WEBVTT 00:00.835 --> 00:03.876 Hello, welcome back to Conversations with 00:03.976 --> 00:07.757 Stephen Kamugasa. This is the second of six 00:07.877 --> 00:13.339 podcast episodes on genocide. Today's guest 00:13.959 --> 00:17.421 is Dr. Omar McDoom, a comparative political 00:17.461 --> 00:21.182 scientist and associate professor at the 00:21.242 --> 00:23.223 London School of Economics Department of 00:23.323 --> 00:27.984 Government. Dr. McDoom holds law degrees 00:28.684 --> 00:32.485 from King's College London and the Université 00:32.565 --> 00:36.386 de Paris, a master's degree in international 00:36.426 --> 00:39.527 development studies from George Washington 00:39.607 --> 00:44.268 University and a PhD in development studies 00:44.888 --> 00:48.449 from the London School of Economics. He is 00:48.689 --> 00:52.410 also a non-practicing attorney at the New 00:52.450 --> 00:57.551 York Bar. Before joining the LSE, Omar completed 00:57.611 --> 01:00.672 research fellowships at Harvard University 01:01.537 --> 01:04.640 at the Belfer Center for Science and International 01:04.680 --> 01:08.803 Affairs, and then at Oxford University in 01:08.823 --> 01:11.646 the Department of Politics and International 01:11.686 --> 01:16.049 Relations. His professional experience outside 01:16.230 --> 01:20.053 of the academia includes work as a policy 01:20.173 --> 01:24.777 officer for the World Bank, as a legal officer 01:25.277 --> 01:28.620 for the government of Guyana, and on electoral 01:28.980 --> 01:31.878 missions for the Organization for Security 01:31.938 --> 01:35.379 Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations. 01:37.019 --> 01:42.320 He also co-founded a non-profit organization 01:42.540 --> 01:46.481 in 2004, which develops leadership potential 01:46.701 --> 01:50.322 in children who were affected by the civil 01:50.362 --> 01:55.182 war in Northern Uganda. Oma is the author 01:55.663 --> 02:00.396 of The Path to Genocide in Rwanda. In this 02:00.556 --> 02:04.598 episode, we discuss the topic of why genocide 02:04.858 --> 02:07.239 is the responsibility of the entire world. 02:08.600 --> 02:10.700 Dr. Omar Makdoon, welcome. 02:12.121 --> 02:13.622 Thank you, Stephen, and thank you for the 02:13.662 --> 02:16.583 opportunity to talk about my work and also 02:16.623 --> 02:20.805 for the comprehensive and flattering introduction. 02:21.065 --> 02:21.905 I appreciate it. 02:24.146 --> 02:26.247 In the acknowledgement section of your book, 02:27.067 --> 02:29.708 the path to genocide in Rwanda. You write, 02:29.828 --> 02:33.570 and I quote, I dedicate the book to my father, 02:34.151 --> 02:36.932 who passed away before he could see it completed. 02:36.952 --> 02:41.534 Please share with us your favorite childhood 02:41.594 --> 02:44.716 memory of your father. And specifically, 02:45.336 --> 02:48.338 in light of your work, how did the relationship 02:48.418 --> 02:51.699 with your father affect how you see reality 02:52.360 --> 02:53.220 as an adult? 02:55.041 --> 02:58.688 That's a nice question. It's an opportunity, 02:58.768 --> 03:02.610 I suppose, for someone to sit back and reflect 03:03.010 --> 03:06.331 on the legacy or the lasting influences that 03:06.371 --> 03:09.372 your parents have on you and how it's marked 03:09.452 --> 03:12.133 and shaped you today. So maybe you'll be 03:12.173 --> 03:14.914 of use to some of your listeners to hear 03:15.354 --> 03:17.095 how I think my father, though it's not, of 03:17.135 --> 03:19.076 course, only my father, my mother also had 03:19.096 --> 03:22.237 a profound impression on who I am as a person 03:22.277 --> 03:26.668 today. Well, my father, I mean, he obviously 03:26.708 --> 03:30.050 would have had both positive and less positive 03:30.690 --> 03:32.892 influences on me. But since you asked me 03:32.952 --> 03:39.016 about my favorite memory, I suppose the influences 03:39.036 --> 03:43.748 that stayed with me were maybe a very strong 03:44.709 --> 03:47.792 sense of the importance of getting ahead 03:47.832 --> 03:50.495 in life on merit, so through hard work and 03:50.535 --> 03:54.359 independence, and also a very strong commitment 03:54.479 --> 03:57.482 to social justice, which probably reflected 03:57.522 --> 03:59.844 in why I spent so much time studying law. 04:00.605 --> 04:02.286 He also gave me some confidence as well. 04:02.386 --> 04:04.587 So, you know, my father's background is interesting 04:04.647 --> 04:07.429 because he was a first-generation immigrant. 04:08.509 --> 04:10.711 He'd never been to university. He came to 04:10.731 --> 04:13.672 the UK from Guyana, a small British colony, 04:14.513 --> 04:18.615 in the 1960s, late 1970s. And he had some 04:19.675 --> 04:22.757 aptitude, academic aptitude, and in those 04:22.797 --> 04:25.559 days it was possible to study law without 04:25.619 --> 04:28.002 having gone to university, become a lawyer 04:28.022 --> 04:29.944 without having gone to university. So he 04:30.004 --> 04:32.347 sat the professional examinations in the 04:32.467 --> 04:36.392 UK and became a solicitor, one of the two 04:36.412 --> 04:39.595 types of lawyers in the UK. So he was quite 04:39.655 --> 04:43.299 good at law, but he was also the time, remember, 04:43.579 --> 04:45.821 it is a time in the UK when there was still 04:46.482 --> 04:49.204 overt discrimination against people of colour. 04:49.905 --> 04:52.207 And, you know, I suppose my most powerful 04:52.247 --> 04:53.948 memory, I say it's more powerful than it 04:54.028 --> 04:56.270 is a favourite memory, but my most powerful 04:56.310 --> 05:02.695 memory of my father is a time when we One 05:02.755 --> 05:05.156 weekend, I think I was about 10 or 11, and 05:05.436 --> 05:07.517 we went to, we were building a rabbit hutch 05:07.557 --> 05:10.458 together. And my father took me to a local 05:10.498 --> 05:13.419 DIY store. And it was there that he was wrongfully 05:13.899 --> 05:16.720 accused and also arrested for shoplifting 05:17.281 --> 05:22.085 very publicly and very, very overtly. And 05:22.125 --> 05:24.127 what had happened is that we had been followed 05:24.648 --> 05:27.930 in the store by a security guard. I won't 05:27.950 --> 05:30.533 mention the company that this person was 05:30.593 --> 05:33.355 employed by. And as my father was exiting 05:33.415 --> 05:35.697 the store, he was apprehended by a group 05:35.738 --> 05:40.041 of security officers and taken in front and 05:40.061 --> 05:42.043 full view of everybody up to the manager's 05:42.103 --> 05:44.565 office. I went with him as I was quite young 05:44.626 --> 05:47.767 and couldn't be by myself. And there he was 05:47.827 --> 05:50.548 accused of stealing a tape measure of all 05:50.628 --> 05:55.430 things. And my father at that time was dressed 05:55.510 --> 05:57.611 in somewhat shabby clothing because it was 05:57.651 --> 05:59.191 his work clothes. We were building a rabbit 05:59.251 --> 06:02.472 hutch together. And they were surprised when 06:02.492 --> 06:03.952 he said, well, I should tell you that I'm 06:03.993 --> 06:06.433 a lawyer and I'm now going to start to make 06:06.513 --> 06:08.794 notes about everything that happens to me. 06:08.814 --> 06:10.895 And he took out a pen and paper and started 06:10.935 --> 06:14.116 writing down. at the time and everything 06:14.136 --> 06:18.440 that was happening. This seemed to infuriate 06:18.540 --> 06:22.522 the security officer, I suppose because my 06:22.562 --> 06:25.104 father was standing up for himself. And she 06:25.144 --> 06:27.026 then decided it was a woman. She said, I'm 06:27.086 --> 06:28.827 actually going to make a citizen's arrest. 06:29.547 --> 06:31.249 And for me, it was eye-opening because the 06:31.289 --> 06:34.031 woman said to my father and to the manager 06:34.071 --> 06:35.592 and the other security officers there that 06:35.652 --> 06:37.653 she had witnessed my father take the tape 06:37.693 --> 06:42.519 measure out of its packaging. which was patently 06:42.600 --> 06:44.864 untrue. The manager called the police. The 06:44.904 --> 06:47.549 police came. The police had a look at the 06:47.589 --> 06:49.332 inspector of the tape measure, realized that 06:49.372 --> 06:51.135 this could not be a new tape measure. It 06:51.175 --> 06:54.632 was old and had marks on it. and said, well, 06:54.652 --> 06:57.613 my father is free to go. The manager was 06:57.673 --> 07:01.294 apologetic, duly so, and offered my father 07:01.414 --> 07:03.255 some money as compensation. And my father 07:03.275 --> 07:05.896 said, no, I think the right thing to do here 07:06.696 --> 07:08.677 is that I think the security officer has 07:08.737 --> 07:11.218 made a mistake. And she has profiled me. 07:11.238 --> 07:13.418 And I think the right thing to do is for 07:13.438 --> 07:15.999 this person to apologize in public in front 07:16.019 --> 07:17.960 of the very same people in front of whom 07:18.000 --> 07:20.581 he was arrested. And he insisted on this 07:20.661 --> 07:24.502 public apology. She refused. The manager 07:24.562 --> 07:26.783 had to make the apology instead on her behalf. 07:27.703 --> 07:29.584 But I mentioned that story because it stayed 07:29.624 --> 07:31.465 with me and it gave me, as I said, a very 07:31.505 --> 07:35.346 strong sense of social justice and standing 07:35.426 --> 07:39.228 up for oneself when you have been taken advantage 07:39.308 --> 07:40.969 of or when you've been discriminated against. 07:41.049 --> 07:42.629 And it's given me a strong sense of wanting 07:42.669 --> 07:44.990 to help the other underdog. And my father, 07:45.030 --> 07:47.231 more generally, I suppose, always felt a 07:47.271 --> 07:50.011 very strong sense of solidarity with people 07:50.071 --> 07:52.072 who come from similar backgrounds to himself, 07:52.952 --> 07:55.033 from former colonies in the global south, 07:55.333 --> 07:57.173 come to the UK to build a better life for 07:57.233 --> 07:59.354 himself. But he's a little bit different, 07:59.394 --> 08:01.874 though, from, I think, many other first-generation 08:01.914 --> 08:04.135 immigrants. He didn't really feel this sense 08:05.295 --> 08:10.199 of debt or gratitude that he needed to demonstrate 08:10.800 --> 08:13.942 to the United Kingdom for allowing him to 08:13.982 --> 08:16.964 build a life there. He saw it quite differently. 08:17.084 --> 08:21.007 He saw and argued that, well, much of the 08:21.168 --> 08:24.270 UK's wealth and position in the international 08:24.330 --> 08:27.653 system is because it had successfully colonized 08:27.713 --> 08:30.435 and conquered countries such as his own and 08:30.495 --> 08:35.522 extracted wealth from it, whether resources 08:35.622 --> 08:38.588 or, and built itself on slave and in his 08:38.628 --> 08:41.693 case indentured labour. So he didn't feel 08:41.793 --> 08:45.953 that that he needed to sort of be grateful 08:46.213 --> 08:48.313 and to integrate and assimilate in society. 08:48.353 --> 08:50.774 He was very proud of his identity as a Guyanese 08:51.254 --> 08:54.535 and also as a Muslim. And so he thought he 08:54.575 --> 08:56.055 had a right to build his life on the same 08:56.095 --> 08:58.396 terms as the indigenous British, as it were. 08:59.116 --> 09:00.697 All that to say is that, you know, it had 09:01.017 --> 09:03.976 an impact on me. made me very interested 09:03.996 --> 09:07.439 in issues around inequality and social justice. 09:08.440 --> 09:10.882 I started studying law. I went on then to 09:10.922 --> 09:13.264 study development, moved to Washington, where 09:13.284 --> 09:15.526 I worked for the World Bank for many years. 09:16.046 --> 09:17.087 And it was there, actually, at the World 09:17.107 --> 09:18.989 Bank that I first got interested in the Rwandan 09:19.029 --> 09:22.992 genocide. I read a book by Peter Uvin, a 09:23.052 --> 09:26.035 professor at the time at Tufts University, 09:27.176 --> 09:31.103 in which he had accused the aid industry 09:31.284 --> 09:33.866 of being complicit in the genocide, or at 09:33.886 --> 09:35.827 least creating the conditions that facilitated 09:35.887 --> 09:39.090 the genocide. And I actually decided to engage 09:39.110 --> 09:42.692 in a PhD and have him as one of my supervisors 09:43.093 --> 09:45.715 to look at this question of the genocide 09:45.735 --> 09:46.295 in Rwanda. 09:49.537 --> 09:53.220 On page 13 of your book, you write, and I 09:53.240 --> 09:58.479 quote, the words of the foreign visitor reproduced 09:58.659 --> 10:02.060 above appear in the guest book of a former 10:02.120 --> 10:05.322 church belonging to the rural community of 10:05.382 --> 10:09.303 Nyamata, located in the small Central African 10:09.403 --> 11:16.671 state of Rwanda. In April 1994, some 5,000 10:16.367 --> 10:19.568 people sought refuge here for the same reason. 10:20.468 --> 10:23.290 They were members of Rwanda's Tutsi ethnic 10:23.330 --> 10:29.053 minority. Over three days, April 14th, 15th 10:30.013 --> 10:35.534 and 16th 1994, the men, women and children 10:36.094 --> 10:38.515 crammed inside the brick, the building's 10:38.575 --> 10:41.015 brick walls were killed without distinction. 10:41.995 --> 10:45.416 Their killers comprised many of their neighbours 10:46.316 --> 10:49.057 as well as a smaller number of militiamen 10:49.437 --> 10:52.458 and soldiers alongside whom they worked. 10:53.898 --> 10:57.141 Overwhelmingly, the assailants were drawn 10:57.241 --> 11:00.983 from Rwanda's Hutu ethnic majority. Their 11:01.083 --> 11:05.965 objective was clear, to kill them all. Omar, 11:06.826 --> 11:09.767 please talk to us about the visitor whose 11:09.847 --> 11:13.689 words you mentioned, and why were the foreign 11:13.729 --> 11:15.270 visitor's words so poignant? 11:16.671 --> 11:22.894 Yeah, so I mean, I chose to use the words 11:22.934 --> 11:26.487 of that foreign visitor because the person 11:26.927 --> 11:29.008 was doing something different, I suppose, 11:29.048 --> 11:31.648 to what many people when they hear about 11:31.689 --> 11:34.209 the genocide or if they visit Rwanda do. 11:34.449 --> 11:37.110 So the tendency, the instinct, I suppose, 11:37.190 --> 11:40.231 is to sort of distance oneself from the people 11:40.291 --> 11:42.591 who committed such atrocious violence, who 11:42.611 --> 11:45.793 did such terrible things. I think that's 11:45.893 --> 11:49.196 easy. I think it's easy to revile, to feel 11:49.236 --> 11:52.999 this revulsion against for what had happened 11:53.059 --> 11:56.483 and to sort of say, well, I would never have 11:56.503 --> 11:58.585 done that. I could never do that. And to 11:59.105 --> 12:02.288 fail to understand how anybody could do that. 12:02.388 --> 12:05.611 But that visitor will do something different. 12:05.671 --> 12:08.774 He was, and it was a man, he was empathizing 12:10.115 --> 12:13.257 with the perpetrators, in this case, mostly 12:13.277 --> 12:17.219 the Hutu population in Rwanda, and was making 12:17.279 --> 12:19.840 an effort to understand the circumstances 12:20.441 --> 12:22.322 in which they found themselves and that led 12:22.382 --> 12:27.945 them to do what they did. And it ties in, 12:28.885 --> 12:31.627 in the field of, you know, the study of perpetrators 12:31.687 --> 12:34.408 of genocide and atrocity crimes, with this 12:34.488 --> 12:38.507 idea that, well, they're very often ordinary 12:38.607 --> 12:42.729 people caught up in very extraordinary circumstances. 12:43.409 --> 12:47.751 And also with this idea that, well, killers, 12:48.251 --> 12:50.892 you're not born, very rarely are people born 12:50.972 --> 12:54.394 killers, they're made into killers. So I 12:54.454 --> 12:57.096 felt that that statement tied into these 12:57.196 --> 12:59.478 two ideas about the ordinariness of being 12:59.518 --> 13:02.401 a killer and the idea that you are made into 13:02.441 --> 13:05.643 a killer through the circumstances that you 13:05.704 --> 13:07.745 live in your life. I think that those were 13:07.785 --> 13:09.847 important and I wanted, and as you see if 13:09.887 --> 13:13.630 you read the book, that those ideas underpin 13:14.311 --> 13:17.193 the arguments that I make in the book. But 13:17.233 --> 13:20.096 it set me on this path to try to understand 13:21.415 --> 13:25.358 how and why so many Rwandans came to do what 13:25.398 --> 13:31.282 they did in that time in 1994. There's this 13:31.322 --> 13:33.823 very complex interaction, I think, between 13:33.843 --> 13:37.746 innate characteristics, who you are as a 13:37.806 --> 13:40.107 person that might predispose you towards 13:40.147 --> 13:42.549 such violence, But it isn't only that, there 13:42.589 --> 13:45.390 is this interaction with the environmental, 13:46.351 --> 13:49.732 the things outside of you, right? The social 13:49.833 --> 13:53.434 community, the political circumstances that 13:53.514 --> 13:55.655 put people on a path, that put them into 13:55.696 --> 13:58.297 situations where they feel that this is what 13:58.337 --> 14:02.019 they have to do. To be clear, though, I mean, 14:02.259 --> 14:05.781 I don't think that this in any way excuses 14:06.041 --> 14:11.926 or justifies or exculpates individuals from 14:11.966 --> 14:15.727 their moral responsibility for killing. To 14:15.787 --> 14:18.687 understand is not the same thing as to excuse. 14:19.868 --> 14:22.748 But I think it is still important to understand. 14:22.808 --> 14:25.689 And I think this is what that individual, 14:25.709 --> 14:27.429 that visitor was trying to do, was trying 14:27.469 --> 14:30.930 to understand how and why individuals came 14:31.050 --> 14:33.711 to do what they did. And that's important. 14:34.251 --> 14:35.811 Well, that's important for two reasons. It's 14:35.851 --> 14:39.233 important first because you know, from the 14:39.273 --> 14:43.216 perspective of preventing future atrocity 14:43.336 --> 14:45.758 for the recurrence, it's important to understand 14:46.319 --> 14:49.101 the journey or the pathway that led people 14:49.522 --> 14:52.424 to that point. So I think it's important 14:52.444 --> 14:55.186 from that perspective. But it's also important 14:56.287 --> 14:59.268 to understand how people do what they do 14:59.808 --> 15:03.469 from the perspective of life after the atrocity 15:03.549 --> 15:07.530 as well, from the perspective of reconciliation 15:07.610 --> 15:11.971 or coexistence at least, this idea of restoring 15:12.471 --> 15:15.932 communities to some or some sort of restorative 15:16.032 --> 15:19.573 justice. So how people come to learn to live 15:19.613 --> 15:21.814 together once more, you need to understand 15:22.234 --> 15:24.374 how it is and why it is that they did what 15:24.414 --> 15:28.515 they did. So I think that that phrase sort 15:28.575 --> 15:33.637 of evokes all of those thoughts that underlie 15:33.657 --> 15:36.797 the motivation for writing the book. 15:37.858 --> 15:41.178 On page 23 of your book, you write, and I 15:41.238 --> 15:45.139 quote, one of the main reasons for why the 15:45.219 --> 15:48.840 range of theories is so broad is the lack 15:48.880 --> 15:51.381 of consensus on the concept of genocide. 15:52.781 --> 15:56.682 The 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide 15:57.403 --> 16:00.563 defines genocide as acts committed with intent 16:00.704 --> 16:05.345 to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 16:06.185 --> 16:12.267 ethnical, racial, or religious group. Almost 16:12.447 --> 16:15.219 every element in the juridical definition 16:15.339 --> 16:17.560 has been the subject of intense scholarly 16:17.600 --> 16:21.561 debate. The victim groups protected, the 16:21.681 --> 16:24.961 perpetrating agents recognized, the modes 16:25.101 --> 16:28.642 of extermination permitted, and the intention 16:29.002 --> 16:33.843 required. Why is there such debate over what 16:33.903 --> 16:36.944 constitutes genocide? And please give us 16:37.264 --> 16:40.645 your best effort at defining genocide in 16:40.725 --> 16:43.860 terms that the average man on the street 16:43.940 --> 16:44.680 can understand? 16:45.501 --> 16:48.862 Yeah, well I think the debate exists because 16:49.262 --> 16:54.924 genocide is widely seen as the crime of crimes. 16:55.184 --> 17:00.585 It is the most morally egregious, heinous 17:01.485 --> 17:06.207 action that can be committed by a state or 17:06.287 --> 17:11.090 people against another people. So It's a 17:11.251 --> 17:16.216 very strong stigma to escape from once a 17:16.296 --> 17:19.721 state or once a people have been accused 17:19.781 --> 17:22.284 of committing genocide. It's very hard to 17:22.344 --> 17:25.427 come back from it. Just look at Germany's 17:25.527 --> 17:29.031 sense of shame in the public psychology since 17:29.292 --> 17:32.333 the Holocaust. So there's going to be very 17:33.014 --> 17:37.795 strong contention around what is a genocide 17:38.515 --> 17:40.715 because people will want to resist the use 17:40.755 --> 17:43.316 of that term in relation to themselves or 17:43.376 --> 17:46.897 to their country. But the other reason why 17:46.957 --> 17:50.038 it's debated is because it's used in different 17:50.198 --> 17:54.499 contexts for very different reasons. So lawyers 17:54.599 --> 17:59.640 use it obviously for the purpose of holding 18:00.740 --> 18:04.601 individuals or states accountable for what 18:04.641 --> 18:08.182 they have done. So there's the rationale 18:08.202 --> 18:11.022 of accountability. But scholars also use 18:11.082 --> 18:13.723 the term genocide and they have departed 18:13.783 --> 18:16.363 from the legal definition because they want 18:16.403 --> 18:20.244 to understand and explain the causes of genocide 18:20.464 --> 18:23.965 or to compare genocides in some way. And 18:23.985 --> 18:26.566 then there were, I suppose, the popular usage 18:26.606 --> 18:29.466 of the term genocide, and that's often made 18:29.606 --> 18:33.167 by communities, sometimes communities who 18:33.227 --> 18:35.448 are the victim communities, because they 18:36.048 --> 18:38.528 want to draw political attention to what's 18:38.568 --> 18:41.109 happening to them. They want to mobilize 18:41.309 --> 18:44.610 resources, perhaps to intervene, to help 18:44.690 --> 18:48.931 them. And they also wish to delegitimize 18:49.031 --> 18:52.732 their opponents, their enemies as well. So 18:52.752 --> 18:54.853 you have all those different reasons and 18:54.873 --> 18:58.975 different communities that use the term genocide. 19:01.395 --> 19:04.657 You know, the meaning varies across them. 19:05.177 --> 19:08.480 So for lawyers, I would say the legal definition 19:08.540 --> 19:12.742 is the most restrictive of all of the ways 19:12.782 --> 19:15.364 in which genocide is conceptualized. And 19:15.384 --> 19:17.285 I would say that sort of the popular usage 19:17.345 --> 19:19.827 is probably the most loose definition of 19:19.887 --> 19:24.131 genocide. But I would say though, maybe to 19:24.351 --> 19:27.214 just highlight how I use the term in the 19:27.254 --> 19:31.338 book as a scholar, and I think maybe to talk 19:31.358 --> 19:33.681 a little bit about how genocide scholars 19:34.862 --> 19:37.565 have moved on from the very limited, very 19:37.625 --> 19:40.368 restrictive definition of genocide in the 19:40.428 --> 19:43.852 Genocide Convention. So there are three ways 19:44.152 --> 19:47.355 I think in which the conceptualization or 19:47.395 --> 19:51.259 the definition of genocide has expanded in 19:51.339 --> 19:57.185 the 70 years or so since the phrase was encapsulated 19:57.245 --> 19:59.668 in the genocide convention. The first is 19:59.728 --> 20:03.311 that the focus on intent. So the convention 20:03.891 --> 20:08.535 sets a very high bar for establishing genocide 20:08.876 --> 20:11.398 because it requires an intent and a very 20:11.498 --> 20:14.360 specific intent. It has to be an intent to 20:14.400 --> 20:17.603 destroy a group. So it's not enough to murder 20:18.124 --> 20:21.366 tens of thousands of people who are from 20:21.406 --> 20:24.749 the same group. you have to show that those 20:24.829 --> 20:26.970 murders were committed with the intent to 20:27.050 --> 20:29.931 destroy in whole or in part that group. So 20:29.951 --> 20:32.453 it's entirely possible to murder many people 20:32.513 --> 20:38.456 but still be not guilty of genocide. So the 20:39.236 --> 20:41.517 scholarly definition has moved away from 20:41.558 --> 20:43.659 this focus on this emphasis on intent and 20:43.699 --> 20:45.820 focuses now on just the idea of, well, is 20:45.840 --> 20:49.642 it deliberate? Is it organized? Is it rather 20:49.682 --> 20:51.443 than, you know, is the intent to destroy? 20:52.223 --> 20:53.965 The second way in which I think scholars 20:54.145 --> 20:57.267 now use the term more expansively is that 20:57.307 --> 21:00.430 they don't limit themselves to the groups 21:00.550 --> 21:02.932 that are recognized in the genocide convention, 21:02.952 --> 21:06.635 ethnic, racial, religious or national. They 21:06.715 --> 21:10.338 say that it's a group that could be defined 21:10.758 --> 21:12.780 along different boundaries, for example, 21:13.200 --> 21:16.483 members of a political group. So if you think 21:16.523 --> 21:20.008 about Indonesia's actions in the 1960s, where 21:20.108 --> 21:22.272 it was the communists who were targeted, 21:22.592 --> 21:24.675 they were targeted because of their political 21:24.735 --> 21:26.678 beliefs. So that might be a genocide for 21:26.738 --> 21:29.142 scholars, but not for lawyers, for example. 21:29.791 --> 21:31.372 And then the third and final way in which 21:31.432 --> 21:35.876 scholars have moved on and expanded the definition 21:35.936 --> 21:39.138 is that they don't limit genocide solely 21:39.258 --> 21:42.841 to the physical destruction of a people, 21:43.261 --> 21:46.604 which is what the legal definition in the 21:46.644 --> 21:50.647 convention does. They, for example, now also 21:51.088 --> 21:54.310 consider the social destruction of a group 21:54.430 --> 21:58.874 to be genocide as well. So if, for example, 21:59.534 --> 22:03.877 the state or the people are targeting the 22:04.237 --> 22:06.758 infrastructure of a community. So if you're 22:06.818 --> 22:10.360 targeting the schools and the universities 22:11.181 --> 22:14.142 and the hospitals and the religious establishments, 22:14.603 --> 22:18.045 then this is an attempt to destroy the society, 22:18.105 --> 22:20.026 the social infrastructure of the group, and 22:20.046 --> 22:24.028 that also can be considered genocide. So 22:26.310 --> 22:29.915 you asked what's the best way for, in simple 22:29.995 --> 22:32.418 terms, for a person who's not a specialist 22:32.439 --> 22:35.342 to understand what genocide is, I would say 22:35.403 --> 22:40.550 this. I say, I would say that, well, violence 22:41.190 --> 22:46.210 generally is a behaviour that tries to communicate 22:46.611 --> 22:50.095 something. And we have many different types 22:50.175 --> 22:52.778 of violence that try to communicate many 22:52.858 --> 22:55.521 different types of things. Some violence 22:56.202 --> 23:00.147 is communicating a wish to control a group, 23:01.007 --> 23:05.089 or to punish a group or to discourage a group. 23:05.849 --> 23:09.431 But with genocide, the type of violence envisaged 23:10.051 --> 23:13.652 is not to communicate. In fact, that violence 23:14.132 --> 23:17.914 in genocide is violence that seeks to end 23:18.514 --> 23:21.575 communication with another group. And I think 23:21.615 --> 23:24.317 that's the best way to think of the difference 23:24.397 --> 23:27.399 between genocidal violence and other types 23:27.479 --> 23:29.941 of political violence, is that there is a 23:30.001 --> 23:33.784 wish to end communication, to end the relationship. 23:33.804 --> 23:37.486 There's no desire to regulate or to control 23:37.826 --> 23:41.209 or to deter. It is to end communication. 23:44.431 --> 23:47.353 On page 41 of your book, under the heading 23:47.613 --> 23:50.575 Research Design, the evidence and methods 23:51.085 --> 23:54.646 You're right, and I quote, genocide is an 23:54.766 --> 23:58.607 empirically complex phenomenon. No single 23:58.647 --> 24:01.048 study can account for all aspects of its 24:01.128 --> 24:04.989 violence. It is also a highly politicized 24:05.729 --> 24:09.010 and deeply emotional subject. On certain 24:09.150 --> 24:11.891 issues, the findings may always be disputed, 24:12.771 --> 24:16.792 and some people may never be persuaded. Researchers 24:16.932 --> 24:20.353 may find they themselves rather than their 24:20.373 --> 24:23.506 research. are the object of scrutiny and 24:23.626 --> 24:28.728 criticism. Accusations of revisionism, minimalism, 24:29.508 --> 24:32.590 and denialism are among the risks genocide 24:32.650 --> 24:36.051 scholars, including those working on Rwanda, 24:36.692 --> 24:42.734 face. Omar, since the victims were once actual 24:43.574 --> 24:47.716 living people, I must wonder, given the current 24:47.776 --> 24:51.400 tragic situation in the Holy Land, Why are 24:51.480 --> 24:54.022 you interested in researching genocides? 24:55.002 --> 24:57.904 Why the Rwandan genocide in particular? 24:59.045 --> 25:02.907 Well, since you've brought up the situation 25:03.947 --> 25:08.170 ongoing in Gaza, anyone who wages into the 25:08.210 --> 25:11.912 debate, into the rights and wrongs of what 25:12.052 --> 25:16.069 Netanyahu's government is doing in Gaza at 25:16.109 --> 25:19.870 the moment, you know, it's his choices in 25:19.910 --> 25:23.592 how to conduct the war since October 7th. 25:24.112 --> 25:27.994 Well, anybody who's done that will know what 25:28.034 --> 25:30.415 I mean when I say that it is an occupational 25:30.475 --> 25:35.758 hazard to work on genocide. That situation 25:35.838 --> 25:38.779 is extremely politically sensitive and very 25:38.939 --> 25:43.952 emotionally charged. And people who offer 25:44.032 --> 25:48.014 views on this run the risk of being accused 25:48.054 --> 25:53.157 of being anti-semitic and we have such a 25:53.217 --> 25:56.199 definition of anti-semitism in how it's being 25:56.319 --> 25:59.561 used at the moment that it is very difficult 25:59.641 --> 26:02.283 or there's very little space to be able to 26:02.323 --> 26:06.085 be critical of Israeli government policy 26:06.666 --> 26:11.120 or critical of the ideology of Zionism without 26:11.160 --> 26:13.841 being accused of being anti-semitic. So when 26:13.901 --> 26:16.681 I say that as a genocide scholar you run 26:16.741 --> 26:20.542 these occupational risks, I think that's 26:20.622 --> 26:25.143 true not just in the case of Israel but also 26:25.183 --> 26:26.964 in the case of other genocides including 26:27.084 --> 26:30.205 the Rwandan genocide. But since you've asked 26:30.265 --> 26:34.123 about the situation or brought it up at least, 26:35.364 --> 26:41.268 I often get from individuals who are supportive 26:41.348 --> 26:44.710 or defensive of Israel and specifically of 26:44.770 --> 26:46.351 Netanyahu's government, I always get the 26:46.391 --> 26:49.513 question, well, why are genocide, why are 26:49.593 --> 26:51.395 scholars being critical of Israel? Why are 26:51.415 --> 26:54.357 they singling Israel out? Because why are 26:54.377 --> 26:56.118 they not speaking about what's happening 26:56.218 --> 26:59.880 against the Rohingya in Myanmar or what's 26:59.920 --> 27:02.202 going on in the Sudan at the moment or what 27:02.602 --> 27:06.164 that atrocities committed in Syria? Why has 27:06.365 --> 27:10.007 Israel been singled out? And maybe you're 27:10.047 --> 27:12.048 biased because you're picking on Israel and 27:12.088 --> 27:15.070 that makes you, maybe that bias is also anti-Semitic. 27:16.251 --> 27:19.053 Well, I don't think so. I think there are 27:19.093 --> 27:24.193 two good reasons why it is justifiable to 27:24.494 --> 27:29.839 speak up if, as a genocide scholar, when 27:29.939 --> 27:33.022 one sees atrocities being committed by both 27:33.082 --> 27:37.487 sides in that situation in Israel and Gaza. 27:38.508 --> 27:42.052 The first is simply because in my case I'm 27:42.092 --> 27:46.997 a UK citizen and I pay UK taxes and it is 27:47.077 --> 27:49.700 my government that is providing both material 27:49.960 --> 27:53.664 and diplomatic support to Netanyahu's government 27:54.244 --> 27:58.111 and that government is committing some very 27:58.271 --> 28:03.114 serious atrocities in Gaza that would require 28:03.655 --> 28:07.477 investigation and legal qualification at 28:07.557 --> 28:10.219 some point. So as a citizen I feel I have 28:10.259 --> 28:12.920 an obligation, not just as a genocide scholar, 28:13.941 --> 28:16.662 but also I think a second reason is that, 28:17.143 --> 28:21.783 well, In the case of like Sudan and Myanmar 28:22.103 --> 28:25.786 and Syria, these are not countries that we 28:26.226 --> 28:30.229 call democracies and do not call themselves 28:30.290 --> 28:32.391 democracies. And they do not say they are 28:32.411 --> 28:36.615 committed to liberal values such as justice 28:36.695 --> 28:39.597 and equality and freedom. They also do not 28:39.657 --> 28:42.279 say that they have the most moral army in 28:42.339 --> 28:48.205 the world. Israel does. So I think if Netanyahu's 28:48.245 --> 28:52.713 government says that and if my country and 28:52.813 --> 28:56.179 other western countries provide support to 28:56.459 --> 29:01.396 Netanyahu on the basis that Israel is seen 29:01.436 --> 29:04.418 to have similar liberal values in common, 29:04.619 --> 29:07.101 moral values in common, then I think then 29:07.181 --> 29:10.523 it does raise the question of whether it 29:10.603 --> 29:14.567 is okay then to then call out if they are 29:14.687 --> 29:17.009 acting inconsistently with those moral values. 29:18.482 --> 29:20.843 But OK, and the case for genocide, by the 29:20.883 --> 29:23.663 way, in Israel, I won't offer a determination, 29:23.943 --> 29:27.024 but I would say that there are the two strongest 29:27.204 --> 29:32.225 arguments. The first is in relation to the 29:32.625 --> 29:37.626 bombing and drone attacks, which when coupled 29:37.706 --> 29:39.966 with the statements from the senior leadership, 29:40.366 --> 29:42.407 from the president, the prime minister and 29:42.427 --> 29:46.529 the minister of defense, Well, it begs the 29:46.569 --> 29:50.954 question of why choose to use such destructive 29:51.054 --> 29:55.559 weaponry? Why so many two ton bombs? At the 29:55.599 --> 29:58.122 very least, I think in the case of the bombing 29:58.403 --> 30:01.566 argument, it shows an extreme disregard for 30:01.606 --> 30:04.530 the value of Palestinian life. whether that's 30:04.590 --> 30:07.532 strong enough to infer an intent to destroy. 30:07.993 --> 30:10.355 Well, I think that's a legal determination. 30:10.895 --> 30:13.998 But I think the stronger case is the humanitarian 30:14.118 --> 30:19.003 siege in that's ongoing in Gaza. So why we 30:19.063 --> 30:24.147 are seeing the Israeli defense forces making 30:24.207 --> 30:27.668 it so difficult for humanitarian aid, food, 30:27.928 --> 30:32.429 fuel, water, medicine to get into Gaza, and 30:32.469 --> 30:35.450 that we now have a UN reports of famine being 30:36.110 --> 30:38.991 imminent, it does beg the question of what 30:39.031 --> 30:41.932 the motivation is for making it so difficult 30:41.992 --> 30:44.693 for humanitarian aid to come in. And of course, 30:44.753 --> 30:47.634 what's happened most recently with the targeting 30:48.294 --> 30:52.175 of the convoy, the aid convoy in which seven 30:53.375 --> 30:56.436 aid workers were killed because the IDF believed 30:56.456 --> 30:59.456 that there was a single Hamas combatant in 30:59.516 --> 31:02.457 that convoy turned out to be untrue. But 31:02.537 --> 31:04.597 even if that were true, that there were a 31:04.657 --> 31:07.438 single Hamas combatant there, it does beg 31:07.478 --> 31:09.839 the question again about the extreme disregard 31:10.199 --> 31:12.819 for the civilian lives, for civilian life, 31:12.959 --> 31:15.920 and in this case, foreign civilians. You 31:15.960 --> 31:20.021 asked the question, well, why Rwanda? Why 31:20.061 --> 31:25.521 did I choose to work on Rwanda? Well, Rwanda's 31:25.861 --> 31:29.603 genocide, genocide, I mean, is fortunately 31:29.623 --> 31:33.305 a very rare occurrence. Rwanda's genocide, 31:33.325 --> 31:36.206 though, stands out even among rare occurrences, 31:36.746 --> 31:40.048 not just because it's tragic and shocking, 31:40.128 --> 31:42.148 but there are some features of the Rwandan 31:42.188 --> 31:44.750 genocide that I think that are quite distinctive. 31:46.210 --> 31:49.173 and puzzling at the same time. And it is 31:49.213 --> 31:50.975 these distinctive features, I think, that 31:51.075 --> 31:53.717 drew me to wish to understand what happened 31:53.757 --> 31:56.860 in Rwanda. So it is the fact that so many 31:57.160 --> 31:59.722 ordinary Rwandans participated in the violence. 32:00.243 --> 32:02.525 It's the fact that this violence happened 32:02.565 --> 32:06.068 in almost every part of Rwanda where Tutsi 32:06.208 --> 32:09.570 lived. It's the fact that it happened so 32:09.790 --> 32:13.391 quickly, in less than a hundred days, this 32:13.471 --> 32:17.073 genocide was executed, and that it resulted 32:17.313 --> 32:20.374 in the deaths of so many. We estimate nearly 32:20.434 --> 32:22.895 two-thirds of the Tutsi population were killed 32:24.035 --> 32:28.838 in that time period. So, for me, the motivation 32:28.898 --> 32:31.120 for the Rwanda genocide is not unusual, it's 32:31.200 --> 32:34.964 quite similar to the motivations for other 32:35.024 --> 32:39.968 genocides, largely around threat and opportunity, 32:41.229 --> 32:44.032 and the Hutu population and the Hutu government 32:44.112 --> 32:47.074 invoking security fears saying that they 32:47.094 --> 32:50.436 were defending themselves. These are logics 32:50.476 --> 32:53.237 that we see in other instances of genocides 32:53.257 --> 32:55.538 which often occur in the context of wars. 32:56.058 --> 32:59.779 But in Rwanda's case, it was the answer to 32:59.799 --> 33:03.021 the question of why was it so distinctive? 33:03.081 --> 33:05.462 Well, it's because I discovered that Rwanda 33:05.482 --> 33:08.463 has a very unusual set of features as a country. 33:08.503 --> 33:11.564 It's a very unusual baseline against which 33:11.604 --> 33:15.346 the war operates. So the high population 33:15.426 --> 33:18.487 density, very small territory, an unusual 33:18.527 --> 33:20.248 topography where it's very difficult for 33:20.288 --> 33:22.949 people to hide, very high road density which 33:22.989 --> 33:26.350 made it very easy for resources including 33:26.410 --> 33:28.771 soldiers and militia to be able to move around, 33:29.331 --> 33:31.072 and the ethnic settlement pattern that you 33:31.112 --> 33:33.933 have not separate Hutu lands and Tutsi lands 33:33.953 --> 33:35.774 but actually Hutu and Tutsi living separate 33:36.274 --> 33:38.495 at side by side next to each other. So I 33:38.535 --> 33:41.116 think all of those very unusual socio-demographic 33:41.176 --> 33:43.656 and socio-political characteristics actually 33:43.696 --> 33:47.377 explain why it is that Rwanda has those unusual 33:47.457 --> 33:49.658 features. But it was those unusual features 33:49.698 --> 33:51.799 that made me want to study it in the first 33:51.839 --> 33:52.099 place. 33:53.339 --> 33:57.240 On page 121 of your book, you write, and 33:57.360 --> 34:00.821 I quote, political liberalization was the 34:00.881 --> 34:04.414 second macro-political factor in conjunction 34:04.454 --> 34:06.855 with the civil war that pushed Rwanda closer 34:06.875 --> 34:12.019 to genocide between 1990 and 1994. As in 34:12.079 --> 34:15.341 many parts of Africa, Rwanda took preliminary 34:15.421 --> 34:19.544 steps away from autocracy and towards democracy. 34:21.385 --> 34:24.827 This move did not, ineluctably or by itself, 34:25.407 --> 34:29.370 lead to mass ethnic violence. 39 other African 34:29.430 --> 34:32.192 nations underwent democratic transitions 34:32.763 --> 34:36.786 at the same time as Rwanda, yet none of these 34:37.366 --> 34:41.969 ended in genocide. In Rwanda, however, the 34:42.009 --> 34:45.391 push for political freedom and usually coincided 34:45.471 --> 34:49.354 with a civil war. Rwanda's ruling elite faced 34:49.514 --> 34:53.156 twin challenges to its power, an external 34:53.216 --> 34:57.419 threat from a rebel army and a domestic challenge 34:57.859 --> 35:01.641 from new opposition parties. The interaction 35:01.922 --> 35:05.610 of the war with liberalization escalated 35:06.070 --> 35:09.192 elite contestation and brought ethnicity 35:09.452 --> 35:12.634 to the foreground of Rwanda's politics. It 35:12.814 --> 35:16.616 enabled the rise of ethnic extremism. Do 35:16.756 --> 35:19.838 I understand you correctly when you say that 35:19.938 --> 35:23.240 democratization and other forms of political 35:23.280 --> 35:26.302 liberalization are not the silver bullet 35:26.382 --> 35:29.524 that would solve all of Africa's, all of 35:29.564 --> 35:32.543 the complex problems brought on by ethnic 35:32.583 --> 35:36.644 conflict in Africa? And if yes, why? 35:38.165 --> 35:40.525 Well, yes, yes, you are correct. And that 35:40.605 --> 35:43.706 is what I am saying. But I should begin by 35:43.786 --> 35:46.567 saying that, well, this is not a new critique, 35:46.647 --> 35:48.927 or even a radical critique among political 35:48.987 --> 35:54.018 scientists that competitive politics that 35:54.459 --> 35:59.585 liberal democracy can be destabilizing. If 35:59.685 --> 36:02.089 one goes back to the end of the Cold War 36:02.109 --> 36:09.000 in 1989, the established accepted wisdom 36:09.120 --> 36:12.541 for how one deals with civil wars reflected 36:12.621 --> 36:14.762 this belief that, you know, it is the triumph 36:14.862 --> 36:19.183 of liberal democracy over communism that 36:19.243 --> 36:22.143 leads to the belief that, well, if you want 36:22.163 --> 36:24.264 to end a civil war, what you do is that you 36:24.904 --> 36:29.345 have some sort of temporary power sharing 36:29.405 --> 36:33.946 agreement a transition period and then some 36:34.026 --> 36:37.948 elections to legitimize a government, competitive 36:38.228 --> 36:42.249 elections to legitimize a government. But 36:42.289 --> 36:45.410 this end of history model, liberal internationalist 36:45.450 --> 36:49.491 model has proved to be problematic as we 36:49.511 --> 36:52.092 have seen and I think Rwanda is just one 36:52.132 --> 36:54.533 of these countries that has illustrated the 36:54.573 --> 36:58.630 risks of competitive politics So the critique 36:58.650 --> 37:01.492 has been, well, liberal democracy or competitive 37:01.532 --> 37:04.535 politics, well, that should only really be 37:04.796 --> 37:09.340 promoted once you have strong institutions 37:09.981 --> 37:12.223 in place in the country. But if you bring 37:12.303 --> 37:16.407 in a liberal model which has at its core 37:16.827 --> 37:20.170 the idea that competition is good, competition 37:20.250 --> 37:22.812 in markets in the economic realm and competition 37:22.853 --> 37:25.335 in politics in the political realm, so elections, 37:26.376 --> 37:29.618 that if you do that before you've got strongly 37:29.879 --> 37:33.302 embedded institutions, so independent institutions 37:33.342 --> 37:37.385 that can resist being captured by private 37:38.086 --> 37:41.089 actors. So it means that in the context of 37:41.169 --> 37:43.130 competitive politics, it means that you need 37:43.150 --> 37:46.393 to have an independent electoral commission, 37:46.814 --> 37:49.876 you need to have an independent judiciary 37:49.957 --> 37:54.521 to be able to adjudicate on disputes around 37:54.541 --> 37:56.843 the elections and campaigning in elections. 37:57.263 --> 37:59.905 You also need to have an independent police 38:00.005 --> 38:05.847 force and army that act neutrally in election 38:05.907 --> 38:09.647 periods, if you don't have those institutions 38:09.687 --> 38:12.688 that are independent and you bring in elections, 38:13.808 --> 38:16.309 then it destabilizes the country because 38:16.349 --> 38:19.710 those institutions are captured by either 38:19.750 --> 38:23.011 the incumbent or perhaps sometimes even challengers 38:23.651 --> 38:27.592 and the country destabilizes under the competition. 38:28.392 --> 38:30.414 But I would go one step further and say that 38:30.434 --> 38:33.176 it's not just that you need to institutionalize 38:33.256 --> 38:36.699 before you liberalize, which is a common 38:36.759 --> 38:39.301 critique. I would say you also need to have 38:39.921 --> 38:43.865 a mature and responsible civil society. in 38:43.905 --> 38:47.888 addition to strong institutions. So this 38:47.968 --> 38:51.109 means that you would have an independent 38:51.149 --> 38:53.311 media and it means that you would also have 38:53.331 --> 38:57.513 a mature NGO sector as well. So and these 38:57.633 --> 39:00.255 are actors then that have strong sense of 39:00.315 --> 39:02.916 professional ethics and professional responsibility 39:03.397 --> 39:06.559 and that they know what is appropriate to 39:06.659 --> 39:09.661 publish, what it is appropriate to say, so 39:09.701 --> 39:12.703 that you do not fan the flames of ethnic 39:12.743 --> 39:16.265 divisionism. These two conditions were clearly 39:16.365 --> 39:20.448 not met in Rwanda in the 1990s. They were 39:20.508 --> 39:23.070 not strong institutions and there was not 39:23.090 --> 39:28.233 a mature and responsible civil society. Much 39:28.273 --> 39:30.093 of the civil society had been co-opted by 39:30.133 --> 39:33.294 the state and the media certainly did not 39:33.554 --> 39:36.235 act, many elements of the media did not act 39:36.415 --> 39:38.796 with that sense of responsibility and restraint 39:39.136 --> 39:42.337 that you would expect in a more mature democracy. 39:44.254 --> 39:47.476 And this view, by the way, is also shared 39:47.516 --> 39:50.378 by the current Rwandan government. They have 39:50.518 --> 39:53.460 explicitly eschewed competitive politics 39:53.560 --> 39:56.862 and opted for consensus democracy instead, 39:57.602 --> 40:01.405 because they also say that the two time periods 40:01.465 --> 40:04.467 in Rwanda's history in which they have experienced 40:04.527 --> 40:09.028 competitive elections, in the period immediately 40:09.669 --> 40:13.509 around independence, and then in the period 40:13.729 --> 40:17.270 after the end of the Cold War. Both of those 40:17.350 --> 40:34.253 resulted in violence, a revolution in 1959, 40:23.231 --> 40:26.671 and then a genocide in 1994. So there is 40:26.751 --> 40:30.912 no love lost for the absence of competitive 40:31.032 --> 40:32.392 elections in Rwanda. 40:34.253 --> 40:40.260 On page 182, You write thus, it again warned 40:40.300 --> 40:42.662 that the killings may be crimes punishable 40:43.182 --> 40:46.744 under international law. However, it was 40:46.784 --> 40:50.427 not until June 8th that the Security Council 40:50.527 --> 40:55.110 finally adopted a Resolution 925 that mentioned 40:55.570 --> 40:58.612 acts of genocide and strengthened the mandate 40:58.732 --> 41:02.674 of Unema II to include the protection of 41:02.734 --> 41:07.026 displaced persons, refugees, civilians at 41:07.106 --> 41:11.088 risk. It was too little, too late, however. 41:12.029 --> 41:14.650 Most of the killing had occurred in the first 41:14.710 --> 41:18.232 two weeks. It would take another month for 41:18.252 --> 41:20.293 the peacekeepers and the resources needed 41:20.434 --> 41:24.136 to operationalize UNIMOD II, even to reach 41:24.676 --> 41:29.299 Rwanda. Omar, there have been several military 41:29.339 --> 41:32.961 confrontations in the 21st century, many 41:33.001 --> 41:37.475 of them verging on genocide. Is the United 41:37.575 --> 41:40.416 Nations Security Council still needed in 41:40.637 --> 41:44.118 a new multipolar world and what proactive 41:44.199 --> 41:47.200 measures can we take to stop the escalation 41:47.781 --> 41:50.782 of armed conflict and improve the management 41:50.842 --> 41:54.204 of it globally within the UN Security Council? 41:55.745 --> 41:58.086 Well that is a big question, the subject 41:58.166 --> 42:03.715 I suppose of several books. The answer is 42:03.755 --> 42:06.477 yes. I think, in my view, that the UN Security 42:06.517 --> 42:09.960 Council is still needed. But I guess I would 42:10.000 --> 42:14.344 obviously acknowledge the anachronistic nature 42:14.664 --> 42:17.787 of the Security Council, the permanent members. 42:17.907 --> 42:20.088 It reflects the balance of power at the end 42:20.108 --> 42:22.851 of World War II, so that we end up with countries 42:22.911 --> 42:25.913 that today are not as internationally or 42:25.953 --> 42:27.975 militarily or economically as significant 42:28.015 --> 42:34.086 as they were in 1945. So there's that, the 42:34.106 --> 42:36.147 anachronistic nature of the balance of power 42:36.207 --> 42:38.849 that's been institutionalized in the permanent 42:38.889 --> 42:40.950 membership of the Security Council. There's 42:41.010 --> 42:44.372 also the more general issue that the capabilities 42:44.412 --> 42:48.174 that the UN, well the expectations that the 42:48.294 --> 42:53.457 UN greatly exceed the UN's capabilities. 42:54.158 --> 42:59.142 And much of the critique that I heard, for 42:59.202 --> 43:01.183 example, when I was in Rwanda talking to 43:01.243 --> 43:04.726 Rwandans, much of the hostility does come 43:04.806 --> 43:07.348 from this idea that, well, the UN failed 43:07.408 --> 43:11.831 us and they had this expectation that the 43:11.951 --> 43:15.393 UN should have done more and so forth. And 43:15.433 --> 43:19.415 then also the fact that the veto that each 43:19.475 --> 43:24.198 permanent member has means that it's very 43:24.258 --> 43:28.860 hard to get resolutions passed, as we have 43:28.900 --> 43:33.263 seen, I suppose, until recently with this 43:33.323 --> 43:37.085 resolution to call for a ceasefire in Gaza. 43:37.885 --> 43:40.749 with the US having vetoed earlier resolutions, 43:41.250 --> 43:43.312 and this time abstaining with the most recent 43:43.412 --> 43:47.457 one. So it's very hard to end that, to kind 43:47.497 --> 43:49.720 of change that architecture. But I still 43:49.740 --> 43:51.162 think despite all of those problems, you 43:51.182 --> 43:53.465 know, the capabilities problem, the veto 43:53.505 --> 43:55.827 problem, etc. I still think that there is 43:55.887 --> 43:58.289 a very important role for the CUN Security 43:58.329 --> 44:00.451 Council in matters of international peace 44:00.491 --> 44:02.353 and security and for preventing genocide 44:02.393 --> 44:06.397 as well. Because it is the only truly supranational 44:06.577 --> 44:08.999 architecture that we have. It's still the 44:09.179 --> 44:13.022 only space that we have in which these issues 44:13.183 --> 44:18.873 can come to be debated and potentially acted 44:18.973 --> 44:21.494 upon. And even if there isn't action, if 44:21.534 --> 44:23.575 there's inaction, because there is veto, 44:23.935 --> 44:26.877 because there is paralysis, well, at least 44:26.897 --> 44:29.738 there's a record that these things are happening 44:29.818 --> 44:31.999 have happened. And there's a record of the 44:32.040 --> 44:34.181 inaction as well. And that that's important 44:34.201 --> 44:37.342 when it comes to assessing historic responsibility 44:37.402 --> 44:40.404 as well. So yes, I still think there's a 44:40.464 --> 44:43.698 need for the UN Security Council. Your second 44:43.718 --> 44:46.040 question is even bigger, I think. What can 44:46.080 --> 44:49.322 we do about this? Well, I think there's no 44:49.402 --> 44:54.246 silver bullet to deal with the scourge of 44:54.686 --> 44:57.728 armed conflict in the world. If you were 44:57.748 --> 44:59.830 to look at the post-World War II history, 44:59.850 --> 45:04.613 I would say that there was a great power 45:04.733 --> 45:07.855 conflict largely ended with 1989, with the 45:07.875 --> 45:12.459 end of the Cold War. and then we entered 45:12.499 --> 45:15.300 a period in history where we saw much of 45:15.400 --> 45:18.462 the armed conflicts that we saw were intrastate 45:18.542 --> 45:20.724 rather than interstate conflicts. These were 45:20.784 --> 45:23.345 civil wars fought within countries and this 45:23.766 --> 45:26.107 of which Rwanda's genocide is the combination 45:26.127 --> 45:29.569 of one such civil war. I say we're now entering 45:29.629 --> 45:32.011 possibly a new phase, which perhaps is the 45:32.071 --> 45:35.374 return of interstate conflict and maybe even 45:35.434 --> 45:39.157 great power conflict. So looking at Russia 45:39.277 --> 45:44.341 and Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, looming 45:44.381 --> 45:46.903 conflict perhaps between Israel and Iran, 45:46.983 --> 45:50.666 or even China and the United States, and 45:50.686 --> 45:54.214 also in my own home country, Guyana, with 45:54.274 --> 45:58.935 Venezuela over Guyana's newly found oil wealth. 45:59.715 --> 46:02.696 So, but, you know, if I were to say and to 46:02.737 --> 46:06.038 try to pick on one thing that I think could 46:06.138 --> 46:10.639 help reduce the incidence of armed conflict, 46:11.119 --> 46:14.581 I would say it would be continue support 46:14.641 --> 46:17.582 for a rules-based system, of which the UN 46:17.622 --> 46:21.083 Security Council is one very important element. 46:21.764 --> 46:24.546 We need to ensure that there is not impunity 46:24.967 --> 46:27.809 for violations of the international legal 46:28.309 --> 46:30.991 order. But I actually think the institution 46:31.011 --> 46:33.834 that needs the greatest political support 46:33.894 --> 46:38.037 and has the greatest potential for preventing 46:39.238 --> 46:43.181 war and atrocity is actually the International 46:43.501 --> 46:46.303 Criminal Court. Unfortunately, we seem to 46:46.323 --> 46:48.105 be moving in the opposite direction rather 46:48.145 --> 46:50.728 than strengthening it. The world seems to 46:50.768 --> 46:54.772 be taking steps to weaken it. But I do think 46:54.833 --> 46:57.015 it is the institution that is best equipped. 46:57.693 --> 47:03.416 for deterring war and atrocity, because it 47:03.476 --> 47:06.577 means individual accountability. And that 47:06.657 --> 47:09.519 means that the people at the top, the leaders, 47:09.939 --> 47:13.660 it changes their calculus. If they know that 47:13.801 --> 47:17.542 if they start a war, or if they engage in 47:17.562 --> 47:20.604 a bombing campaign that results in the mass 47:21.064 --> 47:25.526 killings of individuals, that there is potentially 47:26.334 --> 47:31.016 a reckoning to be had, then I think that 47:31.077 --> 47:33.758 would mean that they would think much more 47:33.838 --> 47:37.980 deeply about engaging in such actions. But 47:38.000 --> 47:41.602 the ICC obviously has some severe constraints. 47:41.742 --> 47:45.344 It's largely seen as an institution that 47:45.444 --> 47:48.705 targets politically and internationally weaker 47:48.765 --> 47:52.207 countries in the global south, rather than 47:54.012 --> 47:56.514 coming after or starting investigations into 47:56.554 --> 47:59.798 the actions of politically more important 47:59.898 --> 48:02.561 countries. But I think that the greatest 48:02.681 --> 48:05.424 testament to the capabilities of the ICC 48:05.905 --> 48:07.547 is to look at the record of the countries 48:07.587 --> 48:10.791 who have refused either to sign or to ratify 48:10.851 --> 48:13.834 the Rome Statute. because they fear and they 48:13.914 --> 48:16.556 know what could potentially happen and how 48:16.616 --> 48:18.858 it would limit their range of actions. So 48:18.878 --> 48:22.321 the United States, Russia, China, so great 48:22.381 --> 48:26.244 powers, India, Indonesia, Israel, these are 48:26.264 --> 48:28.466 all countries which have refused to either 48:28.506 --> 48:32.569 sign or ratify the Rome Statute because the 48:32.669 --> 48:37.874 ICC would so severely limit what it is that 48:37.914 --> 48:39.395 they felt that they could do. 48:40.543 --> 48:44.085 The title of our podcast is, Why Genocide 48:44.245 --> 48:46.666 is the Responsibility of the Entire World. 48:47.826 --> 48:51.788 On September 27th, 2022, you published a 48:51.828 --> 48:55.269 powerful paper in a journal, Africa Affairs, 48:55.590 --> 48:59.551 entitled, Securocratic State Building, the 48:59.611 --> 49:04.614 Rationales, Rebattles, and Risks Behind Extraordinary 49:04.654 --> 49:08.855 Rise of Rwanda After the Genocide. You wrote 49:08.875 --> 49:11.848 the following, and I quote, In a striking 49:11.928 --> 49:15.650 example of this polarization and these differing 49:15.710 --> 49:18.771 priorities, the British government's decision 49:19.011 --> 49:23.533 in 2022 to ask Rwanda to process and settle 49:23.653 --> 49:28.035 asylum seekers to the UK drew starkly divergent 49:28.075 --> 49:31.737 reactions on the day the new policy was announced. 49:32.817 --> 49:35.378 The government justified its decision by 49:35.838 --> 49:38.279 pointing to Rwanda's international recognition 49:38.920 --> 49:43.437 for its safety strong governance, law corruption, 49:44.177 --> 49:47.019 gender equality, and as one of the fastest 49:47.099 --> 49:51.842 growing economies across Africa. Human Rights 49:51.922 --> 49:54.883 Watch, in contrast, challenged the decision 49:55.003 --> 49:57.705 by pointing to Rwanda's known track record 49:58.325 --> 50:01.567 for extrajudicial killings, suspicious deaths 50:02.108 --> 50:06.090 in custody, and lawful or arbitrary detention, 50:06.750 --> 50:10.893 torture, and abusive prosecutions particularly 50:11.333 --> 50:15.755 targeting critics and dissidents. On November 50:17.195 --> 50:21.217 15th, 2023, the UK Supreme Court in a landmark 50:21.257 --> 50:25.198 decision found the UK Rwanda asylum scheme 50:25.438 --> 50:30.240 unlawful. Omar, please explain to our audience 50:31.180 --> 50:34.141 why the problem of genocide is and should 50:34.221 --> 50:36.422 be the responsibility of the entire world 50:36.622 --> 50:39.203 in the context of a podcast theme and in 50:39.283 --> 50:42.439 the light of the ongoing controversy surrounding 50:42.519 --> 50:45.201 the genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath? 50:46.042 --> 50:50.105 And how important is telling the truth with 50:50.145 --> 50:52.787 special reference to the Rwanda safety bill? 50:56.100 --> 50:59.082 for the record, I think that the decision 50:59.283 --> 51:03.426 to the wish to make Rwanda a place to process 51:03.486 --> 51:05.528 and settle asylum seekers to the UK, I think 51:05.568 --> 51:09.431 that that's a that's a bad decision. And 51:09.511 --> 51:11.092 how important is it to tell the truth, I 51:11.112 --> 51:14.955 think it's very important to tell the truth 51:15.035 --> 51:18.558 about the record of a country. But at the 51:18.598 --> 51:21.040 same time, you know, the UK has has a real 51:21.080 --> 51:24.222 problem. And Rwanda presents in the minds 51:24.282 --> 51:25.783 of the current conservative government a 51:25.823 --> 51:27.724 solution to that problem. So the problem 51:27.784 --> 51:33.427 is that the post-World War II system for 51:34.247 --> 51:37.369 dealing with refugees is under strain. There 51:37.409 --> 51:40.511 is simply more refugees than governments 51:40.951 --> 51:43.912 feel capable of being able to manage. And 51:43.933 --> 51:47.214 the UK has a point. There are many people 51:47.614 --> 51:51.696 who are coming on small boats to the United 51:51.736 --> 51:54.137 Kingdom, and they are choosing the United 51:54.197 --> 51:57.859 Kingdom to seek asylum. And the Conservative 51:57.879 --> 52:01.321 government makes the point that, well, the 52:01.361 --> 52:04.922 reason for asylum is that you face persecution 52:04.982 --> 52:07.503 in your home country. That doesn't give you 52:07.644 --> 52:10.445 necessarily an unconditional or unfettered 52:10.525 --> 52:16.448 right which country you can seek asylum in, 52:16.928 --> 52:18.829 you should simply be able to seek asylum 52:18.909 --> 52:20.670 in a country where you would not face this 52:20.770 --> 52:23.712 persecution. Why are you coming to Europe? 52:23.792 --> 52:25.393 Why are you coming to the United Kingdom? 52:25.433 --> 52:26.774 There are other countries where you could 52:26.794 --> 52:29.835 also feel safe and escape persecution. So 52:30.216 --> 52:31.937 the Conservative government believes that 52:32.037 --> 52:34.058 people are coming to the UK not only because 52:34.098 --> 52:35.879 they wish to escape persecution, but because 52:35.899 --> 52:39.901 the UK provides economic opportunities for 52:39.941 --> 52:42.683 them and a political environment that is 52:42.723 --> 52:44.964 better in other countries. And So they want 52:45.004 --> 52:46.505 to discourage this. They think they shouldn't 52:46.525 --> 52:49.546 be able to shop. Refugees shouldn't be able 52:49.586 --> 52:52.207 to shop for the country that they wish to 52:52.247 --> 52:55.468 seek asylum in. So they want to create it 52:55.588 --> 52:57.869 less attractive. They think, well, Rwanda 52:57.909 --> 52:59.909 is less attractive economically, but might 52:59.929 --> 53:02.910 be able to provide asylum seekers with safe 53:03.170 --> 53:05.831 haven. So dealing with the political issue, 53:05.851 --> 53:09.106 but not with the economic issue. And, you 53:09.126 --> 53:11.150 know, from the Rwanda perspective, it's great 53:11.230 --> 53:13.694 because the Rwanda government really wishes 53:13.714 --> 53:19.075 to establish a reputation internationally 53:19.655 --> 53:23.979 and to be recognized as a place where the 53:24.099 --> 53:27.681 UK government feels it is safe for asylum 53:27.722 --> 53:29.523 seekers to be settled, well, that sends a 53:29.563 --> 53:32.385 very powerful signal to the rest of the world 53:32.445 --> 53:35.568 and to Rwanda's critics. So it's a win-win 53:35.728 --> 53:37.910 from the UK government perspective and the 53:38.210 --> 53:40.652 Rwandan government perspective. The losers, 53:41.733 --> 53:44.094 the refugees, are the asylum seekers themselves. 53:44.995 --> 53:49.818 because it's very clear from the human rights 53:50.618 --> 53:52.859 organisations, independent human rights organisations, 53:52.879 --> 53:55.601 that Rwanda is not a safe place for asylum 53:55.621 --> 53:58.102 seekers and that many Rwandan citizens themselves 53:58.602 --> 54:01.103 flee Rwanda seeking asylum elsewhere. So 54:01.123 --> 54:06.566 it's hard to understand how then a country 54:06.927 --> 54:08.928 that has people fleeing, it can also be a 54:08.988 --> 54:12.810 place that can be safe for other asylum seekers. 54:14.010 --> 54:17.091 The response to that you cited in that article 54:17.251 --> 54:21.633 to this Rwanda safety bill is polarized and 54:21.653 --> 54:25.614 it mirrors the polarization, the wider polarization 54:25.634 --> 54:30.379 about Rwanda after the genocide. So and that 54:30.419 --> 54:31.801 polarization, you know, we're coming up to 50:56.100 --> 54:36.445 30, it's 30 years, this year, since the genocide, 54:36.686 --> 54:39.228 and, you know, views on Rwanda are still 54:39.769 --> 54:42.792 polarized, not just among Rwandans, but among 54:42.852 --> 54:45.855 those who observe Rwanda and follow Rwanda. 54:47.757 --> 54:52.587 And, you know, the part of this polarization 54:52.947 --> 54:55.027 is simply a consequence of the civil war 54:55.087 --> 54:57.388 and genocide, but part of it is also simply 54:57.408 --> 54:59.469 a consequence of what do you think is more 54:59.509 --> 55:01.690 important when you try to evaluate a country. 55:02.210 --> 55:06.291 So, you know, if you think that, you know, 55:06.311 --> 55:09.733 the Rwanda is a country which has visionary 55:09.813 --> 55:13.375 leadership, it's technologically very forward-looking, 55:13.395 --> 55:17.138 and it has strong, effective state institutions, 55:17.518 --> 55:20.680 it has political stability, it's a good environment 55:20.700 --> 55:25.643 to do business in, then yes, Rwanda, if those 55:25.703 --> 55:27.904 are your normative priorities, then Rwanda 55:28.244 --> 55:31.926 is a very attractive country. But if your 55:32.406 --> 55:34.247 normative priorities are different, if you 55:34.287 --> 55:38.329 think, well, democracy is important and civil 55:38.369 --> 55:41.110 and political liberties are important and 55:41.210 --> 55:43.471 justice and reconciliation are important, 55:43.852 --> 55:46.953 well then no, Rwanda is not such an attractive 55:47.013 --> 55:50.975 country to live in. And this reflects the 55:51.215 --> 55:54.917 polarization in the academic views on Rwanda 55:55.037 --> 55:59.942 as well as some governments as well. So both 56:00.002 --> 56:02.483 of those views are potentially correct. I 56:02.543 --> 56:04.624 published that article that you mentioned 56:04.804 --> 56:07.466 in African Affairs because I thought that 56:07.506 --> 56:10.287 these polarized views, neither of them truly 56:10.367 --> 56:14.209 captures or does justice to what Rwanda's 56:14.249 --> 56:17.171 post-genocide government is doing in the 56:17.191 --> 56:20.073 country. They're too characterized, right? 56:20.133 --> 56:22.988 On the one hand, Rwanda is this great developmental 56:23.048 --> 56:25.449 state with high modernist ambitions. On the 56:25.489 --> 56:28.591 other hand, it's this dictatorship and ethnocracy 56:29.011 --> 56:31.773 and repressive regime. So neither of those 56:31.853 --> 56:34.554 fully captures what Rwanda is doing. So I 56:34.594 --> 56:37.536 developed this idea of a securocratic state 56:37.596 --> 56:40.197 builder, of which I think the Rwandan government 56:40.397 --> 56:43.619 is an exemplar of. And the Rwandan model, 56:44.099 --> 56:48.593 it's important, Rwanda has, the fate of Rwanda 56:48.633 --> 56:51.035 has more to do with just, you know, what 56:51.095 --> 56:54.097 happens to Rwandan citizens. There are international 56:54.237 --> 56:56.438 organizations, there are other African leaders 56:56.478 --> 56:58.980 and countries who are looking at Rwanda and 56:59.180 --> 57:02.241 asking, will this model succeed? Because 57:02.341 --> 57:04.383 we'd like to see if it does, because maybe 57:04.423 --> 57:07.465 it's one that we should copy. So it has an 57:07.505 --> 57:09.886 impact far beyond the borders of Rwanda. 57:10.386 --> 57:12.908 So what about the Securitatec state building 57:13.008 --> 57:16.048 model? So it's neither liberal nor illiberal. 57:16.168 --> 57:21.371 Rwanda is essentially the only principle 57:21.832 --> 57:23.593 that I think that the Rwandan government 57:23.833 --> 57:26.835 as a securocratic state builder follows is 57:26.875 --> 57:29.197 simply the principle that security comes 57:29.277 --> 57:32.519 first all the time. Security trumps liberty. 57:32.880 --> 57:35.361 Security trumps equality. It's not that we 57:35.482 --> 57:37.483 are against liberty. It's not that we are 57:37.543 --> 57:40.205 against equality. It's simply that security 57:40.265 --> 57:43.223 is much more important. And that's reflected 57:43.803 --> 57:46.646 in the grand strategic choices that the Rwandan 57:46.686 --> 57:48.908 government has made since the genocide, right? 57:49.389 --> 57:51.470 In terms of the political system and political 57:51.510 --> 57:54.513 philosophy, it said no to competitive politics 57:54.833 --> 57:57.436 and yes to consensus democracy, because it 57:57.476 --> 58:00.539 thinks that competition is destabilizing. 58:00.599 --> 58:03.862 So it's a security risk. It said no in the 58:03.942 --> 58:07.465 social realm. It's an undertaken social engineering. 58:07.865 --> 58:09.686 It said that we are going to eliminate in 58:09.706 --> 58:12.087 the public sphere the identification along 58:12.267 --> 58:19.629 ethnic lines because the history of ethnicity 58:19.770 --> 58:23.711 is that it's divisive and leads to conflict. 58:24.251 --> 58:26.452 And then lastly, in the realm of the state 58:26.592 --> 58:28.913 and the economy, its ambition has been to 58:28.973 --> 58:31.254 modernize both the state and the economy, 58:31.874 --> 58:33.675 to have strong, effective institutions and 58:33.695 --> 58:38.508 to generate high levels of growth. None of 58:38.568 --> 58:41.849 those choices is a bad choice in itself, 58:42.329 --> 58:47.230 but none, I'm afraid, in my view, is sustainable 58:47.490 --> 58:52.152 in the long run. And I don't hold much hope 58:52.532 --> 58:57.433 that the model will not end in some dramatic... 59:00.474 --> 59:02.895 I fear that it may end in some dramatic way 59:03.275 --> 59:06.191 that is not peaceable. And the reason for 59:06.231 --> 59:08.352 that is that each of those three grand strategic 59:08.372 --> 59:10.713 choices that Rwanda made in respect of the 59:10.773 --> 59:12.995 political system, well, you can't really 59:13.055 --> 59:16.436 have consensus if you coerce people and don't 59:16.456 --> 59:18.518 let them to have a choice. You can't really 59:18.558 --> 59:20.779 talk about consensus if there is no choice. 59:21.559 --> 59:24.741 And in terms of engineering, you know, eliminating 59:24.781 --> 59:27.503 ethnicity, well, you can't really eliminate 59:27.563 --> 59:32.326 ethnicity if your policies reflect your fear 59:32.406 --> 59:36.251 that ethnicity is still a socially and politically 59:36.431 --> 59:39.455 powerful force in the country. So you know 59:39.495 --> 59:45.023 these laws outlawing genocide ideology, its 59:45.463 --> 59:48.427 recognition that it is a genocide of the 59:48.427 --> 59:52.051 the Tutsi, this memorialization of the genocide. 59:52.411 --> 59:55.334 These all, you know, institutionalize ethnicity 59:55.354 --> 59:57.656 and they all reflect the fear, the government's 59:57.696 --> 01:00:00.519 fear that ethnic extremism still exists somewhere 01:00:00.679 --> 01:00:03.021 inside Rwanda. So you can't really talk about 01:00:03.222 --> 01:00:06.205 outlawing it and trying to be kind of post-ethnic 01:00:06.325 --> 01:00:09.148 if you still fear that it is there. And then 01:00:09.188 --> 01:00:11.591 you can't lastly have strong independent 01:00:11.631 --> 01:00:14.715 institutions if you're going to control all 01:00:14.735 --> 01:00:17.598 of the appointments to government offices. 01:00:17.799 --> 01:00:21.143 It's not enough for the Rwandan government 01:00:21.163 --> 01:00:24.027 that you're competent, that you appoint individuals 01:00:24.047 --> 01:00:26.210 who are competent, you also have to be loyal. 01:00:27.170 --> 01:00:29.391 to the regime. And that, I think, is problematic. 01:00:29.431 --> 01:00:31.972 You can't really have independent institutions 01:00:32.352 --> 01:00:35.633 that can survive a change of political party, 01:00:36.013 --> 01:00:38.854 a turnover of government, if loyalty has 01:00:38.894 --> 01:00:41.695 been baked into the appointment process. 01:00:42.435 --> 01:00:44.597 So fundamentally I think there is this strategic 01:00:44.657 --> 01:00:47.639 contradiction at the heart of the securocratic 01:00:47.939 --> 01:00:50.741 state building model. It's that it emphasizes 01:00:50.821 --> 01:00:54.683 security at the expense of unity and that's 01:00:54.723 --> 01:00:56.705 why I don't think it's sustainable in the 01:00:56.765 --> 01:00:57.305 long run. 01:01:02.469 --> 01:01:05.651 As an academic studying genocide and armed 01:01:05.731 --> 01:01:09.013 conflict, what scares you the most? 01:01:10.914 --> 01:01:15.508 Well let me talk about genocide. I think 01:01:15.949 --> 01:01:20.959 two things that I worry about and these are 01:01:21.620 --> 01:01:25.819 first an under-appreciation of the effect, 01:01:25.899 --> 01:01:27.981 the long-term effect on the behavior of the 01:01:28.081 --> 01:01:30.963 victim group, once they are in power, if 01:01:31.003 --> 01:01:34.306 they come to power. And then the second is 01:01:34.346 --> 01:01:36.548 an under-appreciation again, but this time 01:01:36.608 --> 01:01:39.811 of the long-term impact on the behavior of 01:01:39.991 --> 01:01:41.993 the perpetrator and the bystander group. 01:01:42.033 --> 01:01:44.935 So it's about the long-term effects of genocide, 01:01:45.416 --> 01:01:48.118 underestimated or under-recognized long-term 01:01:48.158 --> 01:01:50.300 effects of them. And the two countries that 01:01:50.320 --> 01:01:54.595 I have in the back of my mind here are Rwanda 01:01:54.875 --> 01:02:00.138 and Israel, because the Tutsi and the Jews 01:02:00.678 --> 01:02:04.060 have similar experiences. They're not perfect 01:02:04.160 --> 01:02:06.381 parallels, but there are some similarities 01:02:06.461 --> 01:02:12.124 here. So both are people who have experienced 01:02:12.925 --> 01:02:16.820 persecution and exclusion, Both are people 01:02:16.920 --> 01:02:20.383 who have had to leave their homeland and 01:02:20.403 --> 01:02:23.805 become refugees. And both are people who 01:02:23.925 --> 01:02:27.688 have returned to their homeland and also 01:02:28.208 --> 01:02:31.651 ascended to power in their homeland as well. 01:02:31.691 --> 01:02:34.233 So they've come to rule in their homelands. 01:02:34.913 --> 01:02:39.426 And when I talk then about effect on the 01:02:39.486 --> 01:02:42.368 behavior of the victim group? Well, what 01:02:42.448 --> 01:02:47.972 I worry about is that we fail to recognize 01:02:48.092 --> 01:02:55.558 just how profoundly strong is the sense of 01:02:55.658 --> 01:02:59.521 victimhood among the victim group itself. 01:02:59.601 --> 01:03:02.724 So this sense of that we are always the victims 01:03:03.324 --> 01:03:07.628 of everything, very pronounced sense of victimization. 01:03:08.288 --> 01:03:11.331 I also think it makes the victim group very 01:03:11.531 --> 01:03:15.014 sensitive, hyper sensitive as well to criticism. 01:03:15.694 --> 01:03:19.057 And because it's motivated by this fear that 01:03:19.437 --> 01:03:23.000 we need to defend ourselves. And indeed, 01:03:23.020 --> 01:03:24.541 that's the third thing is that there is this 01:03:24.621 --> 01:03:29.766 willingness to always invoke their security 01:03:30.166 --> 01:03:33.228 fears or this need to defend themselves against 01:03:34.689 --> 01:03:38.812 an enemy out there. It's very strong. And 01:03:38.832 --> 01:03:42.773 it can lead then to extreme repression, to 01:03:42.833 --> 01:03:45.474 extreme actions to defend themselves, and 01:03:45.534 --> 01:03:49.215 so potentially to further wrongdoings, to 01:03:49.275 --> 01:03:52.576 further even atrocities. So I worry about 01:03:53.116 --> 01:03:55.697 not recognizing how victim groups, when they 01:03:55.737 --> 01:03:58.998 come to power, behave once they're in power. 01:03:59.078 --> 01:04:02.120 They have these They have this set of characteristics, 01:04:02.181 --> 01:04:05.384 I think, that could lead to further atrocities. 01:04:05.925 --> 01:04:09.148 And then from the perpetrator or bystander 01:04:09.308 --> 01:04:11.050 perspective, I think there were impacts on 01:04:11.090 --> 01:04:14.334 their behavior as well that we do not fully 01:04:14.995 --> 01:04:19.399 recognize. So I think the perspective is 01:04:19.540 --> 01:04:23.063 one of guilt and shame. for both perpetrators 01:04:23.183 --> 01:04:26.886 and bystanders, right? So in the case of 01:04:26.946 --> 01:04:29.508 the Jews, it would be Germany's very pronounced 01:04:29.548 --> 01:04:32.831 sense of public shame and remorse for the 01:04:32.871 --> 01:04:37.055 Holocaust and how that's impacted German 01:04:37.195 --> 01:04:40.377 foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel to make it 01:04:40.858 --> 01:04:44.381 so strongly an ally of Israel, potentially 01:04:44.421 --> 01:04:48.364 at the expense of preserving its own liberal 01:04:48.424 --> 01:04:54.055 values around liberal and moral values. And 01:04:54.075 --> 01:04:56.518 then with bystanders, so in the case of Rwanda, 01:04:56.538 --> 01:04:58.760 it would be the international community or 01:04:58.820 --> 01:05:02.323 external actors who failed to act and who 01:05:02.503 --> 01:05:07.068 let the genocide happen. So their guilt and 01:05:07.168 --> 01:05:10.431 shame enables the Rwandan government to do 01:05:10.511 --> 01:05:13.874 things because there's a unwillingness to 01:05:13.994 --> 01:05:17.558 speak out and criticize because, well, who 01:05:17.678 --> 01:05:19.720 are they to speak out and criticize? Because 01:05:19.780 --> 01:05:23.463 where were they in 1994? And it means then 01:05:23.543 --> 01:05:26.987 that the Rwandan government can get away 01:05:27.087 --> 01:05:30.210 with things that perhaps other governments 01:05:30.590 --> 01:05:33.833 could not. And then lastly, I would say this 01:05:33.873 --> 01:05:37.136 has a long-term impact in the other countries. 01:05:37.777 --> 01:05:39.818 So it could have an impact on civil liberties. 01:05:40.725 --> 01:05:44.432 and free speech. If you think about, take 01:05:44.452 --> 01:05:46.094 the case of Israel and what's happening at 01:05:46.134 --> 01:05:49.080 the moment, this overly expansive definition 01:05:49.140 --> 01:05:51.784 of anti-Semitism. Let me just take a sip 01:05:51.824 --> 01:05:56.069 of water. It's made it very difficult to 01:05:56.129 --> 01:05:58.971 have legitimate dissent on Israeli government 01:05:59.132 --> 01:06:04.677 policies. And it's led governments to outlaw 01:06:04.757 --> 01:06:08.201 criticism of Zionism. It's led to making 01:06:08.361 --> 01:06:12.125 even peaceful dissent difficult, outlawing 01:06:12.545 --> 01:06:14.988 boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns. 01:06:16.638 --> 01:06:19.919 France, for example, banned marches that 01:06:19.939 --> 01:06:22.099 are considered to be supportive of Palestinians. 01:06:22.559 --> 01:06:25.100 The UK has led to a redefinition of what 01:06:25.180 --> 01:06:28.341 is extremism in the UK. So I worry about 01:06:28.401 --> 01:06:30.761 also the impact on civil and political liberties 01:06:30.821 --> 01:06:34.342 in our own countries as well that are allies 01:06:34.462 --> 01:06:36.623 with these victim groups that have come to 01:06:36.683 --> 01:06:41.351 power. More generally, I think it reinforces 01:06:41.371 --> 01:06:44.192 a very strong sense of zero-sum thinking, 01:06:44.712 --> 01:06:48.854 them versus us, when victim groups come to 01:06:48.894 --> 01:06:52.395 power and see themselves only as victim groups 01:06:52.855 --> 01:06:55.136 and not as representative of something more. 01:07:00.618 --> 01:07:03.839 Finally, Omar, please advise our listeners 01:07:03.919 --> 01:07:06.060 where they may find your book, The Path to 01:07:06.080 --> 01:07:07.420 Genocide, in Rwanda. 01:07:08.778 --> 01:07:11.520 Sure. It's available on Amazon, and it's 01:07:11.560 --> 01:07:13.422 also available on the Cambridge University 01:07:13.982 --> 01:07:17.585 website as well, both in paperback and in 01:07:17.705 --> 01:07:20.308 hardback and as an e-book as well. 01:07:21.489 --> 01:07:24.471 Dr. Omar MacDoon, thank you very much for 01:07:24.511 --> 01:07:26.473 being a guest on this podcast. 01:07:27.554 --> 01:07:30.016 It was my pleasure, Stephen. Thanks for the 01:07:30.036 --> 01:07:30.516 invitation. 01:07:32.037 --> 01:07:34.680 This podcast was brought to you by the Kamgassa 01:07:34.800 --> 01:07:37.082 Challenge in partnership with Democracy in 01:07:37.202 --> 01:07:40.698 Africa. Democracy in Africa is a platform 01:07:40.738 --> 01:07:43.779 dedicated to building a bridge between academics, 01:07:44.419 --> 01:07:47.880 policymakers, practitioners and citizens. 01:07:48.980 --> 01:07:51.740 The third episode in the series is entitled 01:07:52.380 --> 01:07:55.621 Genocide. How to challenge identity politics 01:07:55.781 --> 01:07:59.021 in the 21st century. An interview with Dr 01:07:59.081 --> 01:08:02.562 Jochen Lingelbach, postdoctoral research 01:08:02.662 --> 01:08:05.703 assistant at the Chair of African History 01:08:06.363 --> 01:08:09.822 in the Cluster of Excellence. at the University 01:08:10.002 --> 01:08:13.644 of Bayreuth. The podcast will go live on 01:08:13.704 --> 01:08:19.027 June 10th, 2024. If you enjoyed this podcast, 01:08:19.547 --> 01:08:22.229 please support us by subscribing to Conversations 01:08:22.269 --> 01:08:24.830 with Stephen Kamgasser through your favorite 01:08:25.430 --> 01:08:28.592 podcast app. Thank you very much for taking 01:08:28.632 --> 01:08:31.734 the time to listen to this podcast. Until 01:08:31.774 --> 01:08:33.435 next time, goodbye.