WEBVTT

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Hello. Welcome back to Conversation with

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Stephen Kamugasa. This is the fifth and final

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podcast episode in our Genocide series. Today's

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guest is Dr. Nic Cheeseman, a political scientist

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and professor of democracy and international

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development at the University of Birmingham,

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specializing in democracy, elections, and

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African politics. Nic read politics, philosophy

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and economics at the University of Oxford

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and then received an M.Phil and D.Phil from

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the same university. He was elected a Cox

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Fellow at New College but left in 2006 to

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take up the position of Associate Professor

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at Jesus College, Oxford. He served as the

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director of Oxford's African Studies Centre

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before moving to the University of Birmingham

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in 2007 to become a professor of democracy

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and international development. In 2022, he

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became the inaugural director of the university's

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new Centre for Elections, Democracy, Accountability

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and Representation, CEDAR. Professor Cheeseman

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is the recipient of many awards, recognizing

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his exceptional scholarship, and the most

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recent is the Josiah Mason Award for Academic

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Advancement at the University of Birmingham.

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He is also the author of many notable books,

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the most prominent being Democracy in Africa,

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Successes, Failures, and the Struggles for

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Political Reform. In this episode, we discuss

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the topic, how critical is democracy in a

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multipolar world? Dr. Nic Cheeseman, welcome.

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Thanks, it's great to be here.

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The name Cheeseman is unusual. You are the

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only person I know named Cheeseman. A quick

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search on the internet showed that it is

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rooted in ancient Anglo-Saxon culture, It

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is a name for someone who worked as a maker

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or seller of cheese. The surname Cheeseman

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literally means cheeseman. Early recordings

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of it can be traced back to the Assize Rolls

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for 1260 in Cheshire, England in the United

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Kingdom. Nic, please tell us something about

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your family background with special reference

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to your childhood. And how did your childhood

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experience colour your appreciation of reality

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in relation to your work as a professor of

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democracy?

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Thanks, well it's great to be here and thanks

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for looking up the family history, that's

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interesting. I think it's often difficult

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to work back and to work out how you ended

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up where you are. You can go back and find

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certain key moments in your personal history.

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What explains why I've had so much of an

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interest, passion for, and relationship with

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countries in Africa, particularly places

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like Kenya and Zambia over the years. I could

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go back to my undergraduate at Oxford University

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with a great professor there, Gavin Williams,

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who was really important when I arrived at

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university to me and really inspired me to

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study Africa, which was one of his great

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passions. Then you could go back a little

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bit further. I spent time in Africa in between

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a number of African countries, in East Africa

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and Southern Africa, in between doing my

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A-levels and going to university. you could

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go back a little bit further. My mother actually

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spent some time in West Africa doing some

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of the research for her own studies many

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years ago before that. So there was, I guess,

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a sense of travel and adventure that I might

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have picked up on when I was younger. The

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idea that actually the interesting things

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in the world are not necessarily you know,

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in the UK. And if we go all the way back,

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you know, my grandmother on my mother's side

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was actually born in South Africa very briefly

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before coming back to the UK. So there's

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lots of sorts of connections that you could

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kind of go back to over the years to suggest

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where the research would end up. But I think

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a lot of it is also, you know, luck. I was

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very close to going to Cambridge to study

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Wittgenstein and philosophy, and then at

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the last minute decided I actually wanted

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to study something that I thought would have

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a more immediate impact and be more immediate

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to the kind of challenges that the world

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was facing. And that pushed me in a more

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political direction. And then the combination

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of that and some of the great professors

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and scholars we had in Oxford pushed me towards

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African politics. And then I worked with

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my PhD supervisor, Dave Anderson, who was

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a great expert on Kenyan politics. That's

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how I ended up in Kenya. And obviously then,

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I've essentially been following Kenyan politics

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as closely as I can ever since. So I think

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there's a lot of serendipity and a lot of

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luck, as well as some kind of crucial turning

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points that maybe we could point back to.

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In the introduction of your book, Democracy

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in Africa, you write on page one the following,

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and I quote, those who depict sub-Saharan

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Africa as a hopeless continent are often

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unaware that the region contains two countries

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that have enjoyed uninterrupted multi-party

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politics since independence, Botswana and

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Mauritius. Indeed, states in which elections

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have not led to civil conflict or political

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disorder are typically overlooked in favour

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of cases in which the body count makes for

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more eye-catching headlines. Why, in your

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opinion, do people view Africa as a hopeless

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continent?

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Well, that line, of course, Hopeless Continent,

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I was notorious because it was put on the

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front cover of The Economist magazine. And

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so one reason why I used that particular

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term is to evoke that front cover, which

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I think caused some consternation and some

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controversy when it was used. In some ways,

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I think it's understandable. I think we see

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the media in general rushing to cover conflict

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more quickly than they cover peace. It's

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the thing that will be more absorbed and

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more desired by audiences around the world,

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and there's a kind of motor there of public

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appetite and the need to you know, get column

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inches and the need to secure advertising

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that we understand in the media. I think

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in the African context that's often overlaid

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with, you know, a relatively limited understanding

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of Africa. Often certain stereotypes are

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inherited from colonial rule, some of them

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racist, many of them misleading, that compounds

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that sense of the media searching for those

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stories. And so it's often true that you'll

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see that even really good pieces on Africa

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that are more nuanced, that are more reflective,

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won't be the ones that get most shared on

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social media and devoured. So I think it's

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a broad combination of the kind of ranges

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of information and media that have been produced

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over the years, the stereotypes that they've

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generated, and then the kind of competitive

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nature of media reporting. All of that has

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generated quite a misleading understanding

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of what happens. Now that's of course not

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to say that a lot of those stories aren't

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true. I mean there are countries that have

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experienced horrible wars horrible conflict.

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There were a lot of countries in which democracy

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has struggled to get off the ground. But

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that is only one side of the coin, and that

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other side of the coin is really important.

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Not only because it's important to understand

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those countries in Africa as well, and a

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lot of the lenses that we're given traditionally—conflict,

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ethnic politics, neopatrimonialism—don't

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help as much in those countries, but also

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because I think if we want to reverse and

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decolonize how Africa is understood, those

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stories are really important for challenging

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those assumptions and those oversimplifications.

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On page 11 of your book, under a subheading

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neo-patrimonial rule, you write the following,

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and I quote, it has become a cliché to note

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that one of the barriers to establishing

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democracy and strong states in Africa is

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the prevalence of neopatrimonial rule, yet

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the term is often misunderstood and misapplied.

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Neopatrimonialism is not simply a synonym

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for corruption, rather it refers to the collision

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between pre-existing patrimonial forms of

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political organization and the modern colonial

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state. Nic, Please define for us, in a language

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an ordinary person can clearly understand,

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the true meaning of democracy. And why, with

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special reference to recent protests in Kenya,

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does a clear understanding of neopatrimonial

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rule help us better appreciate challenges

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facing democracy in Africa?

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Wow Stephen, that's four massively difficult

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questions in one sentence. So that's a big

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challenge you're laying down for me here,

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but I'll try and meet it and do you justice.

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When it comes to democracy, obviously we

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all have a slightly different understanding

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and a different belief about what democracy

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is and should be. Some people would give

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us a very sort of limited definition. They

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would say, you know, free and fair elections

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to select the government. Other people would

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use the famous, you know, one-liner, government

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of the people, for the people, etc. We would

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have a number of different sort of very limited

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definitions like that. Others then, of course,

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if we were to think classically about people

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like Alexis de Tocqueville and others, would

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put in there not just a kind of political

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equality, in other words, one person, one

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vote, but more than that, a kind of understanding

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that democracy needs to be underpinned by

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a degree of social equality. That if one

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man is rich enough to be able to buy another

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man, democracy is never going to function

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well. And so particularly in the European

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variation, there's often a thinking that

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democracy is not just one person, one vote.

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It's also about a certain level of social

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and economic inequality which enables that

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system to work and that set of things together

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constitutes democracy. The other thing that

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I think is important to consider is whether

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or not we believe that democracy should protect

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the Rights of minorities. So on the one hand

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you could have a majoritarian version of

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democracy that says whatever the majority

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want goes. That's one version of democracy.

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Or you could say that democracy is actually

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fundamentally about creating a system of

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checks and balances that prevents anybody

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within a country from being manipulated for

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the ends of other people, and protects the

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Rights of citizens of different genders,

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of different sexualities, and of different

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minorities, and that we understand therefore

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democracy in a sense as a kind of system

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of protection. Where I would be personally,

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and it's not where anyone else necessarily

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has to be, but my vision for democracy is

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that bigger vision, that vision that delivers

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a degree of social equality, that vision

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that protects the Rights of minorities. To

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me, when we think of democracy, we think

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of what we want democracy to achieve, for

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me, democracy is valuable because of how

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it does those things. So I would be in favor

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of strong checks and balances to protect

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minorities and other groups. I would be in

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favor of a democracy that is focused on trying

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to bring about a certain kind of social equality.

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And I would be someone who would say that

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if we went and saw a democracy that neither

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protected those Rights or created a situation

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in which there was a degree of social equality

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that we would then be talking about a very

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poor quality democracy or not a democracy

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at all. So you asked then a second question,

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and your second question related to neopatrimonialism.

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Now, I say in the book, and in other work

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I've done in a 2018 book for Cambridge University

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Press on Institutions and Democracy in Africa,

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one of the things I say there is that there's

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been too much use of the term neopatrimonialism

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in studies of Africa. It's been, in many

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ways, the dominant framework through which

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people have seen Africa academically for

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a long period of time. And the idea of neopatrimonialism

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is roughly this, that you have a kind of

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set of political cultures that are rooted

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around say ethnicity or the charisma and

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family position and ties of a particular

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leader and their location within a community

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and that those ties and that way of thinking

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about power is not about elections or a meritocratic

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bureaucracy. It's about, for example, it

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might be something that connects more to

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the idea of monarchic rule. In other words,

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kings and queens or chiefs and traditional

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leaders. You have your position by the way

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that you were born into it within society,

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not necessarily because you were chosen by

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the people. So the idea in neopetrimonialism

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is that that's one way of organizing power

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in politics. Another way is what we might

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think of as the kind of modern state, where

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you have a centralized bureaucracy, people

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are promoted on the basis of meritocracy,

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the best people get the jobs at the top,

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and you have the government selected on the

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basis of free and fair elections in which

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every individual votes on the basis of their

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own self-interest, and everyone gets an individual

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ballot. It's not a group recognising a leader

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because of how they were born. It's a set

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of individuals voting for their favourite

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candidate in a competitive process. The idea

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of neopatrimonialism, the central thesis,

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is that colonial government attempted to

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implement in Africa this modern, bureaucratic,

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meritocratic, election-based state. Although,

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of course, colonial government itself was

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very repressive and often didn't introduce

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forms of political participation until the

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very end of the colonial period. But that

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the state that was introduced at the end

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of the colonial government and was supposed

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to govern independent Africa would look like

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this. That was the vision. but it didn't

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work, it didn't take, you might say, because

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it was not consistent with or complementary

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to the existing set of understandings and

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beliefs of people within society, and that

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effectively those formal institutions were

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wiped away didn't work as intended because

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people operated on the basis of these other

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more traditional patrimonial values and forms

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of politics. In other words, the leader of

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the country wasn't checked by Parliament,

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wasn't checked by the judiciary, wasn't voted

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in and out by citizens because that way that

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they gained their authority and the way that

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citizens understood their role was on the

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basis of a really different kind of political

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logic. Now, what I argue in a lot of my work

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is that that idea often leads people to say

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that African politics doesn't have meaningful

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political institutions, that leaders operate

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without checks and balances, that we see

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a series of princes or philosopher kings

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or leaders who operate without constraint.

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And therefore, we can almost ignore the role

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of political institutions in the way that

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we analyze politics in Africa. And actually,

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every time we've gone to look at it, you

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know, we see that the institutions that are

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in place matter in really important ways,

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whether we're talking about, you know, the

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legacy of a kind of French legal system or

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British legal system, whether we're talking

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about countries that operated one party states

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or military regimes, However, we're talking

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about systems that have more or less levels

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of decentralization. All of these differences

16:39.135 --> 16:41.878
turn out to actually have quite significant

16:42.078 --> 16:45.080
importance for the way that politics actually

16:45.160 --> 16:48.262
operates today. So one of the things I consistently

16:48.322 --> 16:50.704
say to my students is, you know, it might

16:50.764 --> 16:53.066
not always be as easy to see exactly how

16:53.126 --> 16:55.228
institutions are shaping politics, but they

16:55.388 --> 16:58.451
are. And it's really important not to assume

16:58.491 --> 17:01.174
that all countries are neopatrimonial, or

17:01.214 --> 17:03.297
that this form of politics is equally true

17:03.337 --> 17:05.439
across the continent. So just to give you

17:05.500 --> 17:07.742
one example, one of the things that sometimes

17:07.802 --> 17:10.385
happens out of a kind of neopatrimonial framework

17:10.445 --> 17:12.847
is that people will say, Ah well, because

17:12.887 --> 17:15.088
of neopatrimonialism we get weak institutions,

17:15.148 --> 17:17.208
because of weak institutions we get corruption,

17:17.608 --> 17:19.589
so all African states are really corrupt.

17:20.129 --> 17:21.970
But in reality we know that there are some

17:22.030 --> 17:24.550
states that have been historically much less

17:24.610 --> 17:26.711
corrupt. Botswana would be a good example,

17:26.771 --> 17:29.271
despite having diamond wealth, has historically

17:29.311 --> 17:31.212
been much less corrupt, historically been

17:31.272 --> 17:34.213
much less neopatrimonial than other countries

17:34.273 --> 17:36.634
which fit the model better. So again, the

17:36.754 --> 17:39.157
danger of that model is that if we apply

17:39.177 --> 17:41.759
it in a one-size-fits-all way, we do a lot

17:41.779 --> 17:44.322
of violence to the flexibility of the variation

17:44.362 --> 17:45.904
and the different experiences of different

17:45.944 --> 17:48.426
countries in Africa. The final bit of your

17:48.466 --> 17:50.789
question brings us to Kenya and the protests

17:50.809 --> 17:53.110
that we've seen. And there, of course, I

17:53.151 --> 17:55.712
think what you could say is that, in a sense,

17:55.752 --> 17:59.353
we do see a bit of a clash between the demand

17:59.393 --> 18:01.514
of people for democracy and accountability

18:01.554 --> 18:04.316
and a government that delivers and a system

18:04.436 --> 18:06.537
that, in some ways, still is operating on

18:06.557 --> 18:08.798
the basis of some of those neopatrimonial

18:08.838 --> 18:11.579
logics. So we, in a sense, have the clash

18:11.639 --> 18:15.181
between the two, not neopatrimonialism completely

18:15.241 --> 18:17.682
dominating against other forms of politics,

18:17.742 --> 18:19.883
but actually the interaction and competition

18:19.923 --> 18:23.445
between those. Why do I say that? Well, one

18:23.465 --> 18:25.245
of the things we obviously saw in Kenya where

18:25.265 --> 18:28.566
we had youth-led protests was Kenyans coming

18:28.686 --> 18:31.047
out, very many young Kenyans coming out across

18:31.107 --> 18:33.968
ethnic lines to demand that their government

18:34.008 --> 18:37.169
do a number of things better. One, tackle

18:37.209 --> 18:39.730
corruption and reduce corruption. Two, get

18:39.770 --> 18:42.151
rid of the finance bill, which was very upsetting

18:42.191 --> 18:43.771
for a lot of people because it significantly

18:43.851 --> 18:46.252
increased a range of taxes and they'd already

18:46.292 --> 18:48.593
had a number of fees increased by the government.

18:48.613 --> 18:50.993
So the cost of living was getting much higher.

18:51.293 --> 18:52.994
But there were also complaints, you know,

18:53.034 --> 18:55.815
among the protesters about, you know, different

18:55.855 --> 18:58.135
kinds of government failures over many years,

18:58.815 --> 19:00.896
failure of government to invest economic

19:00.976 --> 19:04.857
funds and loans well, a tendency, you know,

19:04.917 --> 19:07.317
to focus too much on the position of the

19:07.397 --> 19:09.698
president and not to have good enough quality

19:09.758 --> 19:12.859
people in terms of cabinet secretaries, cabinet

19:12.899 --> 19:15.399
ministers, in other words, and so on. So

19:15.419 --> 19:17.160
there were a range of different complaints

19:17.200 --> 19:19.460
that were there. And many of those complaints

19:19.560 --> 19:22.321
related to, in one way or another, complaints

19:22.421 --> 19:24.582
about lack of inclusion in politics and about

19:24.602 --> 19:26.862
accountability. So you could read a lot of

19:26.902 --> 19:29.103
those complaints as being a bottom-up demand

19:29.203 --> 19:31.743
from younger people for a better quality

19:31.803 --> 19:33.924
democracy to deliver them better quality

19:33.964 --> 19:36.325
development and economics. And that was the

19:36.345 --> 19:38.545
kind of challenge that was being pushed on,

19:38.965 --> 19:41.146
a system that has failed to deliver, partly

19:41.206 --> 19:43.326
because it still has a lot of those elements

19:43.806 --> 19:45.947
of patrimonial politics operating at the

19:46.007 --> 19:48.408
top. One of the things I think is really

19:48.468 --> 19:50.830
interesting coming out of that Kenyan experience

19:50.930 --> 19:52.912
is, to what extent are we going to see more

19:52.932 --> 19:55.053
of that in the next 10 years? We know that

19:55.093 --> 19:57.655
African countries have very large youth populations.

19:58.136 --> 20:00.758
We know that we have processes of urbanization

20:00.778 --> 20:03.139
that are bringing people together. across

20:03.199 --> 20:06.261
ethnic lines, we know that we see significant

20:06.301 --> 20:08.182
improvements in education in a number of

20:08.222 --> 20:10.403
different African countries. So one of the

20:10.443 --> 20:12.524
things I'm really interested in is, is that

20:12.624 --> 20:14.465
changing the way that citizens think about

20:14.505 --> 20:16.306
themselves and the state? Is it changing

20:16.326 --> 20:17.887
the way they think about what the government

20:17.927 --> 20:20.768
delivers to them and owes them? And is it

20:20.828 --> 20:22.509
changing the way they're thinking about how

20:22.529 --> 20:24.810
they want to engage politically? In other

20:24.850 --> 20:27.372
words, are we going to see a new group of

20:27.432 --> 20:31.255
young people in urban areas operating not

20:31.355 --> 20:33.317
on the basis of their ethnic identity and

20:33.357 --> 20:35.681
voting for their ethnic leader, but for the

20:35.721 --> 20:37.663
person who will deliver on their particular

20:37.723 --> 20:40.146
agenda? And are we going to see them being

20:40.186 --> 20:42.590
more assertive and more demanding of government

20:42.990 --> 20:45.994
in ways that push accountability and reduce

20:46.034 --> 20:48.216
corruption? Now that would be a really exciting

20:48.256 --> 20:50.097
prospect, but of course, you know, we've

20:50.157 --> 20:52.097
only really seen one round of protests in

20:52.137 --> 20:54.418
Kenya. There were maybe some echoes of those

20:54.478 --> 20:56.499
protests in Nigeria and Uganda, but they

20:56.519 --> 20:59.180
were driven by very different forces as well.

20:59.381 --> 21:01.141
So I think one of the big questions for me

21:01.181 --> 21:03.702
for the next 12 months is, was the Kenyan

21:03.762 --> 21:06.023
experience a one-off or is it actually a

21:06.063 --> 21:08.104
structural change that we will start to see

21:08.164 --> 21:10.485
playing out in a growing number of countries?

21:12.366 --> 21:16.002
Speaking of democracy in Africa, You write

21:16.142 --> 21:18.964
on page 19 of your book the following, and

21:19.064 --> 21:23.686
I quote, the average African country is at

21:23.726 --> 21:27.367
least twice as diverse as New York or London.

21:28.228 --> 21:30.609
And the number of small ethnic groups in

21:30.689 --> 21:34.471
countries such as the DRC, Nigeria, and Uganda

21:35.111 --> 21:38.372
would have made it impossible to design polities

21:38.933 --> 21:41.794
that would have been both ethnically homogeneous

21:42.614 --> 21:45.829
and large enough to be viable It's therefore

21:45.989 --> 21:48.750
unsurprising that African states grouped

21:48.770 --> 21:51.411
together a range of different communities

21:51.451 --> 21:54.272
with a little sense of a common identity

21:54.992 --> 21:57.373
and that subsequent intercommunal relations

21:57.793 --> 22:01.294
were often characterized more by mutual suspicion

22:01.914 --> 22:05.896
than by a sense of solidarity. Is it true

22:06.376 --> 22:08.557
that the colonial powers believed in the

22:08.697 --> 22:11.838
idea of tribe and the Africans gave them

22:11.958 --> 22:15.148
tribes to believe in? And how critical is

22:15.288 --> 22:18.470
tribal identity in modern African politics,

22:19.310 --> 22:22.692
where the idea of democracy is a pressing

22:22.812 --> 22:23.112
issue?

22:24.173 --> 22:26.454
That's a fantastic question. It's also another

22:26.494 --> 22:29.095
challenging one. So let me see if I can now

22:29.115 --> 22:32.277
rise to the challenge. I think it's a really

22:32.397 --> 22:36.319
good point that we need to think very carefully

22:36.439 --> 22:39.201
about the question of how were states designed

22:39.261 --> 22:41.582
and how were national borders drawn. and

22:41.622 --> 22:43.204
then the question of the implications of

22:43.224 --> 22:45.346
that for the present day. One of the points

22:45.386 --> 22:47.087
I'm trying to make there in the book is that

22:47.128 --> 22:49.350
people will often say, well, the colonial

22:49.390 --> 22:51.892
government created this problem by, for example,

22:51.932 --> 22:53.934
drawing arbitrary borders that didn't make

22:53.994 --> 22:56.116
sense, that created countries of a number

22:56.136 --> 22:57.918
of different ethnic groups in the same place.

22:58.679 --> 23:00.620
And that's true, and there are many things

23:00.681 --> 23:02.522
we can lay the blame at the doors of colonialism

23:05.545 --> 23:07.630
and I've written about the way that forms

23:07.670 --> 23:10.376
of European colonialism predisposed African

23:10.436 --> 23:13.403
states to what I've called a form of fragile

23:13.463 --> 23:16.613
authoritarianism. But it's also true, as

23:16.653 --> 23:18.515
you were pointing out there in that quote,

23:18.855 --> 23:21.677
that actually in many countries we see a

23:21.737 --> 23:24.519
high number of ethnic groups, and that in

23:24.639 --> 23:27.481
order to design countries that were mono-ethnic,

23:27.541 --> 23:29.142
in other words, that only had one ethnic

23:29.162 --> 23:31.164
community in them, you would have had to

23:31.264 --> 23:33.626
create hundreds and hundreds more states,

23:33.746 --> 23:35.167
many of which would have been landlocked,

23:36.468 --> 23:38.429
many of which would have been too small to

23:38.489 --> 23:40.951
actually be feasible in terms of producing

23:41.151 --> 23:43.093
economically enough to sustain themselves.

23:43.813 --> 23:47.435
The challenge of creating effective political

23:47.495 --> 23:50.016
systems and building political relations

23:50.096 --> 23:52.697
between ethnic groups is not one that can

23:52.737 --> 23:54.878
be resolved by designing new borders. It

23:54.938 --> 23:58.159
has to be dealt with another way. And that

23:58.199 --> 24:00.440
brings me to the question of how people have

24:00.540 --> 24:03.602
tried to manage ethnicity and the implications

24:03.682 --> 24:06.529
of that. Now I think it is true that colonial

24:06.569 --> 24:08.792
governments believed in tribes. They tended

24:08.852 --> 24:11.235
to have quite racist assumptions about peoples

24:11.655 --> 24:13.638
and to have assumptions about the hierarchy

24:13.658 --> 24:16.161
of peoples. And they would often assume that

24:16.241 --> 24:19.365
groups that looked whiter or looked more

24:19.465 --> 24:22.568
European in one way or another would potentially

24:22.628 --> 24:24.870
be closer to Europeans, and in their racist

24:24.890 --> 24:27.973
worldview, those would be closer allies than

24:28.013 --> 24:30.456
people who didn't, and so on. So they did

24:30.536 --> 24:34.620
believe in tribes. They believed in the idea

24:34.940 --> 24:39.064
of people who had been in the same tribe

24:39.084 --> 24:41.927
for hundreds of years, millennia. And they

24:42.507 --> 24:45.249
constructed forms of government on that basis.

24:45.749 --> 24:48.371
And in doing so, they institutionalized a

24:48.411 --> 24:50.272
lot of the differences between groups, a

24:50.312 --> 24:51.893
lot of the differences between different

24:51.913 --> 24:54.035
people who spoke different languages, as

24:54.075 --> 24:57.097
a result of those assumptions. In many cases,

24:57.137 --> 24:58.738
we know those assumptions were not true.

24:59.478 --> 25:01.220
We know that actually there were communities

25:01.260 --> 25:04.263
that often intermarried. We know that identity

25:04.303 --> 25:06.906
shifted. We know that in some cases, for

25:06.986 --> 25:10.069
example, people spoke different languages,

25:10.129 --> 25:12.131
that sometimes languages were not actually

25:12.191 --> 25:15.234
barriers. That in some cases, different groups

25:15.274 --> 25:17.717
spoke the same language or aspects of the

25:17.757 --> 25:20.018
same language. we know that there was quite

25:20.058 --> 25:22.519
a lot of migration and mobility around in

25:22.579 --> 25:24.920
pre-colonial Africa, and that traditional

25:24.960 --> 25:28.161
leaders who were, for example, too repressive,

25:28.261 --> 25:30.402
or seemed to be too abusive, or seemed not

25:30.442 --> 25:33.983
to offer any protection to people, often

25:34.083 --> 25:37.044
experienced people migrating and leaving

25:37.204 --> 25:39.945
their territories in search for other areas.

25:39.965 --> 25:42.906
And because Africa, in that situation, if

25:42.946 --> 25:46.268
we go back now to the 1700s and 1800s, was

25:46.288 --> 25:49.812
a continent in which we had vast amounts

25:49.852 --> 25:52.275
of land and at that point not as many people,

25:52.836 --> 25:54.798
that this kind of form of migration was a

25:54.858 --> 25:58.002
way of escaping from authoritarian, dictatorial

25:58.062 --> 26:01.086
thought systems in some cases. So the reality

26:01.146 --> 26:03.129
on the ground was much more complex, much

26:03.189 --> 26:06.072
more fluid, much more nuanced. but the colonial

26:06.112 --> 26:09.015
government fixed that in many cases. Classic

26:09.095 --> 26:11.737
examples, of course, being in countries like

26:11.958 --> 26:14.840
Rwanda, creating identity cards that would

26:14.900 --> 26:17.463
state people's identity and ethnic group

26:17.603 --> 26:20.225
on them. Or, for example, in Zambia, Daniel

26:20.245 --> 26:23.729
Posner has shown only translating key educational

26:23.769 --> 26:26.451
or religious materials into so many languages,

26:26.832 --> 26:29.214
which essentially then means that people

26:29.354 --> 26:31.195
need to use those languages if they want

26:31.215 --> 26:33.217
to gain access to those education and those

26:33.257 --> 26:35.859
resources, or risk being left behind and

26:35.899 --> 26:37.500
so all of a sudden you see a significant

26:37.580 --> 26:39.902
shift in the sorts of languages that people

26:39.942 --> 26:42.184
are speaking. So colonial governments really,

26:42.204 --> 26:46.047
through creating a more rigid system, enabled

26:46.989 --> 26:50.290
the strengthening of ethnicity and tribe.

26:50.850 --> 26:53.011
Now, again, this is an important point of

26:53.071 --> 26:55.071
terminology. Colonial governments would have

26:55.111 --> 26:57.532
referred to tribes. Some African citizens

26:57.592 --> 27:00.973
today refer to tribes, but often academics

27:01.033 --> 27:03.073
and researchers prefer to refer to ethnic

27:03.093 --> 27:06.674
groups because tribe has colonial connotations,

27:06.774 --> 27:08.795
and using the term ethnicity and ethnic group

27:09.375 --> 27:11.696
is a way of sort of signaling that you understand

27:11.736 --> 27:13.976
that to an extent, you know, tribe is an

27:14.016 --> 27:16.997
inventive, created term that is deeply contested.

27:17.998 --> 27:20.939
Now, you asked a particular point there about

27:20.979 --> 27:23.139
to what extent did colonial governments believe

27:23.179 --> 27:25.420
in tribes and Africans gave them tribes to

27:25.460 --> 27:27.640
believe in. And there is a great degree of

27:27.680 --> 27:29.801
that. There's really important research by

27:29.861 --> 27:32.342
people like Leroy Vale and others who suggest

27:32.402 --> 27:35.083
that there's a lot of local entrepreneurialism

27:35.243 --> 27:37.723
in this period. I've been in the archive

27:37.803 --> 27:39.884
in Kenya, in the National Archive, and seen

27:39.944 --> 27:42.965
letters from different ethnic groups asking

27:43.005 --> 27:45.205
to have a paramount chief recognized by the

27:45.245 --> 27:47.086
colonial government because they believe

27:47.106 --> 27:49.366
that that's going to be a way of extracting

27:49.406 --> 27:52.127
more resources. So in other words, communities

27:52.167 --> 27:54.327
that didn't necessarily always historically

27:54.427 --> 27:57.248
recognize a paramount chief, didn't recognize

27:57.308 --> 27:59.729
a central authority, weren't classic tribes

27:59.889 --> 28:02.249
in that sense, trying to become more like

28:02.329 --> 28:04.530
that because that's the avenue of securing

28:04.570 --> 28:07.290
more resources. So one of the things we see

28:07.310 --> 28:08.651
during the colonial period is this kind of

28:08.731 --> 28:12.232
creative co-production of the idea of a tribe

28:12.492 --> 28:15.513
as a political unit in a way that in many

28:15.593 --> 28:18.034
countries didn't really exist beforehand,

28:18.134 --> 28:19.815
but of course in some countries had done.

28:20.495 --> 28:22.876
And so that's the sort of legacy that colonial

28:22.916 --> 28:25.917
government leaves for post-colonial Africa.

28:26.832 --> 28:29.713
Now, the extent to which that legacy remains

28:30.153 --> 28:32.934
is partly about the extent to which post-colonial

28:32.974 --> 28:35.515
governments have played upon those divisions,

28:35.575 --> 28:38.096
have played divide and rule politics. So

28:38.356 --> 28:40.537
classic examples here would be to compare,

28:40.597 --> 28:46.578
say, Tanzania where historically, under Julius

28:46.618 --> 28:48.539
Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania,

28:48.579 --> 28:51.840
you had a situation where there was a strong

28:51.920 --> 28:54.501
emphasis on national culture, on the use

28:54.561 --> 28:57.061
of Swahili as a lingua franca, on certain

28:57.101 --> 28:59.522
common symbols that could bring people together,

28:59.542 --> 29:02.683
a focus on teaching civic education, and

29:02.723 --> 29:04.924
therefore creating the idea that there were

29:04.984 --> 29:07.544
Tanzanians, not people of different ethnic

29:07.564 --> 29:10.785
groups, and that being a very strong focus

29:11.185 --> 29:13.406
throughout Nyerere's time in power. Then

29:13.426 --> 29:14.846
you could compare that to somewhere like

29:14.886 --> 29:17.066
Kenya, where under Jomo Kenyatta you have

29:17.126 --> 29:19.127
more of a survival of the fittest model.

29:19.587 --> 29:21.587
Ethnic groups are expected to look after

29:21.647 --> 29:24.248
themselves. The state doesn't provide so

29:24.308 --> 29:26.489
much. There's less of a focus on building

29:26.529 --> 29:28.969
a cohesive national identity, and you see

29:29.029 --> 29:31.830
ethnic competition ravine politics over resources.

29:32.690 --> 29:36.151
Those two different ways of managing ethnicity

29:36.511 --> 29:39.072
create very different types of societies.

29:39.152 --> 29:41.853
In Tanzania, ethnicity is much easier to

29:41.893 --> 29:44.294
manage, doesn't play such a central role

29:44.334 --> 29:47.475
in politics, doesn't create so many divisions,

29:47.555 --> 29:49.756
hasn't been a source of election violence.

29:50.316 --> 29:52.457
And in the Kenyan context, all of those things

29:52.497 --> 29:56.038
have come to pass. So we see, in other words,

29:56.379 --> 29:59.060
the ways in which leaders manage ethnicity

29:59.100 --> 30:01.442
and manage different ethnic groups is really

30:01.502 --> 30:04.144
important to the extent to which ethnicity

30:04.204 --> 30:07.146
continues to be a major driver in African

30:07.186 --> 30:10.268
politics today. Now, one of the things that's

30:10.308 --> 30:12.169
then maybe worth saying just at the end of

30:12.209 --> 30:14.190
that is that one of the sad things about

30:14.250 --> 30:17.312
identity politics, which can be quite divisive

30:17.352 --> 30:19.514
and can generate instability and conflict,

30:20.114 --> 30:22.135
is that it doesn't tend to take that much

30:22.275 --> 30:24.936
to mobilize that into politics, to get people

30:24.996 --> 30:26.917
to be afraid of each other, to get people

30:26.957 --> 30:29.599
to be suspicious. But it takes a long time

30:29.659 --> 30:32.720
to get it out. In other words, if you have

30:32.760 --> 30:34.761
an episode of ethnic violence, if you have

30:34.781 --> 30:37.623
an episode of a leader of one group demonizing

30:37.703 --> 30:40.384
another, it then can often take quite a long

30:40.464 --> 30:43.106
time to actually be able to mobilize that

30:43.266 --> 30:46.428
out of politics in order to be able to actually

30:46.468 --> 30:49.309
go back to a situation in which those tensions

30:49.349 --> 30:51.671
and those divisions are much less pronounced.

30:52.131 --> 30:53.752
And that's one of the great challenges I

30:53.792 --> 30:56.553
think we're still facing, that even in countries

30:56.633 --> 30:58.554
where governments that play divide and rule

30:58.594 --> 31:01.016
have been replaced, it takes a long time

31:01.096 --> 31:04.258
and really strong proactive policies to reintegrate

31:04.298 --> 31:06.139
people and to build back that sense of a

31:06.219 --> 31:09.061
more harmonious, consensual national identity.

31:11.942 --> 31:14.224
In chapter three of your book, where you

31:14.304 --> 31:18.186
turn your gaze on transition, you write on

31:18.266 --> 31:23.009
page 91 the following, and I quote, in contrast

31:23.049 --> 31:26.903
to Kenya and Tongo, The independence of political

31:27.023 --> 31:29.323
institutions in South Africa had not been

31:29.583 --> 31:33.425
wholly undermined by neopatrimonial politics.

31:34.465 --> 31:37.706
Of course, power was abused and apartheid,

31:38.626 --> 31:41.227
and the regime was often closed and opaque,

31:41.827 --> 31:44.188
with the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond,

31:44.909 --> 31:48.330
also known as Afrikaner Brotherhood, wielding

31:48.490 --> 31:52.211
great influence behind the scenes. But South

31:52.291 --> 31:55.312
African leaders operated under real constraints.

31:56.498 --> 32:00.960
Nic, how significant are independent institutions

32:01.020 --> 32:04.502
to political transition? That is, the peaceable

32:04.582 --> 32:06.943
transfer of power from one leader to the

32:07.003 --> 32:10.425
next. And what is your recommendation for

32:10.525 --> 32:13.926
fostering such institutions in support of

32:13.966 --> 32:15.167
democracy in Africa?

32:18.023 --> 38:27.029
So yeah, institutions are critical, 100%

32:20.786 --> 32:25.371
critical to the ability to actually manage

32:25.431 --> 32:27.073
a transition from one government to the next,

32:27.133 --> 32:30.236
to the ability to constrain leaders. It's

32:30.417 --> 32:33.300
all about those institutions. So do we have

32:33.360 --> 32:35.042
strong legislature? Do we have a strong and

32:35.082 --> 32:36.823
independent judiciary? Do we have a strong

32:36.843 --> 32:38.405
and independent electoral commission? But

32:39.126 --> 32:42.308
of course, The fact that you have those institutions

32:42.488 --> 32:45.049
and that they're strong and independent also

32:45.169 --> 32:47.029
depends on a number of other factors. So

32:47.069 --> 32:50.210
for example, do we have strong public support

32:50.231 --> 32:51.931
for those institutions that protects them

32:52.171 --> 32:54.372
if the government decides to try and manipulate

32:54.412 --> 32:56.813
them? Do we see, as we were talking about

32:56.853 --> 32:59.314
a moment ago, the attempt to subvert those

32:59.374 --> 33:02.635
institutions by using patrimonial strategies

33:02.715 --> 33:06.036
and so on? So aspects of political culture,

33:06.116 --> 33:08.477
aspects of social norms come in here as well.

33:09.077 --> 33:11.742
But yes, absolutely. The most important factor

33:11.783 --> 33:14.608
here to look at, in my opinion, is the extent

33:14.628 --> 33:16.592
to which those institutions are independent.

33:17.335 --> 33:19.456
and can therefore check the power of the

33:19.516 --> 33:22.057
government in a genuine way. And where we

33:22.118 --> 33:24.439
see that that's the case, transfers of power

33:24.479 --> 33:26.340
become much more feasible. And where transfers

33:26.400 --> 33:28.481
of power are much more feasible, you start

33:28.521 --> 33:30.782
to see, for example, competitive politics,

33:30.822 --> 33:33.623
the breakdown of the ability of one party

33:33.663 --> 33:36.065
and one leader to dominate politics. And

33:36.105 --> 33:38.666
that's a really good thing in general. In

33:38.726 --> 33:41.487
general, in African countries, we see leaders

33:41.527 --> 33:43.709
who stay in power for longer becoming more

33:43.769 --> 33:45.810
corrupt, becoming more likely to manipulate

33:45.850 --> 33:48.171
elections, less likely to deliver to their

33:48.191 --> 33:50.811
people. So being able to get rid of a leader

33:50.871 --> 33:53.692
when he's performing badly, even if the next

33:53.752 --> 33:55.753
leader doesn't perform great themselves,

33:55.893 --> 33:58.154
is still a benefit over having to have that

33:58.234 --> 33:59.914
leader be there and become president for

33:59.954 --> 34:02.035
life. And of course, one of the really worrying

34:02.075 --> 34:03.716
things we've seen over the last 20 years

34:04.236 --> 34:06.116
is an increased number of presidents trying

34:06.136 --> 34:08.137
to set themselves up as presidents for life,

34:08.177 --> 34:10.738
for example, by removing presidential term

34:10.778 --> 34:12.699
limits in the case of people like Yoweri

34:12.739 --> 34:15.780
Museveni in Uganda, removing age limits as

34:15.840 --> 34:17.740
well as term limits to make sure that they

34:17.780 --> 34:20.802
can stay effectively until they die in office.

34:21.362 --> 34:23.523
So those institutions are absolutely critical.

34:23.903 --> 34:25.524
How do we build them and foster them and

34:25.564 --> 34:28.065
strengthen them? That's one of the big multi-million

34:28.085 --> 34:29.906
dollar questions. If we could answer that

34:30.166 --> 34:32.727
easily and effectively, we could transform

34:32.767 --> 34:34.527
the state of democracy around the world.

34:35.048 --> 34:37.109
One of the challenges we face is that building

34:37.149 --> 34:39.229
good institutions is one of the most difficult

34:39.249 --> 34:41.411
things that there is to do. So one of the

34:41.471 --> 34:43.093
things that we really need to think about

34:43.153 --> 34:46.557
is how do we creatively create stronger institutions

34:47.098 --> 34:49.180
in countries where they don't exist Right

34:49.280 --> 34:51.343
now. And that's really difficult, you know,

34:51.383 --> 34:53.225
we have to be very clear about how big a

34:53.265 --> 34:55.908
challenge that is. We have seen it done though

34:56.128 --> 34:58.371
in recent times in some African countries,

34:58.431 --> 35:01.334
I would say that the Judiciary in Malawi

35:01.895 --> 35:04.898
is stronger than it was 30 years ago and

35:04.938 --> 35:07.521
has been emboldened, for example, to reject

35:07.621 --> 35:10.664
the election result in 2019, becoming one

35:10.704 --> 35:13.687
of the only courts in the world to reject

35:13.827 --> 35:15.789
the election of a sitting president. The

35:15.829 --> 35:18.370
Kenyan Supreme Court, of course, before the

35:18.410 --> 38:27.029
Malawian one, set that precedent in 2017

35:21.772 --> 35:24.473
in validating that election. And we see in

35:24.533 --> 35:28.355
Kenya that in response to post-election violence

35:28.395 --> 35:30.176
and a political crisis that challenged the

35:30.236 --> 35:33.837
legitimacy of the regime in 2007-2008, we

35:33.897 --> 35:36.318
then get the political elite accepting a

35:36.378 --> 35:39.640
new constitution which introduces devolution,

32:18.023 --> 35:43.241
47 new counties with directly elected governors

35:43.281 --> 35:45.902
and senators. We see the creation of that

35:45.962 --> 35:48.903
Supreme Court, and we see a process of judicial

35:48.943 --> 35:51.143
vetting that actually vets many of the judges

35:51.203 --> 35:53.604
and removes some of the worst offenders from

35:53.624 --> 35:55.865
the previous regimes in terms of corruption

35:56.485 --> 35:58.585
and bias in decision making. And so we get

35:58.625 --> 36:00.826
a judiciary and a Supreme Court, that the

36:00.886 --> 36:02.947
people have more confidence in, which then

36:03.007 --> 36:05.468
enables that judiciary to nullify the election

36:05.508 --> 36:09.289
in 2017 and to take the wrath of the government,

36:09.329 --> 36:11.930
which was deeply unimpressed and unhappy

36:11.990 --> 36:14.371
about that decision. So in a country like

36:14.411 --> 36:16.412
Kenya, despite all the challenges that I

36:16.452 --> 36:17.992
talked about earlier when I talked about

36:18.633 --> 36:20.213
the problems in the government of President

36:20.253 --> 36:22.714
Ruto and the protests of young people, If

36:22.794 --> 36:24.956
in a context like that, that difficult, that

36:25.016 --> 36:28.439
challenging, we can see significant institutional

36:28.699 --> 36:31.182
innovation, the creation of new institutions

36:31.222 --> 36:32.903
such as devolution in the Supreme Court,

36:33.384 --> 36:35.625
processes of cleaning up those institutions

36:35.665 --> 36:37.887
that have actually meant that they perform

36:37.927 --> 36:40.309
better. They're not ideal. There are still

36:40.370 --> 36:42.391
challenges to the way that devolution works,

36:42.411 --> 36:44.713
to the way that the judiciary works. But

36:44.814 --> 36:48.138
that clear improvement and progress demonstrates

36:48.198 --> 36:50.922
that this is possible. I think the question

36:50.962 --> 36:53.305
then for a lot of us is, what are the exact

36:53.345 --> 36:55.348
conditions that enable that to come about?

36:56.221 --> 36:58.683
In the Kenyan context, perhaps, it was the

36:58.703 --> 37:01.285
political elite realizing the extent to which

37:01.325 --> 37:03.326
they brought the country to the brink, that

37:03.386 --> 37:06.588
men accept a constitution that perhaps they

37:06.628 --> 37:09.190
wouldn't have accepted otherwise, combined

37:09.270 --> 37:10.912
maybe with the fact that the president of

37:10.952 --> 37:13.173
the time, Mwai Kibaki, was in his second

37:13.213 --> 37:15.675
term in office, and therefore wasn't standing

37:15.735 --> 37:18.157
for election again, and therefore was willing

37:18.257 --> 37:20.558
to introduce reforms that would bind future

37:20.598 --> 37:23.340
leaders but would not bind himself. And perhaps

37:23.400 --> 37:25.721
those two things were particularly important.

37:26.242 --> 37:28.183
Now, of course, that's a really interesting

37:28.483 --> 37:31.584
conflation of events that enabled the institutional

37:31.664 --> 37:34.185
strengthening to happen in Kenya. The challenge

37:34.245 --> 37:36.246
is that we don't see those things a lot of

37:36.266 --> 37:38.167
the time. And of course, we don't want to

37:38.207 --> 37:39.908
see one of them. We don't want to see the

37:39.948 --> 37:42.509
conflict and the instability. that we saw

37:42.589 --> 37:44.790
in Kenya. So how do we actually bring about

37:44.830 --> 37:47.952
those changes in countries where we don't

37:48.012 --> 37:50.353
see that violence? Well, going back to what

37:50.373 --> 37:52.293
I was saying before, one thing that does

37:52.333 --> 37:54.274
seem to be really important is that these

37:54.314 --> 37:56.015
kind of changes are often more likely to

37:56.055 --> 37:57.936
be brought in by a president who's leaving

37:57.996 --> 38:00.437
power and doesn't plan on being there forever.

38:00.897 --> 38:03.538
President Kibaki in the Kenyan context. So

38:03.618 --> 38:05.219
perhaps one of the things again that that

38:05.259 --> 38:07.520
takes us back to is the importance of defending

38:07.580 --> 38:10.121
presidential term limits and having leaders

38:10.161 --> 38:11.922
who know that at a certain point they won't

38:11.962 --> 38:14.523
be in office. And that then generates a greater

38:14.543 --> 38:17.245
opportunity in the final period of those

38:17.305 --> 38:19.706
leaders being in office to generate the kind

38:19.746 --> 38:21.426
of reforms that would actually strengthen

38:21.467 --> 38:23.968
and make more independent electoral commissions

38:24.148 --> 38:25.788
and judiciaries moving forwards.

38:27.029 --> 38:30.640
Turning to chapter four of your book, entitled

38:31.461 --> 38:34.623
Exporting Elections, International Actors

38:34.783 --> 38:38.146
and the Era of Democratic Dependency. You're

38:38.206 --> 38:43.169
Right on page 109, thus, and I quote, following

38:43.369 --> 38:46.351
decades of failed interventions around the

38:46.391 --> 38:50.454
world, European and North American donors

38:50.914 --> 38:54.657
were desperate for a success story by presenting

38:54.757 --> 38:58.697
Uganda as a client guinea on which international

38:58.817 --> 39:02.818
aid programs could be tested, Museveni offered

39:02.898 --> 39:05.258
donors a chance to show that their policies

39:05.318 --> 39:09.419
would have worked if only they had been implemented

39:09.519 --> 39:13.240
correctly. Thus, Museveni committed his government

39:13.660 --> 39:17.521
to talking about and tackling HIV-AIDS at

39:17.561 --> 39:20.261
a time when most African governments were

39:20.301 --> 39:23.482
refusing to recognize and respond to the

39:23.562 --> 39:27.856
danger posed by the pandemic. He also embraced

39:28.336 --> 39:32.679
the advice of IMF and World Bank, accepting

39:32.839 --> 39:36.582
economic liberalization as the price of preventing

39:36.722 --> 39:40.845
political liberalization. Please talk to

39:41.045 --> 39:45.508
us about why the donor community felt compelled

39:45.568 --> 39:48.790
to put their relationship with Museveni above

39:48.850 --> 39:52.093
the need to democratize Uganda's political

39:52.113 --> 39:55.451
landscape. And do you think Western donors

39:55.551 --> 39:59.132
were naive about Museveni, with special reference

39:59.192 --> 40:03.013
to an open secret that is his long-running

40:03.073 --> 40:05.433
project to create a presidential monarchy

40:06.134 --> 40:06.794
in Uganda?

40:09.895 --> 40:14.375
I think donors both European and North American

40:14.415 --> 40:18.578
donors at the time felt that they needed

40:18.598 --> 40:22.121
a success story, somewhere they could point

40:22.181 --> 40:25.604
to that was doing well, partly in order to

40:25.684 --> 40:28.106
show that their programs could be effective,

40:28.166 --> 40:31.089
partly because demonstrating that aid could

40:31.129 --> 40:33.352
work helped to make the case for aid back

40:33.392 --> 40:35.254
home. And of course, one of the challenges

40:35.334 --> 40:39.039
for donors is to justify why scarce resources

40:39.079 --> 40:42.023
should be spent abroad rather than on taxpayers

40:42.063 --> 40:45.347
needs domestically. So that's a factor that

40:45.367 --> 40:48.189
was playing in. I think Museveni also carefully

40:48.229 --> 40:51.271
manipulated Uganda's history of instability

40:51.311 --> 40:54.012
and conflict to tell donors that there would

40:54.072 --> 40:56.413
be more instability and violence if they

40:56.493 --> 40:59.215
forced him to democratize too quickly. And

40:59.255 --> 41:01.356
that was perhaps another factor in the back

41:01.396 --> 41:02.996
of donors' mind, that they didn't want to

41:03.096 --> 41:06.238
force a process and therefore generate instability

41:06.258 --> 41:08.979
and then be responsible for the instability

41:09.039 --> 41:11.481
that resulted. I think there's also a fact

41:11.521 --> 41:13.543
that Museveni has just been very clever at

41:13.603 --> 41:15.865
manipulating people's perceptions of him.

41:16.565 --> 41:19.447
We roll the videotape forwards a little bit

41:19.527 --> 41:22.130
from the period I was describing there to

41:22.150 --> 41:25.172
the more recent period. He's gone from being

41:25.232 --> 41:27.194
willing to be one of the only African leaders

41:27.234 --> 41:31.357
to talk about HIV-AIDS to now being a leader

41:31.437 --> 41:34.579
who has supported, for example, international

41:34.660 --> 41:36.681
missions in other countries by providing

41:36.781 --> 41:39.844
Ugandan troops in situations where actually

41:39.884 --> 41:41.845
those missions have ended up being fairly

41:41.885 --> 41:44.748
dependent on Ugandan troops. He's also been

41:44.768 --> 41:49.752
a supporter of Western policies and programs

41:49.812 --> 41:52.354
around anti-terror operations. And again,

41:52.394 --> 41:56.017
in all of those ways, he's consistently ingratiated

41:56.077 --> 41:58.639
himself with governments around the world.

41:59.020 --> 42:01.502
And that has then led them to mute their

42:01.542 --> 42:05.311
criticism of him. Did he fool them? I'm not

42:05.411 --> 42:07.613
sure he necessarily always fooled them. I

42:07.653 --> 42:09.875
think in some cases they understood who they

42:09.895 --> 42:11.717
were dealing with and they made trade-offs.

42:11.757 --> 42:14.300
They traded off Ugandan democracy against

42:14.800 --> 42:18.464
stability, development, and so on. I think

42:18.524 --> 42:21.346
perhaps where they made the biggest mistakes

42:22.007 --> 42:25.489
was, as you say, to one, fail to understand

42:25.629 --> 42:27.830
what would happen in the end, which is that

42:27.951 --> 42:30.252
Uganda's economy would begin to struggle,

42:30.692 --> 42:34.054
that Museveni would end up lacking genuine

42:34.074 --> 42:36.776
innovation, that his desire to be a president

42:36.796 --> 42:38.957
for life would stop political change and

42:38.997 --> 42:42.659
therefore prevent economic revitalization,

42:43.159 --> 42:45.361
and that Museveni would become a big part

42:45.381 --> 42:47.162
of the problem rather than the solution.

42:47.762 --> 42:50.343
I think they also perhaps failed to understand

42:50.764 --> 42:53.205
how strategic Museveni was and how he would

42:53.245 --> 42:55.906
very quickly abandon them if it was in his

42:55.966 --> 42:57.587
interest to do so. And of course, one of

42:57.607 --> 42:59.148
the things we've seen in the last couple

42:59.168 --> 43:01.989
of years is Museveni increasingly distancing

43:02.029 --> 43:04.410
himself from his former Western allies and

43:04.450 --> 43:06.931
increasingly talking positively about governments

43:06.991 --> 43:09.253
like the one in Russia. So I think this is

43:09.573 --> 43:12.634
unique to Uganda. Uganda was a particularly

43:12.694 --> 43:15.736
good example of this process, but it's something

43:15.776 --> 43:17.617
that we've seen in other countries as well,

43:17.717 --> 43:20.479
where, for example, Rwanda would be a good

43:20.539 --> 43:22.720
example, where the British government until

43:22.760 --> 43:26.242
recently had a plan to send refugees to Rwanda,

43:26.582 --> 43:28.223
which then led the British government to

43:28.263 --> 43:30.904
have to imply that Rwanda was safe. And of

43:30.964 --> 43:32.645
course, that flies in the face of some of

43:32.665 --> 43:34.346
the advice the British government itself

43:34.406 --> 43:37.708
has received and given over the years. So

43:37.768 --> 43:41.209
this kind of process of leaders understanding,

43:41.289 --> 43:43.210
Paul Kagame and Rwanda being very good at

43:43.230 --> 43:46.531
this as well, how to impress donors, claiming

43:46.591 --> 43:49.772
to be good on performance, then meeting donor

43:49.812 --> 43:52.393
priorities in terms of whether it's refugees,

43:52.433 --> 43:55.154
migration, economic policy, security, and

43:55.194 --> 43:58.415
then using that to essentially insulate themselves

43:58.455 --> 44:00.815
from global criticism for the lack of democracy,

44:01.296 --> 44:03.216
that's something that we've seen in a number

44:03.296 --> 44:06.157
of different places. I think the most striking

44:06.337 --> 44:09.338
example of it for me is that in Uganda, when

44:09.358 --> 44:11.538
we've seen significant human Rights abuses,

44:11.618 --> 44:14.639
so the arrest of Bobi Wine when he's an opposition

44:14.679 --> 44:16.239
candidate in the election, the arrest of

44:16.279 --> 44:18.460
Kizza Besigye before Bobi Wine as the main

44:18.500 --> 44:21.081
opposition candidate, you know, the brutality

44:21.221 --> 44:23.502
that was meted out to Bobby Wine supporters

44:23.542 --> 44:25.923
at the last election, many of whom, you know,

44:25.963 --> 44:27.944
were beaten, some were killed, some were

44:28.044 --> 44:30.805
tortured, some we still don't know what happened

44:30.845 --> 44:33.186
to them, that there wasn't a stronger, more

44:33.246 --> 44:35.768
powerful, you know, international outcry

44:35.908 --> 44:38.429
about those abuses which were just flagrant

44:39.129 --> 44:42.433
explicit, there for everybody to see, not

44:42.513 --> 44:45.437
in any way disguised. And that really is

44:45.497 --> 44:47.840
a problematic situation, not just because

44:47.900 --> 44:51.264
it lets down people in Uganda, who want to

44:51.324 --> 44:53.927
see a better quality democracy, more accountability,

44:53.947 --> 44:57.290
more inclusion, but also because it sends

44:57.350 --> 44:59.651
a signal around the world that the international

44:59.691 --> 45:02.273
community is not acting consistently. And

45:02.313 --> 45:05.395
I think that evidence of hypocrisy and inconsistency

45:05.795 --> 45:07.816
is one of the things that gives ammunition

45:07.936 --> 45:09.937
to authoritarian leaders. It's one of the

45:09.998 --> 45:12.479
things that they now point to as evidence

45:12.539 --> 45:14.740
that people shouldn't listen to international

45:14.761 --> 45:16.842
and Western criticism when it comes to democracy.

45:17.322 --> 45:19.584
Because they will say, they're talking about

45:19.624 --> 45:21.547
democracy here, but did you notice that they

45:21.567 --> 45:23.669
didn't do it in Saudi Arabia? Did you notice

45:23.709 --> 45:25.752
they didn't do it in Uganda? Did you notice

45:25.792 --> 45:28.004
they didn't do it you know, and the examples

45:28.064 --> 45:30.065
might go on to include Gaza and the Middle

45:30.105 --> 45:33.228
East and so on. And that sense of inconsistency

45:33.248 --> 45:36.050
and hypocrisy is slowly eroding any moral

45:36.090 --> 45:37.911
high ground Western states, you know, may

45:37.951 --> 45:40.233
have once had. So I think Uganda is a really

45:40.273 --> 45:42.875
good example, not just of how those competing

45:42.895 --> 45:45.317
priorities can play off and undermine the

45:45.357 --> 45:47.618
promotion of democracy in an individual country,

45:48.059 --> 45:50.801
but also how that process can then complicate

45:51.141 --> 45:53.563
the credibility of Western donors when it

45:53.623 --> 45:56.065
comes to promoting democracy and development

45:56.105 --> 45:56.665
more broadly.

45:57.646 --> 46:00.948
The title of our podcast is How Critical

46:01.088 --> 46:04.289
is Democracy in a Multipolar World? Now,

46:04.589 --> 46:09.832
on March 27th, 2024, Nic Westcott, a professor

46:09.852 --> 46:12.253
of diplomacy at Soares University, London,

46:12.993 --> 46:15.735
published a comment on your website, Democracy

46:15.835 --> 46:20.077
in Africa, entitled, As the Opposition Wins

46:20.257 --> 46:23.538
in Senegal, Is Democracy in Africa Really

46:23.618 --> 46:26.620
Backsliding? He wrote the following, and

46:26.760 --> 46:32.340
I quote, In 2023, Xi Jinping launched China's

46:32.520 --> 46:36.362
Global Civilizations Initiative, its Global

46:36.402 --> 46:39.803
Development Initiative, and a Global Security

46:39.903 --> 46:44.244
Initiative. Like the old Belt and Road Initiative,

46:44.904 --> 46:47.445
these are designed to reorient the world

46:47.525 --> 46:50.986
towards China, in this case ideologically

46:51.406 --> 46:55.168
rather than physically. While their substance

46:55.288 --> 46:58.422
remains vague, The initiatives provide an

46:58.582 --> 47:02.164
alternative to the Western norms embodied

47:02.344 --> 47:05.666
in the UN, its multilateral institutions,

47:06.286 --> 47:08.928
and the multiple charters and agreements

47:09.048 --> 47:13.910
promulgated under its auspices. They are

47:14.030 --> 47:16.712
an integral part of efforts to reframe the

47:16.752 --> 47:20.774
debate from one of democracy versus authoritarians

47:21.775 --> 47:24.776
to the global South and its reliable friends

47:24.996 --> 47:28.581
in the global East versus neo-colonialist

47:28.861 --> 47:32.823
exploitative West. The latter narrative is

47:32.883 --> 47:36.264
gaining traction in Africa, boosted by the

47:36.344 --> 47:39.125
Gaza crisis, where Western countries are

47:39.205 --> 47:43.207
often seen hypocritically as quick to condemn

47:43.427 --> 47:46.669
Hamas, but slow to criticize the huge death

47:46.749 --> 47:49.710
toll Israel has inflicted on Palestinian

47:49.750 --> 47:54.052
civilians. Nic, in the context of our podcast

47:54.112 --> 47:57.865
theme, How critical is democracy in a multipolar

47:57.905 --> 48:01.629
world? Do you also think that democracy may

48:01.769 --> 48:04.613
one day flourish on the continent of Africa?

48:05.273 --> 48:09.258
Put another way, are there any bad democracies?

48:12.221 --> 48:14.805
I think there are. And I'm broadly speaking

48:14.865 --> 48:17.346
optimistic about the future of Africa. And

48:17.366 --> 48:19.727
the reason for that is partly what we talked

48:19.787 --> 48:21.547
about a moment ago when we talked about what

48:21.567 --> 48:24.188
we've seen recently in Kenya. We see young

48:24.248 --> 48:26.729
people who have been brought up with elections,

48:26.849 --> 48:28.829
who are used to being able to choose who's

48:28.889 --> 48:31.690
in power. And let's not forget that Kenya

48:31.710 --> 48:34.090
has had two transfers of power. We could

48:34.871 --> 48:36.831
quibble over whether President Ruto winning

48:37.191 --> 48:38.872
was a real transfer because he was deputy

48:38.912 --> 48:41.232
president before. But We've essentially had

48:41.292 --> 48:42.933
two elections in which the candidate the

48:42.993 --> 48:46.033
president wanted to win didn't win. So we've

48:46.053 --> 48:48.714
got countries like that, that people are

48:48.754 --> 48:51.454
starting to get used to having a say, Malawi,

48:51.894 --> 48:54.255
Zambia, where people are used to being able

48:54.275 --> 48:56.855
to vote out the president, Gambia, Liberia,

48:57.435 --> 49:00.996
Sierra Leone, and where the belief in being

49:01.116 --> 49:03.197
able to speak your mind and being able to

49:03.257 --> 49:06.100
choose your leader is very powerful. and

49:06.140 --> 49:09.263
very vibrant. And I think in those societies

49:09.343 --> 49:11.145
leaders can try and shut that down, they

49:11.165 --> 49:13.447
can try and intimidate civil society, they

49:13.467 --> 49:16.249
can try and intimidate the media, but that

49:16.409 --> 49:19.912
impulse of wanting to have a say and expecting

49:19.952 --> 49:21.854
to have a say in politics will continue.

49:22.474 --> 49:24.596
And so I think one thing we'll see in the

49:24.656 --> 49:27.079
authoritarian states of Africa, for example

49:27.119 --> 49:28.900
the new military hunters after the coups

49:28.940 --> 49:31.522
in West Africa, But also, you know, some

49:31.562 --> 49:33.484
of those authoritarian states in southern

49:33.504 --> 49:36.186
and eastern Africa is that they will continue

49:36.226 --> 49:38.708
to face significant challenges because people

49:38.768 --> 49:40.770
in those countries want to live in a democracy.

49:40.790 --> 49:43.452
And we know that. We know that from the Afrobarometer

49:43.472 --> 49:46.655
data. So broadly speaking, I am positive

49:46.715 --> 49:49.537
and hopeful that long term processes of education,

49:49.737 --> 49:53.320
economic growth, rising middle class, urbanization

49:53.741 --> 49:56.784
will create stronger opportunities to foster

49:56.824 --> 49:59.306
that impulse and to turn it into more democratic

49:59.366 --> 50:02.249
institutions and processes. I'm also aware

50:02.309 --> 50:03.911
though that that's going to be a very long-term

50:03.951 --> 50:06.413
process and the governments and leaders will

50:06.433 --> 50:07.994
try and manipulate it, they will try and

50:08.035 --> 50:10.377
manipulate how urbanization works, they will

50:10.417 --> 50:12.459
try and move citizens around the country

50:12.919 --> 50:15.522
to prevent the formation of pro-opposition

50:15.582 --> 50:18.225
or pro-democracy urban blocs and we will

50:18.285 --> 50:21.328
see support from China and Russia in some

50:21.408 --> 50:24.292
cases enabling authoritarian states to commute

50:24.352 --> 50:26.634
human Rights abuses and so it's going to

50:26.674 --> 50:29.217
be a long-term process and a long-term struggle.

50:30.123 --> 50:32.284
But I do believe that over the longer term,

50:32.705 --> 50:34.866
that struggle in the very long term will

50:34.926 --> 50:37.428
lead to a more democratic set of societies,

50:37.508 --> 50:39.209
because I believe fundamentally that that's

50:39.249 --> 50:42.331
what people in those societies want. In terms

50:42.471 --> 50:45.473
of the situation globally, I think you're

50:45.493 --> 50:47.635
absolutely Right about the points you make

50:47.715 --> 50:49.356
about the West and the way that the West

50:49.416 --> 50:51.637
is seen to be hypocritical, and the way that

50:51.677 --> 50:53.899
that then plays into a kind of language of

50:53.939 --> 50:56.420
decolonization and of the role of the West

50:56.500 --> 50:59.082
in colonizing and human Rights abuses and

50:59.142 --> 51:01.704
so on. All of that comes together as a very

51:01.764 --> 51:04.585
powerful package which is well used by, for

51:04.645 --> 51:06.827
example, the Russian government and its allies.

51:07.527 --> 51:09.428
I do think, though, in time that one of the

51:09.468 --> 51:11.469
things that people will start to see is that

51:11.489 --> 51:13.831
the Russian government is very similar. That

51:13.851 --> 51:16.132
we actually will start to see, for example,

51:16.833 --> 51:19.274
people in West Africa whose governments are

51:19.314 --> 51:21.856
now in league with Russia and for whom their

51:21.876 --> 51:24.677
resources are being exploited both to keep

51:24.737 --> 51:27.999
governments in power and to satisfy the demands

51:28.320 --> 51:31.001
of Russia, will start to see Russia in a

51:31.061 --> 51:32.923
similar way that they previously saw France

51:33.143 --> 51:35.024
as actually part of the problem sustaining

51:35.684 --> 51:37.786
authoritarian and unresponsive governments,

51:38.286 --> 51:41.168
rather than as a form of solidarity. So it's

51:41.248 --> 51:44.330
not in that sense that I'm much overly optimistic

51:44.410 --> 51:47.773
about people coming back to Western governments

51:47.873 --> 51:49.994
and once again realigning themselves that

51:50.054 --> 51:52.736
way. It's more in terms of my optimism that

51:52.756 --> 51:55.038
I think people will become much more critically

51:55.118 --> 51:58.542
aware of the problems of engaging with Russia

51:58.582 --> 52:00.204
and China in the way that some countries

52:00.244 --> 52:02.306
have been and that that will then lead to

52:02.387 --> 52:04.469
another backlash and one of the things that

52:04.509 --> 52:06.770
that will do is bring people back to the

52:06.850 --> 52:09.731
idea that actually, you know, being too much

52:10.632 --> 52:14.073
in debt to any global power is an unhelpful

52:14.113 --> 52:16.374
position and that they need to take control

52:16.414 --> 52:18.234
of their own political systems. And as I

52:18.274 --> 52:20.975
say, that what they want in most cases from

52:20.995 --> 52:23.376
the survey data we have is to be able to

52:23.416 --> 52:25.317
make those systems more democratic and more

52:25.357 --> 52:26.637
inclusive and more accountable.

52:29.198 --> 52:32.199
As democracy totters in a multipolar world,

52:33.019 --> 52:34.720
what keeps you up at night?

52:36.955 --> 52:38.596
Almost everything, Stephen, especially as

52:38.656 --> 52:40.957
I get older, almost everything keeps me up

52:41.557 --> 52:45.379
from my own aches and pains all the way through

52:45.459 --> 52:47.360
to what we've seen over the last 10 years.

52:47.380 --> 52:49.341
We've seen a rise in digital manipulation.

52:49.801 --> 52:52.202
We've seen rising authoritarian innovation.

52:52.562 --> 52:55.004
We've seen greater influence from authoritarian

52:55.044 --> 52:57.064
states, whether we're talking about Turkey,

52:57.085 --> 53:00.527
Iran, China, Russia, you know, a much broader

53:00.587 --> 53:02.589
range of states than people often recognize,

53:02.609 --> 53:04.671
you know, all the way through to the new

53:04.731 --> 53:06.973
mechanisms that are being used to manipulate

53:07.013 --> 53:10.977
civil society, the spread of anti NGO legislation,

53:10.997 --> 53:12.678
you know, in the wake of Russia's foreign

53:12.818 --> 53:15.160
agent law. there are so many things that

53:15.200 --> 53:16.981
keep me awake at night and i do think the

53:17.021 --> 53:20.162
situation we face globally is much more challenging

53:20.222 --> 53:22.683
now than it even was ten fifteen years ago

53:22.804 --> 53:25.585
so despite my kind of broad optimism of the

53:25.625 --> 53:28.706
longer term i'm also very worried about all

53:28.726 --> 53:30.707
of these short term struggles and i think

53:30.847 --> 53:32.669
one of the things that you know those of

53:32.729 --> 53:35.771
us who care about and are interested in democracy

53:35.811 --> 53:38.253
and equality and fairness and freedom you

53:38.273 --> 53:40.975
know need to do is to come together to make

53:41.055 --> 53:43.477
sure that everybody is aware of how great

53:43.517 --> 53:45.858
the challenge is and that that longer term

53:45.919 --> 53:48.120
more inclusive more peaceful and prosperous

53:48.160 --> 53:51.323
future is only going to be possible if we

53:51.403 --> 53:54.125
actually start to see real mobilization of

53:54.185 --> 53:55.926
pro-democratic forces around the world.

53:57.227 --> 53:59.949
And finally Nic please advise our listeners

54:00.009 --> 54:02.253
where they may find your book Democracy in

54:02.333 --> 54:02.673
Africa.

54:03.975 --> 54:05.496
You're very kind Stephen. Well people could

54:05.536 --> 54:07.658
find that book Democracy in Africa and also

54:07.719 --> 54:10.041
a newer book How to Rig an Election. They're

54:10.081 --> 54:12.083
in all good bookstores but particularly you

54:12.103 --> 54:15.006
could find them on Amazon. Many of my chapters

54:15.046 --> 54:17.469
and my journal articles I make freely available

54:17.649 --> 54:19.851
on a website called ResearchGate so if you

54:19.871 --> 54:22.093
go to Nic Cheeseman on ResearchGate you can

54:22.133 --> 54:24.354
get a lot of my information and publications

54:24.394 --> 54:26.955
for free. And I try and make that as accessible

54:27.015 --> 54:29.557
as possible. So please head there. I'd also

54:29.597 --> 54:31.377
head to any good bookstore and you should

54:31.397 --> 54:33.118
be able to get a copy of those books. And

54:33.158 --> 54:35.279
thank you very much for an interesting conversation.

54:36.500 --> 54:39.041
Dr. Nic Cheeseman, thank you very much for

54:39.081 --> 54:43.183
being a guest on this podcast. This podcast

54:43.203 --> 54:46.084
was brought to you by the Kamugasa Challenge

54:46.124 --> 54:48.025
in partnership with Democracy in Africa.

54:49.580 --> 54:52.242
Democracy in Africa is a platform dedicated

54:52.302 --> 54:55.984
to building a bridge between academics, policymakers,

54:56.124 --> 55:00.187
practitioners and citizens. We dedicate this

55:00.247 --> 55:03.690
podcast to this podcast episode to the Right

55:03.790 --> 55:06.652
Reverend Dr Alan Wilson, the former Bishop

55:06.692 --> 55:09.614
of Buckingham. Thanks to his willingness

55:09.654 --> 55:12.495
to take risks as a leader, he put himself

55:12.576 --> 55:15.678
forward to play the guinea pig and help launch

55:15.718 --> 55:18.379
conversations with Stephen Kamugasa as a

55:18.480 --> 55:21.656
first guest. the Right Reverend Dr. Alan

55:21.696 --> 55:25.697
Wilson died suddenly and unexpectedly on

55:25.757 --> 55:29.918
February 17th, 2024. We are taking a short

55:29.978 --> 55:32.519
break and we'll resume service in the new

55:32.559 --> 55:35.580
year with a brand new series on leadership.

55:36.360 --> 55:39.040
The first episode in the leadership series

55:39.100 --> 55:42.281
is entitled, Why Great Leadership Will Make

55:42.321 --> 55:45.362
You Question Everything. An interview with

55:45.462 --> 55:49.003
Ms Sally Percy, an experienced business journalist

55:49.143 --> 55:52.176
and editor who specializes in writing about

55:52.276 --> 55:55.258
leadership and management. The podcast will

55:55.298 --> 56:00.141
go live on February 10th, 2025. If you enjoyed

56:00.161 --> 56:02.863
this podcast, please support us by subscribing

56:02.883 --> 56:05.564
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56:05.604 --> 56:08.546
your favorite podcast app. Thank you very

56:08.606 --> 56:10.187
much for taking the time to listen to this

56:10.267 --> 56:13.689
podcast. Until next time, goodbye.