WEBVTT 00:02.654 --> 00:06.637 Hello. Welcome back to Conversations with 00:06.757 --> 00:10.459 Stephen Kamugasa. This is the fourth episode 00:10.659 --> 00:15.182 in our 2025 Leadership Series. Today's guest 00:15.843 --> 00:18.644 is a friend of this podcast, Mary Inman. 00:19.625 --> 00:22.267 Mary Inman is a partner at Whistleblower 00:22.327 --> 00:26.249 Partners, a boutique law firm specializing 00:26.389 --> 00:29.486 exclusively in representing clients and the 00:29.566 --> 00:32.808 various USA whistleblower reward programs. 00:34.149 --> 00:37.311 Mary was previously a long-time partner at 00:37.351 --> 00:39.993 the San Francisco office of Constantine Cannon, 00:40.693 --> 00:43.355 where she represented whistleblowers in the 00:43.435 --> 00:47.657 United States for over 20 years. In July 00:02.654 --> 00:50.439 2017, she moved to London for three years 00:51.079 --> 00:53.621 to start the firm's international whistleblower 00:53.781 --> 00:57.183 practice, which she oversaw until she left 00:57.663 --> 01:00.470 Constantine Cannon to found Whistleblower 01:00.650 --> 01:05.372 Partners. Mary now represents a growing number 01:05.472 --> 01:08.574 of foreign whistleblowers who want to reveal 01:08.594 --> 01:12.176 wrongdoing abroad that has a connection with 01:12.216 --> 01:16.198 the United States. She also frequently assists 01:16.338 --> 01:19.460 whistleblowers in submitting claims to foreign 01:19.600 --> 01:23.402 authorities, such as the National Tax Service 01:23.562 --> 01:27.164 of Korea, the Ontario Securities Commission, 01:27.967 --> 01:32.611 the Canada Revenue Agency and His Majesty's 01:32.891 --> 01:36.794 Revenue and Customs. In this episode, we 01:36.814 --> 01:40.077 discuss the topic, exposing your blind spots, 01:40.917 --> 01:42.839 the argument for fostering whistleblower 01:42.879 --> 01:47.142 voices to become a successful leader. Mary 01:47.242 --> 01:48.323 Inman, welcome. 01:49.364 --> 01:51.926 Thank you so much, Stephen. It's a pleasure 01:51.946 --> 01:52.827 to be here tonight. 01:53.697 --> 01:56.459 Your insightful question was a key part of 01:56.519 --> 02:00.642 my 2022 podcast interview with Guy Den, the 02:00.682 --> 02:03.845 founder of Protect. The podcast in question 02:03.925 --> 02:07.167 is entitled Whistleblower, an Angel, a Villain 02:07.688 --> 02:10.750 or a Bloody Fool. I recommend it highly. 02:11.731 --> 02:14.293 Specifically, you raised the connection between 02:14.333 --> 02:17.716 the Economic Crime Transparency and Enforcement 02:17.936 --> 02:23.194 Act 2022 aimed at exposing Russian oligarchs' 02:23.274 --> 02:27.034 financial activities in London and HMRC's 02:27.094 --> 02:30.715 discretionary whistleblower rewards. This 02:30.815 --> 02:33.736 highlighted your clear support for policies 02:33.796 --> 02:36.837 that compensate whistleblowers for providing 02:36.917 --> 02:40.777 crucial information. But first, Mary, can 02:40.797 --> 02:43.518 you please tell us something about your childhood 02:44.398 --> 02:46.859 and how did your childhood prepare you to 02:46.919 --> 02:50.081 become an effective and successful lawyer 02:50.121 --> 02:51.001 for Whistleblowers? 02:52.783 --> 02:54.984 You wanted to start at the beginning. I like 02:55.024 --> 02:59.867 that. So I was born and raised in a very 02:59.927 --> 03:02.409 small town on the Canadian border in Maine, 03:02.429 --> 03:07.992 a little town called Holton. And I think 03:08.032 --> 03:11.114 what prepared me best to be a lawyer was, 03:11.354 --> 03:17.739 frankly, my parents. My mom was a lifelong 03:17.840 --> 03:22.544 English teacher, and my father originally 03:22.604 --> 03:24.245 was an English teacher as well, then went 03:24.305 --> 03:27.108 and got his library sciences degree and became 03:27.128 --> 03:31.252 a librarian. So I was raised in a home where 03:31.592 --> 03:36.656 education, reading, inquiry, questioning 03:37.017 --> 03:41.360 was always sort of the broth and the stew 03:41.400 --> 03:46.925 that I simmered in. So I think questioning, 03:48.166 --> 03:52.949 poking holes, debate was very much part of 03:53.210 --> 03:58.561 our family dinners and just every part of 03:58.621 --> 04:01.762 my life. So I really credit my parents with 04:02.462 --> 04:05.104 creating the type of environment where I 04:05.144 --> 04:07.725 learned to question it and felt safe to question, 04:07.745 --> 04:11.867 but also just encouraging me to pursue my 04:11.907 --> 04:15.969 passions. They didn't pressure me in any 04:15.989 --> 04:18.730 way. They just exposed me to a lot of different 04:18.750 --> 04:23.713 things. So I had a number of lawyers in my 04:23.813 --> 04:25.974 family, not in my nuclear family, immediate 04:26.014 --> 04:31.437 family, but a very close family member was 04:31.457 --> 04:35.339 a justice of the Maine Supreme Court. And 04:35.439 --> 04:38.881 he had very much an outsized influence on 04:38.941 --> 04:43.984 me in terms of showing me just an introduction 04:44.044 --> 04:46.245 to the legal profession and all that it had 04:46.285 --> 04:50.142 to offer. It's really my family, I think, 04:50.222 --> 04:55.326 that helped give me the insight to realize 04:55.366 --> 04:59.749 that I was always someone who was very concerned 04:59.809 --> 05:04.012 about human rights and justice. From a very 05:04.072 --> 05:07.695 young age, I would complain mightily about 05:07.755 --> 05:10.578 injustice, whether it's even just in fairness 05:10.658 --> 05:13.099 in the home, whether my brother was getting 05:13.160 --> 05:16.239 away with not having to do as many chores, 05:16.399 --> 05:19.760 or even when I was in middle school, I remember 05:20.180 --> 05:24.582 in a debate, I took the side early on that 05:24.622 --> 05:26.703 I felt like women should be allowed to be 05:26.783 --> 05:31.604 in combat roles in the military. So it's 05:31.644 --> 05:35.046 just sort of, I've always sort of loved to 05:35.186 --> 05:36.846 argue and advocate. 05:37.987 --> 05:41.168 You had a great career at Constantine Cannon, 05:41.968 --> 05:45.921 where you were. a partner for a long time. 05:46.742 --> 05:48.803 While a partner at Constantine Cannon, you 05:48.883 --> 05:52.526 did many great things, including joining 05:52.946 --> 05:57.149 Shaifali Joshi-Clark, a senior forensic accountant 05:57.890 --> 06:00.492 in the whistleblower office of the Ontario 06:00.512 --> 06:04.395 Securities Commission as a co-panelist for 06:04.515 --> 06:07.917 a webinar titled The Expansion of Whistleblower 06:07.977 --> 06:12.781 Reward Programs in the US, Canada, and Globally. 06:13.939 --> 06:16.620 I'm particularly interested in your career 06:16.660 --> 06:19.962 trajectory. What motivated your decision 06:20.002 --> 06:22.943 to transition from a successful position 06:23.684 --> 06:26.885 at a well-regarded law firm to found your 06:27.025 --> 06:31.047 own practice? Additionally, could you elaborate 06:31.267 --> 06:34.529 on the key attributes and skills you believe 06:34.749 --> 06:38.030 are essential for a lawyer specializing in 06:38.090 --> 06:39.151 whistleblower cases? 06:40.686 --> 06:43.747 Sure. So your first part of your question 06:44.688 --> 06:49.049 was, why did I choose after 10 years working 06:49.069 --> 06:54.292 at Constantine Cannon to embark on a new 06:54.352 --> 06:58.753 chapter and co-found a new law firm? I think 06:59.013 --> 07:03.691 one of the main reasons is that When I was 07:03.771 --> 07:07.214 at Constantine, the firm was a much bigger 07:07.254 --> 07:11.678 firm, about 50 to 70 lawyers, with multiple 07:11.698 --> 07:16.182 different practice areas. And so whistleblowing 07:16.222 --> 07:19.364 was just one of the practice areas. The firm 07:19.484 --> 07:23.348 also did intellectual property. It did antitrust 07:23.388 --> 07:28.113 competition law. It did other civil litigation. 07:29.114 --> 07:32.859 So what often happens with lawyers is that 07:32.960 --> 07:36.164 we create conflicts for each other. So I 07:37.666 --> 07:42.565 think it really just became desirable to 07:42.585 --> 07:45.287 a group of us. There were about 13 of us 07:45.327 --> 07:47.849 who left and started our own practice to 07:48.349 --> 07:51.951 be able to specialize. It's particularly 07:52.051 --> 07:53.892 important, I think, with whistleblowers that 07:54.193 --> 07:59.457 they know that It's a very dangerous position 07:59.497 --> 08:01.739 to put yourself in to decide to blow the 08:01.779 --> 08:04.261 whistle and you do so at great risk to yourself 08:04.321 --> 08:07.164 personally and professionally. And I just 08:07.204 --> 08:10.127 think clients have more faith when they know 08:10.147 --> 08:12.809 that that's all you do, that there isn't 08:12.889 --> 08:15.031 another section of your firm that actually 08:16.072 --> 08:18.695 defends some of the very people or types 08:18.735 --> 08:22.001 of corporations that you take on. It just 08:22.041 --> 08:24.502 felt right for us to be able to say, this 08:24.562 --> 08:27.644 is all we do. We represent individuals. We 08:27.704 --> 08:30.165 don't represent the big corporations who 08:30.225 --> 08:32.046 are the targets. And I think it makes a lot 08:32.066 --> 08:33.787 of our clients feel much more comfortable. 08:34.247 --> 08:37.408 But it also, for us, allows us to have a 08:37.628 --> 08:41.110 full breadth of, and basically little to 08:41.190 --> 08:43.771 no limitations on the types of targets that 08:43.811 --> 08:46.441 we can take on, the companies that we can 08:46.541 --> 08:49.962 sue on behalf of whistleblowers. At Constantine, 08:50.002 --> 08:53.123 we were routinely, our wings were clipped 08:53.263 --> 08:56.464 because we might bring in a case and it could 08:56.484 --> 08:58.984 be against an existing firm client and then 08:59.224 --> 09:01.505 we'd have to decline for conflict of interest 09:01.545 --> 09:04.946 reasons. So it was an incredible place for 09:05.006 --> 09:08.107 me to work. I thoroughly enjoyed my 10 years 09:08.187 --> 09:13.528 there. And frankly, Constantine is a place 09:14.207 --> 09:18.311 really responsible for a huge focus area 09:18.371 --> 09:22.214 and passion in my career, which is through 09:22.254 --> 09:25.997 their London office. I was allowed to practice 09:26.038 --> 09:28.620 there for three years and really start to 09:28.740 --> 09:31.502 advocate for whistleblower reward programs 09:31.562 --> 09:34.905 internationally and also, most importantly, 09:35.085 --> 09:38.368 attract international whistleblowers into 09:38.388 --> 09:41.506 the US. I think a lot of People even in the 09:41.606 --> 09:44.068 US don't know about these programs, let alone 09:44.709 --> 09:48.432 globally. So it was just really terrific 09:48.573 --> 09:52.170 and giving me the pulpit to start. recruiting 09:52.230 --> 09:54.792 people and educating people that you don't 09:54.812 --> 09:57.054 have to be American to use these programs. 09:57.134 --> 09:59.395 And in fact, I think as we'll talk about 09:59.435 --> 10:02.037 a little bit later, by definition, Foreign 10:02.057 --> 10:05.239 Corrupt Practices Act violations, which whistleblowers 10:05.279 --> 10:07.981 can report to the SEC and to the DOJ now, 10:09.061 --> 10:11.623 by definition, those occur overseas, right? 10:12.224 --> 10:15.005 It's the bribery of a foreign government 10:15.045 --> 10:19.969 official. So it became a really great part 10:20.009 --> 10:25.418 of my a tool set and toolbox to get to cut 10:25.478 --> 10:27.660 my teeth in the international realm. And 10:27.720 --> 10:31.503 I have Constantine to thank for that. Oh, 10:31.783 --> 10:34.625 you asked about what attributes should a 10:34.725 --> 10:37.527 lawyer have to represent whistleblowers? 10:39.328 --> 10:43.131 I think what's probably little known and 10:43.171 --> 10:45.333 appreciated, but probably one of the most 10:45.413 --> 10:48.035 important skills is frankly, empathy and 10:48.095 --> 10:52.472 emotional intelligence. Whistleblowers, as 10:52.532 --> 10:55.773 I alluded to earlier, when they're in the 10:55.813 --> 10:57.914 process of making the decision whether or 10:57.974 --> 11:01.035 not to blow the whistle, it can be a life-changing 11:01.075 --> 11:05.582 and life-altering decision. That being said, 11:05.642 --> 11:07.963 sometimes our clients come to us and the 11:08.063 --> 11:09.443 horse is already out of the bar and they've 11:09.463 --> 11:13.504 already blown the whistle. But in those circumstances 11:13.564 --> 11:16.705 where a whistleblower is deciding and gets 11:16.785 --> 11:20.366 to make that choice, it really requires a 11:20.406 --> 11:22.927 lot of sensitivity and a lot of skills that 11:23.007 --> 11:24.827 they frankly don't teach you in law school 11:24.967 --> 11:29.228 in terms of really managing your client's 11:29.288 --> 11:31.309 expectation and testing them and pushing 11:31.349 --> 11:34.572 them to see that I often say that if you 11:35.012 --> 11:39.722 are a whistleblower who has a family, it 11:39.802 --> 11:42.124 can be really important to make sure that 11:42.144 --> 11:44.647 the family agrees with the decision because 11:44.667 --> 11:47.429 it can have repercussions for the whole family. 11:47.449 --> 11:50.752 And I've seen, for instance, research that 11:50.952 --> 11:53.915 the New England Journal of Medicine did that 11:54.155 --> 11:56.097 on pharmaceutical whistleblowers, whistleblowers 11:56.117 --> 11:58.780 who exposed fraud in the pharmaceutical industry, 11:58.820 --> 12:01.522 that they had higher incidences of divorce, 12:01.582 --> 12:04.345 of alcoholism, substance abuse, depression, 12:05.709 --> 12:07.691 because of the strains and the pressure. 12:07.791 --> 12:12.596 So I think it really requires a lot of awareness 12:13.057 --> 12:17.742 and ability to counsel. And because a whistleblower, 12:18.002 --> 12:19.924 by the time that they're coming to us, they're 12:20.024 --> 12:24.656 often an extremist. They're often facing 12:25.416 --> 12:27.738 a very stressful situation or maybe in the 12:27.779 --> 12:31.202 middle of it. And it's difficult often to 12:31.242 --> 12:33.925 make those the best decisions when you're 12:34.505 --> 12:37.908 in a state of stress. So a lot of what we 12:37.988 --> 12:40.771 try and do is sort of, you know, try and 12:40.831 --> 12:43.374 ground them and make sure that they're in 12:43.394 --> 12:45.657 a place where they feel safe. to talk and 12:45.697 --> 12:48.580 that they can logically think through what 12:48.700 --> 12:50.601 the implications might be for them. So I 12:50.641 --> 12:53.904 think that is sort of a skill set that not 12:53.944 --> 12:56.206 all lawyers are required to have, but I think 12:57.547 --> 12:59.849 it's particularly important skill set to 12:59.909 --> 13:01.510 have when you're dealing with whistleblowers. 13:02.010 --> 13:05.013 We may talk later today in the interview 13:05.113 --> 13:07.715 about sort of the psychosocial impacts on 13:08.342 --> 13:10.264 whistleblowers, unfortunately, we've seen 13:10.304 --> 13:15.308 a number of whistleblowers, not only be blacklisted, 13:16.329 --> 13:20.773 block listed from future job prospects, but 13:21.053 --> 13:25.197 the sort of spiral that can happen can be 13:25.237 --> 13:29.321 a downward spiral, which unfortunately, has 13:29.441 --> 13:32.641 resulted in even suicide for some for some 13:32.681 --> 13:34.461 whistleblowers. I know a lot of people are 13:34.501 --> 16:32.446 familiar with John Barnett, the Boeing 737 13:37.562 --> 13:39.363 Max whistleblower who took his life in the 13:39.403 --> 13:43.663 middle of depositions in his case. But even 13:43.804 --> 13:46.864 recently an open AI whistleblower named Sushir 13:46.944 --> 13:52.185 Balaji. There was even a Theranos whistleblower, 13:52.205 --> 13:54.386 a little known fact, who took his life under 13:54.406 --> 14:00.647 the pressure. So it's an unfortunate, circumstance. 14:00.727 --> 14:03.089 And again, I think requires whistleblower 14:03.129 --> 14:07.071 lawyers, although we're not trained as therapists, 14:07.571 --> 14:10.532 to have some real sensitivity and ability 14:10.612 --> 14:14.094 to help the whistleblower see the full picture 14:14.134 --> 14:17.996 and basically serve as a support system because 14:18.536 --> 14:21.679 it can be incredibly difficult when you blow 14:21.699 --> 14:23.481 the whistle in an organization. I think we're 14:23.501 --> 14:25.743 now all, I think, as a result of the Me Too 14:25.783 --> 14:28.605 movement, aware of the terms like gaslighting 14:29.246 --> 14:31.548 and this sort of self-doubt that gets created 14:31.568 --> 14:35.911 because often there's an approach taken by 14:36.272 --> 14:38.574 companies. I've often said most companies, 14:38.634 --> 14:40.835 regardless of industry, seem to have a corporate 14:40.875 --> 14:44.111 playbook. which I think comes from the medieval 14:44.172 --> 14:47.674 mindset that a lot of us are in, that when 14:47.714 --> 14:51.037 a whistleblower blows a whistle, rather than 14:51.257 --> 14:54.239 embracing them and thanking them for helping 14:55.099 --> 14:57.021 be the canaries in the coal mine to help 14:57.321 --> 15:01.917 the company to avoid risk, they often shoot 15:01.957 --> 15:04.939 the messenger and make it. So the whistleblower 15:04.959 --> 15:07.400 is just shining the light on a problem and 15:07.440 --> 15:10.502 it's like a ricochet effect. Most companies 15:10.582 --> 15:13.424 will all of a sudden say, well, really it's 15:13.484 --> 15:15.925 about you, the whistleblower, which can be 15:15.986 --> 15:18.847 completely disorienting. And then, you know, 15:18.887 --> 15:21.289 they try and make an example of them and 15:21.429 --> 15:25.641 often either fire them, demote them. And 15:25.701 --> 15:28.303 that causes like everyone around them to 15:28.383 --> 15:31.904 worry their fellow employees that this might 15:31.944 --> 15:35.186 be contagious. And so they tend to get isolated 15:35.246 --> 15:37.267 and then they start to doubt, am I the only 15:37.327 --> 15:41.790 person who thinks this is wrong? So can be 15:41.810 --> 15:46.101 a very stressful situation. process. And 15:46.481 --> 15:50.404 I think a whistleblower lawyer needs to have 15:50.444 --> 15:53.867 the human and emotional intelligence skills 15:54.307 --> 15:56.649 to support someone through that, and guide 15:56.689 --> 16:00.932 them and be there as a sounding board and, 16:01.572 --> 16:04.815 and a gateway to more resources. We are very 16:04.875 --> 16:06.916 strong. And like I said earlier, telling 16:06.956 --> 16:09.342 our clients to make sure if they're comfortable, 16:09.402 --> 16:11.423 that it'd be great to bring the family in. 16:11.503 --> 16:15.443 It's also important to have therapy and to 16:15.483 --> 16:17.924 be able to talk about the pressures so that, 16:18.504 --> 16:21.924 and to start to rebuild and create new support 16:21.984 --> 16:24.785 systems since they often have lost, you know, 16:25.185 --> 16:28.886 not just their job, but all the social relationships 16:28.926 --> 16:32.446 that come from that with coworkers and friends. 16:33.507 --> 16:37.411 In the webinar mentioned earlier, You talked 16:37.471 --> 16:40.353 at length about the qui tam provisions of 16:40.373 --> 16:44.715 the US False Claims Act, which empower whistleblowers 16:44.755 --> 16:48.137 to launch a lawsuit in the government's name 16:48.737 --> 16:51.338 when they have information about fraud against 16:51.358 --> 16:55.740 the government or one of its programs. Mary, 16:56.421 --> 16:58.782 for someone living and working in New York 16:58.882 --> 17:02.103 City, how would you describe the practical 17:02.123 --> 17:05.105 significance of a whistleblower reward program? 17:06.058 --> 17:08.902 Why should the average New Yorker be concerned 17:09.503 --> 17:10.925 with these programs? 17:12.267 --> 17:14.591 Yeah, I love that question because it kind 17:14.631 --> 17:17.255 of goes to the heart of the work that we 17:17.315 --> 17:22.113 do. So whistleblower reward programs are 17:22.173 --> 17:26.715 really extraordinary. And the reason for 17:26.755 --> 17:30.796 that is that the original whistleblower reward 17:30.856 --> 17:32.837 statute is something called the False Claims 17:33.057 --> 17:36.679 Act. It's also known as Lincoln's Law. It 17:36.719 --> 17:39.900 came in in 1863 around the time of the Civil 17:39.960 --> 17:43.521 War. And it was actually a concept that was 17:44.301 --> 17:47.987 stolen from English common law. So this comes 17:48.107 --> 17:51.450 from the seventh century when, before there 17:51.490 --> 17:54.432 were police services, the king incentivized 17:54.652 --> 17:59.555 and deputized private citizens to basically 17:59.615 --> 18:02.457 expose when their neighbors were not observing 18:02.497 --> 18:05.760 the Sabbath laws, for instance. So it's a 18:05.800 --> 18:09.582 concept that allows whistleblowers, and in 18:09.622 --> 18:13.645 the context of the Civil War, it was, whistleblowers 18:13.665 --> 18:16.600 had information about unscrupulous defense 18:16.660 --> 18:19.021 contractors who are selling gum powder cut 18:19.061 --> 18:24.004 with sawdust, defective horses and military 18:24.044 --> 18:28.707 equipment, and recognizing that it is very 18:28.767 --> 18:31.569 hard for the government to detect that kind 18:31.629 --> 18:34.330 of fraud unless they incentivize insiders 18:34.450 --> 18:37.352 inside the very defense companies where the 18:37.392 --> 18:39.894 bad behavior is occurring. There's some very 18:40.434 --> 18:45.618 incredible testimony that was in the Congress 18:45.658 --> 18:47.363 at the time that the bill was being passed, 18:47.383 --> 18:50.513 that it said, it takes a rogue to catch a 18:50.594 --> 18:54.119 rogue. Which is one of my favorite statements, 18:54.179 --> 18:57.761 right? It recognizes that that's very difficult 18:57.982 --> 19:00.963 for an auditor or an investigator from the 19:01.003 --> 19:03.605 defense department to know what's going on. 19:04.125 --> 19:07.788 But a whistleblower insider, which is the 19:07.808 --> 19:10.169 prototypical whistleblower, can provide a 19:10.209 --> 19:14.792 roadmap to the fraud. They can show exactly 19:14.892 --> 19:17.634 why, when, and the knowledge requirements 19:17.674 --> 19:20.282 that the company knew They were selling these 19:20.323 --> 19:22.424 defective goods and they did it intentionally 19:22.844 --> 19:26.967 to improve their profit margin. So, but what 19:27.007 --> 19:29.768 makes it remarkable is under, in the example 19:29.788 --> 19:32.710 of the False Claims Act, not only a whistleblower 19:32.730 --> 19:35.011 doesn't just get to submit a tip, they get 19:35.051 --> 19:37.713 to launch a lawsuit in the name of the government. 19:38.453 --> 19:40.875 So they really are deputized as a private 19:40.935 --> 19:43.356 attorney general. And I think why it matters 19:44.197 --> 19:49.164 to, The average New Yorker, not just to prosecutors, 19:49.244 --> 19:52.265 obviously prosecutors love these cases because 19:53.086 --> 19:55.347 they're much easier to prove. The whistleblower 19:55.947 --> 19:58.848 gives them all the smoking guns and the great 19:58.928 --> 20:01.329 evidence and other testimonies. But to an 20:01.489 --> 20:05.010 average New Yorker, why these programs matter 20:05.190 --> 20:08.612 is because if you're working in a company, 20:09.457 --> 20:11.979 like so many people are, if you have either 20:12.059 --> 20:14.040 contracts with the federal government, if 20:14.080 --> 20:17.222 you're a government contractor, or if your 20:17.283 --> 20:21.646 business impacts some of the many other agencies' 20:21.806 --> 20:24.447 work that also have rewards programs. So 20:24.488 --> 20:26.569 for instance, if you're in financial services 20:26.649 --> 20:29.091 in New York City, there's an SEC program 20:29.131 --> 20:31.953 that allows whistleblowers to report on any 20:32.013 --> 20:34.194 sort of securities fraud where investors 20:34.274 --> 20:37.316 are harmed. There is a risk that you will 20:37.336 --> 20:41.293 get caught So I think that deterrence is 20:41.433 --> 20:43.836 one of the biggest things that people should 20:43.876 --> 20:47.820 be aware of, right? That if you're in a company 20:47.860 --> 20:51.124 and you don't speak up about any sort of 20:51.184 --> 20:53.406 malfeasance, there's a very good chance someone 20:53.446 --> 20:56.029 in the cubicle beside you may already be 20:56.049 --> 20:58.653 incentivized to speak to the government and 20:58.693 --> 21:02.577 cooperating with them. So detection, the 21:02.617 --> 21:05.940 chance of detection is increased. And so, 21:05.960 --> 21:10.024 you know, malfeasance is more likely to see 21:10.064 --> 21:13.087 the light of day, which can be seen as a 21:13.127 --> 21:16.250 good thing or a bad thing depending on what 21:16.310 --> 21:19.649 side you sit on. But I think, You know, I 21:20.129 --> 21:22.490 think it's one of the strengths of these 21:22.530 --> 21:25.331 laws is they tend to be a very much a bipartisan 21:25.391 --> 21:29.493 issue that no one's really pro-fraud. Who 21:29.593 --> 21:32.854 wants taxpayer dollars to be misappropriated? 21:33.855 --> 21:36.096 You know, Republicans and Democrats can both 21:37.176 --> 21:40.618 get behind that. And that's one of the things 21:40.658 --> 21:43.119 that I've seen in my career, Stephen, is, 21:44.199 --> 21:45.500 you know, when I started, it was just the 21:45.540 --> 21:47.981 False Claims Act was the statute that was 21:48.021 --> 21:51.379 in existence and then Since that time, the 21:51.820 --> 21:55.663 IRS, the SEC, the CFTC, I know this is American 21:55.743 --> 21:58.605 alphabet soup for all of our agencies, the 21:58.645 --> 22:02.028 Transportation Department, the Treasury Department, 22:02.328 --> 22:06.892 and even now DOJ has just within the past 22:06.932 --> 22:09.915 two weeks adopted an antitrust program. So 22:10.895 --> 22:14.759 clearly, this is a growth industry, clearly, 22:15.931 --> 22:18.759 The inside information whistleblowers provide 22:19.300 --> 22:21.988 is invaluable and in fact, supercharges the 22:22.850 --> 22:27.043 enforcement. efforts by all of these various 22:27.163 --> 22:30.044 agencies in the government. And you know, 22:30.104 --> 22:31.985 it goes back to something we've seen before 22:32.025 --> 22:34.426 this idea that we pay confidential informants 22:34.506 --> 22:37.287 is really, that's something that we see around 22:37.327 --> 22:40.868 the globe. It really sort of picks up on 22:40.908 --> 22:44.890 that notion, and has been enormously successful. 22:44.970 --> 22:48.381 And I think that is really proof of why people 22:48.401 --> 22:51.022 should pay attention. It's not just limited 22:51.102 --> 22:55.583 to private contractors these days. Whistleblowers 22:55.643 --> 22:58.283 are now incentivized to report on tax fraud, 22:58.323 --> 23:00.783 securities fraud, sanctions violations, money 23:00.843 --> 23:06.324 laundering, antitrust, bid rigging, you name 23:06.344 --> 23:09.845 it. So it becomes increasingly riskier to 23:10.545 --> 23:13.206 engage in this behavior with the prospect 23:13.246 --> 23:15.446 of insiders being incentivized to speak up. 23:16.661 --> 23:20.924 On March 13th, 2025, you posted on LinkedIn 23:21.004 --> 23:24.747 the following, and I quote, after advocating 23:24.807 --> 23:28.991 for this result since 2017, during my work 23:29.131 --> 23:32.213 in London, I'm so chuffed to see this news 23:32.293 --> 23:35.956 that HM Revenue and Customs will be adopting 23:35.976 --> 23:39.979 a US and Canadian style program, guaranteeing 23:40.480 --> 23:43.768 rewards to whistleblowers who bring actionable 23:43.868 --> 23:47.710 information about violations of UK tax laws. 23:48.790 --> 23:52.412 In the US, empowering tax whistleblowers 23:52.972 --> 23:56.693 has been a proven strategy for success. Between 23:16.661 --> 24:01.435 2007 and 2023, the Internal Revenue Service 24:01.535 --> 24:06.597 collected 6.9 US billions in proceeds as 24:06.777 --> 24:10.238 a result of whistleblower informant tips. 24:11.189 --> 24:14.651 This program will go a long way towards recouping 24:14.671 --> 24:19.012 the 5.5 British pounds lost to tax fraud 24:19.173 --> 24:23.214 in the UK every year. Eight years is a long 24:23.274 --> 24:28.216 time for an advocacy work. In a 2022 podcast 24:28.277 --> 24:30.618 interview with Guy Dehn, which I mentioned 24:30.698 --> 24:35.120 earlier, Guy posited a cultural divergence 24:35.240 --> 24:38.521 between the Americas and England regarding 24:38.601 --> 24:42.350 the monetization of information Specifically, 24:42.711 --> 24:46.232 he suggested a reticence among the English 24:46.832 --> 24:51.194 to directly exchange information for monetary 24:51.634 --> 24:55.916 compensation. Mary, to what extent do you 24:55.976 --> 24:58.497 believe this cultural factor contributed 24:58.557 --> 25:01.959 to the protracted eight-year timeline? If 25:02.039 --> 25:05.701 it was a significant factor, what actionable 25:05.741 --> 25:08.802 strategies would you recommend to cultivate 25:08.922 --> 25:12.576 a more normalized culture of information 25:12.596 --> 25:14.939 monetization within the English context. 25:16.401 --> 25:20.487 This is one of my favorite questions, frankly, 25:20.907 --> 25:24.472 is to talk about the cultural differences 25:24.572 --> 25:29.525 between the UK and the US. as it comes to 25:29.725 --> 25:32.486 incentivizing paying whistleblowers. So I 25:32.646 --> 25:37.109 absolutely believe that these cultural differences 25:37.349 --> 25:42.092 are what led to a very long and protracted 25:42.172 --> 25:47.278 period of resistance to these ideas. After 25:47.398 --> 25:49.639 Dodd-Frank, so the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 25:49.699 --> 25:52.040 Reform Act is when we ushered in, in the 25:52.100 --> 25:54.441 United States, in the wake of the financial 25:54.481 --> 25:57.483 crisis, we ushered in the new SEC whistleblower 25:57.563 --> 26:01.905 reward program. And it was, and that, you 26:01.945 --> 26:04.706 know, it took off rather quickly that it 26:04.846 --> 26:07.988 really got on people's radars. There were 26:08.008 --> 26:11.209 a number of successes, and it really put 26:11.249 --> 26:14.150 the SEC on the map. And so not shortly after 26:14.170 --> 26:17.027 that, around 2014, so that The program came 26:17.147 --> 32:40.588 in and really was started in earnest in 2010. 26:20.210 --> 26:23.874 And in 2014, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority 26:23.994 --> 26:26.456 did an analysis and said, should we do this? 26:26.516 --> 26:29.960 We're now seeing some success in the US. 26:30.080 --> 26:33.483 And basically, the decision was, it's just 26:33.523 --> 26:36.286 not British. Or as they like to say, it's 26:36.326 --> 26:42.331 not cricket. And so they had some reasons 26:42.431 --> 26:44.493 that were more substantive, but I think it 26:44.533 --> 26:46.674 really came down to the cultural piece of 26:46.735 --> 26:48.616 it. And it's certainly what I observed during 26:48.656 --> 26:52.379 my three years living there. You know, literally 26:52.459 --> 26:54.741 people would step back when I told them what 26:54.821 --> 26:56.842 I did, they would just, you know, shake their 26:56.862 --> 27:00.765 head. And, you know, the idea was, it's not 27:00.845 --> 27:03.688 British, we're British, we blow the whistle 27:03.708 --> 27:06.110 because it's the right thing to do. We don't 27:06.170 --> 27:08.532 need to be paid for it. And somehow being 27:08.592 --> 27:12.255 paid for it tarnished the moral righteousness 27:12.316 --> 27:16.800 of the act. And the more I observed that, 27:16.820 --> 27:19.502 and it was really almost to a person that 27:19.543 --> 27:22.685 I would get this visceral reaction. The more 27:22.785 --> 27:24.566 I observed it, the more I realized that a 27:24.646 --> 27:27.287 lot of it comes from a bias about Americans. 27:27.447 --> 27:29.807 Brits want to be different than Americans, 27:29.907 --> 27:32.608 right? And we obviously, we all want to be 27:32.688 --> 27:35.729 unique. And I think Americans are perceived 27:35.769 --> 27:38.550 by Brits rightly or wrongly or stereotypically 27:38.650 --> 27:41.771 as overly transactional and overly mercenary. 27:42.571 --> 27:45.832 So this was an idea that was not attracted 27:45.852 --> 27:48.073 to them for that reason. Like we don't want 27:48.113 --> 27:50.654 to become like those transactional mercenary 27:50.714 --> 27:53.617 Americans. And so to the second part of your 27:53.657 --> 27:56.098 question, like how did this change? What 27:56.139 --> 28:00.201 were the strategies we adopted? A lot of 28:00.281 --> 28:03.923 it came from, you know, people like me and 28:04.043 --> 28:06.645 other folks talking, not just me, many others, 28:06.685 --> 28:09.687 but saying that you don't have to do it the 28:09.747 --> 28:12.529 American way. Like you can make your program 28:12.569 --> 28:14.350 British. There are many ways to do it. For 28:14.410 --> 28:16.791 instance, if you look at how another Commonwealth 28:16.831 --> 28:19.653 country, Canada, adopted these programs, 28:19.713 --> 28:22.835 they had smaller raiseds of rewards. So in 28:22.855 --> 28:25.937 the US, it's usually 10 to 30% that a whistleblower 28:25.977 --> 28:29.900 can receive of a fine as a finder's fee for 28:29.960 --> 28:33.202 their providing the information. In Canada, 28:33.222 --> 28:35.424 it can be five to 15, and sometimes they 28:35.464 --> 28:38.025 put caps on it. A lot of the complaints that 28:38.566 --> 28:40.607 British people have is that we, I think the 28:40.647 --> 28:43.469 word they use is gobsmacking amounts of money 28:43.589 --> 28:46.131 often gets rewarded to whistleblowers. The 28:46.251 --> 28:49.873 largest reward I'm aware of is $275 million. 28:49.913 --> 28:53.574 So, you know, you can put a cap on that, 28:53.654 --> 28:55.895 other things like you, but I think what really 28:55.935 --> 28:59.436 turned the tides is when, at least in my 28:59.496 --> 29:01.437 experience, I was working with the all party 29:01.477 --> 29:04.258 parliamentary group for whistleblowing and 29:04.418 --> 29:09.300 one of the co-chairs of that group was a 29:09.340 --> 29:11.821 woman named Baroness Susan Kramer, who's 29:11.861 --> 29:15.702 still a strong champion for whistleblowing 29:16.890 --> 29:19.012 generally in improvements to the Public Interest 29:19.032 --> 29:22.354 Disclosure Act. And she seemed representative 29:22.374 --> 29:24.596 to me because it was clear when she started 29:24.616 --> 29:27.378 to make speeches about rewards, when she 29:27.438 --> 29:31.361 started to think about it less as a bounty 29:31.981 --> 29:34.783 and more as unemployment insurance, that 29:34.803 --> 29:37.765 it sits more as a financial safety net, just 29:37.865 --> 29:41.128 another form of protection. When she thought 29:41.168 --> 29:43.330 about it that way, it felt more British to 29:43.390 --> 29:46.052 her that these people are undertaking a risk 29:46.152 --> 29:48.574 on behalf of the public interest. And as 29:48.634 --> 29:50.816 a result, they often lose their job and their 29:50.856 --> 29:54.139 livelihoods. So isn't really what Americans 29:54.199 --> 29:57.182 call a reward? Isn't it really more just 29:57.282 --> 30:00.604 like unemployment insurance, or a safety 30:00.644 --> 30:03.785 net. And, and that I think helped her make 30:03.825 --> 30:05.805 it feel like it's more British if she put 30:05.865 --> 30:08.706 it into her own context. So I think, I think 30:08.746 --> 30:11.846 a lot of that is what finally turned the 30:11.886 --> 30:15.707 tides, frankly, the fact that the labor government 30:15.827 --> 30:19.008 is now in place, there's a minister by the 30:19.048 --> 30:21.608 name of David Lammy, when he was a shadow 30:21.648 --> 30:24.789 minister before labor became the party, the 30:27.406 --> 30:30.407 government party in office. I think he did 30:30.447 --> 30:33.909 a tour of the US and became enamored of reward 30:33.969 --> 30:37.310 programs and had actually even put it into 30:37.350 --> 30:40.572 the labor party platform. So there seems 30:40.652 --> 30:43.513 to be a perfect storm right now in a good 30:43.573 --> 30:46.574 way of the labor government that is trying 30:46.614 --> 30:50.976 to close the tax gap, deal with budget shortfalls, 30:51.056 --> 30:54.477 and recognizes that confidential informants 30:54.577 --> 30:57.721 properly incentivize can be indispensable 30:57.741 --> 31:02.306 in helping supercharge enforcement efforts. 31:02.326 --> 31:05.689 So I think it's a little bit of both. And 31:05.789 --> 31:09.572 also I would commend to your audience an 31:09.633 --> 31:13.016 incredible research paper done by a British 31:13.096 --> 31:15.729 group think tank associated with the Ministry 31:15.749 --> 31:18.572 of Defense called RUSI, the Royal United 31:18.653 --> 31:21.296 Services Institute. They have a Center for 31:21.396 --> 31:25.241 Finance and Security. And a woman by the 31:25.281 --> 31:27.744 name, a researcher by the name of Eliza Lockhart 31:27.865 --> 31:32.217 wrote a lengthy A research report came out 31:32.237 --> 31:35.118 in December of last year that said, basically 31:35.178 --> 31:38.479 concluded that the use of whistleblower incentives 31:38.799 --> 31:41.360 would really serve the British government 31:41.420 --> 31:44.941 well in fighting financial crime. So I feel 31:44.981 --> 31:47.842 like a lot of that has sort of all come at 31:47.862 --> 31:50.123 the same time and it's resulted, I think, 31:50.183 --> 31:53.545 in a bit of a shift in the opinion, a pretty 31:54.105 --> 31:56.206 radical shift for me because I think it went 31:56.306 --> 31:59.567 from a lot of groups just saying it's not 31:59.587 --> 32:02.309 British to all of a sudden, even now, the 32:02.709 --> 32:04.810 head of the serious frauds office, Nick Ephgrave, 32:05.571 --> 32:08.092 is a strong champion of rewards. Even the 32:08.212 --> 32:11.114 FCA has started to change their tune. And 32:11.234 --> 32:14.136 obviously, as you mentioned in the preamble 32:14.236 --> 32:19.579 to your question, HMRC will be hopefully 32:19.639 --> 32:23.361 adopting, it's announced its program, it 32:23.381 --> 32:26.385 will be launched this fall. So I within the 32:26.445 --> 32:28.126 next month or two, we'll be hearing more 32:28.166 --> 32:31.526 about that. So it's rather remarkable. And 32:31.546 --> 32:34.347 I, as I said earlier, to quote my British, 32:34.647 --> 32:40.588 favorite British expression, I'm quite chuffed. 32:41.289 --> 32:45.610 Your 2014 podcast with Evan Epstein on boardroom 32:45.710 --> 32:49.471 governance was insightful. I especially appreciated 32:49.511 --> 32:52.951 your emphasis on a broad approach encapsulated 32:53.131 --> 32:56.221 in your quote, which I'll quote here. the 32:56.421 --> 32:59.322 arc of the moral universe is long, but it 32:59.443 --> 33:03.724 bends towards jobs. However, this contrasts 33:03.804 --> 33:06.125 sharply with the reality of whistleblowing, 33:06.726 --> 33:10.087 which is often career-ending, particularly 33:10.107 --> 33:13.108 within institutions like the UK's National 33:13.128 --> 33:17.270 Health Service. For those unfamiliar with 33:17.290 --> 33:20.552 your excellent interview with Evan Epstein, 33:20.612 --> 33:24.296 which I strongly recommend, could you describe 33:24.336 --> 33:26.338 the emotional journey of the whistleblower. 33:27.118 --> 33:30.822 Specifically, how should young lawyers guide 33:30.862 --> 33:33.344 their clients facing this difficult decision? 33:33.965 --> 33:36.767 Perhaps you could give us an example. 33:38.369 --> 33:43.274 Yes, absolutely. So I'm definitely quoting 33:44.335 --> 33:48.514 the good Dr. Martin Luther King there. His 33:48.574 --> 33:52.076 famous quote is, the moral arc of the universe 33:52.136 --> 33:56.259 is long, but it bends towards justice. And 33:56.359 --> 33:59.801 for whistleblowers, hopefully it bends towards 33:59.921 --> 34:04.183 jobs as well. The emotional journey of a 34:04.283 --> 34:10.027 whistleblower typically follows a path that 34:10.147 --> 34:12.929 starts with them maybe not even knowing they're 34:12.949 --> 34:17.116 a whistleblower. So it can be a path of confusion 34:17.176 --> 34:19.298 at first. So if you, for instance, are the 34:19.338 --> 34:21.319 head of internal audit, if you're a chief 34:21.379 --> 34:25.062 compliance officer, it is your job oftentimes 34:25.122 --> 34:27.524 to deliver bad news, right? Like we can't 34:27.584 --> 34:30.126 do this, that's, you know, this would transgress 34:30.166 --> 34:33.668 certain laws, or I just did an audit that 34:33.708 --> 42:47.819 says we need to pay back, you know, $500 34:36.791 --> 34:39.513 million to the US government because of an 34:39.553 --> 34:43.229 accounting irregularity. So they often bring 34:43.269 --> 34:46.510 that information forward just as part of 34:46.530 --> 34:48.951 their job, not thinking that they're gonna 34:48.971 --> 34:51.292 be turned into a whistleblower. And I've 34:51.332 --> 34:54.413 often said it's companies who create whistleblowers 34:54.533 --> 34:57.034 often by how they react to the information 34:57.114 --> 35:00.355 that individuals are bringing. So it can 35:00.415 --> 35:03.055 often be very disorienting. The first part 35:03.075 --> 35:04.796 of the emotional journey is that they bring 35:04.836 --> 35:06.596 this information, they're doing their job, 35:06.997 --> 35:10.662 and all of a sudden, Instead of being applauded 35:10.682 --> 35:14.225 or rewarded by, you know, good performance 35:14.245 --> 35:17.107 evaluations for doing the work, speaking 35:17.147 --> 35:20.030 the hard truths, they all of a sudden start 35:20.070 --> 35:25.054 to be shut out of meetings, denied promotions. 35:25.074 --> 35:27.215 They may have, often the case with many of 35:27.235 --> 35:28.837 my clients, they've had years and years and 35:28.857 --> 35:31.170 years of great performance reviews. all of 35:31.210 --> 35:33.791 a sudden they're found not to be a team player, 35:35.372 --> 35:38.574 reasons, pretextual reasons, pretextual reasons 35:38.594 --> 35:42.556 start to show up about, you know, oh, someone 35:42.576 --> 35:44.077 who might've been chronically late their 35:44.117 --> 35:45.938 whole career, all of a sudden it becomes 35:45.998 --> 35:49.139 a problem. And they start, you know, they 35:49.179 --> 35:52.621 start to just be mystified. Again, that this 35:53.441 --> 35:57.667 idea of, Because you've spoken an inconvenient 35:57.727 --> 35:59.548 truth, we're going to make the problem about 35:59.608 --> 36:02.489 you, the messenger, rather than looking at 36:02.529 --> 36:05.811 the message. Companies, just like humans, 36:05.871 --> 36:08.232 when they're criticized, will often get in 36:08.272 --> 36:11.013 a defensive crouch and not be in a growth 36:11.073 --> 36:14.235 mindset set. So that can be really disorienting 36:14.275 --> 36:17.791 for for a whistleblower that, you know, they 36:17.831 --> 36:18.872 don't even know they're a whistleblower and 36:18.892 --> 36:20.832 all of a sudden they're getting retaliated 36:20.892 --> 36:24.693 against and they don't know why. And so the 36:24.753 --> 36:28.053 journey will often start under very stressful 36:28.093 --> 36:30.234 circumstances at work, because that's the 36:30.294 --> 36:32.354 typical whistleblower is an insider whose 36:32.434 --> 36:37.675 employer is engaged in illegality. And so, 36:38.535 --> 36:40.796 you know, particularly for Americans where 36:40.876 --> 36:44.749 so much of our self-worth, I think, is derived 36:44.789 --> 36:46.530 from our jobs. I think that's true of many 36:46.610 --> 36:49.833 humans, but Americans, we have a workaholic 36:49.893 --> 36:55.939 type tendency that when you start to suffer, 36:55.979 --> 36:57.981 you know, so much of your social connection 36:58.021 --> 36:59.642 and your self-worth comes out of that, all 36:59.662 --> 37:02.525 of a sudden, you know, you're probably likely 37:02.585 --> 37:06.777 on your way to losing your job. that can 37:06.817 --> 37:10.079 be incredibly difficult. As I described earlier, 37:10.139 --> 37:14.442 you lose your social network from work and 37:15.442 --> 37:18.144 you may find it difficult to find another 37:18.164 --> 37:21.626 job. I had a client who was featured in the 37:21.686 --> 37:26.389 New Yorker magazine who for years kept getting 37:26.429 --> 37:28.610 job interviews and doing pretty well, but 37:28.710 --> 37:31.292 up until the point of where references were 37:31.332 --> 37:34.008 needed and then he wouldn't hear again. And 37:34.048 --> 37:36.429 that was because the employer that he exposed 37:36.469 --> 37:42.593 for Medicare fraud seemed to have been spreading 37:42.633 --> 37:44.794 the word that you don't want him in your 37:44.834 --> 37:46.755 organization because he's a whistleblower. 37:46.775 --> 37:51.676 So. You know, and then you end up without 37:51.717 --> 37:54.420 that job, you start draining your 401k, your 37:54.460 --> 37:58.124 retirement plan, your family. If you're the 37:58.164 --> 38:00.747 primary breadwinner, there's a lot of stress 38:00.787 --> 38:02.869 placed on your family. I can't tell you how 38:02.909 --> 38:04.871 many whistleblowers often end up being dog 38:04.911 --> 38:07.915 walkers or in just like people, a very vault. 38:08.428 --> 38:12.771 of vaulted statuses. One of the most famous 38:12.871 --> 38:15.133 whistleblowers in the UK was one of the top 38:15.273 --> 38:19.155 cardiologists. And after exposing the NHS, 38:19.195 --> 38:20.756 he's never worked again. I mean, it's such 38:20.816 --> 38:23.658 an enormous brain drain, not just a tragedy 38:23.718 --> 38:26.180 for him, but a tragedy for all of us, right? 38:26.200 --> 38:28.181 That we lose the services of these people. 38:28.261 --> 38:31.363 So you fall, it's like needing an air mask, 38:31.423 --> 38:35.564 right? You drop in altitude. make a huge 38:35.664 --> 38:39.426 drop, which is disorienting and can have 38:39.446 --> 38:41.227 all these ramifications that I talked about 38:41.267 --> 38:44.328 in the New England Journal of Medicine. But 38:44.368 --> 38:50.411 it's not all bad. For some whistleblowers, 38:50.491 --> 38:52.712 it is all bad. But for many whistleblowers, 38:53.292 --> 38:55.673 particularly ones where they're able to get 38:55.733 --> 38:59.323 their information to a government agency 38:59.383 --> 39:02.286 that wants to act on it. My clients don't 39:02.346 --> 39:04.428 do this for the money. The money is there 39:04.528 --> 39:08.431 to help them as a safety net. But mostly 39:08.471 --> 39:10.733 they want whatever it is that they raise 39:10.813 --> 39:13.916 to be addressed and for someone to correct 39:14.036 --> 39:17.499 it. And so there can be an enormous amount 39:17.879 --> 39:21.526 of Pleasure taken, but that's many years 39:21.606 --> 39:23.667 later, right? Because the other part in the 39:23.707 --> 39:25.547 whistleblowers journey is once you get that 39:25.607 --> 39:27.228 information to the government, if it's a 39:27.288 --> 39:29.548 massive fraud, it can take many, many years 39:29.628 --> 39:33.950 before the government ends up imposing a 39:34.010 --> 39:37.567 fine. be there being a jury trial and a verdict 39:37.627 --> 39:41.528 or a judgment or settlement. So at the very 39:41.648 --> 39:43.389 end of the day, a lot of my clients have 39:43.429 --> 39:47.030 enormous success, but it can feel like a 39:47.070 --> 39:51.931 marathon getting to that place and a lot 39:51.971 --> 39:53.912 of ups and downs and a lot of patience. And 39:53.932 --> 39:56.493 that's really where the role of the whistleblower 39:56.553 --> 39:59.614 attorney and a lot of amazing whistleblower 39:59.634 --> 40:02.675 support NGOs that are support organizations 40:04.234 --> 40:07.199 can really help whistleblowers get through 40:07.319 --> 40:08.982 all of that. And frankly, one of the best 40:09.022 --> 40:13.188 things we can do for whistleblowers is to 40:13.748 --> 40:16.170 help predict for them what's going to come 40:16.390 --> 40:18.372 so that they can manage their expectations. 40:18.432 --> 40:20.954 So I can't tell you how many people call 40:20.974 --> 40:23.076 me early in the process and they start to 40:23.116 --> 40:26.159 describe what's happening. And when I say, 40:26.179 --> 40:28.541 I think they're on their way to firing you 40:28.621 --> 40:30.542 and they're just shocked. I said, I don't 40:30.602 --> 40:33.024 know, but this has all the earmarks of it. 40:33.044 --> 40:35.586 And this seems to be where it is. If you 40:35.626 --> 40:39.062 can at least prepare someone for that, it 40:39.262 --> 40:42.083 at least helps deal with some of the blows 40:42.143 --> 40:44.364 and actually if they can get a good employment 40:44.404 --> 40:46.505 attorney and things like that who can get 40:46.525 --> 40:48.606 them a negotiated structured settlement out 40:48.646 --> 40:50.687 the door, it can limit some of the damage. 40:50.727 --> 40:55.169 In fact, as part of an employment negotiation, 40:55.229 --> 40:59.930 you can often require or negotiate good recommendations 40:59.970 --> 41:01.851 or at least a neutral recommendation so it 41:01.871 --> 41:03.472 doesn't hurt your future career as much. 41:03.512 --> 41:05.193 So there's just a lot that can be done. So 41:05.213 --> 41:08.094 if we can empower them, it can impact their 41:08.134 --> 41:12.569 journey. But it can be incredibly emotionally 41:12.669 --> 41:16.632 trying. And the more we can demystify the 41:16.672 --> 41:22.057 process and get them to the government, people 41:22.137 --> 41:25.740 who will valorize them for this, rather than 41:25.781 --> 41:28.483 the fact that they were vilified. As Guy 41:28.563 --> 41:31.325 from Protect was saying, you know, there's 41:31.385 --> 41:35.609 a whole raised of our whistleblowers, heroes, 41:35.729 --> 41:40.019 villains, They frankly just want to be neither. 41:40.039 --> 41:43.202 They'd like to just have it be a normal act 41:43.262 --> 41:45.785 that doesn't have to change your life. And 41:45.805 --> 41:47.927 I think we'll talk about that more in a minute. 41:47.987 --> 41:50.810 How do we listen to whistleblowers so that 41:52.131 --> 41:57.316 they don't get turned into villains? So yeah, 41:57.336 --> 42:00.279 in terms of how do we counsel in a specific 42:00.379 --> 42:06.147 example, You know, I have a client who has 42:06.187 --> 42:09.189 sued a major health insurer in the United 42:09.209 --> 42:12.690 States for Medicare fraud. And, you know, 42:12.730 --> 42:15.832 a lot of the guidance that I've followed 42:15.892 --> 42:18.834 was we involved his wife in the decision-making 42:20.315 --> 42:24.097 early on. And I think that really helped. 42:24.197 --> 42:26.498 She had a lot of questions. And I think a 42:26.538 --> 42:29.927 lot of people forget that This is a, there 42:29.947 --> 42:31.728 are a lot of people behind that whistleblower 42:31.768 --> 42:34.950 who's taking that act. So I feel like that's 42:35.030 --> 42:37.973 an example that I learned pretty early on 42:38.653 --> 42:40.714 through some not so good experiences with 42:40.754 --> 42:44.257 whistleblowers having a hard time. I learned 42:44.317 --> 42:47.539 that it would be good to get the family involved 42:47.579 --> 42:47.819 early. 42:47.839 --> 42:53.523 In your January 2025 article, DOJ reaches 42:53.603 --> 42:56.806 historic settlement with MA Plan Independent 42:56.866 --> 43:00.390 Health. and former executive in Whistleblower 43:00.450 --> 43:04.451 Case, which was published in RAC Monitor, 43:05.091 --> 43:08.732 you wrote thus, and I quote, the case is 43:08.832 --> 43:12.093 remarkable in several ways. It's the largest 43:12.253 --> 43:16.034 ever Part C settlement with a health plan 43:16.134 --> 43:19.314 purely based on a whistleblower case. It 43:19.374 --> 43:22.775 is also one of the first, if not the first 43:23.035 --> 43:26.888 settlement with a vendor for allegations 43:26.928 --> 43:30.530 of risk adjustment fraud, and notably includes 43:30.670 --> 43:33.651 an individual executive at the vendor Gaffney, 43:34.352 --> 43:37.153 who agreed to pay two million U.S. dollars 43:37.853 --> 43:41.234 to resolve the allegations against her. Can 43:41.274 --> 43:44.536 you give us a straightforward explanation 43:44.556 --> 43:49.158 of what risk adjustment fraud is, and what 43:49.518 --> 43:52.259 are the defining characteristics of a successful 43:52.339 --> 43:54.100 false claims act lawsuit? 43:55.695 --> 44:00.840 Absolutely. So risk adjustment fraud, for 44:00.900 --> 44:04.763 folks who are not familiar with the US Medicare 44:05.063 --> 44:07.245 program, our government health insurance 44:07.325 --> 44:10.928 program, sits within something called managed 44:11.008 --> 44:15.052 care. So when we say Part C, there are three 44:15.092 --> 44:17.907 different parts of Medicare, Part A, Part 44:17.947 --> 44:21.068 B, and Part C, and managed care is Part C, 44:21.228 --> 44:25.669 and managed care is a lot like HMOs. So it's 44:25.749 --> 44:29.370 a fairly new concept where in Medicare Part 44:29.790 --> 44:32.630 A, which tends to be hospital and doctor's 44:33.050 --> 44:35.591 offices services, there's something called 44:35.651 --> 44:39.572 fee-for-service Medicare, where the way that, 44:39.592 --> 44:44.171 you know, doctors are reimbursed when providing 44:44.231 --> 44:47.634 services is based on each individual service. 44:48.174 --> 44:51.597 So the more you bill, the more money you 44:51.657 --> 44:53.939 make or the higher reimbursement you get 44:54.019 --> 44:56.621 from the United States government. Part C 44:56.701 --> 44:59.463 turned that on its head and said, we're instead 44:59.503 --> 45:01.684 going to pay the health insurers a fixed 45:01.744 --> 45:06.168 amount based on actuarial analysis. So if 45:06.208 --> 45:11.307 you're a 72-year-old woman in Florida, we're 45:11.327 --> 45:14.530 gonna pay you X amount. And then, you know, 45:14.550 --> 45:17.772 if you can deliver the services for less 45:17.832 --> 45:20.615 than that monthly capitated payment, capitated 45:20.635 --> 45:23.697 amount, then you pocket the difference. But 45:23.757 --> 45:26.660 if not, if you go over, then, you know, you're 45:26.680 --> 45:29.122 still, you're gonna go in the red. So it 45:29.182 --> 45:34.066 incentivized health insurers to be more preventive, 45:34.426 --> 45:37.508 to engage in preventative care. But one of 45:37.568 --> 45:40.631 the things that happened early on was that 45:41.636 --> 45:43.696 it was susceptible to cheating. And so a 45:43.996 --> 45:46.917 lot of insurance plans, when they had enrollment 45:47.017 --> 45:48.897 periods, when they're trying to recruit people 45:48.937 --> 45:50.738 into the plans, the health insurers would 45:50.778 --> 45:55.158 have the enrollment fairs on the fifth floor 45:55.198 --> 45:57.199 of a building with no elevators offering 45:57.279 --> 46:01.360 gym memberships. So they're clearly trying 46:01.480 --> 46:03.560 to self-select for healthy patients. And 46:03.620 --> 46:09.181 so Medicare revised the program and said, 46:09.301 --> 46:12.767 okay, you get a set amount every month based 46:12.887 --> 46:15.368 on the actuarial demographics we talked about. 46:15.869 --> 46:18.610 But you'll get a multiplier called a risk 46:18.650 --> 46:21.172 adjustment factor, which is the multiplier 46:21.232 --> 46:24.934 for every comorbid condition that a patient 46:24.995 --> 46:27.976 has. So if you're treating someone with a 46:28.036 --> 46:32.920 lot of comorbidities, with pulmonary disease, 46:33.280 --> 46:37.402 with diabetes, cancer, history of stroke, 46:37.483 --> 46:40.581 heart attack, those sorts of things, For 46:40.721 --> 46:42.782 each of those different conditions, you'll 46:42.802 --> 46:45.023 get a multiplier, and those multipliers can 46:45.063 --> 46:47.144 stack up. So what do you think happened? 46:48.185 --> 46:51.407 So a lot of companies realized you can make 46:51.447 --> 46:54.328 a lot more money if you make patients look 46:54.368 --> 46:57.770 sicker than they are. So we started to see 46:59.171 --> 47:02.172 conditions like severe malnutrition, which 47:02.232 --> 47:05.774 although that is sometimes a problem in the 47:05.894 --> 47:10.262 US, it's not a super prevalent problem, We 47:10.322 --> 47:12.543 actually often have the opposite problem 47:12.723 --> 47:16.405 with morbid obesity and the prevalence weights, 47:16.566 --> 47:19.187 because that risk adjusted, it went off the 47:19.227 --> 47:22.329 charts. So you started to see these health 47:22.369 --> 47:25.891 plans, not all of them, but many of them 47:26.931 --> 47:30.293 encouraging doctors and incentivizing doctors 47:30.813 --> 47:33.695 to upcode. So a famous example that I gave 47:33.755 --> 47:35.756 in Teresa Ross's case, the independent health 47:35.776 --> 47:38.238 case you just quoted, was a patient we called 47:38.338 --> 47:43.681 Sunny D The medical record of the office 47:43.721 --> 47:48.047 visit at issue showed that his past medical 47:48.107 --> 47:50.870 history had shown that he had suffered an 47:50.990 --> 47:54.434 episodic incident of depression. And it was 47:54.495 --> 47:57.238 connected to, I think his sister had died. 47:58.197 --> 48:01.322 And so he was an elderly patient. And when 48:01.343 --> 48:03.586 they brought him back for this visit, they 48:03.687 --> 48:06.531 looked at, the notes from the doctor was 48:06.571 --> 48:08.655 that he had a sunny disposition. That's why 48:08.695 --> 48:13.111 we called him Sunny D. But yet the billers 48:13.191 --> 48:15.092 and the coders at the health insurance plan 48:15.172 --> 48:18.232 went back and billed major depression based 48:18.352 --> 48:21.493 on that prior reference in the medical record 48:21.653 --> 48:23.553 because that risk adjusts and gives them 48:23.593 --> 48:27.034 the higher multiplier. So we saw many, many, 48:27.174 --> 48:29.634 many examples of that. So it wasn't being 48:29.674 --> 48:33.155 done by the doctors necessarily. It was being 48:33.195 --> 48:35.055 done by coders from the health insurance 48:35.115 --> 48:37.476 plans later on as they were combing through, 48:37.496 --> 48:41.048 we would often say mining for codes. It's 48:41.148 --> 48:45.869 been really a thrill of my career to represent 48:46.069 --> 48:49.710 four or five whistleblowers who brought these 48:49.790 --> 48:54.991 types of allegations to the Justice Department 48:55.011 --> 48:58.491 about major health insurance plans cheating 48:58.511 --> 49:03.132 and defrauding the Medicare program by overbilling 49:03.932 --> 49:06.973 for conditions that are more extreme than 49:07.013 --> 49:10.449 what the patient actually has. I think you 49:10.469 --> 49:12.490 had a second part to that one. 49:17.173 --> 49:19.514 What are the defining characteristics of 49:19.574 --> 49:22.295 a successful False Claims Act lawsuit? 49:23.656 --> 49:30.320 Yeah, I think it really, so the False Claims 49:30.440 --> 49:34.562 Act is a civil fraud statute. So it can't 49:34.602 --> 49:37.103 just be negligence. You need to be able to 49:37.183 --> 49:41.178 show that the the government contractor knowingly 49:41.338 --> 49:44.019 submitted false claims to the government, 49:44.039 --> 49:46.560 so false invoices typically for payment. 49:47.300 --> 49:53.602 So it can be very helpful to have the kind 49:53.802 --> 49:58.224 of scenario where it's clear that the company 49:58.304 --> 50:02.686 was aware of the problem. So you don't have 50:02.706 --> 50:05.347 to have actual knowledge. If the company, 50:05.367 --> 50:09.184 like, covered their eyes and covered their 50:09.264 --> 50:13.166 ears. The standard is like reckless, engaged 50:13.186 --> 50:15.888 with reckless disregard for the truth of 50:15.928 --> 50:17.629 the facts. So put their heads in the sand 50:17.709 --> 50:21.011 or reckless indifference, deliberate indifference, 50:21.071 --> 50:25.873 reckless disregard. You need to have information 50:25.913 --> 50:28.895 that clearly the company was aware or should 50:28.955 --> 50:31.436 have been aware and was deliberately ignorant 50:32.517 --> 50:37.253 and not following the rules or finding out 50:37.273 --> 50:40.595 the information. So it's really important 50:40.655 --> 50:44.357 for it to really be fraud and for it not 50:44.377 --> 50:47.179 to just to be some technical violation of 50:48.620 --> 50:50.902 something that any person innocently could 50:50.922 --> 50:53.723 have done. So that's what really makes a 50:53.764 --> 50:56.866 successful False Claims Act is a whistleblower, 50:57.466 --> 51:01.048 typically an insider who has observed the 51:01.088 --> 51:04.090 wrongdoing and preferably has documents to 51:05.509 --> 51:08.070 to corroborate what was going on. You don't 51:08.110 --> 51:09.971 always have to have documents, but it certainly 51:10.011 --> 51:14.293 can help. Yeah, a well-placed whistleblower 51:14.373 --> 51:17.535 insider who saw, had visibility into the 51:17.615 --> 51:21.576 decision-making and saw that it was intentionally 51:21.636 --> 51:27.099 the law was violated. That can be, if not 51:27.139 --> 51:30.460 a slam dunk, a very strong false claims that 51:30.500 --> 51:30.761 case. 51:31.841 --> 51:35.532 The title of our podcast is exposing your 51:35.572 --> 51:39.115 blind spots, the argument for fostering whistleblower 51:39.155 --> 51:42.798 voices to become a successful leader. Now, 51:43.018 --> 51:45.660 a distinguished fellow at Washington and 51:45.740 --> 51:50.004 Jefferson College, Jonathan Gottschall, writing 51:50.144 --> 51:53.747 in the Harvard Business Review on October 51:31.841 --> 51:56.550 16, 2018, published an article entitled, 51:57.150 --> 52:00.573 Theranos and the Dark Side of Storytelling. 52:01.294 --> 52:04.977 He said the following, and I quote, According 52:05.017 --> 52:08.159 to Nick Bilton's absorbing expose in Vanity 52:08.239 --> 52:12.181 Fair, Theranos, a company once valued at 52:12.301 --> 52:16.003 nine billion US dollars, got as far as it 52:16.063 --> 52:19.946 did mainly on the strength of a pretty naturally 52:20.206 --> 52:24.248 good story. Holmes constructed an inspiring 52:24.368 --> 52:28.010 hero narrative starring herself, a precocious 52:28.210 --> 52:32.664 girl genius who, at 19 years of age, began 52:33.005 --> 52:35.346 pioneering medical technologies that could 52:35.647 --> 52:39.189 potentially save millions of lives around 52:39.250 --> 52:42.812 the world. Despite abundant warning signs 52:43.113 --> 52:45.554 and despite the Silicon Valley Company's 52:45.695 --> 52:49.297 refusal to provide real evidence that their 52:49.337 --> 52:52.880 technology worked, journalists didn't skeptically 52:53.000 --> 52:56.203 evaluate Holmes' story. They simply repeated 52:56.263 --> 53:00.446 it. They told and retold Holmes' story until 53:00.486 --> 53:03.980 she began to seem less like an active person 53:04.701 --> 53:07.883 and more like a living symbol of progress, 53:08.703 --> 53:12.625 of innovation, of female empowerment. The 53:12.666 --> 53:16.168 problem, as the Wall Street Journal's John 53:16.248 --> 53:19.810 Carreyrou has reported in more than a score 53:19.870 --> 53:23.292 of articles, was that there was little to 53:23.352 --> 53:26.994 Theneros beyond its story, and the story 53:27.415 --> 53:31.318 was mainly fictional. Very In keeping with 53:31.439 --> 53:35.021 our podcast theme, what's the primary benefit 53:35.181 --> 53:38.443 for a leader in fostering a culture where 53:38.483 --> 53:42.505 whistleblowers are hard? And why is the open 53:42.665 --> 53:45.367 exposure of corporate governance blind spots 53:45.887 --> 53:46.488 so vital? 53:48.309 --> 53:55.153 Yeah, this is one of the areas where I am 53:55.293 --> 53:59.676 most passionate is in sort of debunking the 53:59.696 --> 54:05.179 myth that whistleblowers are disloyal and 54:05.479 --> 54:07.680 embracing the notion that not only are they 54:07.720 --> 54:10.422 not disloyal, they're among your most loyal 54:11.162 --> 54:14.264 employees. And the reason for that is the 54:14.324 --> 54:15.925 answer to the question that you asked is 54:16.025 --> 54:18.927 why is it so important to listen to whistleblowers? 54:19.648 --> 54:23.290 Because they're your eyes and ears and they're 54:23.310 --> 54:26.052 your best risk management tool. There's a 54:26.112 --> 54:29.133 wonderful social behavioral scientist named 54:29.174 --> 54:31.874 Christine Hunter who has renamed whistleblowers 54:31.974 --> 54:36.736 Forward Indicators of Risk. They're risk 54:36.816 --> 54:39.317 detectors, they're canaries in the coal mine. 54:40.538 --> 54:43.479 So if you're interested in knowing where 54:43.539 --> 54:46.781 your vulnerabilities lie and who wouldn't 54:46.821 --> 54:49.022 be, who shouldn't be as a company, you want 54:49.062 --> 54:50.863 to know your blind spots, the name of your 54:50.903 --> 54:57.406 podcast, these are guides to your blind spots. 54:57.786 --> 55:01.941 And these are the people who, don't succumb 55:01.961 --> 55:05.605 to the pressure of, it's very easy to be 55:05.625 --> 55:08.407 a yes person and to kiss the ring and to 55:08.507 --> 55:11.530 not raise, as I love to say, inconvenient 55:11.590 --> 55:15.033 truths. These very people are the people 55:15.053 --> 55:18.036 who have the intestinal fortitude, the temerity 55:18.056 --> 55:22.500 to speak the hard truths and explain when 55:22.520 --> 55:25.022 you're doing wrong so you can course correct. 55:25.063 --> 55:27.793 And I often say to people, In your personal 55:27.873 --> 55:30.154 life, who are the people in your personal 55:30.194 --> 55:33.657 life who hold you to account, hold your feet 55:33.697 --> 55:37.039 to the fire when you're not being your best 55:37.080 --> 55:39.241 self? They're the people who care for you 55:39.261 --> 55:43.905 the most. So I think that's very true in 55:43.925 --> 55:48.628 the corporate setting as well. So unfortunately, 55:48.888 --> 55:52.571 most people in the boardroom, in the C-suite, 55:53.590 --> 55:55.671 approach whistleblowers as people who need 55:55.691 --> 56:00.132 to be contained and exited when in fact, 56:00.972 --> 56:03.233 you know, they're just shining a light on 56:03.273 --> 56:05.754 a problem that you should investigate. You 56:05.794 --> 56:08.374 shouldn't be looking at them beyond just 56:08.414 --> 56:11.575 corroborating. Like 99% of the whistleblowers 56:11.675 --> 56:14.016 I represent never have to take the stand 56:14.736 --> 56:17.537 because there's, and they're not great witnesses, 56:17.597 --> 56:19.758 right? Because they have a financial motivation. 56:20.711 --> 56:22.715 But you don't need to have them take the 56:22.735 --> 56:25.501 stand because in 99% of the cases, there 56:25.521 --> 56:27.966 are other people who can corroborate it. 56:31.229 --> 56:34.292 people need to do is investigate what the 56:34.332 --> 56:36.414 whistleblowers are looking at and not look 56:36.454 --> 56:41.639 at the messenger. It's so irresistible, right? 56:41.839 --> 56:45.323 We want to know who is raising the concern, 56:45.363 --> 56:47.945 but in a way it's best if you don't and you 56:47.985 --> 56:51.949 just see. So now a lot of these internal 56:52.009 --> 56:55.781 reporting mechanisms allow for anonymized 56:55.841 --> 56:57.762 reporting. And in a way I think that's great. 56:57.842 --> 56:59.903 It's obviously more protective of the whistleblower 56:59.943 --> 57:02.305 and that's the state of the art, the industry 57:03.005 --> 57:06.147 requirement in many countries. But there's 57:06.167 --> 57:08.028 a good reason for it because you're just 57:08.108 --> 57:11.810 looking at the facts and not the person raising 57:11.850 --> 57:17.293 the concern. So I would love to see people 57:17.814 --> 57:21.876 recognizing that these are really heroes. 57:23.180 --> 57:26.124 and people who are to be applauded and rewarded 57:26.285 --> 57:28.508 and noticed in their performance reviews 57:28.849 --> 57:33.871 for raising concerns. Um, there's great research 57:34.292 --> 57:37.334 that has been done that if you aren't persuaded 57:37.394 --> 57:40.116 by my argument here, there's empirical data 57:40.136 --> 57:44.879 that actually says, um, and shows that listening 57:44.919 --> 57:49.262 to whistleblowers, um, improves your ROI, 57:49.302 --> 57:51.884 your, your bottom line, it's more profitable. 57:52.444 --> 57:54.726 So the, there were two graduate business 57:54.746 --> 57:58.249 school professors, um, Stephen, uh, Stephen 57:58.289 --> 58:02.163 Auberys and Kyle Welch. They're at the University 58:02.183 --> 58:05.165 of Utah and George Washington University, 58:05.225 --> 58:08.248 respectively. And they were given access 58:08.428 --> 58:12.151 to an anonymized data set from NavX Global, 58:12.271 --> 58:14.593 one of the largest providers of internal 58:15.353 --> 58:18.015 reporting software for all the major corporations. 58:18.656 --> 58:22.819 And when they unpacked the data, they were 58:22.959 --> 58:25.081 able to show, which involved hundreds and 58:25.141 --> 58:27.482 hundreds of companies, they were able to 58:27.542 --> 58:31.265 show that companies whose hotlines were I'm 58:31.605 --> 58:33.846 ringing off the hook who are getting lots 58:34.066 --> 58:37.868 of. Reports were more profitable than companies 58:37.908 --> 58:40.669 whose hotlines are silent. And that almost 58:40.709 --> 58:42.930 seems counterintuitive right if it's silent 58:42.950 --> 58:44.891 you like there must be no problems if it's 58:44.911 --> 58:48.853 silent and of course. Every organization 58:48.913 --> 58:51.133 their problems that need to be reported and. 58:51.894 --> 58:54.255 The one that was ringing off the hook had 58:54.315 --> 58:56.636 created a culture where people felt safe 58:56.896 --> 59:00.788 to speak up and clearly. they were acting 59:01.048 --> 59:04.791 on and those reports and using it to course 59:04.851 --> 59:10.516 correct. So hopefully, you know, I always 59:10.576 --> 59:13.419 say to people who are in compliance and other 59:13.699 --> 59:16.181 areas where like, what can I do to persuade 59:16.241 --> 59:19.664 my C-suite that they need to invest in the 59:19.964 --> 59:22.486 type of training and culture creation that 59:23.692 --> 59:26.133 engenders trust for people to feel like they 59:26.153 --> 59:28.415 can safely speak up. And I always point to 59:28.455 --> 59:31.756 this research study by saying it makes good 59:31.797 --> 59:35.278 business. And of course, probably what is 59:35.338 --> 59:37.420 going on here behind these numbers, why they're 59:37.440 --> 59:39.361 more profitable. And I think this is part 59:39.381 --> 59:42.883 of what the researchers concluded is that 59:43.403 --> 59:46.763 you have fewer lawsuits The lawsuits you 59:46.823 --> 59:49.724 do have probably settle for less money because 59:50.124 --> 59:54.146 you may have voluntarily disclosed to the 59:54.186 --> 59:56.387 government as a result or things like that. 59:58.448 --> 01:00:01.970 You don't have to suffer the huge brand damage 01:00:01.990 --> 01:00:04.051 to the brand and reputational damage that 01:00:04.091 --> 01:00:06.032 can come. You look at a company like Boeing, 01:00:06.092 --> 01:00:08.013 I don't know that they'll ever recover from 01:00:08.073 --> 01:00:14.051 that with planes continuing to go down. It's, 01:00:14.311 --> 01:00:16.093 to me, it's a really, one of the reasons 01:00:16.133 --> 01:00:19.395 I'm honored to be on your podcast is because 01:00:19.435 --> 01:00:21.957 it gets to this, the crux of this very issue, 01:00:21.998 --> 01:00:24.840 which is a cultural change, a debunking of 01:00:24.920 --> 01:00:29.644 myths, a really, asking people to address 01:00:29.684 --> 01:00:32.226 the prejudices and the biases we have against 01:00:32.286 --> 01:00:34.568 whistleblowers, which frankly come from, 01:00:34.588 --> 01:00:37.750 you know, medieval times, shoot the messenger. 01:00:37.790 --> 01:00:39.311 You know, the British expression is don't 01:00:39.331 --> 01:00:41.933 put your head above the parapet, it'll get 01:00:41.993 --> 01:00:45.036 shot off. We all as children are told not 01:00:45.056 --> 01:00:48.599 to be snitches, grassers, daubers, tattletales. 01:00:48.719 --> 01:00:51.421 We have rats. We have all these horrible 01:00:51.501 --> 01:00:56.766 names. But at the same time, you have, that's 01:00:56.786 --> 01:00:58.547 what childrens are told, not to tell tales, 01:00:58.587 --> 01:01:02.891 but same time we say in, you know, airport 01:01:02.931 --> 01:01:05.253 settings, if you see something, say something, 01:01:05.313 --> 01:01:09.323 or on the tube, right? I think we need to 01:01:09.383 --> 01:01:13.265 challenge that bias that we see whistleblowers 01:01:13.325 --> 01:01:18.127 as snitches and instead see them as real 01:01:19.047 --> 01:01:22.989 assets to any organization. And that's obviously 01:01:23.049 --> 01:01:25.710 a brain shift. You gotta take your brain 01:01:25.750 --> 01:01:27.850 out and flip it around. And that's why I 01:01:27.890 --> 01:01:30.091 love to be on podcasts like this one to encourage 01:01:30.131 --> 01:01:33.452 people to really recognize their biases. 01:01:33.492 --> 01:01:36.854 There's a wonderful whistleblower named Wendy 01:01:36.954 --> 01:01:41.625 Addison who did, and I think still does, 01:01:41.825 --> 01:01:46.989 virtual reality trainings of teaching people 01:01:47.070 --> 01:01:50.012 to listen up. Because it's one thing to encourage 01:01:50.072 --> 01:01:53.154 speak up, but how you react to someone speaking 01:01:53.294 --> 01:01:55.496 up is really important so that you obviously 01:01:55.536 --> 01:01:59.399 don't retaliate. And so she does sort of 01:01:59.920 --> 01:02:03.402 scenarios, hypothetical scenarios, role-playing 01:02:03.442 --> 01:02:06.788 that kind of encourages people to try and 01:02:06.848 --> 01:02:09.210 see how they handle the situation. In fact, 01:02:10.110 --> 01:02:11.652 I haven't talked to Wendy about this, but 01:02:11.712 --> 01:02:17.096 just recently Anthropic, the AI company did 01:02:17.177 --> 01:02:19.679 red team testing. And one of the prompts 01:02:19.759 --> 01:02:23.642 that they gave to the agentic AI was that 01:02:23.682 --> 01:02:26.004 there was some fraud happening in a pharmaceutical 01:02:26.064 --> 01:02:30.687 company. and they told the AI to act boldly 01:02:30.927 --> 01:02:33.828 and the AI submitted a whistleblower tip 01:02:35.448 --> 01:02:38.669 to the, I think to the FDA and the SEC or 01:02:38.709 --> 01:02:45.391 something. So even the AI robots are blowing 01:02:45.431 --> 01:02:46.971 the whistle these days, Stephen. 01:02:51.432 --> 01:02:57.052 On February 10th, 2025, President Trump halted 01:02:57.372 --> 01:03:00.515 enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 01:03:00.795 --> 01:03:05.680 Act in an executive order, arguing the move 01:03:05.780 --> 01:03:09.903 would aid American businesses abroad. What 01:03:09.943 --> 01:03:13.607 does this mean for businesses operating in 01:03:13.627 --> 01:03:15.088 the US and globally? 01:03:16.539 --> 01:03:26.386 So that was a real blow to the rule of law, 01:03:26.707 --> 01:03:29.849 honestly, and just sort of the status of 01:03:29.869 --> 01:03:35.116 the United States government as one of the 01:03:35.216 --> 01:03:40.641 leaders in anti-corruption bribery laws. 01:03:40.701 --> 01:03:43.483 We had one of the first laws and then the 01:03:43.623 --> 01:03:46.305 UK Bribery Act, Sap and Deux, other laws 01:03:46.345 --> 01:03:49.127 have followed. But for a long time, we were 01:03:49.167 --> 01:03:52.150 kind of the police officer of the markets 01:03:52.250 --> 01:03:55.652 trying to make sure that there was fair play 01:03:55.732 --> 01:03:57.774 and competitors were not at a disadvantage. 01:03:57.814 --> 01:04:00.836 So it was very discouraging to see that put 01:04:00.916 --> 01:04:06.006 on pause. Since that announcement in executive 01:04:06.126 --> 01:04:09.628 order, it was a six-month pause. And recently, 01:04:10.589 --> 01:04:16.032 last month, the pause was lifted. And the 01:04:16.072 --> 01:04:18.193 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act will continue 01:04:18.233 --> 01:04:20.935 to be enforced, but in a very limited way. 01:04:21.815 --> 01:04:26.037 So sort of the guidelines and in a very America 01:04:26.137 --> 01:04:28.399 first kind of way, which is really unfortunate 01:04:28.459 --> 01:04:34.747 because Whereas previously we'd seen American 01:04:34.807 --> 01:04:42.792 companies like Walmart and other companies 01:04:43.492 --> 01:04:47.915 pay huge fines for violating the FCPA, the 01:04:47.995 --> 01:04:50.256 new guidance out of the Trump administration 01:04:50.316 --> 01:04:53.238 suggests that in an America first kind of 01:04:53.298 --> 01:04:56.419 way, the only kind of cases they'll want 01:04:56.459 --> 01:04:58.841 to bring are ones that touch on where an 01:04:58.901 --> 01:05:02.496 American company has been harmed. So it doesn't 01:05:02.556 --> 01:05:05.658 feel like a level playing field. It feels 01:05:05.718 --> 01:05:08.679 like moving forward, we'll only be going 01:05:08.759 --> 01:05:12.101 after foreign companies that have a US nexus 01:05:12.181 --> 01:05:16.584 or presence. And it seems very one-sided. 01:05:18.865 --> 01:05:25.129 But that's where we sit, I'm afraid. You 01:05:25.169 --> 01:05:29.652 know, what we've seen is during that time 01:05:29.752 --> 01:05:32.614 of the gap, the six month gap where no enforcement 01:05:32.654 --> 01:05:36.677 was happening, we saw the UK, France and 01:05:36.777 --> 01:05:39.358 Switzerland jump into the breach and create 01:05:39.578 --> 01:05:42.700 a task force on anti-bribery to pick up the 01:05:42.760 --> 01:05:46.783 slack that was left. And I think we'll continue 01:05:46.823 --> 01:05:48.484 to do that. So I guess I would say that's 01:05:48.524 --> 01:05:51.886 a bit of a silver lining is that it really 01:05:51.926 --> 01:05:56.096 has required other countries to be more aggressive, 01:05:57.457 --> 01:05:59.699 recognizing that the United States has pulled 01:05:59.779 --> 01:06:03.242 back in many ways on its FCPA enforcement. 01:06:03.282 --> 01:06:05.824 But to me, it's a bit demoralizing. 01:06:07.045 --> 01:06:10.328 Finally, Mary, please advise our listeners 01:06:10.388 --> 01:06:12.630 where they may connect with your law firm 01:06:12.770 --> 01:06:13.911 whistleblower partners. 01:06:15.239 --> 01:06:20.662 Yes, so we have a website. It's www.whistleblower.law. 01:06:22.003 --> 01:06:28.868 We are on LinkedIn, Bluesky, Instagram. So 01:06:28.908 --> 01:06:31.469 you can find us at our handles at all of 01:06:31.549 --> 01:06:34.951 those places. But the best place to start 01:06:35.032 --> 01:06:38.474 is with our website where you can see myself 01:06:38.534 --> 01:06:44.534 and my other partners and associates. and 01:06:44.594 --> 01:06:46.676 read our blog and find out what we're doing. 01:06:47.516 --> 01:06:50.458 Mary Inman, thank you very much for being 01:06:50.498 --> 01:06:52.019 a guest on this podcast. 01:06:53.520 --> 01:06:55.662 It was my pleasure, Stephen. Thanks for all 01:06:55.722 --> 01:06:57.883 the great questions and all the due diligence 01:06:57.923 --> 01:07:02.467 you did and, um, and, and finding out, uh, 01:07:02.707 --> 01:07:05.549 what the whistleblower laws in the U S as 01:07:05.649 --> 01:07:07.190 relates to rewards do. 01:07:08.431 --> 01:07:11.591 Thank you. This podcast was brought to you 01:07:11.691 --> 01:07:13.912 by the Kamugasa Challenge in partnership 01:07:13.932 --> 01:07:17.393 with Democracy in Africa. Democracy in Africa 01:07:17.413 --> 01:07:20.294 is a platform dedicated to building a bridge 01:07:20.534 --> 01:07:23.934 between academics, policymakers, practitioners, 01:07:24.115 --> 01:07:27.996 and citizens. The fifth episode in our leadership 01:07:28.036 --> 01:07:31.096 series is entitled Reimagining the Media 01:07:31.476 --> 01:07:34.297 in a Liberal Democracy, an interview with 01:07:34.477 --> 01:07:37.878 Alex Renton, a British journalist, broadcaster, 01:07:38.647 --> 01:07:41.509 and a visiting fellow at Newcastle University. 01:07:42.449 --> 01:07:46.472 The podcast will go live on October 13th, 01:07:08.431 --> 01:07:49.033 2025. If you enjoyed this podcast, please 01:07:49.133 --> 01:07:52.135 click the share button in your app to send 01:07:52.155 --> 01:07:56.017 this episode to a friend. Thank you very 01:07:56.077 --> 01:07:57.798 much for taking the time to listen to this 01:07:57.898 --> 01:08:01.100 podcast. Until next time, goodbye.