 00:36:51,151
I was following this on Twitter. And Meredith

1004
00:36:51,230 --> 00:36:52,742
Whitaker, who's the president of Signal,

1005
00:36:53,537 --> 00:36:55,230
who... I have a lot of respect for

1006
00:36:55,764 --> 00:36:56,639
responded this way.

1007
00:36:57,688 --> 00:37:00,230
There's been some chatter about signal desktop recently,

1008
00:37:00,389 --> 00:37:02,851
so let's clear the air. 3 points. 1.

1009
00:37:03,328 --> 00:37:06,029
The reported issues rely on an attacker already

1010
00:37:06,029 --> 00:37:08,673
having full access to your device, either physically,

1011
00:37:09,073 --> 00:37:11,471
through a malware compromise or ava via a

1012
00:37:11,471 --> 00:37:13,868
malicious application running on the same device. This

1013
00:37:13,868 --> 00:37:16,186
is not something that signal or any other

1014
00:37:16,186 --> 00:37:18,754
app can fully protect against nor do we

1015
00:37:18,754 --> 00:37:19,551
ever claim to.

1016
00:37:20,427 --> 00:37:22,978
2, we continue working to harden our desktop

1017
00:37:22,978 --> 00:37:26,023
build across supported operating systems and take advantage

1018
00:37:26,023 --> 00:37:28,900
of new platform capabilities as they emerge. Those

1019
00:37:28,900 --> 00:37:31,137
of you following our repo can follow this

1020
00:37:31,137 --> 00:37:32,735
work there, and I'll come back to that.

1021
00:37:33,545 --> 00:37:36,165
And 3, the posters who raised this issue

1022
00:37:36,165 --> 00:37:38,389
did so without contacting us directly.

1023
00:37:39,103 --> 00:37:41,183
Instead they went straight to social media and

1024
00:37:41,183 --> 00:37:44,210
some cases using inflammatory language and they dropped

1025
00:37:44,210 --> 00:37:46,839
these claims over a Us holiday weekend.

1026
00:37:47,317 --> 00:37:49,787
This is the opposite of responsible disclosure.

1027
00:37:50,519 --> 00:37:52,912
We ask those who are serious about security

1028
00:37:52,912 --> 00:37:55,704
and privacy to please engage us directly in

1029
00:37:55,704 --> 00:37:58,349
the future instead of resort first to online

1030
00:37:58,349 --> 00:38:01,211
claims that can confuse non experts and lead

1031
00:38:01,211 --> 00:38:04,470
people to make unsafe choices and develop inaccurate

1032
00:38:04,470 --> 00:38:06,617
mental models based on scary language.

1033
00:38:07,189 --> 00:38:10,305
We monitor security at signal dot org carefully

1034
00:38:10,305 --> 00:38:13,341
and respond to all legitimate reports. Alright. Back

1035
00:38:13,341 --> 00:38:15,934
to the article, the response to meredith statement

1036
00:38:15,993 --> 00:38:19,349
has varying opinions on social media. Some users

1037
00:38:19,349 --> 00:38:21,187
argue that the issue of storing encryption keys

1038
00:38:21,187 --> 00:38:23,205
in plain text has been known for years

1039
00:38:23,439 --> 00:38:25,594
with the initial report dating back to 20

1040
00:38:25,594 --> 00:38:27,748
18, which this article just talked about. The

1041
00:38:27,748 --> 00:38:29,823
idea being that signal has had ample time

1042
00:38:29,823 --> 00:38:30,860
to address the problem.

1043
00:38:31,434 --> 00:38:33,991
Others criticized the assertion that full device access

1044
00:38:33,991 --> 00:38:36,089
is necessary for exploiting this vulnerability,

1045
00:38:36,628 --> 00:38:38,786
pointing out that access to user level files

1046
00:38:38,786 --> 00:38:39,425
is sufficient.

1047
00:38:40,079 --> 00:38:42,151
It's a tough 1 to balance. The mixed

1048
00:38:42,151 --> 00:38:44,942
reactions highlight the tension between immediate security needs

1049
00:38:44,942 --> 00:38:47,971
and developers practical limitations in safeguard local data.

1050
00:38:48,784 --> 00:38:50,936
On April first, a pull request was made

1051
00:38:50,936 --> 00:38:53,248
on github. This is their code repo for

1052
00:38:53,248 --> 00:38:56,380
signal that would alleviate this problem by implementing

1053
00:38:56,518 --> 00:38:58,629
electrons safe storage Api

1054
00:38:59,167 --> 00:39:01,484
and on July tenth, which was just last

1055
00:39:01,484 --> 00:39:01,644
week.

1056
00:39:02,363 --> 00:39:05,400
1 of Signals developers finally accepted the safe

1057
00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:07,650
store a Api poor request on Github that

1058
00:39:07,650 --> 00:39:08,868
which should mean that that

1059
00:39:09,485 --> 00:39:10,464
solution that was

1060
00:39:10,842 --> 00:39:12,757
posted on April first, which kind of addresses

1061
00:39:12,757 --> 00:39:13,955
this problem I'll come back in a minute.

1062
00:39:14,528 --> 00:39:16,763
Has been accepted and will go into a

1063
00:39:16,763 --> 00:39:18,998
future signal release. It is possible that the

1064
00:39:18,998 --> 00:39:21,312
concern about signals desktop encryption key storage may

1065
00:39:21,312 --> 00:39:22,031
be overblown.

1066
00:39:22,683 --> 00:39:24,666
1 user on Twitter contend that the current

1067
00:39:24,666 --> 00:39:27,284
setup is, quote, best for the masses, not

1068
00:39:27,284 --> 00:39:29,108
the extremely security conscious, quote.

1069
00:39:29,837 --> 00:39:32,136
This v viewpoint suggests that users highly concerned

1070
00:39:32,136 --> 00:39:35,252
about potential 0 day exploits or arbitrary code

1071
00:39:35,387 --> 00:39:38,652
execution should consider more stream measures such as

1072
00:39:38,652 --> 00:39:41,612
setting message expiration timers to very short intervals

1073
00:39:41,746 --> 00:39:43,888
or avoiding message retention altogether.

1074
00:39:44,539 --> 00:39:46,297
And that's referring to a signal feature where

1075
00:39:46,297 --> 00:39:47,836
you could actually have your messages

1076
00:39:48,454 --> 00:39:50,372
automatically deleted over a certain period of time

1077
00:39:50,372 --> 00:39:51,731
and you could do that per user or

1078
00:39:51,731 --> 00:39:52,050
per group.

1079
00:39:52,702 --> 00:39:54,451
And that user added, quote, even if you

1080
00:39:54,451 --> 00:39:57,074
install as root and use Su to open

1081
00:39:57,074 --> 00:39:58,448
it, there are still privilege

1082
00:39:58,822 --> 00:40:01,579
escalation 0 days, and I'm sure you don't

1083
00:40:01,699 --> 00:40:03,443
suspect to the source and check some of

1084
00:40:03,443 --> 00:40:06,138
all binaries areas you execute as root. This

1085
00:40:06,138 --> 00:40:07,565
isn't as big of an issue as it's

1086
00:40:07,565 --> 00:40:08,833
made out to be here unquote.

1087
00:40:09,483 --> 00:40:11,791
In a post on Mastodon, The researchers noted

1088
00:40:11,791 --> 00:40:14,099
that this practice is common among many applications.

1089
00:40:14,497 --> 00:40:17,681
They cited Whatsapp and Apple's imessage as examples.

1090
00:40:18,237 --> 00:40:19,948
Whatsapp apps chat context

1091
00:40:20,406 --> 00:40:23,599
can be accessed by any other launched application

1092
00:40:23,599 --> 00:40:24,237
without restriction.

1093
00:40:24,955 --> 00:40:27,291
I imessage, however, stores data in a sandbox

1094
00:40:27,844 --> 00:40:28,344
preventing

1095
00:40:28,723 --> 00:40:32,000
unauthorized processes from accessing it. In both cases,

1096
00:40:32,320 --> 00:40:34,637
attackers must first gain access to the local

1097
00:40:34,637 --> 00:40:37,847
user account to reach such application data. Once

1098
00:40:37,847 --> 00:40:40,473
this access is obtained, other data is typically

1099
00:40:40,473 --> 00:40:43,498
also vulnerable including locally stored documents that are

1100
00:40:43,498 --> 00:40:46,601
usually une encrypted unless users take specific measures.

1101
00:40:47,255 --> 00:40:48,934
The researchers point out that the level of

1102
00:40:48,934 --> 00:40:51,255
protection needed for chat content compared to other

1103
00:40:51,255 --> 00:40:54,215
locally stored data may vary depending on the

1104
00:40:54,215 --> 00:40:54,590
specific

1105
00:40:55,108 --> 00:40:55,267
situation.

1106
00:40:56,304 --> 00:40:57,123
Okay. So

1107
00:40:57,659 --> 00:40:58,934
there's kind of a lot to unpack here.

1108
00:40:59,413 --> 00:41:02,362
I've actually been debating this at length with

1109
00:41:02,362 --> 00:41:03,135
some of my

1110
00:41:03,494 --> 00:41:05,487
some of my privacy peeps. And I think

1111
00:41:05,487 --> 00:41:07,082
there's a lot of blame to go around

1112
00:41:07,082 --> 00:41:07,901
here. And

1113
00:41:08,278 --> 00:41:11,229
first of all, I... Yes. This was reported

1114
00:41:11,229 --> 00:41:12,106
in 20 18.

1115
00:41:12,919 --> 00:41:15,317
So it is a known issue. So in

1116
00:41:15,317 --> 00:41:17,155
that sense, Mis was basically saying,

1117
00:41:17,954 --> 00:41:19,472
look, there's no reason to go through this

1118
00:41:19,472 --> 00:41:21,710
private disclosure process because you've known about this

1119
00:41:21,710 --> 00:41:22,110
for years.

1120
00:41:22,764 --> 00:41:25,800
However, that said, the way it was presented

1121
00:41:25,800 --> 00:41:26,918
on social media was,

1122
00:41:28,037 --> 00:41:29,475
I think a little bit alarm.

1123
00:41:30,128 --> 00:41:31,642
And there is something to be said for

1124
00:41:31,642 --> 00:41:34,749
the fact that it's really, really hard to

1125
00:41:34,749 --> 00:41:35,249
secure

1126
00:41:35,705 --> 00:41:37,639
local data from malware

1127
00:41:38,016 --> 00:41:40,422
running on that machine because anything you can

1128
00:41:40,422 --> 00:41:40,661
do,

1129
00:41:41,460 --> 00:41:43,614
that Malware can do. And sometimes that Malware

1130
00:41:43,614 --> 00:41:45,051
can even do more. If you're if you

1131
00:41:45,051 --> 00:41:47,445
have a non administrator account as your normal

1132
00:41:47,445 --> 00:41:50,090
account, there are bugs in software which allow

1133
00:41:50,250 --> 00:41:51,387
Malware to gain

1134
00:41:51,763 --> 00:41:52,639
higher privileges.

1135
00:41:53,117 --> 00:41:55,427
And so, basically, I think signals perspective on

1136
00:41:55,427 --> 00:41:57,673
this, which appears to match that of you

1137
00:41:57,673 --> 00:41:58,492
know, other

1138
00:41:59,428 --> 00:42:01,661
applications that are privacy and security oriented is

1139
00:42:01,661 --> 00:42:03,815
that, look, if you manage to get malware

1140
00:42:03,815 --> 00:42:06,447
running on this system, if the endpoint itself

1141
00:42:06,447 --> 00:42:07,165
is compromised,

1142
00:42:07,818 --> 00:42:09,096
then there's not a whole lot we can

1143
00:42:09,096 --> 00:42:11,592
do. And so, therefore, we're not gonna bother

1144
00:42:11,810 --> 00:42:12,209
doing it.

1145
00:42:13,007 --> 00:42:15,402
They count on things like, you know, encrypting

1146
00:42:15,402 --> 00:42:17,809
your entire hard drive. To prevent somebody's from,

1147
00:42:17,968 --> 00:42:20,298
like, stealing your laptop or stealing your smartphone

1148
00:42:20,912 --> 00:42:23,220
and finding the keys and decrypt your stuff

1149
00:42:23,220 --> 00:42:24,494
because they won't be able to decrypt anything

1150
00:42:24,494 --> 00:42:25,926
because all the entire hard drives is encrypted.

1151
00:42:26,419 --> 00:42:29,234
But if you're malware running on that system

1152
00:42:29,692 --> 00:42:32,188
as the the logged in user or even

1153
00:42:32,326 --> 00:42:34,641
somebody with higher privilege, it's really hard to

1154
00:42:34,641 --> 00:42:37,369
hide stuff. From from that malware because they

1155
00:42:37,369 --> 00:42:38,885
have the same permissions you do, if you

1156
00:42:38,885 --> 00:42:40,321
can read your messages, they can read your

1157
00:42:40,321 --> 00:42:40,640
messages.

1158
00:42:41,199 --> 00:42:43,047
Even if the stuff was encrypted, that the

1159
00:42:43,047 --> 00:42:44,711
the malware may be able to launch the

1160
00:42:44,711 --> 00:42:46,772
app, maybe even behind the scenes without it

1161
00:42:46,772 --> 00:42:48,595
coming up and you're seeing it, you know,

1162
00:42:48,833 --> 00:42:49,887
launch it in an immediately

1163
00:42:50,433 --> 00:42:51,862
put it in your dock or something like

1164
00:42:51,862 --> 00:42:54,085
that, and then scroll through this stuff and

1165
00:42:54,085 --> 00:42:54,958
and screen grab it.

1166
00:42:55,672 --> 00:42:56,784
I mean, you know, there's a lot of

1167
00:42:56,784 --> 00:42:58,705
things you can do as now we're running

1168
00:42:58,705 --> 00:43:00,613
on a system that's very hard to protect

1169
00:43:00,613 --> 00:43:03,396
against. Okay. So so there's that. But I

1170
00:43:03,396 --> 00:43:06,257
also think that Meredith response was a little

1171
00:43:06,257 --> 00:43:08,981
bit tone deaf. I think I think you

1172
00:43:08,981 --> 00:43:10,975
could say all you on about some random

1173
00:43:10,975 --> 00:43:13,688
researcher, and this is, honestly, somebody who's done

1174
00:43:13,688 --> 00:43:15,458
some really good work in the past. And

1175
00:43:15,458 --> 00:43:16,356
you can kinda

1176
00:43:16,969 --> 00:43:19,118
complain about the way they approach this problem,

1177
00:43:19,277 --> 00:43:20,789
and I think some of those complaints could

1178
00:43:20,789 --> 00:43:22,300
be valid. That doesn't mean you have to

1179
00:43:22,300 --> 00:43:23,994
do the same thing. I I personally

1180
00:43:24,385 --> 00:43:26,324
if I were and Meredith position

1181
00:43:26,625 --> 00:43:28,625
would have been a little bit more diplomatic

1182
00:43:28,625 --> 00:43:29,505
about it than she was,

1183
00:43:30,065 --> 00:43:32,385
maybe Would've have reached out to them directly

1184
00:43:32,385 --> 00:43:34,551
and privately. You know, basically do the thing

1185
00:43:34,551 --> 00:43:36,540
that you wanted them to do with you.

1186
00:43:37,017 --> 00:43:39,403
And also, there are mitigation that can be

1187
00:43:39,403 --> 00:43:41,010
used. In fact, talked about it in this

1188
00:43:41,010 --> 00:43:43,180
article. There there are ways to

1189
00:43:43,715 --> 00:43:46,579
sandbox data so that, for example,

1190
00:43:47,056 --> 00:43:49,068
1 application running as the user

1191
00:43:49,379 --> 00:43:51,693
can't access data from another application even for

1192
00:43:51,693 --> 00:43:54,407
that same user. This is commonly done on

1193
00:43:54,407 --> 00:43:56,641
smartphones now. In fact, a lot of the

1194
00:43:56,641 --> 00:43:58,329
protections that are on smartphones phones really should

1195
00:43:58,329 --> 00:44:00,717
be migrated to desktop computers. They're pretty good.

1196
00:44:01,275 --> 00:44:02,787
So there are things that can be done.

1197
00:44:02,946 --> 00:44:05,197
There are mitigation strategies. There are

1198
00:44:05,588 --> 00:44:07,659
some steps that could make this better that

1199
00:44:07,738 --> 00:44:09,411
I think they should do. And it actually

1200
00:44:09,411 --> 00:44:11,242
kinda sounds like they might be doing them.

1201
00:44:11,561 --> 00:44:14,442
So after complaining after complaining about it, and

1202
00:44:14,442 --> 00:44:17,248
complaining about the way it was presented and

1203
00:44:17,861 --> 00:44:20,088
something that was brought up 5 or 6

1204
00:44:20,088 --> 00:44:22,155
years ago that they're finally just now addressing.

1205
00:44:22,314 --> 00:44:24,239
They are addressing it, And they're basically taking

1206
00:44:24,239 --> 00:44:26,473
this person's advice. Now it is possible. I

1207
00:44:26,473 --> 00:44:28,068
mean, I'm a software I've seen this happen.

1208
00:44:28,228 --> 00:44:30,702
It's possible for software companies of have any

1209
00:44:30,702 --> 00:44:30,941
size.

1210
00:44:31,673 --> 00:44:32,950
For things like this to just slip through

1211
00:44:32,950 --> 00:44:34,944
the cracks. Mistakes are made, people are human.

1212
00:44:35,502 --> 00:44:37,177
When this was first brought up in 20

1213
00:44:37,177 --> 00:44:39,171
18, some of these stand sandbox boxing and

1214
00:44:39,171 --> 00:44:42,219
other integration strategies probably didn't exist. And that

1215
00:44:42,219 --> 00:44:44,616
not trying to excuse this. Signal needs to

1216
00:44:44,616 --> 00:44:46,374
do better. They are the gold standard for

1217
00:44:46,374 --> 00:44:47,813
this as far as I'm concerned, I will

1218
00:44:47,813 --> 00:44:50,290
still recommend them, especially just for regular people

1219
00:44:50,290 --> 00:44:52,217
like you and me. But they need to

1220
00:44:52,217 --> 00:44:54,682
be making their stuff better constantly, and they

1221
00:44:54,682 --> 00:44:57,625
need to be receptive and responsive to criticism

1222
00:44:57,625 --> 00:44:59,692
like this, even when it's not done in,

1223
00:44:59,772 --> 00:45:00,726
you know, the best way.

1224
00:45:01,378 --> 00:45:03,365
So if you are in a high risk

1225
00:45:03,365 --> 00:45:06,092
category and you're using signal as a desktop

1226
00:45:06,149 --> 00:45:07,501
app. Well, first of all, you could... First

1227
00:45:07,501 --> 00:45:08,852
thing you could do is not use it

1228
00:45:08,852 --> 00:45:10,363
as a desktop app anymore, just use it

1229
00:45:10,363 --> 00:45:10,974
under Smartphone

1230
00:45:11,412 --> 00:45:12,684
But if you do use it under on

1231
00:45:12,684 --> 00:45:13,956
your desktop app and you link it to

1232
00:45:13,956 --> 00:45:16,104
your account, you might wanna set, you know,

1233
00:45:16,263 --> 00:45:18,410
just pairing messages so that the data is

1234
00:45:18,410 --> 00:45:18,648
deleted,

1235
00:45:19,841 --> 00:45:20,659
consistent basis

1236
00:45:21,365 --> 00:45:22,713
Obviously, you wanna make sure that your hard

1237
00:45:22,713 --> 00:45:24,538
drive is encrypted. You wanna be using the

1238
00:45:24,538 --> 00:45:26,123
latest version of signal because it sounds like

1239
00:45:26,123 --> 00:45:28,106
they might actually be putting some mitigation strategies

1240
00:45:28,106 --> 00:45:30,114
in soon. But otherwise, you need to follow

1241
00:45:30,114 --> 00:45:31,414
some very careful

1242
00:45:31,954 --> 00:45:33,875
Internet hygiene and computer hygiene to make sure

1243
00:45:33,875 --> 00:45:35,715
that you don't get infected because once you

1244
00:45:35,715 --> 00:45:36,755
get malware in your system,

1245
00:45:37,649 --> 00:45:39,565
you know, it's really, really hard to protect

1246
00:45:39,565 --> 00:45:41,800
it. Signal should do what they can, but

1247
00:45:41,959 --> 00:45:44,434
I don't consider it signals fault. If you

1248
00:45:44,434 --> 00:45:45,870
manage to get it infected by something else,

1249
00:45:46,030 --> 00:45:48,120
they there's a lot of different ways they

1250
00:45:48,120 --> 00:45:49,397
can try to get it your signal data.

1251
00:45:49,956 --> 00:45:52,350
No matter what protections signal tries to put

1252
00:45:52,350 --> 00:45:54,719
on it. End day end encryption is exactly

1253
00:45:55,077 --> 00:45:57,694
between the 2 endpoints, it is extremely secure.

1254
00:45:58,091 --> 00:46:00,391
But at the endpoints, by necessity, it needs

1255
00:46:00,391 --> 00:46:02,394
to be uni uninterrupted, so that the people

1256
00:46:02,394 --> 00:46:04,632
at either end could actually, you know, write

1257
00:46:04,632 --> 00:46:05,751
and read the messages.

1258
00:46:06,230 --> 00:46:08,068
And that means that if the endpoint is

1259
00:46:08,068 --> 00:46:08,568
compromised,

1260
00:46:09,107 --> 00:46:11,505
then that data is potentially vulnerable.

1261
00:46:11,918 --> 00:46:13,532
So act accordingly and

1262
00:46:14,305 --> 00:46:17,032
bake that into your threat models and

1263
00:46:17,487 --> 00:46:18,282
security strategies.

1264
00:46:18,934 --> 00:46:20,695
Oh, 1 more quick comment about this. The

1265
00:46:20,695 --> 00:46:22,934
whole thing about cl, the messages and taking

1266
00:46:22,934 --> 00:46:25,255
them to a different machine and having signaled

1267
00:46:25,255 --> 00:46:26,375
not call that out.

1268
00:46:27,502 --> 00:46:28,931
I would hope that signal would be able

1269
00:46:28,931 --> 00:46:30,463
to... If they haven't

1270
00:46:30,914 --> 00:46:31,788
built this in already,

1271
00:46:32,661 --> 00:46:34,803
defeat this particular situation. I mean, this is

1272
00:46:34,803 --> 00:46:37,277
another tricky thing. Like, let's say, I'm trying

1273
00:46:37,277 --> 00:46:38,704
to spy on somebody. I know that you

1274
00:46:38,704 --> 00:46:39,021
signal.

1275
00:46:39,735 --> 00:46:41,162
I managed to get access to the device

1276
00:46:41,162 --> 00:46:42,669
either through malware directly.

1277
00:46:43,318 --> 00:46:45,224
Getting into their account on the device, and

1278
00:46:45,382 --> 00:46:47,764
I do this. I copy off all of

1279
00:46:47,764 --> 00:46:49,431
their signal data. Okay. Great. I've got that.

1280
00:46:49,670 --> 00:46:50,805
But maybe they have

1281
00:46:51,114 --> 00:46:53,110
you know, the message is being deleted right

1282
00:46:53,110 --> 00:46:55,185
away or the on a very short term

1283
00:46:55,185 --> 00:46:57,101
basis. If I... Still... If I can copy

1284
00:46:57,101 --> 00:46:59,416
this data off of that machine to another

1285
00:46:59,416 --> 00:46:59,735
machine,

1286
00:47:00,308 --> 00:47:01,735
All of a sudden, that other machine is

1287
00:47:01,735 --> 00:47:04,376
basically a new signal client for that user

1288
00:47:04,590 --> 00:47:06,811
automatically logged in and good to go, and

1289
00:47:06,811 --> 00:47:08,731
now I can, you know, watch the messages

1290
00:47:08,731 --> 00:47:10,083
that go back and forth on that account.

1291
00:47:10,560 --> 00:47:13,185
And signal wouldn't call that out as a

1292
00:47:13,185 --> 00:47:14,776
new device. Like, hey, that's weird.

1293
00:47:15,430 --> 00:47:17,190
You know, maybe there's some ids buried in

1294
00:47:17,190 --> 00:47:18,710
there, but I'm like, I'm seeing this Id

1295
00:47:18,710 --> 00:47:20,949
twice. That's that's strange. I should call that

1296
00:47:20,949 --> 00:47:22,630
out. So that's something else is signal I

1297
00:47:22,630 --> 00:47:23,910
think needs to address here.

1298
00:47:24,804 --> 00:47:26,641
Alright. 1 more kind of controversial story here,

1299
00:47:26,801 --> 00:47:28,559
and then we'll, get to some lighter fare.

1300
00:47:29,438 --> 00:47:31,275
And and this is directly from Mozilla.

1301
00:47:31,849 --> 00:47:33,203
It's part of a press release they just

1302
00:47:33,203 --> 00:47:35,035
put out, and it's something that I either

1303
00:47:35,035 --> 00:47:37,425
mister or forgot about, but it's something they're

1304
00:47:37,425 --> 00:47:38,960
calling privacy preserving

1305
00:47:39,655 --> 00:47:43,168
attribution, and it's about a supposedly privacy preserving

1306
00:47:43,168 --> 00:47:44,304
way to do

1307
00:47:44,915 --> 00:47:45,415
track

1308
00:47:46,582 --> 00:47:48,487
ads. So anyway, let me let me read

1309
00:47:48,487 --> 00:47:49,282
this and I'll give a comment.

1310
00:47:50,648 --> 00:47:53,842
Privacy preserving attribution is an experimental feature in

1311
00:47:54,001 --> 00:47:56,556
Firefox version 01:28, which by the way just

1312
00:47:56,556 --> 00:47:58,950
came out. Mozilla is prototyping this feature in

1313
00:47:58,950 --> 00:48:01,684
order to form an emerging web standard designed

1314
00:48:01,684 --> 00:48:04,505
to help sites understand how their ads perform

1315
00:48:04,885 --> 00:48:08,019
without collecting data about individual people. By offering

1316
00:48:08,019 --> 00:48:10,420
sites a non invasive alternative to cross site

1317
00:48:10,420 --> 00:48:13,059
tracking, we hope to achieve a significant reduction

1318
00:48:13,059 --> 00:48:14,900
in this harmful practice across the web.

1319
00:48:15,871 --> 00:48:18,337
Attribution is how advertisers learn whether their advertising

1320
00:48:18,337 --> 00:48:18,576
works.

1321
00:48:19,610 --> 00:48:21,837
Attribution measures how many people saw an add

1322
00:48:21,837 --> 00:48:23,610
on a web site, and then later visited

1323
00:48:23,610 --> 00:48:26,410
the advertisers website to do something the advertiser

1324
00:48:26,410 --> 00:48:29,289
cared about. For example, maybe someone sees ad

1325
00:48:29,289 --> 00:48:31,223
for a sale on a product, and then

1326
00:48:31,223 --> 00:48:31,941
buys that product.

1327
00:48:32,818 --> 00:48:35,052
Attribution counts how many people do that.

1328
00:48:36,090 --> 00:48:37,765
Attribution is very important to advertisers.

1329
00:48:38,340 --> 00:48:40,519
Sadly, tracking is the only way to perform

1330
00:48:40,660 --> 00:48:42,260
attribution without help from the browser.

1331
00:48:42,980 --> 00:48:45,434
Tracking is terrible for privacy because it gives

1332
00:48:45,554 --> 00:48:47,949
it is detailed information about what you do

1333
00:48:47,949 --> 00:48:50,981
online. While Firefox includes many privacy protections that

1334
00:48:50,981 --> 00:48:52,577
make it more difficult for sites to track

1335
00:48:52,577 --> 00:48:53,215
you online,

1336
00:48:53,789 --> 00:48:57,469
like enhanced tracking protection, total cookie protection, query

1337
00:48:57,469 --> 00:48:59,150
parameter stripping and many other measures,

1338
00:48:59,710 --> 00:49:02,122
there's a huge incentive for sites to find

1339
00:49:02,122 --> 00:49:04,534
ways around these in order to perform

1340
00:49:04,911 --> 00:49:06,983
attribution. Our hope is that if we develop

1341
00:49:06,983 --> 00:49:10,103
a good attribution solution, it will offer a

1342
00:49:10,103 --> 00:49:13,203
real alternative to more objection practices like tracking.

1343
00:49:13,680 --> 00:49:15,429
We are currently testing this approach to see

1344
00:49:15,429 --> 00:49:17,576
if it can provide advertisers with the information

1345
00:49:17,576 --> 00:49:18,291
they're looking for.

1346
00:49:19,182 --> 00:49:22,773
P doesn't involve websites tracking you. Instead, your

1347
00:49:22,773 --> 00:49:26,179
browser is in control. This means strong privacy

1348
00:49:26,299 --> 00:49:29,010
safeguards including the option to not participate, and

1349
00:49:29,090 --> 00:49:30,605
I'll come back to that important point in

1350
00:49:30,605 --> 00:49:33,555
a second. P is enabled in Firefox starting

1351
00:49:33,555 --> 00:49:34,911
in version 01:28.

1352
00:49:35,563 --> 00:49:37,318
A small number of sites are going to

1353
00:49:37,318 --> 00:49:39,891
test this and provide feedback to inform our

1354
00:49:40,188 --> 00:49:42,500
standardization plans and help us understand if this

1355
00:49:42,500 --> 00:49:43,936
is likely to gain traction.

1356
00:49:44,507 --> 00:49:46,972
P can be disabled in Firefox settings.

1357
00:49:47,528 --> 00:49:49,992
Firefox provides an easy simple option to disable

1358
00:49:49,992 --> 00:49:53,193
the privacy preserving attribution feature if users prefer

1359
00:49:53,193 --> 00:49:54,231
not to participate.

1360
00:49:54,871 --> 00:49:56,708
Websites will not know if you chose to

1361
00:49:56,708 --> 00:49:58,786
opt out in this way. To opt out

1362
00:49:58,786 --> 00:50:00,236
do the following. And the menu bar at

1363
00:50:00,236 --> 00:50:02,250
the top of the screen, click Firefox and

1364
00:50:02,307 --> 00:50:03,923
select preferences or settings

1365
00:50:04,379 --> 00:50:06,530
depending on your Macos version in the privacy

1366
00:50:06,530 --> 00:50:09,913
and security panel, find the website advertising preferences

1367
00:50:10,048 --> 00:50:13,300
section and uncheck the box labeled allow websites

1368
00:50:13,300 --> 00:50:15,918
to perform privacy preserving ad measurements.

1369
00:50:16,648 --> 00:50:18,637
So the press release was longer than that,

1370
00:50:18,716 --> 00:50:20,545
and they get into some other stuff. It

1371
00:50:20,545 --> 00:50:21,818
also provides a link to

1372
00:50:22,375 --> 00:50:24,625
a much more detailed and technical

1373
00:50:25,492 --> 00:50:27,879
breakdown of what this P is actually doing

1374
00:50:27,879 --> 00:50:29,869
under the covers, which I did read through

1375
00:50:29,869 --> 00:50:31,380
and so I will give you my take

1376
00:50:31,380 --> 00:50:32,255
on what I found there.

1377
00:50:33,145 --> 00:50:34,654
First of all, let's state the obvious.

1378
00:50:35,608 --> 00:50:38,331
The way the the the web works today

1379
00:50:38,626 --> 00:50:40,794
is we have an ad based

1380
00:50:41,265 --> 00:50:44,465
quote unquote, free model where, you know, a

1381
00:50:44,465 --> 00:50:47,025
lot of sites don't charge you, and instead

1382
00:50:47,025 --> 00:50:49,184
sell ad space on their sites and make

1383
00:50:49,184 --> 00:50:51,757
money that way. And these ad companies, Google

1384
00:50:51,757 --> 00:50:53,516
and Facebook chief among them, But there are

1385
00:50:53,516 --> 00:50:54,415
there are others

1386
00:50:55,034 --> 00:50:56,713
really want to be able to go back

1387
00:50:56,713 --> 00:50:59,030
to the people advertising with them to give

1388
00:50:59,030 --> 00:51:01,833
them much information as possible about how effective

1389
00:51:01,833 --> 00:51:04,461
their ads are. That is this attribution thing

1390
00:51:04,461 --> 00:51:06,612
that we're talking about. And there's this notion

1391
00:51:06,612 --> 00:51:07,112
of

1392
00:51:07,487 --> 00:51:07,806
impressions,

1393
00:51:08,379 --> 00:51:11,031
and conversions. So an ad impression

1394
00:51:11,568 --> 00:51:12,387
is when

1395
00:51:12,843 --> 00:51:15,713
they can verify that somebody saw 1 of

1396
00:51:15,713 --> 00:51:16,112
your ads.

1397
00:51:17,161 --> 00:51:19,463
Sometimes it also means that they actually clicked

1398
00:51:19,463 --> 00:51:21,210
on 1 of your ads. It's that's it's

1399
00:51:21,210 --> 00:51:23,036
a 2 part thing, But those those are

1400
00:51:23,036 --> 00:51:25,278
ad impressions. Those are Those are the gotcha.

1401
00:51:25,438 --> 00:51:28,074
That is they successfully got their advertisement in

1402
00:51:28,074 --> 00:51:30,072
front of you. And then a conversion is

1403
00:51:30,072 --> 00:51:31,371
that you actually then

1404
00:51:31,922 --> 00:51:33,989
did something based on that ad that they

1405
00:51:33,989 --> 00:51:36,056
wanted you to do. And what that is

1406
00:51:36,056 --> 00:51:37,805
kinda varies depending on what they wanna measure.

1407
00:51:37,964 --> 00:51:40,110
Sometimes it's it's sufficient that you just got

1408
00:51:40,110 --> 00:51:42,588
to their website. Other times, they actually want

1409
00:51:42,588 --> 00:51:44,573
to know that you bought something from their

1410
00:51:44,573 --> 00:51:47,773
website. That is called a conversion. And since

1411
00:51:47,987 --> 00:51:50,947
these things often happen at different times, and

1412
00:51:50,947 --> 00:51:52,062
maybe even different devices,

1413
00:51:52,779 --> 00:51:55,249
they really have a hard time linking those

1414
00:51:55,249 --> 00:51:57,980
2 things together. But they desperately wanna do

1415
00:51:57,980 --> 00:51:58,139
so.

1416
00:51:58,859 --> 00:52:00,859
And and of course, the the classic quote

1417
00:52:00,859 --> 00:52:02,139
here, and I looked this up because I

1418
00:52:02,139 --> 00:52:02,940
wanted to know who said it.

1419
00:52:03,659 --> 00:52:05,119
Was by a guy named John Wanna,

1420
00:52:05,673 --> 00:52:07,658
and he is the creator of what would

1421
00:52:07,658 --> 00:52:09,643
eventually become Macy's, and he said this, like,

1422
00:52:09,723 --> 00:52:11,311
a hunt over a hundred years ago. And

1423
00:52:11,311 --> 00:52:13,296
the quote is half the money I spend

1424
00:52:13,296 --> 00:52:15,778
on advertising is wasted. The trouble is, I

1425
00:52:15,778 --> 00:52:17,697
don't know which half. That is what this

1426
00:52:17,697 --> 00:52:20,173
is trying to address. These people who are

1427
00:52:20,173 --> 00:52:21,532
trying to advertise their products and try to

1428
00:52:21,532 --> 00:52:23,050
get people to then go buy their products.

1429
00:52:24,103 --> 00:52:25,936
Need some way to know if the ads

1430
00:52:25,936 --> 00:52:28,487
they're placing are are working because, you know,

1431
00:52:28,567 --> 00:52:30,639
if they if they put their ad in

1432
00:52:30,639 --> 00:52:31,516
20 different places,

1433
00:52:32,407 --> 00:52:34,077
And only 2 of those places are actually

1434
00:52:34,077 --> 00:52:35,032
bringing in customers,

1435
00:52:35,509 --> 00:52:37,259
then they wanna focus their advertising on those

1436
00:52:37,259 --> 00:52:38,532
2 places and not on the others.

1437
00:52:39,184 --> 00:52:41,741
So this whole attribution thing is crucial for

1438
00:52:41,741 --> 00:52:42,940
somebody who's advertising.

1439
00:52:43,499 --> 00:52:45,417
And again, the way this really works is

1440
00:52:45,417 --> 00:52:47,255
there's people who want to sell products and

1441
00:52:47,255 --> 00:52:49,260
there's places that need to sell advertising space.

1442
00:52:49,419 --> 00:52:51,510
And then there's companies like Google who match

1443
00:52:51,567 --> 00:52:54,644
in between and put those together and and

1444
00:52:54,764 --> 00:52:56,920
know, take money from companies that wanna advertise

1445
00:52:56,920 --> 00:52:58,357
and then give that money to the websites

1446
00:52:58,357 --> 00:53:01,071
when they show ads and convert Yada. That's

1447
00:53:01,071 --> 00:53:02,907
the whole ad marketing thing that's happening here.

1448
00:53:03,465 --> 00:53:03,965
Now

1449
00:53:05,231 --> 00:53:07,216
I was kinda surprised as that Firefox was

1450
00:53:07,216 --> 00:53:10,552
doing this because Firefox is very privacy oriented

1451
00:53:10,552 --> 00:53:11,585
and the the threes reason in that I,

1452
00:53:11,823 --> 00:53:14,940
you know, often recommend them as my favorite

1453
00:53:14,940 --> 00:53:16,293
browser. It's the 1 I use on all

1454
00:53:16,293 --> 00:53:18,283
my devices. And they have gone to great

1455
00:53:18,283 --> 00:53:20,034
lengths to prevent this web tracking, and they...

1456
00:53:20,193 --> 00:53:21,546
Some of their technology is very good at

1457
00:53:21,546 --> 00:53:23,654
it. But these companies are so desperate

1458
00:53:24,110 --> 00:53:26,283
to do this attribution that they

1459
00:53:26,978 --> 00:53:28,811
are it's this constant cat and mouse game

1460
00:53:28,811 --> 00:53:30,404
where they're trying to work around all these

1461
00:53:30,404 --> 00:53:33,454
privacy protections to track you anyway. Now I

1462
00:53:33,454 --> 00:53:35,135
read through the technical diet details of this,

1463
00:53:35,215 --> 00:53:35,855
and it's actually...

1464
00:53:36,494 --> 00:53:37,695
It's certainly in spirit,

1465
00:53:38,335 --> 00:53:40,179
very similar to what Google is trying to

1466
00:53:40,179 --> 00:53:42,006
do with their privacy sandbox and their topics

1467
00:53:42,244 --> 00:53:44,651
Api. They're trying to

1468
00:53:45,740 --> 00:53:48,940
learn more about you in a way that

1469
00:53:48,940 --> 00:53:49,440
doesn't

1470
00:53:50,375 --> 00:53:54,123
impact any particular person's privacy. They're trying to

1471
00:53:54,123 --> 00:53:55,877
basically do a lot of this stuff in

1472
00:53:55,877 --> 00:53:56,356
aggregate.

1473
00:53:56,768 --> 00:53:58,434
And that is what Mozilla is trying to

1474
00:53:58,434 --> 00:54:00,497
do here as well. When I looked into

1475
00:54:00,497 --> 00:54:02,164
this also found out that they're working with

1476
00:54:02,322 --> 00:54:04,306
Meta. In other words, Facebook on this, which

1477
00:54:04,306 --> 00:54:05,074
is another

1478
00:54:05,753 --> 00:54:08,065
another black mark as far as I'm concerned.

1479
00:54:08,225 --> 00:54:10,618
But I understand again, why they're trying to

1480
00:54:10,618 --> 00:54:11,277
do this

1481
00:54:11,655 --> 00:54:13,489
as people are blocking through party cookies and

1482
00:54:13,489 --> 00:54:14,606
trying to block all this tracking,

1483
00:54:15,179 --> 00:54:17,485
they're desperately trying to find something that will

1484
00:54:17,485 --> 00:54:20,132
work that people will allow to work

1485
00:54:20,586 --> 00:54:22,972
so that they can continue with their advertising

1486
00:54:22,972 --> 00:54:24,741
business. They're trying to use some of these

1487
00:54:24,741 --> 00:54:27,613
privacy enhancing technologies, these Pet that we talked

1488
00:54:27,613 --> 00:54:29,209
about last week with our our nap,

1489
00:54:30,087 --> 00:54:30,587
specifically

1490
00:54:31,139 --> 00:54:32,674
Mo mozilla plan is using

1491
00:54:33,050 --> 00:54:36,157
differential privacy and multi party computation. They're trying

1492
00:54:36,157 --> 00:54:37,431
to do this right. And the ups shot

1493
00:54:37,431 --> 00:54:39,263
of what of what these things do. This

1494
00:54:39,263 --> 00:54:42,540
end Google's privacy sandbox is they're trying to

1495
00:54:42,540 --> 00:54:43,597
get the browser

1496
00:54:44,290 --> 00:54:47,791
to record all this information instead of the

1497
00:54:47,791 --> 00:54:50,352
websites you visit and know, recording this information

1498
00:54:50,352 --> 00:54:51,785
via third party cookies and such,

1499
00:54:52,501 --> 00:54:54,889
and keeping it all local to the browser,

1500
00:54:55,048 --> 00:54:56,583
and then have the browser

1501
00:54:56,974 --> 00:54:58,887
in a privacy preserving way,

1502
00:54:59,764 --> 00:55:02,235
aggregate and report this data in such a

1503
00:55:02,235 --> 00:55:05,047
fashion that nobody can figure out specifically

1504
00:55:05,839 --> 00:55:08,336
who that information is about. But in aggregate,

1505
00:55:08,955 --> 00:55:11,352
can see that, okay, you know, of these

1506
00:55:11,352 --> 00:55:13,590
10 websites where I posted this ad,

1507
00:55:14,163 --> 00:55:16,150
2 of them had a very strong conversion

1508
00:55:16,150 --> 00:55:18,137
rate. I don't know who did it. I

1509
00:55:18,137 --> 00:55:19,408
may know a little bit about when,

1510
00:55:20,362 --> 00:55:22,128
but that's about it. And by the way,

1511
00:55:22,367 --> 00:55:24,280
another way, that a... This attribution is often

1512
00:55:24,280 --> 00:55:26,514
done is through these promo codes. You see

1513
00:55:26,514 --> 00:55:28,108
these all the time. Right? Now you'll get

1514
00:55:28,108 --> 00:55:29,783
an email from somebody saying, hey, we're having

1515
00:55:29,783 --> 00:55:31,313
a special this week you bought from us

1516
00:55:31,313 --> 00:55:33,468
before, or you've been on our website many

1517
00:55:33,468 --> 00:55:35,463
times and never bought something. Here's a promo

1518
00:55:35,463 --> 00:55:37,299
code that you can use for the next,

1519
00:55:37,459 --> 00:55:39,156
you know, month or something to buy

1520
00:55:39,709 --> 00:55:40,908
a product and we'll and we'll give you

1521
00:55:40,908 --> 00:55:43,704
a discount. Well, that specific promo code helps

1522
00:55:43,704 --> 00:55:47,221
them attribute the advertising campaign directly, like whoever

1523
00:55:47,221 --> 00:55:48,180
uses that promo code,

1524
00:55:49,230 --> 00:55:51,297
you know, got it hopefully from their advertising

1525
00:55:51,297 --> 00:55:54,081
campaign. Now, course, there are deal coupon sites

1526
00:55:54,081 --> 00:55:55,853
that totally screw that up

1527
00:55:56,228 --> 00:55:56,728
by

1528
00:55:57,119 --> 00:55:58,976
publishing these promo codes

1529
00:55:59,514 --> 00:56:01,909
to everybody. And so that, again, that screws

1530
00:56:01,909 --> 00:56:03,585
up their whole attribution thing to the point

1531
00:56:03,585 --> 00:56:05,262
where a lot of times, once these codes

1532
00:56:05,262 --> 00:56:06,320
show up on those

1533
00:56:06,634 --> 00:56:09,587
deal coupon sites, they're canceled immediately because they're

1534
00:56:09,587 --> 00:56:11,742
now useless to them. The whole point of

1535
00:56:11,742 --> 00:56:13,817
the promo code was to help them figure

1536
00:56:13,817 --> 00:56:14,317
out

1537
00:56:15,027 --> 00:56:17,407
how to attribute the impression with the conversion.

1538
00:56:18,200 --> 00:56:19,549
Alright. Just a couple more notes about this.

1539
00:56:19,707 --> 00:56:21,794
So so far, this appears to only

1540
00:56:22,103 --> 00:56:24,644
handle the attribution aspect. Obviously, there's a lot

1541
00:56:24,644 --> 00:56:26,972
more to advertising that Google and Facebook offer

1542
00:56:27,822 --> 00:56:31,014
about very detailed demographics on people that are

1543
00:56:31,014 --> 00:56:32,918
looking at and buying their products. That is

1544
00:56:32,918 --> 00:56:34,266
not included in this whatsoever.

1545
00:56:34,663 --> 00:56:36,408
Also, this is a very limited trial. There's

1546
00:56:36,408 --> 00:56:37,305
only certain

1547
00:56:38,092 --> 00:56:40,565
websites that are even participating in this. It

1548
00:56:40,565 --> 00:56:42,319
is also not the full solution. They are

1549
00:56:42,319 --> 00:56:43,856
just testing part of this technology.

1550
00:56:44,393 --> 00:56:45,748
And also, I have to think that ad

1551
00:56:45,748 --> 00:56:46,886
blockers would completely

1552
00:56:47,358 --> 00:56:49,115
screw up this whole process because you're not

1553
00:56:49,115 --> 00:56:50,392
being showed the ads in the first place.

1554
00:56:50,871 --> 00:56:52,547
But if you're interested in the details, if

1555
00:56:52,547 --> 00:56:53,984
you really wanna dig into it, there are

1556
00:56:53,984 --> 00:56:55,421
links in the show notes that take you

1557
00:56:55,421 --> 00:56:55,661
to,

1558
00:56:56,871 --> 00:56:57,690
Mo mozilla is

1559
00:56:58,145 --> 00:57:00,532
more detailed description of this. It's it's it's

1560
00:57:00,532 --> 00:57:02,204
worth a rate. It's not super long. But

1561
00:57:02,363 --> 00:57:03,636
I'm gonna be keeping an eye on this.

1562
00:57:04,608 --> 00:57:06,443
And I will let you know what I

1563
00:57:06,443 --> 00:57:07,720
find. And the devil's is always in the

1564
00:57:07,720 --> 00:57:09,635
details. I'll be very interested to see what

1565
00:57:09,635 --> 00:57:10,614
other people think

1566
00:57:11,151 --> 00:57:12,996
about this and if they could find ways

1567
00:57:12,996 --> 00:57:14,427
to break it. If they can find ways

1568
00:57:14,427 --> 00:57:14,927
to

1569
00:57:15,539 --> 00:57:17,470
manipulate the system to still

1570
00:57:17,844 --> 00:57:19,036
track individual people.

1571
00:57:19,688 --> 00:57:21,597
Like, for example, looking at the technical details,

1572
00:57:21,755 --> 00:57:24,005
there's there's an ad campaign Id

1573
00:57:24,380 --> 00:57:25,892
that's recorded. If you were to give up

1574
00:57:25,892 --> 00:57:27,578
a particular their Id per person, that then

1575
00:57:27,658 --> 00:57:29,011
I would think you could track them. No

1576
00:57:29,011 --> 00:57:30,682
matter what you did to try to hide

1577
00:57:30,682 --> 00:57:32,990
their identity. But I wanna make 2 other

1578
00:57:32,990 --> 00:57:34,423
points at At a much higher level.

1579
00:57:35,458 --> 00:57:35,776
First of all,

1580
00:57:36,588 --> 00:57:38,181
this really kinda is the holy grail. This...

1581
00:57:38,659 --> 00:57:40,832
We... If we're going to say

1582
00:57:41,288 --> 00:57:43,997
that we want to have this ad driven

1583
00:57:43,997 --> 00:57:46,565
web economy where we have these quote free

1584
00:57:46,565 --> 00:57:48,405
services, and that we pay for them is

1585
00:57:48,405 --> 00:57:49,764
by looking at ads,

1586
00:57:51,045 --> 00:57:51,925
and not blocking them,

1587
00:57:52,484 --> 00:57:54,492
then coming up with some way to do

1588
00:57:54,492 --> 00:57:56,898
that that preserves our privacy

1589
00:57:57,907 --> 00:58:00,630
is a really, really big deal and worth

1590
00:58:00,686 --> 00:58:02,116
trying to figure out. I don't know if

1591
00:58:02,116 --> 00:58:04,840
they'll get there. But, you know, I applaud

1592
00:58:04,840 --> 00:58:05,639
the fact that they're trying.

1593
00:58:06,677 --> 00:58:08,613
On the other hand, Mo mozilla

1594
00:58:08,992 --> 00:58:10,748
is creeping me out that they're doing this

1595
00:58:10,748 --> 00:58:13,500
in the first place. Apparently, They've also recently

1596
00:58:13,559 --> 00:58:15,880
merged with or acquired an ad company.

1597
00:58:16,839 --> 00:58:18,119
You know, and they've gotta make money too.

1598
00:58:18,359 --> 00:58:20,280
I get it. I just don't like they're

1599
00:58:20,280 --> 00:58:22,207
doing it. More than I like that Apple

1600
00:58:22,207 --> 00:58:23,799
has its own ad business either. I think

1601
00:58:23,799 --> 00:58:24,993
they should just leave that alone. Of course,

1602
00:58:25,232 --> 00:58:25,732
Apple's

1603
00:58:26,266 --> 00:58:26,766
making

1604
00:58:27,142 --> 00:58:28,574
more money than just about any other company

1605
00:58:28,574 --> 00:58:29,768
on of the planet, and that is certainly

1606
00:58:29,768 --> 00:58:32,014
not the same as most Mozilla. But also,

1607
00:58:32,253 --> 00:58:32,992
they really

1608
00:58:33,527 --> 00:58:35,679
absolutely should not have turned this on by

1609
00:58:35,679 --> 00:58:38,642
default. I am sure that they needed people

1610
00:58:38,642 --> 00:58:40,156
to do this so they could test it.

1611
00:58:40,475 --> 00:58:42,307
And if they did it as an opt

1612
00:58:42,307 --> 00:58:44,299
in thing, they probably would have gotten no

1613
00:58:44,299 --> 00:58:45,038
uptake whatsoever.

1614
00:58:46,291 --> 00:58:48,297
I understand why they did it. But they

1615
00:58:48,297 --> 00:58:49,331
should not have done it that way.

1616
00:58:50,128 --> 00:58:51,719
So I'm sure we'll have more to say

1617
00:58:51,719 --> 00:58:52,993
about this in the future. I will keep

1618
00:58:52,993 --> 00:58:54,505
an eye on it, and I will report

1619
00:58:54,505 --> 00:58:55,005
back

1620
00:58:55,380 --> 00:58:57,211
as there are new developments.

1621
00:58:58,503 --> 00:59:00,021
Alright. Finally, I was gonna read this article

1622
00:59:00,021 --> 00:59:01,699
from Life factor, but... I'm just gonna summarize

1623
00:59:01,699 --> 00:59:03,297
it actually very quickly. You can... You can

1624
00:59:03,297 --> 00:59:04,415
still find the link in the share notes

1625
00:59:04,415 --> 00:59:06,815
if you want. But basically, Proton has just

1626
00:59:06,815 --> 00:59:09,536
come out with a end to end encrypted

1627
00:59:09,591 --> 00:59:12,606
private version of Google Docs. Something I've been

1628
00:59:12,606 --> 00:59:13,106
wanting

1629
00:59:13,493 --> 00:59:15,956
for so so long. I've only played with

1630
00:59:15,956 --> 00:59:17,228
it a little bit, but it does look,

1631
00:59:17,307 --> 00:59:19,374
you know, very full featured. It's got a

1632
00:59:19,374 --> 00:59:21,440
nice slick interface. It looks very reminiscent of

1633
00:59:21,599 --> 00:59:23,364
Google Docs. Have to play with it some

1634
00:59:23,364 --> 00:59:24,795
more to figure out if there's any major

1635
00:59:24,795 --> 00:59:26,625
features that I like that are missing, but

1636
00:59:26,625 --> 00:59:28,057
it looks pretty good so far,

1637
00:59:28,852 --> 00:59:31,098
but it's it's something that I've been wanting

1638
00:59:31,098 --> 00:59:32,295
for so so long. It's 1 of the

1639
00:59:32,295 --> 00:59:34,150
last few Google services

1640
00:59:34,607 --> 00:59:35,962
that I have not been able to replace.

1641
00:59:36,202 --> 00:59:37,876
So this is a really huge deal for

1642
00:59:37,876 --> 00:59:37,956
me.

1643
00:59:38,768 --> 00:59:40,443
If you have not tried proton at all,

1644
00:59:40,603 --> 00:59:41,958
this might be the thing that, you know,

1645
00:59:42,198 --> 00:59:43,474
gets you to give it a shot. They

1646
00:59:43,474 --> 00:59:45,090
do have a very usable free

1647
00:59:45,547 --> 00:59:47,302
tier that you can start with to play

1648
00:59:47,302 --> 00:59:49,313
play around with But I'm very interested that.

1649
00:59:49,552 --> 00:59:52,189
I have confirmed with Andy, the Ceo that

1650
00:59:52,189 --> 00:59:53,387
he's gonna come back and we're gonna talk

1651
00:59:53,387 --> 00:59:54,686
about this and other

1652
00:59:55,065 --> 00:59:56,996
new things that proton is doing and will

1653
00:59:56,996 --> 00:59:59,951
be doing in the near future. So I'm

1654
00:59:59,951 --> 01:00:01,627
very much looking forward to that. They've come

1655
01:00:01,627 --> 01:00:02,984
out with all all sorts of new stuff.

1656
01:00:03,144 --> 01:00:05,871
They've got the password manager. They've also just

1657
01:00:05,871 --> 01:00:07,543
released a new feature for their password manager

1658
01:00:07,543 --> 01:00:09,771
that allows you to securely share credentials with

1659
01:00:09,771 --> 01:00:10,885
people on a limited basis.

1660
01:00:11,601 --> 01:00:13,689
They're doing some great work. So I'm very

1661
01:00:13,689 --> 01:00:15,287
much looking forward to talking to Andy about

1662
01:00:15,287 --> 01:00:15,686
all that,

1663
01:00:16,565 --> 01:00:17,604
sometime in the next couple months.

1664
01:00:19,203 --> 01:00:21,041
Okay. So let's get to... Alright. So let's

1665
01:00:21,041 --> 01:00:22,652
jump to my tip of the week. And

1666
01:00:22,812 --> 01:00:24,667
I wanna talk to you again about

1667
01:00:25,282 --> 01:00:26,000
blocking ads.

1668
01:00:26,717 --> 01:00:29,188
It's obviously very relevant to something we're talking

1669
01:00:29,188 --> 01:00:31,433
about today. And it's something that I've covered

1670
01:00:31,433 --> 01:00:32,708
on and off over the years, I had

1671
01:00:32,708 --> 01:00:33,925
an older article

1672
01:00:34,859 --> 01:00:36,293
about this that I called on the ethics

1673
01:00:36,293 --> 01:00:38,303
of ad blocking. And I realized,

1674
01:00:38,782 --> 01:00:40,300
as I was doing some research for this,

1675
01:00:41,179 --> 01:00:42,537
that I wrote that almost 8 years ago

1676
01:00:42,537 --> 01:00:44,375
now. It still holds up pretty well actually.

1677
01:00:44,868 --> 01:00:45,983
I wanted to revisit it for the tip

1678
01:00:45,983 --> 01:00:47,336
of the week. And again, if you go

1679
01:00:47,336 --> 01:00:49,803
to firewalls don't dragons, the top blog article

1680
01:00:49,803 --> 01:00:51,474
there is the full length version of this

1681
01:00:51,474 --> 01:00:53,783
with all sorts of helpful links and other

1682
01:00:53,783 --> 01:00:53,942
information.

1683
01:00:54,594 --> 01:00:56,588
I highly recommend that you do that. And

1684
01:00:56,588 --> 01:00:58,343
if you want this information to just come

1685
01:00:58,343 --> 01:00:59,401
to you automatically

1686
01:00:59,778 --> 01:01:01,214
every 2 weeks, you can sign up for

1687
01:01:01,214 --> 01:01:03,128
my newsletter because my blog on my newsletter

1688
01:01:03,128 --> 01:01:05,374
are almost always the same thing. So really

1689
01:01:05,374 --> 01:01:08,557
quickly, ads are obviously, ubiquitous today.

1690
01:01:10,149 --> 01:01:10,649
They're

1691
01:01:11,104 --> 01:01:13,651
often very annoying. I understand that part of

1692
01:01:13,651 --> 01:01:15,338
it. But they're also a privacy risk and

1693
01:01:15,338 --> 01:01:16,453
even a security risk.

1694
01:01:17,090 --> 01:01:19,001
We've already talked about the privacy risks in

1695
01:01:19,001 --> 01:01:20,275
terms of a lot of these ads wanting

1696
01:01:20,275 --> 01:01:22,107
to track you and build these dossier on

1697
01:01:22,107 --> 01:01:23,952
you. But because of the way the ad

1698
01:01:23,952 --> 01:01:24,748
networks work,

1699
01:01:25,304 --> 01:01:27,532
and it's kinda like billboard space available for

1700
01:01:27,532 --> 01:01:30,316
anybody to buy, bad guys often buy that

1701
01:01:30,316 --> 01:01:33,144
space and put up fishing ads or even

1702
01:01:33,285 --> 01:01:35,525
ads that can deliver malware either by clicking

1703
01:01:35,525 --> 01:01:37,125
on them or in some cases just by

1704
01:01:37,125 --> 01:01:39,445
visiting the page. That's less common, but it

1705
01:01:39,445 --> 01:01:42,244
has happened. And so I think everybody is

1706
01:01:42,244 --> 01:01:45,419
perfectly within their rights to block most ads,

1707
01:01:45,896 --> 01:01:47,483
even just the annoying part. I mean, I

1708
01:01:47,642 --> 01:01:49,094
I've seen other people

1709
01:01:49,484 --> 01:01:51,977
browse the web who don't have ad blockers

1710
01:01:52,036 --> 01:01:53,949
installed, and I I just blows my mind.

1711
01:01:54,188 --> 01:01:55,943
I look... Out how can you even deal

1712
01:01:55,943 --> 01:01:58,096
with that? It's just so so annoying.

1713
01:01:58,668 --> 01:02:00,019
So I've been using an ad blocker for

1714
01:02:00,019 --> 01:02:01,155
a long time. And

1715
01:02:01,610 --> 01:02:03,597
as far as the ethics go, yes, these

1716
01:02:03,597 --> 01:02:05,505
websites need to show ads to make money

1717
01:02:05,505 --> 01:02:07,254
and they need money to survive. I get

1718
01:02:07,254 --> 01:02:09,574
that. So you know, there are ways that

1719
01:02:09,574 --> 01:02:13,311
you can certainly disable ad blocking on websites

1720
01:02:13,311 --> 01:02:14,447
that you want to

1721
01:02:15,140 --> 01:02:16,969
access because maybe they block you if you

1722
01:02:16,969 --> 01:02:18,099
don't turn off your blocker,

1723
01:02:18,818 --> 01:02:20,816
or because you wanna support them. You are

1724
01:02:20,816 --> 01:02:22,813
gonna take some risks in doing that, but

1725
01:02:22,813 --> 01:02:24,811
it's often possible to actually view the ads

1726
01:02:24,811 --> 01:02:27,456
and still block the tracking. Which the solutions

1727
01:02:27,536 --> 01:02:29,603
I'm going to give to you today will

1728
01:02:29,603 --> 01:02:30,398
hopefully do for you.

1729
01:02:31,192 --> 01:02:32,385
So there's 2 kind of basic ways that

1730
01:02:32,464 --> 01:02:33,657
I talk about blocking ads. First of all,

1731
01:02:33,816 --> 01:02:35,262
is is in your browser. And the best

1732
01:02:35,262 --> 01:02:37,967
way to do that is to install u

1733
01:02:37,967 --> 01:02:40,592
block origin. There are many ad blockers out

1734
01:02:40,592 --> 01:02:40,672
there,

1735
01:02:41,403 --> 01:02:43,498
it's been called the biggest boycott in history

1736
01:02:43,557 --> 01:02:44,993
because there are so many of them than

1737
01:02:44,993 --> 01:02:46,668
so many people use them, because we all

1738
01:02:46,668 --> 01:02:49,619
hate these horrible horrible annoying ads. But the

1739
01:02:49,619 --> 01:02:51,969
best 1 by far. Bar on

1740
01:02:52,348 --> 01:02:54,505
is U block origin. Now do not confuse

1741
01:02:54,505 --> 01:02:55,464
that with u block.

1742
01:02:56,103 --> 01:02:57,942
This is something I I kinda wish 1

1743
01:02:57,942 --> 01:03:00,114
of these guys would change the names. But

1744
01:03:00,114 --> 01:03:01,635
you block and u block origin are not

1745
01:03:01,635 --> 01:03:03,255
the same thing, and there's a long

1746
01:03:03,635 --> 01:03:06,194
nasty history between those 2 products, the 1

1747
01:03:06,194 --> 01:03:07,154
you want for sure.

1748
01:03:07,809 --> 01:03:09,090
Is you block origin.

1749
01:03:09,730 --> 01:03:11,170
And to get the full benefit of u

1750
01:03:11,170 --> 01:03:12,930
block origin, you need to use a browser

1751
01:03:12,930 --> 01:03:13,590
like Firefox

1752
01:03:14,210 --> 01:03:16,704
because all the Chromium based browser, including Google

1753
01:03:16,784 --> 01:03:19,421
Chrome and Microsoft Edge are now using this

1754
01:03:19,421 --> 01:03:21,838
thing called Manifest v 3, which basically

1755
01:03:22,217 --> 01:03:24,315
prevents U block origin from doing

1756
01:03:24,787 --> 01:03:26,217
what it really needs to do to to

1757
01:03:26,217 --> 01:03:28,283
properly block ads. In fact, they had to

1758
01:03:28,283 --> 01:03:30,666
come up with you block origin light to

1759
01:03:30,666 --> 01:03:32,733
address those browsers because they can no longer

1760
01:03:32,733 --> 01:03:34,265
do what they what they used to be

1761
01:03:34,265 --> 01:03:36,905
able to do. So another reason to switch

1762
01:03:36,905 --> 01:03:37,545
to Firefox.

1763
01:03:38,344 --> 01:03:39,945
Now if you... For some reason, don't like

1764
01:03:39,945 --> 01:03:41,545
you black origin, you can also try Ef

1765
01:03:41,545 --> 01:03:42,585
efs privacy badger,

1766
01:03:43,398 --> 01:03:46,350
or Duck goes privacy essentials. They also do

1767
01:03:46,350 --> 01:03:48,286
similar things. You could theoretically

1768
01:03:48,664 --> 01:03:49,164
install

1769
01:03:49,541 --> 01:03:50,911
2 or 3 of if you wanted to,

1770
01:03:51,070 --> 01:03:52,264
they call kinda do the same thing and

1771
01:03:52,264 --> 01:03:53,378
they do it a little differently.

1772
01:03:54,094 --> 01:03:54,833
They can

1773
01:03:55,367 --> 01:03:56,243
interfere with each other some.

1774
01:03:57,118 --> 01:03:58,789
But from my experience, u block origin is

1775
01:03:58,789 --> 01:03:59,267
all you need.

1776
01:03:59,998 --> 01:04:01,352
And u black origin has got a lot

1777
01:04:01,352 --> 01:04:03,126
of other really cool features,

1778
01:04:03,661 --> 01:04:05,811
that let you get rid of, other pop

1779
01:04:05,811 --> 01:04:07,722
ups and things that's got this little zap

1780
01:04:07,722 --> 01:04:09,811
feature you know, when something pops over and

1781
01:04:09,811 --> 01:04:11,168
you just... And you visit that site all

1782
01:04:11,168 --> 01:04:12,606
the time, you're tired are seeing the pop

1783
01:04:12,606 --> 01:04:15,001
up saying, subscribe to my newsletter, you can

1784
01:04:15,001 --> 01:04:16,996
actually with u block origins zap those, so

1785
01:04:16,996 --> 01:04:18,846
they're never shown again. Which is wonderful.

1786
01:04:19,324 --> 01:04:20,678
But the other 1 I wanna spend more

1787
01:04:20,678 --> 01:04:21,873
time on today is what I don't talk

1788
01:04:21,873 --> 01:04:24,285
about as much. And that is blocking ads

1789
01:04:24,422 --> 01:04:27,785
using Dns or the domain name system. So

1790
01:04:27,785 --> 01:04:30,025
again, the domain system is kinda like the

1791
01:04:30,025 --> 01:04:32,045
phone book for the Internet. It converts

1792
01:04:32,425 --> 01:04:33,385
names to numbers,

1793
01:04:33,864 --> 01:04:34,800
and instead of

1794
01:04:35,239 --> 01:04:38,116
person's names to telephone numbers it converts domain

1795
01:04:38,116 --> 01:04:40,594
names like firewalls don't strap dragons dot com

1796
01:04:40,594 --> 01:04:42,671
to an Ip address like 34 dot 1

1797
01:04:42,671 --> 01:04:44,349
74 dot 87 dot 100.

1798
01:04:44,844 --> 01:04:46,280
That last 1 is something that we don't

1799
01:04:46,280 --> 01:04:48,036
like as humans, but computers, that's what they

1800
01:04:48,036 --> 01:04:49,552
need to to wrap these things. So this

1801
01:04:49,552 --> 01:04:51,388
is the conversion your computer is doing whenever

1802
01:04:51,388 --> 01:04:52,665
it's trying to get to websites.

1803
01:04:53,317 --> 01:04:54,690
And websites with ads

1804
01:04:55,065 --> 01:04:57,869
have all sorts of well known

1805
01:04:58,561 --> 01:04:59,061
advertising

1806
01:04:59,435 --> 01:05:00,253
domain names

1807
01:05:00,800 --> 01:05:03,125
that they go to call out to to,

1808
01:05:03,260 --> 01:05:05,085
you know, to show these ads. So you

1809
01:05:05,085 --> 01:05:07,172
can just intercept that lookup

1810
01:05:07,798 --> 01:05:09,383
And whenever it's for a well known ad

1811
01:05:09,383 --> 01:05:12,079
site, just don't let that route through. And

1812
01:05:12,079 --> 01:05:14,140
then those ads can't show up. Your browser

1813
01:05:14,140 --> 01:05:14,775
can't fetch them.

1814
01:05:15,504 --> 01:05:16,863
1 of the really cool things about using

1815
01:05:17,023 --> 01:05:17,523
Dns

1816
01:05:17,982 --> 01:05:19,820
is that it's not just for your web

1817
01:05:19,820 --> 01:05:21,738
browser. A lot of your apps on your

1818
01:05:21,738 --> 01:05:23,416
computer are also doing the same thing if

1819
01:05:23,416 --> 01:05:25,268
they've got... If it's a free app that

1820
01:05:25,268 --> 01:05:27,095
you've installed in your computer that's ad based,

1821
01:05:27,969 --> 01:05:30,034
it can sometimes block those ads as well.

1822
01:05:30,352 --> 01:05:32,592
But if you go even 1 step up

1823
01:05:32,592 --> 01:05:34,024
in the food chain. If you go up

1824
01:05:34,024 --> 01:05:36,012
to your router, your home router,

1825
01:05:36,649 --> 01:05:39,170
your Wifi at home and and set that

1826
01:05:39,689 --> 01:05:42,986
Dns on that device, which will then propagate

1827
01:05:43,445 --> 01:05:45,443
to all the other devices in your home,

1828
01:05:45,922 --> 01:05:48,320
You can now block ads for everything within

1829
01:05:48,320 --> 01:05:48,880
your home network.

1830
01:05:49,533 --> 01:05:51,448
Now there can be exceptions to that. Each

1831
01:05:51,448 --> 01:05:52,826
device in your home could

1832
01:05:53,362 --> 01:05:53,862
theoretically

1833
01:05:54,400 --> 01:05:56,963
define its own Dns server, but generally, the

1834
01:05:56,963 --> 01:05:58,391
way it works is when these devices come

1835
01:05:58,391 --> 01:05:59,660
up and asked to get on the network,

1836
01:06:00,056 --> 01:06:02,118
part of the information provided by the router

1837
01:06:02,118 --> 01:06:03,863
other than the Ip address to use locally,

1838
01:06:04,355 --> 01:06:05,793
is also, hey. When you wanna do a

1839
01:06:05,873 --> 01:06:08,030
Dns query, here's where you should send it.

1840
01:06:08,270 --> 01:06:09,948
Usually, that's to the router and then the

1841
01:06:09,948 --> 01:06:12,105
router sends it on to wherever they wanna

1842
01:06:12,105 --> 01:06:12,345
do it.

1843
01:06:13,079 --> 01:06:15,000
By default, the way that usually works as

1844
01:06:15,000 --> 01:06:16,599
it goes to your Internet service provider.

1845
01:06:17,480 --> 01:06:19,320
And your Internet service provider by the way,

1846
01:06:19,960 --> 01:06:21,900
uses that information to track

1847
01:06:22,213 --> 01:06:24,200
all the websites you go to. And and

1848
01:06:24,200 --> 01:06:25,869
may even be bundling those up and selling

1849
01:06:25,869 --> 01:06:28,413
those to somebody else as well. So another

1850
01:06:28,413 --> 01:06:29,659
great reason to use

1851
01:06:30,338 --> 01:06:33,449
some Dns besides your Internet service providers to

1852
01:06:33,449 --> 01:06:34,109
deny them

1853
01:06:34,726 --> 01:06:36,481
at least a way to easily track where

1854
01:06:36,481 --> 01:06:37,851
you go. They're even if you don't do

1855
01:06:37,931 --> 01:06:39,524
Dns lookup through them, they could still see

1856
01:06:39,524 --> 01:06:40,878
the Ip addresses as you go to and

1857
01:06:40,878 --> 01:06:42,313
they can look those up as well, but

1858
01:06:42,313 --> 01:06:43,667
it's it's not quite a straightforward.

1859
01:06:44,319 --> 01:06:46,654
So within the whole Dns solution, there's 2

1860
01:06:47,192 --> 01:06:48,947
solutions that I'm gonna propose. First of all,

1861
01:06:49,665 --> 01:06:50,622
next Dns.

1862
01:06:51,181 --> 01:06:52,550
There are other ones to do this as

1863
01:06:52,550 --> 01:06:54,641
well, but Next Dns is my favorite. It's

1864
01:06:54,858 --> 01:06:57,484
extremely customizable, it's very, very powerful and it

1865
01:06:57,484 --> 01:06:58,996
just works like a charm.

1866
01:06:59,568 --> 01:07:00,386
So Next

1867
01:07:00,840 --> 01:07:02,748
has a free version, but it's limited to

1868
01:07:02,748 --> 01:07:04,338
how many queries you could do per month.

1869
01:07:04,974 --> 01:07:06,326
I just pay for it. It's not that

1870
01:07:06,326 --> 01:07:07,677
expensive. I think it's like, 50 bucks a

1871
01:07:07,677 --> 01:07:09,842
year or something like that. And when I

1872
01:07:09,842 --> 01:07:11,378
set my home router to

1873
01:07:11,755 --> 01:07:13,909
use that Dns, and so every device in

1874
01:07:13,909 --> 01:07:16,143
my house then uses next Dns for dns,

1875
01:07:16,462 --> 01:07:18,376
I get ad blocking on every device in

1876
01:07:18,376 --> 01:07:19,666
my home. Is fantastic.

1877
01:07:20,382 --> 01:07:21,976
Now for devices that can leave my home,

1878
01:07:22,135 --> 01:07:24,365
like my smartphone and my laptop, you could

1879
01:07:24,365 --> 01:07:27,232
also configure Dns directly on those devices,

1880
01:07:28,201 --> 01:07:30,185
to use Next Dns as well. And if

1881
01:07:30,185 --> 01:07:31,535
you go to the Next dns site, they've

1882
01:07:31,535 --> 01:07:33,757
got a really nice, listing there for how

1883
01:07:33,757 --> 01:07:35,821
to set set up Next Dns at all

1884
01:07:35,821 --> 01:07:38,536
those devices, In some cases you download this

1885
01:07:38,536 --> 01:07:40,125
profile and it's just a matter double clicking

1886
01:07:40,125 --> 01:07:42,293
this profile and and your

1887
01:07:42,667 --> 01:07:44,018
operating system saying, are you sure you wanna

1888
01:07:44,018 --> 01:07:44,891
do this and you say, yes,

1889
01:07:45,622 --> 01:07:48,087
And then now you're using that Dns. It's

1890
01:07:48,087 --> 01:07:50,313
actually gotten pretty simple. And then you can

1891
01:07:50,313 --> 01:07:51,824
go to the next Dns dashboard and get

1892
01:07:51,824 --> 01:07:52,937
also is a really cool.

1893
01:07:53,908 --> 01:07:55,583
Analytics to see how many ads you've blocked

1894
01:07:55,583 --> 01:07:57,417
and where they're coming from and things like

1895
01:07:57,417 --> 01:08:00,448
that. It's really neat. Tech, which is a

1896
01:08:00,448 --> 01:08:02,703
fantastic website and Henry and those guys are

1897
01:08:02,761 --> 01:08:04,127
some of my favorite privacy people.

1898
01:08:05,157 --> 01:08:06,449
They have done a really

1899
01:08:06,821 --> 01:08:10,150
detailed next Dns video. It's about 40 minutes

1900
01:08:10,150 --> 01:08:10,388
long.

1901
01:08:11,199 --> 01:08:11,918
I've got a link to it in and

1902
01:08:11,918 --> 01:08:14,395
show notes that's well worth the watch. Because

1903
01:08:14,474 --> 01:08:16,552
Next Dns does so much more than just

1904
01:08:16,552 --> 01:08:17,910
had add in tracker blocking.

1905
01:08:18,484 --> 01:08:20,470
So that's option 1. Now if you're a

1906
01:08:20,470 --> 01:08:21,821
do it yourself or if you're a hobby,

1907
01:08:21,979 --> 01:08:22,877
if you like to

1908
01:08:23,331 --> 01:08:25,238
mu around with computers and electronics,

1909
01:08:26,050 --> 01:08:28,850
Another solution that's kinda similar is a project

1910
01:08:28,850 --> 01:08:29,729
called Pi hole.

1911
01:08:30,369 --> 01:08:32,210
And that's PIH0LE,

1912
01:08:32,369 --> 01:08:34,623
pie like the the Greek letter. Because it's

1913
01:08:34,623 --> 01:08:37,657
based on the Raspberry pie mini computer. And

1914
01:08:37,657 --> 01:08:39,173
you could buy a raspberry pie for about

1915
01:08:39,173 --> 01:08:41,249
35 bucks, but you'll also need to buy

1916
01:08:41,249 --> 01:08:42,527
a power supply and a case and an

1917
01:08:42,606 --> 01:08:44,538
Sd card if it'll run you maybe a

1918
01:08:44,538 --> 01:08:45,896
hundred bucks when it's all said and done.

1919
01:08:46,296 --> 01:08:48,553
But basically, you set up this little dedicated

1920
01:08:48,932 --> 01:08:51,030
Dns server in your house

1921
01:08:51,502 --> 01:08:53,487
and then you point your router to that

1922
01:08:53,487 --> 01:08:55,711
for Dns lookup ups. Effectively, it does the

1923
01:08:55,711 --> 01:08:56,981
same thing, and it's also got some fun

1924
01:08:56,981 --> 01:08:58,728
dashboards and things. It's a little more involved,

1925
01:08:58,886 --> 01:09:00,157
You know, hey, if you don't wanna pay

1926
01:09:00,157 --> 01:09:03,111
in an ongoing subscription for next Dns, and

1927
01:09:03,111 --> 01:09:04,382
you wanna, you know, have all little funnel

1928
01:09:04,382 --> 01:09:04,938
order project.

1929
01:09:05,812 --> 01:09:07,322
That is a cool way to go. The

1930
01:09:07,322 --> 01:09:09,045
only thing... The only downside of that is

1931
01:09:09,163 --> 01:09:10,511
for your devices that leave your home.

1932
01:09:11,384 --> 01:09:13,287
It's kinda harder to use that pie. You

1933
01:09:13,287 --> 01:09:15,904
can set up, you know, Vpn connections back

1934
01:09:15,904 --> 01:09:16,801
to your home

1935
01:09:17,429 --> 01:09:20,386
router that peek into your raspberry pie, but

1936
01:09:20,386 --> 01:09:22,783
that's that's a pain in the butt. So

1937
01:09:22,783 --> 01:09:24,541
anyway, I have migrated to Next dns and

1938
01:09:24,621 --> 01:09:25,180
I have loved it.

1939
01:09:26,152 --> 01:09:27,660
But if you wanna, you know, get little

1940
01:09:27,660 --> 01:09:29,090
more geek and try something on your own,

1941
01:09:29,328 --> 01:09:30,440
check out the pie hole project.

1942
01:09:31,234 --> 01:09:33,061
So there are a couple caveats and garages

1943
01:09:33,061 --> 01:09:35,305
to this whole thing. When you start introducing

1944
01:09:35,305 --> 01:09:36,978
things like e block origin or next dns,

1945
01:09:37,137 --> 01:09:39,051
either 1 of them. They start blocking things,

1946
01:09:39,210 --> 01:09:41,441
and some websites just do not like that.

1947
01:09:42,013 --> 01:09:43,844
Some will detect that you are trying to

1948
01:09:43,844 --> 01:09:46,231
block ads and complain, and they'll either not

1949
01:09:46,231 --> 01:09:48,380
let you into their site until you've disabled

1950
01:09:48,380 --> 01:09:50,210
your ad blocker or sometimes they'll just pop

1951
01:09:50,210 --> 01:09:51,739
up a warning and if You kinda have

1952
01:09:51,739 --> 01:09:53,577
to look for the the little hidden link

1953
01:09:53,577 --> 01:09:56,054
that says, continue this time, and I promise

1954
01:09:56,054 --> 01:09:58,611
next time, I'll I'll block my ads. They're

1955
01:09:58,611 --> 01:10:00,538
all a little bit different. But some websites,

1956
01:10:00,697 --> 01:10:03,158
they just outright break. Like, things just don't

1957
01:10:03,158 --> 01:10:05,383
work. Like, whoever design that webpage page did

1958
01:10:05,383 --> 01:10:07,551
not take into account the fact that somebody

1959
01:10:08,339 --> 01:10:10,337
might go to the trouble of blocking certain

1960
01:10:10,337 --> 01:10:13,453
elements of that page from loading. So some

1961
01:10:13,453 --> 01:10:15,372
websites were just not function. Like, they won't

1962
01:10:15,372 --> 01:10:17,290
load at all, or they're partially load or

1963
01:10:17,290 --> 01:10:19,054
you'll They look like they load, but then

1964
01:10:19,054 --> 01:10:20,164
you go to fill out a form or

1965
01:10:20,164 --> 01:10:21,434
click a button and nothing happens.

1966
01:10:21,989 --> 01:10:23,575
You'll need to be aware that when you're

1967
01:10:23,575 --> 01:10:24,710
using these kind of

1968
01:10:25,241 --> 01:10:27,484
technologies, it can cause things like that to

1969
01:10:27,484 --> 01:10:28,918
happen and you're gonna have to do some

1970
01:10:28,918 --> 01:10:31,946
debugging. You can actually pretty easily just turn

1971
01:10:31,946 --> 01:10:34,271
off you block origin for example on any

1972
01:10:34,271 --> 01:10:36,498
given website either temporarily or permanently,

1973
01:10:36,896 --> 01:10:38,168
and then reload the page and see if

1974
01:10:38,168 --> 01:10:39,362
it works, and then you'll know that was

1975
01:10:39,362 --> 01:10:42,167
the problem. If it's next Dns, however, you're

1976
01:10:42,167 --> 01:10:43,365
actually gonna have to log into your Next

1977
01:10:43,365 --> 01:10:45,922
dns account. Look at the logs. It'll show

1978
01:10:45,922 --> 01:10:47,440
you like, live,

1979
01:10:48,254 --> 01:10:50,090
updates of what was recently blocked and why.

1980
01:10:50,809 --> 01:10:52,485
And, you know, you may find it something

1981
01:10:52,485 --> 01:10:54,401
there. And then from next Dns, you can

1982
01:10:54,401 --> 01:10:56,497
put it on your allow list either temporarily

1983
01:10:56,556 --> 01:10:57,216
or permanently

1984
01:10:57,609 --> 01:10:59,599
and see if that fixes your problem. It

1985
01:10:59,599 --> 01:11:01,748
sounds bad and it can be frustrating. It

1986
01:11:01,748 --> 01:11:03,420
doesn't happen that often. I just want you

1987
01:11:03,420 --> 01:11:05,489
to be aware that it can happen when

1988
01:11:05,489 --> 01:11:07,001
you're doing this sorts of blocking.

1989
01:11:07,574 --> 01:11:08,852
Now by the way, there's no reason you

1990
01:11:08,852 --> 01:11:10,690
can't do both. I do both. I have

1991
01:11:10,690 --> 01:11:12,927
both do black origin and next Dns. They

1992
01:11:12,927 --> 01:11:15,015
do different things in different ways. They don't

1993
01:11:15,015 --> 01:11:16,996
really interfere with each other, it just does

1994
01:11:16,996 --> 01:11:18,185
mean that if you have to debug now,

1995
01:11:18,264 --> 01:11:20,007
you've got check both those as possible sources

1996
01:11:20,007 --> 01:11:20,483
of the problem.

1997
01:11:21,116 --> 01:11:22,724
1 more thing I will add is that

1998
01:11:22,724 --> 01:11:24,561
if you use a Vpn, a lot of

1999
01:11:24,561 --> 01:11:26,239
times your Vpn service will have its own

2000
01:11:26,239 --> 01:11:27,358
dedicated Dns service.

2001
01:11:28,317 --> 01:11:30,748
So unless you do some kinda tricky

2002
01:11:31,364 --> 01:11:34,237
configurations. When you're using a Vpn, often that

2003
01:11:34,237 --> 01:11:36,470
means you're not using next Dns, But, you

2004
01:11:36,470 --> 01:11:38,145
know, if you're using you v block origin,

2005
01:11:38,304 --> 01:11:40,395
then you're still gonna get that protection. You're

2006
01:11:40,395 --> 01:11:42,074
just not gonna get the Next Dns protection.

2007
01:11:42,635 --> 01:11:43,994
In fact, a lot of times I actually

2008
01:11:43,994 --> 01:11:44,814
use this

2009
01:11:45,194 --> 01:11:45,694
fact

2010
01:11:45,994 --> 01:11:48,494
that the Vpn doesn't use Next dns because

2011
01:11:48,635 --> 01:11:50,649
oftentimes what I'm like, in a newsletter or

2012
01:11:50,649 --> 01:11:51,710
somebody sends me

2013
01:11:52,570 --> 01:11:53,070
form

2014
01:11:53,609 --> 01:11:55,130
email that they sent to a lot of

2015
01:11:55,130 --> 01:11:55,369
people,

2016
01:11:56,010 --> 01:11:59,385
the services that send mass mailing often replace

2017
01:11:59,385 --> 01:12:02,284
whatever links are in that email with special

2018
01:12:02,344 --> 01:12:04,264
redirect links because they wanna know who clicked

2019
01:12:04,264 --> 01:12:05,144
on what and when.

2020
01:12:05,957 --> 01:12:08,205
And those redirect links under the covers

2021
01:12:08,658 --> 01:12:10,328
can be blocked by next Dns.

2022
01:12:10,804 --> 01:12:12,314
So you'll click on the ads and they

2023
01:12:12,314 --> 01:12:14,221
just won't go anywhere. They don't work.

2024
01:12:14,792 --> 01:12:16,778
And so in cases like that, often what

2025
01:12:16,936 --> 01:12:18,207
I'll do is I'll just quickly turn on

2026
01:12:18,207 --> 01:12:20,509
my Vpn and click on it again and

2027
01:12:20,509 --> 01:12:22,017
very often then it will go through and

2028
01:12:22,017 --> 01:12:24,096
then I'll turn my Vpn back off. Yes,

2029
01:12:24,255 --> 01:12:26,478
that means that some analytics somewhere knew that

2030
01:12:26,556 --> 01:12:28,462
I clicked on that link. But in most

2031
01:12:28,462 --> 01:12:30,208
cases, that's all they're looking for is just

2032
01:12:30,208 --> 01:12:31,796
knowing that someone did click it, and that's

2033
01:12:31,796 --> 01:12:34,039
that's fine. So there you have everybody, your

2034
01:12:34,039 --> 01:12:35,555
news and your tip of the week.

2035
01:12:41,297 --> 01:12:43,148
All everybody do it this week. Thank you

2036
01:12:43,148 --> 01:12:43,787
for tuning in.

2037
01:12:44,587 --> 01:12:46,823
A couple quick reminders. First of all, do

2038
01:12:46,823 --> 01:12:49,460
take your questions, Listener our questions, dear carry

2039
01:12:49,460 --> 01:12:49,780
questions.

2040
01:12:50,274 --> 01:12:52,029
You can go to FDSD

2041
01:12:52,029 --> 01:12:53,624
dot me slash QNA.

2042
01:12:54,103 --> 01:12:56,016
That link is in the show notes, or

2043
01:12:56,016 --> 01:12:57,293
you can just send me an email at

2044
01:12:57,293 --> 01:12:59,447
dear carey at firewalls don't stop dragons dot

2045
01:12:59,447 --> 01:13:01,134
com. And that's CAREY.

2046
01:13:01,611 --> 01:13:03,122
So real quick on the book search. First

2047
01:13:03,122 --> 01:13:05,429
of all, again, thank you very very much

2048
01:13:05,429 --> 01:13:07,737
to everybody who participated. I'm sure we sold

2049
01:13:07,737 --> 01:13:09,817
a good number of books, We got very

2050
01:13:09,817 --> 01:13:11,799
close to hitting the top 10. If you're

2051
01:13:11,799 --> 01:13:13,543
curious, I do have some statistics on that

2052
01:13:13,543 --> 01:13:14,257
and some graph.

2053
01:13:15,050 --> 01:13:16,398
I will try to put that up somewhere.

2054
01:13:16,636 --> 01:13:17,926
I'm not maybe I'll add that to the

2055
01:13:17,926 --> 01:13:20,158
bottom of the book search blog post on

2056
01:13:20,158 --> 01:13:22,152
my website. But we got very close to

2057
01:13:22,152 --> 01:13:23,587
the top 10, And I I wanna give

2058
01:13:23,587 --> 01:13:25,261
it 1 more shot. So what I'm gonna

2059
01:13:25,261 --> 01:13:25,761
do

2060
01:13:26,314 --> 01:13:27,595
is for Saturday,

2061
01:13:28,074 --> 01:13:30,175
July twentieth. I'm gonna pick a single

2062
01:13:30,635 --> 01:13:32,175
day. So if you

2063
01:13:32,555 --> 01:13:34,555
missed it last week for some reason or

2064
01:13:34,555 --> 01:13:36,167
didn't get around to doing it, and would

2065
01:13:36,167 --> 01:13:37,201
like to try again.

2066
01:13:37,757 --> 01:13:39,746
Go to amazon dot com and buy a

2067
01:13:39,746 --> 01:13:42,371
copy of my book this Saturday, July twentieth.

2068
01:13:42,863 --> 01:13:44,453
If you are willing to buy more than

2069
01:13:44,453 --> 01:13:47,393
1 copy, currently, Amazon has a 3 for

2070
01:13:47,393 --> 01:13:49,618
the price of 2 sale going on,

2071
01:13:50,349 --> 01:13:51,546
It's not just my book it's other stuff

2072
01:13:51,546 --> 01:13:52,743
too. So I guess actually you might be

2073
01:13:52,743 --> 01:13:54,579
able to use that to buy some other

2074
01:13:54,579 --> 01:13:56,416
books besides mine. But if you wanted to

2075
01:13:56,416 --> 01:13:58,411
buy 3 copies of my book for the

2076
01:13:58,411 --> 01:14:00,259
price of 2, you could give the extra

2077
01:14:00,259 --> 01:14:02,248
copies to friends and family or maybe to

2078
01:14:02,248 --> 01:14:03,283
your local library,

2079
01:14:04,158 --> 01:14:06,147
a local high school library maybe or a

2080
01:14:06,147 --> 01:14:07,898
senior center. That's a great place for this

2081
01:14:07,898 --> 01:14:08,057
book.

2082
01:14:08,867 --> 01:14:10,536
So that... That's a that's a potential option,

2083
01:14:10,695 --> 01:14:12,443
and you could do that. And if you

2084
01:14:12,443 --> 01:14:13,738
can do it on Saturday,

2085
01:14:14,112 --> 01:14:15,781
we'll see if we can't focus all of

2086
01:14:15,781 --> 01:14:17,505
our attention on a single day and give

2087
01:14:17,782 --> 01:14:20,163
1 more shot to crack into the top

2088
01:14:20,163 --> 01:14:20,243
10.

2089
01:14:21,037 --> 01:14:22,545
Because we didn't really hit... We didn't really

2090
01:14:22,545 --> 01:14:24,052
hit the milestones. I did get some extra

2091
01:14:24,052 --> 01:14:27,243
reviews just a handful, which is look, better

2092
01:14:27,243 --> 01:14:27,640
than nothing,

2093
01:14:28,354 --> 01:14:29,703
but it's really, really hard to get reviews.

2094
01:14:29,941 --> 01:14:31,608
I definitely need more. You could still do

2095
01:14:31,608 --> 01:14:33,512
that because I would also like to get

2096
01:14:33,512 --> 01:14:35,675
the average rating my book up. Only went

2097
01:14:35,675 --> 01:14:37,195
up a tenth of a point. I really

2098
01:14:37,195 --> 01:14:38,875
like to get it up higher. So that

2099
01:14:38,875 --> 01:14:40,555
is something else you could do. I don't

2100
01:14:40,555 --> 01:14:42,235
know if doing that on Saturday really counts.

2101
01:14:42,728 --> 01:14:44,160
Actually, I think it takes them, like, even

2102
01:14:44,160 --> 01:14:46,626
24 hours before the review posts. So maybe

2103
01:14:46,626 --> 01:14:47,739
you could do it on Friday. I don't

2104
01:14:47,739 --> 01:14:49,012
know that I even matters as far as

2105
01:14:49,012 --> 01:14:50,853
timing. But that is still something I would

2106
01:14:50,853 --> 01:14:52,518
love to have you do. So we'll give

2107
01:14:52,518 --> 01:14:54,422
that 1 more shot. Because we didn't really

2108
01:14:54,422 --> 01:14:56,246
make the milestones. I'm gonna hold off on

2109
01:14:56,246 --> 01:14:57,278
planning a Zoom call,

2110
01:14:58,250 --> 01:15:00,729
nevertheless, you know, if you did do something

2111
01:15:00,729 --> 01:15:02,409
here, you know, save some evidence of that,

2112
01:15:02,569 --> 01:15:05,130
take a screenshot of your social media post

2113
01:15:05,130 --> 01:15:05,630
or

2114
01:15:06,425 --> 01:15:08,345
your purchase email or something like that. Just

2115
01:15:08,345 --> 01:15:09,864
hold just hold onto to it. I've got

2116
01:15:09,864 --> 01:15:11,704
a couple more campaigns I wanna run in

2117
01:15:11,704 --> 01:15:12,985
the next 2 or 3 months or so.

2118
01:15:13,639 --> 01:15:15,074
And at the end of all that, I

2119
01:15:15,074 --> 01:15:16,908
think I'm gonna have a thank you Zoom

2120
01:15:16,908 --> 01:15:18,743
party. And so you'll need someone to punch

2121
01:15:18,743 --> 01:15:19,403
that ticket

2122
01:15:19,860 --> 01:15:21,694
to to to get your invite to that

2123
01:15:21,694 --> 01:15:23,051
party. So hold on to that evidence.

2124
01:15:23,783 --> 01:15:25,538
I may be asking for that later. Now,

2125
01:15:25,698 --> 01:15:27,134
I do have 1 more promotion.

2126
01:15:27,931 --> 01:15:29,447
And thank you very much to Grey fox,

2127
01:15:29,606 --> 01:15:31,440
who is what of... Which is the handle

2128
01:15:31,440 --> 01:15:33,057
for 1 of my patrons

2129
01:15:33,448 --> 01:15:35,456
who had an extra ticket to Def con

2130
01:15:35,511 --> 01:15:37,732
and is offering it up to me to

2131
01:15:37,732 --> 01:15:39,001
give away to you.

2132
01:15:39,636 --> 01:15:41,325
I realized this is only going to

2133
01:15:41,792 --> 01:15:43,301
appeal to a limited number of you. First

2134
01:15:43,301 --> 01:15:44,887
of all, you've gotta be able to go.

2135
01:15:45,523 --> 01:15:47,904
Again, it's August 8 through eleventh in Las

2136
01:15:48,063 --> 01:15:48,777
Vegas, Nevada,

2137
01:15:49,426 --> 01:15:51,251
So you... You're gonna have to buy a

2138
01:15:51,251 --> 01:15:52,520
plane ticket, and you're gonna have to get

2139
01:15:52,520 --> 01:15:54,345
lodging. But if you'd like to get in

2140
01:15:54,345 --> 01:15:55,773
and say 4 and 80 bucks,

2141
01:15:56,423 --> 01:15:58,254
We've got a ticket to give you. So

2142
01:15:58,333 --> 01:16:00,244
I'm going to do a straight up raffle

2143
01:16:00,244 --> 01:16:01,916
on that. If you're willing able to go,

2144
01:16:02,472 --> 01:16:05,034
send an email to me at dc c

2145
01:16:05,034 --> 01:16:06,944
24 as in dev con 24.

2146
01:16:07,502 --> 01:16:08,877
Dc c 24

2147
01:16:09,093 --> 01:16:11,162
at firewalls don't dot agnes dot com. And

2148
01:16:11,241 --> 01:16:12,276
I'll put that in the show notes too

2149
01:16:12,355 --> 01:16:13,803
So you don't have to remember it. But

2150
01:16:13,803 --> 01:16:15,159
shoot me an email and say that you'd

2151
01:16:15,159 --> 01:16:17,154
like to enter that raffle. Now, I am

2152
01:16:17,154 --> 01:16:18,908
gonna throw in 1 other bit of incentive.

2153
01:16:19,306 --> 01:16:21,220
As you know, I give away Dragon challenge

2154
01:16:21,220 --> 01:16:23,316
coins from time to time, and

2155
01:16:23,628 --> 01:16:25,778
besides having this really super cool dragon coin,

2156
01:16:26,653 --> 01:16:28,404
that also doubles as a d 20 die

2157
01:16:28,404 --> 01:16:30,256
that you can use to generate past phrases

2158
01:16:30,314 --> 01:16:32,701
at my website, d 20 key dot com,

2159
01:16:33,194 --> 01:16:34,966
if you should ever meet me in person

2160
01:16:35,103 --> 01:16:37,807
and present this coin, I will buy you

2161
01:16:37,807 --> 01:16:39,876
a drink on me. So I'm gonna offer

2162
01:16:39,876 --> 01:16:41,807
here as an additional incentive to

2163
01:16:42,197 --> 01:16:43,015
do this raffle

2164
01:16:43,947 --> 01:16:45,458
is if you sign up to be an

2165
01:16:45,458 --> 01:16:48,322
annual patron at the night aren't level or

2166
01:16:48,322 --> 01:16:48,822
higher

2167
01:16:49,213 --> 01:16:51,468
and you in the raffle, I will personally

2168
01:16:51,606 --> 01:16:54,637
hand you a dragon challenge coin and buy

2169
01:16:54,637 --> 01:16:56,871
you a drink on the spot in wonderful

2170
01:16:56,950 --> 01:16:58,840
Las Vegas Nevada when we both go

2171
01:16:59,597 --> 01:17:01,832
to Def con. And note that I'm still

2172
01:17:01,832 --> 01:17:04,467
doing the Treasure chest promotion that's an ongoing

2173
01:17:04,467 --> 01:17:06,063
thing for people who sign up as a

2174
01:17:06,063 --> 01:17:07,420
patron for night Erin and above,

2175
01:17:07,994 --> 01:17:09,592
And that is you basically get a 40

2176
01:17:09,592 --> 01:17:10,492
dollar value

2177
01:17:11,110 --> 01:17:13,608
coupon for either malware bites, proton

2178
01:17:14,067 --> 01:17:16,479
or safe port master. So it covers a

2179
01:17:16,479 --> 01:17:18,720
good bit of your of your annual subscription.

2180
01:17:19,360 --> 01:17:20,960
So that's all kinda wrapped into it. If

2181
01:17:20,960 --> 01:17:22,960
you've got any questions, you can let me

2182
01:17:22,960 --> 01:17:24,295
know when you send me an email a

2183
01:17:24,493 --> 01:17:26,326
24 at firewalls stones dot dragons dot com.

2184
01:17:26,884 --> 01:17:28,956
I will announce that winner probably in 2

2185
01:17:28,956 --> 01:17:30,708
weeks. I wanna make sure I have time

2186
01:17:30,708 --> 01:17:32,860
to get it to everybody but before we

2187
01:17:32,860 --> 01:17:33,577
go to Las Vegas.

2188
01:17:34,309 --> 01:17:35,736
So sometime the next 2 weeks if you

2189
01:17:35,736 --> 01:17:37,163
wanna enter into that raffle for a free

2190
01:17:37,163 --> 01:17:39,384
ticket to Def con 32, just shoot me

2191
01:17:39,384 --> 01:17:41,445
that email. And you can wait of course

2192
01:17:41,445 --> 01:17:41,945
until

2193
01:17:42,734 --> 01:17:44,252
you you find out if you win if

2194
01:17:44,252 --> 01:17:45,770
you also want to become a patron to

2195
01:17:45,770 --> 01:17:47,528
do the Dragon coin thing. That's totally up

2196
01:17:47,528 --> 01:17:49,445
to you. Alright. We're already running long. So

2197
01:17:49,445 --> 01:17:50,739
let me cut it off here. We've got

2198
01:17:50,739 --> 01:17:53,536
a great interview next week on Os or

2199
01:17:53,536 --> 01:17:56,332
open source intelligence with Jason Edison from Intel

2200
01:17:56,332 --> 01:17:58,170
techniques. That's a... Was a really great interview.

2201
01:17:58,583 --> 01:18:00,572
So stay tuned for that. And lots of

2202
01:18:00,572 --> 01:18:01,924
other great stuff coming down the pike. So

2203
01:18:01,924 --> 01:18:03,674
if you haven't already subscribed and then you

2204
01:18:03,674 --> 01:18:05,265
won't miss any of that goodness.

2205
01:18:06,000 --> 01:18:08,239
Alright. Take care everybody. Stay safe out there

2206
01:18:08,239 --> 01:18:10,000
and until next week as always.

2207
01:18:10,560 --> 01:18:12,212
Don't get caught with your dr