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This episode is brought to you by the

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Marine Corps Association and Foundation.

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The Marine Corps wants marines at all levels

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to be able to make sound and timely

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decisions,

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And marines can hone their decision making capabilities

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by being put into situations that require them

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to think critically.

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One way that the Marine Corps Association supports

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this is by providing decision forcing cases.

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A decision forcing case is a decision making

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exercise that places participants

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in the roles of historical protagonists,

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who at some time in the past faced

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a particularly challenging problem.

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In that role, participants are asked to devise,

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deliver, defend, refine, and critique solutions to the

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scenario as the scenario moves forward in time,

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creating new problems and opportunities.

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DFCs allow marines to develop vicarious experience,

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develop decision making skills under pressure, and foster

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critical thinking and creative problem solving.

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This is one of the many ways MCA

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supports marines through an adult learning methodology.

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Learn more about our programs and support to

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marines at mca-marines.org/professional-development.

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That's

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mca-marines.org/professional-development.

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We would like to thank the Marine Corps

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Association and Foundation for sponsoring this episode.

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Hey, Scuttlebutt listeners. This is episode 196.

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This week, we welcome adjunct professor at Georgetown

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University,

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executive director for Battle Study Research Group, and

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author of the book Ground Combat, Puncturing the

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Myth of Modern War, doctor Ben Conable to

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the show.

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Ben is a retired marine intelligence and Middle

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East foreign area officer,

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was formerly a senior political scientist at the

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RAND Corporation,

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and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic

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Council.

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Ben talks to us about his experiences in

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uniform and as a foreign area officer,

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the impetus behind the writing of his book,

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and the empirical research he and his team

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at the Battle Research Group are doing to

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help improve

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the collective understanding of modern warfare.

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Ben speaks candidly and authoritatively,

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and it was fascinating to get his thoughts

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on the current course of military thinking.

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Here is episode 196.

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Hey, Scott O'Bart listeners. Thank you for joining

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us in your continued support. I'm Vic. I'm

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here with William. Howdy. And, we're really excited

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to be welcoming Ben Conable to the show.

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Sir, thank you so much for being here.

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Very happy to be here. Yeah. This is

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great.

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This was actually an easy yes for us

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for scheduling,

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because you came referred to us by Tom

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Schuman,

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friend of the show. And

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without even

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really looking into it, like, yeah, let's get

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let's get him on. And then

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looking at everything you've done, really excited

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to have you on,

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because

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of the not only your experience in the

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Marine Corps,

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going from, you know, enlisted to officer,

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places you've been

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extremely pivotal, not only in Marine Corps history,

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but geopolitical,

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the landscape as we see it now.

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But also you've got this book coming out.

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You seem like a real

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freethinker

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seems a little trite,

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but you're not afraid to oppose sort of

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conventional thinking.

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And so really

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excited to kind of dive into a lot

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of that,

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really critical thinking about

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a lot of the axioms and and the

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cultures that we assume are ubiquitous

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throughout time. So,

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yeah. Again, thank you so much for coming

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down, Battling Traffic, and and being here with

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us today. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I I I

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I prefer, professionally blunt. Yeah. For sure. Yeah.

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Yes. Right. That's right. You can work with

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that. Yeah. That,

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it it doesn't do well for retweets. But

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yeah. You're Yeah. No.

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Well, really quick. So just,

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to sort of level the playing field on

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who doctor Ben Conable is, your, adjunct professor

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professor at, Georgetown University

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security studies program,

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also part time principal research scientist at the

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Center for Naval Analyses

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and a senior research adviser at the DT

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Institute here in DC,

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a retired Marine Corps intelligence officer,

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a Middle East, North African Foreign Area Officer.

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And,

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in,

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o six and o nine,

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you co led the Marine Corps culture intelligence

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program, which I think is an empty building

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now, but I Kayokel,

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correct,

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is what we we've known for us

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gray beards. So it would have been Kayokel.

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Is that right? So I was a plank

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holder for Kayokel. I was the cultural intel

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program lead with marine corps intelligence activity. Oh,

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okay. But, yeah, Kayokel

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Yeah. I think it's I think that was

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the pronunciation. Terrible

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accuracy. Yeah. Yeah. But, yeah, they're they're now

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defunct. Yeah. Yeah. Which is just awful.

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We had had talked, I think, with, Colonel

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Woodbridge, our, editor in chief last time he

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was on the show

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about, sort of some of the programs that

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really seem to be leaning into,

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at least a cultural understanding, you know, signing

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officers out of TBS regions. They had to,

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you know, sort of show proficiency in throughout

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their careers. That has gone away.

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And it it seems like we've sort of

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laid the groundwork for this, oh, shit moment

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where we're gonna, like, oh, I wish we

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had some cultural area people or regional

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expertise. We should

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talking standing forces,

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and,

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you know, sort of alone and unafraid,

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immersed within these cultures as we try to,

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you know, battle near peer.

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That stuff, it's gonna be like, wow. I

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really wish we had some cultural expertise out

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there that we had started at a younger,

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you know, younger age or whatever. But, anyhow,

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so, obviously, you've got the pedigree.

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Really excited to dive in,

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on all of your experiences, DLI,

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sort of talent management,

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and then your book, Ground Combat and all

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of the, like you said, sort of

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unpacking a lot of the assumptions that we

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assume about character war, nature

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war, and this sort

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of chasing the bright blue you know, the

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bright light all the time. Like, oh, drones

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and tech and

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some of the things. We were talking before

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we came in.

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I was taking the quiz that's on your

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website.

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You're not doing very well on it. So

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I think you're gonna learn us all something

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today. So,

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really long way of leading into

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what was your,

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experience pre marine corps? Like, why the marine

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corps? Was it,

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you saw, like,

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the marine ethos was just calling to you,

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or was it like, I could do this

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or

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go work at

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I am I am the greatest,

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recruiting office sucker story, you know, poster child.

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They could probably actually put me on a

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poster with a picture of me looking at

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those little tiles. Yeah. The benefit tags. Oh,

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that's right. So I walked I knew I

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wanted to serve and I I, I just,

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you know, was like, the heck with it

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and went down to the recruiting station.

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What area was this? New York. Okay. Yeah.

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I dropped out of college, went to the

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recruiting center, and,

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you know, I went to the army and

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they're like, oh, we can get you, you

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know,

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money for college and that kind of stuff.

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I walked by the navy guy and, you

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know, he didn't look it just wasn't impressive

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to me, and I'll keep it that way.

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And then I went to the marine

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recruiter's office and he looked up and he

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just couldn't have cared less that I was

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there. At least did a really good job

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of convincing me of that. Yeah. Yeah. And,

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what are you doing here? And then threw

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the tiles out. And if you've never done

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those tiles before, it's

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what matters most to you, and it's honor

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and service,

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and then money is there too. And so

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I stacked them all up and put, of

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course, honor and service. Yeah. Yeah. And money

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last, and he did a pause very dramatic

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and stared at me and said, you're exactly

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what we're looking for. And that was it.

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I was hooked, you know, immediately. Of course,

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I I I'm sure that was what rehearsed.

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Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No. That's great. Yeah. I

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they sort of they did the

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the counter thing for me when I same

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thing.

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Look in what I wanna do. Everybody's offering

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me, you know, special forces, money for college,

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whatever. And then the oh so was like,

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I don't know if we could get you

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in. Like, we're kinda stacked up right now.

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I was like, oh, yeah, motherfucker. Let's watch

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this.

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Hold my beer. Yeah.

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So,

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so then you you sign up and, if

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I Celestia, you're a machine gunner. Is that

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right? You went you went o three? I

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did. Yeah.

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You know, I was probably the worst machine

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gunner in the marine corps because I came

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out of Barrack City. I was at the

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camp Camp David. Okay. Yeah. Ethan and I,

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for my first tour. It was that was

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really interesting because it was right in the

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middle of the crack, epidemic in the late

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eighties. Okay. And we were doing security on

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the streets in Southeast DC. About to say

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Southeast DC. That's a Tight crew there,

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of marines from Eighth And Ninth, Camp David.

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I'm still in close contact with a lot

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of them.

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That was from the late eighties.

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Then I went out to 39,

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when I was, you know, I was like

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a barracks corporal, and so, yeah, I got

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deservedly got no respect.

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And and, I was in the Gulf War

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though in in with three nine Okay. Task

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force papa bear. I got to

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the I was in colonel then then lieutenant

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Frank Donovan, now lieutenant general Frank Donovan's platoon,

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and it was he was, he was terrific.

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Some really solid marines, and, you know, we

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did our job. And is that where you're

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sort of, like,

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like, were you reading the tea leaves of

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as far as, like, your the marines involvement

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in The Middle East?

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Is that what led you to that or

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no? It was just, like, I Give me

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the hell out of here. 19 year old

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knucklehead.

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You know, I think I was maybe 20

269
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by the time I went out there. I

270
00:10:33,205 --> 00:10:35,284
mean, it was no. I was just along

271
00:10:35,284 --> 00:10:37,365
for the ride. And I volunteered. It was

272
00:10:37,365 --> 00:10:38,804
it was kind of a funny story. I

273
00:10:38,804 --> 00:10:39,899
was actually I had orders

274
00:10:40,460 --> 00:10:42,139
to two nine and back then a corporal

275
00:10:42,139 --> 00:10:43,580
would tell you where you were going. You

276
00:10:43,580 --> 00:10:45,259
know, you would check-in. It was all paperwork.

277
00:10:45,259 --> 00:10:46,700
Yeah. And he said, well, where you're going

278
00:10:46,700 --> 00:10:48,399
to 29. I go, well, but I'm a

279
00:10:48,620 --> 00:10:49,920
I had gone to an,

280
00:10:50,300 --> 00:10:53,019
chemical biological defense course at Camp David and

281
00:10:53,019 --> 00:10:54,379
they go, oh, well, we're gonna need you

282
00:10:54,379 --> 00:10:56,325
and he just immediately switched my orders right

283
00:10:56,325 --> 00:10:58,245
then and there. 29 was the only battalion

284
00:10:58,245 --> 00:10:59,865
that didn't deploy if I remember correctly.

285
00:11:00,485 --> 00:11:02,965
Okay. Well, they have good choice then. Right?

286
00:11:02,965 --> 00:11:05,065
Yeah. Yeah. So then you went MECEP

287
00:11:05,524 --> 00:11:07,365
directly after? Is that I did. Sort of

288
00:11:07,365 --> 00:11:07,945
the promotion?

289
00:11:08,519 --> 00:11:11,399
Yeah. And, that that is a terrific program.

290
00:11:11,399 --> 00:11:14,700
It's a marine enlisted commissioning education program, basically

291
00:11:14,759 --> 00:11:16,840
NCO to officer. Yeah. And I went to

292
00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:17,980
the University of Colorado.

293
00:11:18,840 --> 00:11:21,955
But I I will credit my experience even

294
00:11:21,955 --> 00:11:23,495
as a kind of a crappy NCO,

295
00:11:24,115 --> 00:11:26,355
to giving me the mindset that you alluded

296
00:11:26,355 --> 00:11:27,875
to at the beginning of the podcast, which

297
00:11:27,875 --> 00:11:30,514
is, you know, this be blunt and be

298
00:11:30,514 --> 00:11:31,014
straightforward.

299
00:11:31,715 --> 00:11:34,035
Be critical. Don't be afraid to speak your

300
00:11:34,035 --> 00:11:36,120
mind. But if you if you do speak

301
00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:37,819
your mind, have a plan Mhmm.

302
00:11:38,440 --> 00:11:40,919
Of action to to make up for it.

303
00:11:40,919 --> 00:11:42,620
So, you know, have a recommendation.

304
00:11:43,720 --> 00:11:45,000
And as long as you come in with

305
00:11:45,000 --> 00:11:47,079
a recommendation, as long as you're professional, then

306
00:11:47,079 --> 00:11:49,159
you're doing the right thing. And so I

307
00:11:49,159 --> 00:11:51,754
carried that with me through the MECEP program,

308
00:11:52,134 --> 00:11:54,875
into into my time as an officer. Okay.

309
00:11:55,174 --> 00:11:57,174
Nice. Yeah. And and just for those who

310
00:11:57,174 --> 00:12:00,554
aren't aware, the MECEP program is an opportunity

311
00:12:00,774 --> 00:12:01,274
for

312
00:12:02,294 --> 00:12:03,274
enlisted marines,

313
00:12:04,375 --> 00:12:04,875
to

314
00:12:05,940 --> 00:12:06,679
be awarded

315
00:12:06,980 --> 00:12:07,960
essentially a

316
00:12:08,419 --> 00:12:08,919
college

317
00:12:09,379 --> 00:12:09,879
scholarship

318
00:12:10,259 --> 00:12:10,759
with

319
00:12:11,620 --> 00:12:14,600
stipend for housing and and food, BRCBAH,

320
00:12:16,179 --> 00:12:18,740
and non competitive promotion while you're in the

321
00:12:18,740 --> 00:12:19,240
program

322
00:12:19,735 --> 00:12:21,595
with a payback tour. Obviously,

323
00:12:22,294 --> 00:12:23,174
once you're through,

324
00:12:23,894 --> 00:12:25,575
if I had known about this as a

325
00:12:25,575 --> 00:12:27,415
young man, I probably wouldn't have gone to

326
00:12:27,415 --> 00:12:28,715
college. It's such a

327
00:12:29,095 --> 00:12:29,595
fantastic

328
00:12:30,455 --> 00:12:32,460
thing. And I encouraged when I was a

329
00:12:32,860 --> 00:12:35,440
platoon commander, company commander, or even battalion XL,

330
00:12:35,820 --> 00:12:37,820
like, let's use because in a lot of

331
00:12:37,820 --> 00:12:39,200
ways, the the

332
00:12:40,139 --> 00:12:42,379
the screening process is really can you get

333
00:12:42,379 --> 00:12:44,700
the package together. Like, that's where you get

334
00:12:44,700 --> 00:12:45,759
most of your attrition.

335
00:12:46,139 --> 00:12:48,524
And especially now, there's so many universities

336
00:12:48,825 --> 00:12:50,044
offering this program.

337
00:12:51,065 --> 00:12:53,084
Yeah, if if you're listening and and

338
00:12:53,464 --> 00:12:55,705
you're considering college, you feel like you have

339
00:12:55,705 --> 00:12:56,825
to get out of the Marine Corps to

340
00:12:56,825 --> 00:12:59,144
do it, you do not look into MICEP.

341
00:12:59,144 --> 00:13:02,440
It's an unbelievable, unbelievable program. Yeah. I agree.

342
00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:04,220
I can't say enough about it. Yeah.

343
00:13:04,919 --> 00:13:06,059
So great. So then,

344
00:13:07,399 --> 00:13:09,740
Intel then. So you go to TBS

345
00:13:10,120 --> 00:13:12,919
quality thirds. Was it Oh, no. I I

346
00:13:12,919 --> 00:13:13,879
I wound up getting,

347
00:13:14,600 --> 00:13:16,519
military police because I was I think I

348
00:13:16,519 --> 00:13:17,534
was I was, like,

349
00:13:18,095 --> 00:13:20,495
aiming squarely at the bottom of the top

350
00:13:20,495 --> 00:13:22,414
third. Yes. That's right. And I was, you

351
00:13:22,414 --> 00:13:24,815
know, terrified. Top of the bottom, actually. Yeah.

352
00:13:24,815 --> 00:13:25,794
I had, like, this

353
00:13:27,054 --> 00:13:28,995
kernel of fear that I was gonna be

354
00:13:29,054 --> 00:13:30,929
put into an MOS that I definitely did

355
00:13:30,929 --> 00:13:33,034
not want. I won't list any of those,

356
00:13:33,034 --> 00:13:35,138
but you you all know who you are.

357
00:13:35,138 --> 00:13:37,506
And, so there were only two ways out,

358
00:13:37,506 --> 00:13:39,610
Intel and MP. And because I had been,

359
00:13:39,873 --> 00:13:42,504
Ethan and I Okay. And he was a

360
00:13:42,504 --> 00:13:44,608
possibility. So I actually was a military police

361
00:13:44,608 --> 00:13:47,375
officer for, for my first tour. Okay. Lap

362
00:13:47,375 --> 00:13:49,134
moved then into Intel? Is that I lap

363
00:13:49,134 --> 00:13:51,554
moved later. Yeah. Mhmm. Very cool. And then,

364
00:13:52,174 --> 00:13:54,355
once you're in that pipeline, then DLI

365
00:13:54,654 --> 00:13:57,695
followed suit? Or I I simultaneously applied for

366
00:13:57,695 --> 00:14:00,710
the foreign area officer program fail and a

367
00:14:00,710 --> 00:14:02,470
lat move into intel, and I got both

368
00:14:02,470 --> 00:14:04,550
approved at the same time Oh, wow. Coming

369
00:14:04,550 --> 00:14:06,230
out of a tour in Okinawa, where I

370
00:14:06,230 --> 00:14:07,670
had been lucky to be on the fourth

371
00:14:07,670 --> 00:14:10,470
marine staff, which was amazing, you know, just

372
00:14:10,470 --> 00:14:12,790
kind of full immersion into the Pacific Theater

373
00:14:12,950 --> 00:14:14,835
Yeah. Yeah. Life. Interesting.

374
00:14:15,215 --> 00:14:17,535
So yeah. So the this old these thing

375
00:14:17,615 --> 00:14:18,975
these cards just sort of fell on a

376
00:14:18,975 --> 00:14:21,634
place then. It wasn't sort of premeditated like,

377
00:14:22,095 --> 00:14:24,035
hey. I've been I had no no premeditation

378
00:14:24,335 --> 00:14:25,855
for anything in my life. And so this

379
00:14:25,855 --> 00:14:27,389
is one of the things I I tell

380
00:14:27,549 --> 00:14:29,809
students and people that I I sometimes mentor

381
00:14:29,870 --> 00:14:31,330
now as an older guy.

382
00:14:32,029 --> 00:14:33,990
You just sink yourself into whatever's in front

383
00:14:33,990 --> 00:14:36,429
of you, with a fanaticism. You know, you

384
00:14:36,429 --> 00:14:37,250
just drive

385
00:14:37,629 --> 00:14:38,129
completely

386
00:14:38,670 --> 00:14:41,044
drive yourself into the deck, you know, focused

387
00:14:41,044 --> 00:14:42,324
on the thing right in front of you

388
00:14:42,324 --> 00:14:44,804
and and commit fully to the organization that

389
00:14:44,804 --> 00:14:46,404
you're with now. And don't worry about what

390
00:14:46,404 --> 00:14:48,725
comes next. Because if you do if you

391
00:14:48,725 --> 00:14:50,964
do the right thing in the present, it

392
00:14:51,044 --> 00:14:53,365
it'll all pay off. Yeah. So No. That's

393
00:14:53,365 --> 00:14:55,784
great words. I I kinda yeah. I

394
00:14:56,360 --> 00:14:57,339
had this really,

395
00:14:58,120 --> 00:15:01,159
horrible characteristic of always looking at the like,

396
00:15:01,159 --> 00:15:04,440
what's next even while I'm still learning what

397
00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:06,120
the hell it is I'm doing. I'm already,

398
00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:07,659
like, thinking about what's next.

399
00:15:08,205 --> 00:15:10,285
So yeah. No. That's great. ADHD helps with

400
00:15:10,285 --> 00:15:10,785
that.

401
00:15:13,965 --> 00:15:15,884
And then so as your experience as a

402
00:15:15,884 --> 00:15:16,845
foreign area officer,

403
00:15:17,644 --> 00:15:18,785
I wanna say that,

404
00:15:19,165 --> 00:15:20,845
and I might be jumping ahead to your

405
00:15:20,845 --> 00:15:21,904
career, but you were

406
00:15:22,690 --> 00:15:23,129
the,

407
00:15:23,570 --> 00:15:24,070
attache

408
00:15:24,450 --> 00:15:26,370
in Jordan? Yeah. I was jumping ahead. So

409
00:15:26,370 --> 00:15:27,090
I I did,

410
00:15:27,889 --> 00:15:29,810
I I went to Naval Postgraduate School, got

411
00:15:29,810 --> 00:15:32,070
my degree, got my language training at DLI,

412
00:15:32,690 --> 00:15:33,670
went to Cairo,

413
00:15:34,290 --> 00:15:36,129
for a year, traveled around The Middle East,

414
00:15:36,129 --> 00:15:37,634
which is great. So that's the

415
00:15:38,035 --> 00:15:39,095
phase. Pre nine eleven?

416
00:15:39,554 --> 00:15:41,154
That was nine eleven happened while I was

417
00:15:41,154 --> 00:15:43,475
at Arabic language. Oh, wow. Okay. So it

418
00:15:43,475 --> 00:15:45,095
was a bit of a How was that,

419
00:15:45,315 --> 00:15:47,575
actually? Like yeah. How was like,

420
00:15:47,955 --> 00:15:49,495
is this one of these, like,

421
00:15:50,079 --> 00:15:52,000
oh, shit. This is now I get granted

422
00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:53,919
you're already of a combat vet, but, I

423
00:15:53,919 --> 00:15:54,419
mean,

424
00:15:55,679 --> 00:15:57,940
I for me, 09/11,

425
00:15:58,159 --> 00:16:00,500
because I came in through the Clinton era,

426
00:16:01,279 --> 00:16:04,179
was not something that was, like, quite literally

427
00:16:04,559 --> 00:16:05,379
on the radar.

428
00:16:05,904 --> 00:16:07,205
Yep. So it was very

429
00:16:07,585 --> 00:16:08,804
shocking, and

430
00:16:09,745 --> 00:16:11,845
things got very real very quickly.

431
00:16:12,464 --> 00:16:14,485
You being at DLI as

432
00:16:15,105 --> 00:16:17,264
a as a Middle East you know, future

433
00:16:17,264 --> 00:16:19,125
Middle East fail and Arabic

434
00:16:19,709 --> 00:16:20,209
student.

435
00:16:20,990 --> 00:16:22,789
What was that like for you? Like, were

436
00:16:22,789 --> 00:16:24,189
you just like, my business is about to

437
00:16:24,189 --> 00:16:25,709
get a lot busier. Yeah. Yeah. No. We

438
00:16:25,709 --> 00:16:26,990
all were. I mean, because I was in

439
00:16:26,990 --> 00:16:28,289
the Arab Arabic,

440
00:16:28,990 --> 00:16:30,750
you know, cohort there. Yeah. And, you know,

441
00:16:30,750 --> 00:16:32,029
we had a lot of young students in

442
00:16:32,029 --> 00:16:33,945
there, and we had some conversations with, like,

443
00:16:33,945 --> 00:16:35,705
this is it. We're very clearly going to

444
00:16:35,705 --> 00:16:37,945
war now. Yeah. Everybody immediately knew that we

445
00:16:37,945 --> 00:16:39,325
were we were going to war.

446
00:16:39,945 --> 00:16:41,865
The base, you know, there was even concern

447
00:16:41,865 --> 00:16:43,625
all the way out in Monterey, California that

448
00:16:43,625 --> 00:16:45,144
we're gonna get attacked, which, you know, in

449
00:16:45,144 --> 00:16:47,225
retrospect, it's a little bit silly, but the

450
00:16:47,225 --> 00:16:48,764
feeling was very real. Mhmm.

451
00:16:49,399 --> 00:16:51,559
And, you know, we transitioned to a wartime

452
00:16:51,559 --> 00:16:53,820
footing almost almost, on a dime.

453
00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:56,680
Jeez. Yeah. I can only imagine. So alright.

454
00:16:56,680 --> 00:16:58,360
So, yeah, so now you're in the middle

455
00:16:58,519 --> 00:16:59,580
you're in Egypt?

456
00:17:00,200 --> 00:17:01,574
Sort of. Egypt,

457
00:17:02,034 --> 00:17:04,434
and then I went back to headquarters Marine

458
00:17:04,434 --> 00:17:05,654
Corps as an intel officer,

459
00:17:06,595 --> 00:17:08,835
and was at was a Middle East Desk

460
00:17:08,835 --> 00:17:10,994
Officer there at headquarters Marine Corps. And then

461
00:17:10,994 --> 00:17:12,914
I just volunteered to deploy one time after

462
00:17:12,914 --> 00:17:13,894
another Okay.

463
00:17:14,275 --> 00:17:16,330
Into into Iraq. And I got to do

464
00:17:16,330 --> 00:17:19,390
the march up, with the division forward

465
00:17:19,769 --> 00:17:22,750
command post and then I returned into Anbar,

466
00:17:22,970 --> 00:17:25,369
with general Mattis as his cultural advisor and

467
00:17:25,369 --> 00:17:27,549
as an intel ops officer with general

468
00:17:28,170 --> 00:17:30,190
then lieutenant colonel Gruen, retired

469
00:17:30,805 --> 00:17:31,865
three star now.

470
00:17:32,644 --> 00:17:34,325
And then my last tour, I was the

471
00:17:34,325 --> 00:17:36,744
senior intel officer in Anbar Province,

472
00:17:37,125 --> 00:17:39,545
working for Pete Devlin. What year was that?

473
00:17:40,164 --> 00:17:42,984
So I invasion o three, then o four

474
00:17:43,045 --> 00:17:43,945
for the

475
00:17:44,630 --> 00:17:46,710
the Anbar tour sort of right there. Was

476
00:17:46,710 --> 00:17:49,110
that Flusia Ramadi? Yeah. Okay. I was in

477
00:17:49,190 --> 00:17:50,890
I was at Camp Blue Diamond in Ramadi.

478
00:17:51,190 --> 00:17:51,750
And then,

479
00:17:52,470 --> 00:17:54,710
in o five, o '6, I was back

480
00:17:54,710 --> 00:17:56,710
as the Intel I'll start with Ramadi in

481
00:17:56,710 --> 00:17:58,630
Flusia then. Okay. Yeah. Wow. They really you've

482
00:17:58,630 --> 00:18:01,115
really wrecked and stacked it. Yeah. Yeah. What

483
00:18:01,115 --> 00:18:02,494
was it like in Egypt,

484
00:18:03,274 --> 00:18:04,414
post nine eleven?

485
00:18:04,714 --> 00:18:07,034
I've really never talked to anyone who was

486
00:18:07,034 --> 00:18:09,674
in that area. Like, what were the

487
00:18:10,315 --> 00:18:12,954
I guess, what were our ally regional allies?

488
00:18:12,954 --> 00:18:14,894
Like, how was what was the fuel?

489
00:18:16,019 --> 00:18:16,519
Stunned,

490
00:18:16,900 --> 00:18:18,420
I think, would be the right term. I

491
00:18:18,420 --> 00:18:19,940
mean, it was it was vacant. I mean,

492
00:18:19,940 --> 00:18:21,539
this is a this is a part of

493
00:18:21,539 --> 00:18:24,019
the world that thrives on tourism. Yeah. And

494
00:18:24,019 --> 00:18:26,340
so Egypt, Jordan, all the countries that I

495
00:18:26,340 --> 00:18:28,660
was traveling to had this huge tourism deficit.

496
00:18:28,660 --> 00:18:29,460
I mean, I went I went to the

497
00:18:29,460 --> 00:18:30,359
Valley Of Kings,

498
00:18:30,704 --> 00:18:32,144
and I was the only one there. I

499
00:18:32,144 --> 00:18:34,144
went to, you know, every every place I

500
00:18:34,144 --> 00:18:35,585
went, it was like I had the whole

501
00:18:35,585 --> 00:18:36,964
the whole world to myself.

502
00:18:37,424 --> 00:18:38,484
So as a tourist,

503
00:18:39,505 --> 00:18:41,105
which was part of my job to go

504
00:18:41,105 --> 00:18:42,005
travel around,

505
00:18:42,875 --> 00:18:45,069
was it was fantastic, but it was terrible

506
00:18:45,069 --> 00:18:47,150
for their economies. I mean, they probably still

507
00:18:47,150 --> 00:18:48,349
haven't recovered from it.

508
00:18:48,829 --> 00:18:49,650
And psychologically,

509
00:18:50,990 --> 00:18:52,769
I you know, this is an important thing

510
00:18:52,990 --> 00:18:54,750
to keep in mind as we deal with

511
00:18:54,750 --> 00:18:57,630
the Canadians and Europeans and Mexicans now,

512
00:18:59,125 --> 00:19:01,704
is that in my experience historically,

513
00:19:02,644 --> 00:19:05,444
also I think in literature, if you engage

514
00:19:05,444 --> 00:19:07,525
with people directly point to point, they'll tell

515
00:19:07,525 --> 00:19:09,704
you, look, I have no issue with you.

516
00:19:10,085 --> 00:19:11,065
It's your government.

517
00:19:11,470 --> 00:19:13,950
That was the same mindset after 09:11 as

518
00:19:13,950 --> 00:19:14,769
well. Okay.

519
00:19:15,150 --> 00:19:17,470
Was there you know, because one of the

520
00:19:17,470 --> 00:19:19,570
really salacious things that,

521
00:19:21,549 --> 00:19:23,570
media outlets were doing here

522
00:19:24,029 --> 00:19:24,769
were showing

523
00:19:25,785 --> 00:19:28,025
sort of the Arab. And I use air

524
00:19:28,025 --> 00:19:29,705
quotes for because you can't see what I'm

525
00:19:29,705 --> 00:19:32,585
doing. But the and I I put Arab

526
00:19:32,585 --> 00:19:33,725
in air quotes because

527
00:19:34,105 --> 00:19:36,025
the media at that time sort of portrayed

528
00:19:36,025 --> 00:19:39,240
anybody who was brown and not from South

529
00:19:39,240 --> 00:19:41,080
America as Arab. Right.

530
00:19:41,799 --> 00:19:43,880
And so they were showing sort of the

531
00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:46,119
Arab response in at eleven. Of course, it

532
00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:46,859
was the

533
00:19:47,240 --> 00:19:47,740
most

534
00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:49,340
sort of

535
00:19:51,044 --> 00:19:51,544
flag

536
00:19:51,845 --> 00:19:55,144
rallying sort of depictions. What was your experience?

537
00:19:56,404 --> 00:19:58,504
Because I've heard from folks who,

538
00:19:59,845 --> 00:20:01,845
you know, that there was actually a a

539
00:20:01,845 --> 00:20:03,464
really a a sense of

540
00:20:04,420 --> 00:20:06,900
of sadness and for you know, being really

541
00:20:06,900 --> 00:20:10,019
forlorn over the thing, kind of already understanding

542
00:20:10,019 --> 00:20:11,619
what the response is going to be like

543
00:20:11,619 --> 00:20:13,779
and what its effect on their lives are

544
00:20:13,779 --> 00:20:15,859
gonna That's a better description. Yeah. Look, I

545
00:20:15,859 --> 00:20:16,575
mean, it's

546
00:20:17,054 --> 00:20:19,934
it's average people. It's normal people going about

547
00:20:19,934 --> 00:20:20,914
their daily lives.

548
00:20:21,855 --> 00:20:24,014
They don't walk around for the most part

549
00:20:24,014 --> 00:20:24,514
harboring

550
00:20:25,134 --> 00:20:26,994
animosity and screaming

551
00:20:27,375 --> 00:20:29,454
into cameras. I mean, that's Yeah. That's a

552
00:20:29,454 --> 00:20:31,214
soda straw view, and it's a very select

553
00:20:31,214 --> 00:20:33,140
one too. No. I didn't experience any of

554
00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:35,539
that. Yeah. It's fascinating stuff.

555
00:20:37,279 --> 00:20:39,279
Okay. And then so then, you leave the

556
00:20:39,279 --> 00:20:41,359
marine corps, and then that's you and then

557
00:20:41,440 --> 00:20:42,400
oh. Well, then I did

558
00:20:43,599 --> 00:20:45,779
so my last, couple tours, I was

559
00:20:46,714 --> 00:20:49,134
at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity here on Quantico,

560
00:20:49,434 --> 00:20:51,355
which was great. I I really enjoyed it.

561
00:20:51,515 --> 00:20:53,115
Great learning experience. I got to work with

562
00:20:53,115 --> 00:20:55,914
some incredibly smart folks. And then my last

563
00:20:55,914 --> 00:20:56,414
tour,

564
00:20:56,795 --> 00:20:58,714
I I was in Natache, which was also

565
00:20:58,714 --> 00:20:59,994
terrific. That was incredible. I mean, I had

566
00:20:59,994 --> 00:21:02,234
one great tour after another. Yeah. And then,

567
00:21:02,450 --> 00:21:03,970
yeah. Well, I was at the embassy in

568
00:21:03,970 --> 00:21:05,410
Algiers for a little bit, and then I

569
00:21:05,410 --> 00:21:07,410
went to Amman, Jordan for eighteen months as

570
00:21:07,410 --> 00:21:09,170
a marine and naval attache. And that's how

571
00:21:09,170 --> 00:21:11,730
I closed out my career. Yeah. You know,

572
00:21:11,730 --> 00:21:13,890
I can't say enough. My all of my

573
00:21:13,890 --> 00:21:16,609
experience with the Jordanians has been just absolutely

574
00:21:16,609 --> 00:21:17,825
outstanding. You

575
00:21:19,164 --> 00:21:21,825
know, obviously, they were just an absolute

576
00:21:22,524 --> 00:21:23,345
key ally,

577
00:21:24,444 --> 00:21:27,164
during the long war, especially, you know, with

578
00:21:27,164 --> 00:21:29,024
us. And and I was out

579
00:21:29,404 --> 00:21:31,184
in even though I was in

580
00:21:31,644 --> 00:21:33,024
Anbar sort of

581
00:21:33,590 --> 00:21:37,529
along Wadi Heron there at, Wuhayat, we still,

582
00:21:38,070 --> 00:21:39,369
had a lot of interactions

583
00:21:39,750 --> 00:21:43,430
out west in just the Jordanian intelligence and

584
00:21:43,430 --> 00:21:44,650
stuff that they we were

585
00:21:45,029 --> 00:21:47,454
they were feeding us and cooperation we had,

586
00:21:47,454 --> 00:21:49,134
like a KV and all kinds of stuff.

587
00:21:49,134 --> 00:21:50,194
It was just unbelievable.

588
00:21:51,375 --> 00:21:53,534
And then I worked with some Jordanians when

589
00:21:53,534 --> 00:21:55,875
I was in UAE as well and just

590
00:21:56,095 --> 00:21:58,815
I can't say enough about that partnership and

591
00:21:58,815 --> 00:22:01,134
and everything that they did enabling us to

592
00:22:01,134 --> 00:22:03,559
do our mission. So They're real professionals, and

593
00:22:03,559 --> 00:22:05,160
I still count a lot of them as

594
00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:07,500
very close friends. I go back frequently.

595
00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:10,039
Still stay heavily engaged in that area and

596
00:22:10,039 --> 00:22:11,340
also in Iraq too.

597
00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:13,559
But I may or may not have crossed

598
00:22:13,559 --> 00:22:15,400
over the border at one point. Isn't that

599
00:22:15,400 --> 00:22:17,400
tache to say hi to some marine friends

600
00:22:17,400 --> 00:22:19,355
on the other side. Nice. Yeah. That was

601
00:22:19,355 --> 00:22:21,274
fun. If it happened, it may not happen.

602
00:22:21,274 --> 00:22:23,034
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. But there was a

603
00:22:23,034 --> 00:22:25,755
really sharp colonel on the Jordanian side working

604
00:22:25,755 --> 00:22:27,674
that border in a very tense time, and

605
00:22:27,674 --> 00:22:29,034
I know there was a lot of great

606
00:22:29,034 --> 00:22:31,349
support there. Great. That's that's so cool. So

607
00:22:31,429 --> 00:22:33,029
how do you transition from the Marine Corps

608
00:22:33,029 --> 00:22:34,809
and then to academia? Terribly.

609
00:22:37,109 --> 00:22:39,029
I had no plan, even though I had

610
00:22:39,029 --> 00:22:40,869
a family, my wife and a kid on

611
00:22:40,869 --> 00:22:42,809
the way. I'd I'd really I

612
00:22:43,190 --> 00:22:45,049
did what I always done, which is

613
00:22:45,424 --> 00:22:48,005
ADHD committed myself to the job at hand.

614
00:22:48,464 --> 00:22:50,544
And, I will tell you, if you're retiring,

615
00:22:50,544 --> 00:22:51,845
don't ever do it from overseas.

616
00:22:52,384 --> 00:22:54,325
Yeah. Really, really challenging

617
00:22:54,625 --> 00:22:55,924
to do it. Does UAE

618
00:22:56,384 --> 00:22:59,309
and FifthMed was my Yeah. Really brutal. But

619
00:22:59,309 --> 00:23:00,750
I got I got really lucky. I I

620
00:23:00,750 --> 00:23:02,990
was asked to speak at a workshop on

621
00:23:02,990 --> 00:23:03,970
Anbar Province,

622
00:23:04,269 --> 00:23:06,190
with Ray Gerber. Some of the listeners may

623
00:23:06,190 --> 00:23:07,089
know who Ray is.

624
00:23:07,710 --> 00:23:09,549
And just so happened there's a guy from

625
00:23:09,549 --> 00:23:12,029
the Rand Corporation there, and he was listening

626
00:23:12,029 --> 00:23:13,845
to me talk about Anbar, which was, you

627
00:23:13,845 --> 00:23:15,464
know, one of my areas of expertise.

628
00:23:15,765 --> 00:23:16,884
And he said, what are you doing? And

629
00:23:16,884 --> 00:23:18,484
I said, I don't have a plan. He

630
00:23:18,484 --> 00:23:20,085
goes, send me your CV. And two days

631
00:23:20,085 --> 00:23:22,105
later, I had a job at Rand. Wow.

632
00:23:22,404 --> 00:23:24,404
Yeah. It was amazing. That was really amazing.

633
00:23:24,404 --> 00:23:26,005
And that that that went on to be

634
00:23:26,005 --> 00:23:27,539
a terrific experience as well.

635
00:23:27,940 --> 00:23:30,420
And then, you're still focusing in The Middle

636
00:23:30,420 --> 00:23:31,880
East then through Rand,

637
00:23:32,740 --> 00:23:33,880
or Diversified.

638
00:23:34,259 --> 00:23:36,180
I mean, Rand one of the great things

639
00:23:36,180 --> 00:23:38,580
about Rand so if any if anybody's unfamiliar

640
00:23:38,580 --> 00:23:40,740
with it, it's a federally it has within

641
00:23:40,740 --> 00:23:42,519
it federally funded research

642
00:23:42,924 --> 00:23:44,065
and development centers,

643
00:23:44,684 --> 00:23:46,765
which are kind of like half government, half

644
00:23:46,765 --> 00:23:47,265
private,

645
00:23:48,285 --> 00:23:49,345
research entities.

646
00:23:49,884 --> 00:23:51,904
And so it it's a flattish

647
00:23:52,285 --> 00:23:55,005
organization. It gives you an amazing opportunity to

648
00:23:55,005 --> 00:23:57,170
work on many different areas. So I was

649
00:23:57,170 --> 00:23:58,450
doing a lot yeah, I was doing a

650
00:23:58,450 --> 00:23:59,730
lot of Middle East stuff, but I was

651
00:23:59,730 --> 00:24:01,109
doing insurgency, counterinsurgency

652
00:24:01,490 --> 00:24:02,390
theory, counterterrorism,

653
00:24:03,089 --> 00:24:04,230
conventional warfare,

654
00:24:04,529 --> 00:24:06,390
Middle East I'm sorry, Asia.

655
00:24:07,089 --> 00:24:09,170
I got to travel all over the world.

656
00:24:09,170 --> 00:24:11,429
I did a lot of Afghanistan work when

657
00:24:11,490 --> 00:24:11,984
that

658
00:24:13,184 --> 00:24:14,325
heated up. So,

659
00:24:14,704 --> 00:24:16,005
no, it was a

660
00:24:16,384 --> 00:24:18,785
really fascinating diverse intellectual experience and I got

661
00:24:18,785 --> 00:24:20,384
to engage what was really great about it

662
00:24:20,384 --> 00:24:21,525
is I stayed engaged

663
00:24:22,224 --> 00:24:23,605
with Marines, with soldiers

664
00:24:24,224 --> 00:24:25,869
on a routine basis. I got to go

665
00:24:25,869 --> 00:24:27,710
out around the country and around the world

666
00:24:27,710 --> 00:24:28,769
interviewing them,

667
00:24:29,150 --> 00:24:30,829
and being in the field with them and

668
00:24:30,829 --> 00:24:31,329
seeing

669
00:24:31,869 --> 00:24:34,429
things through their eyes, which was which I

670
00:24:34,429 --> 00:24:36,029
then tried to convey back to the policy

671
00:24:36,029 --> 00:24:38,349
makers in DC. That's cool. Yeah. When we

672
00:24:38,349 --> 00:24:38,849
mentioned,

673
00:24:39,694 --> 00:24:41,954
before we started recording that you were doing

674
00:24:42,335 --> 00:24:42,835
actual,

675
00:24:44,494 --> 00:24:45,875
classes and briefings

676
00:24:47,054 --> 00:24:49,454
for units that were working up, right? So

677
00:24:49,454 --> 00:24:51,615
like we were talking about Afghanistan. So you

678
00:24:51,615 --> 00:24:53,934
were actually working with those units that were

679
00:24:53,934 --> 00:24:55,559
in the chute. Yeah. And I was lucky

680
00:24:55,559 --> 00:24:56,460
to have amazing

681
00:24:56,759 --> 00:24:59,000
Afghan real Afghan experts. I was not one,

682
00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:01,099
but, Arturo Munoz and Dave Phillips,

683
00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:02,359
they're,

684
00:25:02,759 --> 00:25:04,440
talking to these bringing them out to speak

685
00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:06,380
with marines and soldiers before they deployed.

686
00:25:06,759 --> 00:25:09,075
Hopefully, we helped a little bit. Yeah. I've

687
00:25:09,315 --> 00:25:11,954
yeah. I I got a when I my

688
00:25:12,355 --> 00:25:13,414
brought to Afghanistan,

689
00:25:14,115 --> 00:25:16,054
I was, I and I

690
00:25:16,355 --> 00:25:17,174
in Jacksonville

691
00:25:17,634 --> 00:25:20,160
got orders, and I was told, but don't

692
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:22,240
get a apartment. You're leaving, like, in two

693
00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:24,320
weeks. Yeah. So I didn't get a lot

694
00:25:24,320 --> 00:25:26,559
of that kinda workup stuff. But based off

695
00:25:26,559 --> 00:25:28,400
of the performance of the marines, they were

696
00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:29,700
definitely ready to go.

697
00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:31,680
I think I was the one holding them

698
00:25:31,680 --> 00:25:32,420
back. But,

699
00:25:33,039 --> 00:25:34,320
so how did you end up then at

700
00:25:34,320 --> 00:25:34,820
Georgetown?

701
00:25:36,765 --> 00:25:38,684
Part of, part of being at Rand is

702
00:25:38,684 --> 00:25:40,445
there are actually quite a few Rand folks

703
00:25:40,445 --> 00:25:42,445
that teach as adjunct at Georgetown, and I

704
00:25:42,684 --> 00:25:45,025
somebody suggested it, and I got invited over.

705
00:25:45,325 --> 00:25:47,005
And, I've been teaching there for over ten

706
00:25:47,005 --> 00:25:49,005
years now. I only teach one class a

707
00:25:49,005 --> 00:25:51,559
year. I started out with insurgency and counterinsurgency,

708
00:25:52,180 --> 00:25:53,779
and then I created a course on human

709
00:25:53,779 --> 00:25:56,019
behavior and war centered on some work on

710
00:25:56,019 --> 00:25:57,779
the will to fight Yeah. That I had

711
00:25:57,779 --> 00:26:00,200
led at Rand in the last, I think,

712
00:26:00,500 --> 00:26:02,039
seven years that I was there.

713
00:26:02,545 --> 00:26:04,384
But I really Georgetown is also a terrific

714
00:26:04,384 --> 00:26:06,305
institution. Sounds like an interesting course. Who do

715
00:26:06,305 --> 00:26:08,545
you have, like, on your syllabus for recommended

716
00:26:08,545 --> 00:26:11,205
reading for that? So I have two books.

717
00:26:12,224 --> 00:26:12,884
One is,

718
00:26:13,744 --> 00:26:16,039
Inside the Insurgency. I can't I'm sorry. The

719
00:26:16,039 --> 00:26:17,880
name's escaping me at the moment. The Algerian

720
00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:19,419
Insurgency by Zora Dreif.

721
00:26:19,960 --> 00:26:21,400
The title is wrong, but,

722
00:26:21,720 --> 00:26:23,579
it's a female insurgence

723
00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:25,099
kind of autobiographical

724
00:26:25,799 --> 00:26:28,434
explanation of what the insurgency was like. And

725
00:26:28,434 --> 00:26:30,275
it's really her her book was the the,

726
00:26:30,595 --> 00:26:32,674
inspiration for the movie, The Battle of Algiers,

727
00:26:32,674 --> 00:26:34,535
if you've if you've ever seen it. Yeah.

728
00:26:35,154 --> 00:26:36,835
And then the other one is Lord Moran's

729
00:26:36,835 --> 00:26:40,049
Anatomy of Courage, which any marine should read.

730
00:26:40,289 --> 00:26:41,410
It should be if if it's not on

731
00:26:41,410 --> 00:26:42,690
the common knowledge reading list, it should be

732
00:26:42,690 --> 00:26:44,529
on the common knowledge reading list. Yeah. And

733
00:26:44,529 --> 00:26:46,769
then I've I overload I've been told I

734
00:26:46,769 --> 00:26:47,970
overload the students with,

735
00:26:48,529 --> 00:26:50,049
everything else because I want them to read

736
00:26:50,049 --> 00:26:52,289
all of them. Yeah. Perfect. Well, we've asked,

737
00:26:52,289 --> 00:26:53,785
I think, a lot of the, Vik has

738
00:26:53,785 --> 00:26:55,144
asked a lot of the good cop questions.

739
00:26:55,144 --> 00:26:56,904
Now it's it's bad cop time. You,

740
00:26:57,305 --> 00:26:59,384
you currently, have a book that's coming out

741
00:26:59,384 --> 00:27:01,785
in, this month. Correct? March? It's out. It's

742
00:27:01,785 --> 00:27:03,224
out. It's out. Perfect. Alright. Go get it.

743
00:27:03,224 --> 00:27:05,545
But, so the title is Ground Combat Puncturing

744
00:27:05,545 --> 00:27:07,865
the Myths of Modern War. So just for

745
00:27:07,865 --> 00:27:08,924
our audience's sake,

746
00:27:09,890 --> 00:27:13,269
quickly just address, you know, what question what

747
00:27:13,329 --> 00:27:15,250
gap in academia were you trying to answer

748
00:27:15,250 --> 00:27:15,829
or fill?

749
00:27:16,609 --> 00:27:18,690
What's your thesis? And then we can go

750
00:27:18,690 --> 00:27:19,349
from there.

751
00:27:19,809 --> 00:27:20,950
When I was at Rand,

752
00:27:21,329 --> 00:27:22,275
I, you know, I was

753
00:27:22,835 --> 00:27:23,335
repeatedly

754
00:27:23,875 --> 00:27:24,375
frustrated

755
00:27:24,674 --> 00:27:25,174
by

756
00:27:25,555 --> 00:27:27,634
the lack of kind of constructive analysis of

757
00:27:27,634 --> 00:27:29,394
modern warfare. We had a lot of kind

758
00:27:29,394 --> 00:27:31,634
of deep dives on specific events. We had

759
00:27:31,634 --> 00:27:34,115
a lot of political and sociopolitical analysis of

760
00:27:34,115 --> 00:27:36,440
war, but we really didn't have like that

761
00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:37,900
kind of traditional

762
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:38,700
historical

763
00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:40,299
on the ground

764
00:27:41,559 --> 00:27:42,059
consistent

765
00:27:42,360 --> 00:27:45,259
approach to understanding what happened. So

766
00:27:45,720 --> 00:27:47,880
in general, in The United States, we've stopped

767
00:27:47,880 --> 00:27:49,259
treating war as history.

768
00:27:50,105 --> 00:27:51,164
We treat war

769
00:27:51,545 --> 00:27:53,465
as a political this is an academia, as

770
00:27:53,465 --> 00:27:55,164
a political and social phenomenon,

771
00:27:56,105 --> 00:27:57,805
which is fine because

772
00:27:58,664 --> 00:28:00,904
the politics and the social aspects of warfare

773
00:28:00,904 --> 00:28:03,460
are essential for us to understand, but abandoning

774
00:28:03,460 --> 00:28:05,299
the history part of it, which we've done

775
00:28:05,299 --> 00:28:06,599
to a significant extent,

776
00:28:07,460 --> 00:28:10,019
means that we we don't we don't see

777
00:28:10,019 --> 00:28:11,700
what has actually happened. And if you don't

778
00:28:11,700 --> 00:28:13,240
know what has actually happened,

779
00:28:13,700 --> 00:28:15,640
then you're you're bound to

780
00:28:16,099 --> 00:28:17,000
draw some

781
00:28:17,524 --> 00:28:19,765
bad start with bad assumptions and then draw

782
00:28:19,765 --> 00:28:22,404
bad conclusions Right. From this impartial data that

783
00:28:22,404 --> 00:28:23,845
we have. So one of the things I

784
00:28:23,845 --> 00:28:25,605
I really wanted to do was build this

785
00:28:25,605 --> 00:28:26,105
database

786
00:28:26,804 --> 00:28:28,505
of of modern combat,

787
00:28:29,044 --> 00:28:30,825
and to try to make it as comprehensive

788
00:28:30,964 --> 00:28:31,625
as possible.

789
00:28:32,570 --> 00:28:33,470
Zero interest

790
00:28:33,769 --> 00:28:35,769
across the Department of Defense in doing that

791
00:28:35,769 --> 00:28:36,990
kind of basic research.

792
00:28:37,369 --> 00:28:39,390
Zero interest from the military historical

793
00:28:40,089 --> 00:28:40,589
community,

794
00:28:41,930 --> 00:28:43,849
because it takes money to get people out

795
00:28:43,849 --> 00:28:45,865
into the field to do these things. So

796
00:28:45,944 --> 00:28:47,704
So wait. Is that is that really the

797
00:28:47,704 --> 00:28:49,625
rub? Is the money? Or is there just

798
00:28:49,625 --> 00:28:51,644
a lack of intellectual curiosity?

799
00:28:52,585 --> 00:28:55,464
The curiosity is there. The capacity is is

800
00:28:55,464 --> 00:28:57,224
mostly gone. I mean, there there is don't

801
00:28:57,224 --> 00:28:59,065
get me wrong. There's still military history departments

802
00:28:59,065 --> 00:29:00,765
in United States, but they're

803
00:29:01,330 --> 00:29:03,009
anemic compared to what we used to have.

804
00:29:03,009 --> 00:29:04,869
And if you look at the kinda history,

805
00:29:05,570 --> 00:29:07,650
when when we think military history, we think

806
00:29:07,650 --> 00:29:09,330
like the stuff we read growing up about

807
00:29:09,330 --> 00:29:12,289
World War two and Vietnam. It's incredibly detailed

808
00:29:12,289 --> 00:29:13,590
and rich. You could tell

809
00:29:13,970 --> 00:29:14,470
where

810
00:29:14,875 --> 00:29:17,194
people were on the battlefield and the timeline

811
00:29:17,194 --> 00:29:19,595
and the narrative and and Yeah. Order battle

812
00:29:19,595 --> 00:29:20,575
and that kind of stuff.

813
00:29:20,875 --> 00:29:21,534
I mean,

814
00:29:21,914 --> 00:29:23,194
just go ahead and go through your head

815
00:29:23,194 --> 00:29:24,394
and see if you could pull that up

816
00:29:24,394 --> 00:29:26,394
for even battles that we participated in Yeah.

817
00:29:26,554 --> 00:29:27,534
For both sides.

818
00:29:28,649 --> 00:29:30,730
So, yeah, it it's and it's it does

819
00:29:30,730 --> 00:29:32,970
take money. So one thing that doesn't take

820
00:29:32,970 --> 00:29:34,409
a huge amount of money is to do

821
00:29:34,409 --> 00:29:35,549
a deskside analysis

822
00:29:35,849 --> 00:29:38,329
and do start by creating this database, which

823
00:29:38,329 --> 00:29:40,809
I did. And that's what that's the foundation

824
00:29:40,809 --> 00:29:44,595
of the book is this database of 423

825
00:29:44,595 --> 00:29:47,335
modern battles. So 2003

826
00:29:47,714 --> 00:29:48,914
to 2022,

827
00:29:48,914 --> 00:29:49,815
'20 year period.

828
00:29:50,994 --> 00:29:51,494
So,

829
00:29:52,994 --> 00:29:55,234
when I so, essentially, then, I guess, the

830
00:29:55,234 --> 00:29:57,154
second part of the question is, based off

831
00:29:57,154 --> 00:29:59,359
of the data you collected from 423 modern

832
00:29:59,359 --> 00:29:59,859
battles,

833
00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:02,240
what argument are you trying to to make

834
00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:04,399
that that a lot of academia is missing?

835
00:30:04,639 --> 00:30:07,039
What because you said, quote, unquote, in your

836
00:30:07,119 --> 00:30:07,859
on your website,

837
00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:10,480
you asked several questions. Like, what if there's

838
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:11,919
no character of war? So let's start with

839
00:30:11,919 --> 00:30:12,419
there.

840
00:30:13,484 --> 00:30:15,964
You say that, we often assume that we

841
00:30:15,964 --> 00:30:18,845
can characterize war with a universal explanation. Evidence

842
00:30:18,845 --> 00:30:21,085
from both historical and modern war suggests that

843
00:30:21,085 --> 00:30:23,644
there is not, in fact, a universal character

844
00:30:23,644 --> 00:30:25,644
of war. Readers may be surprised to find

845
00:30:25,644 --> 00:30:27,244
out who agrees with this conclusion. So my

846
00:30:27,244 --> 00:30:29,369
first part is, who is making the argument

847
00:30:29,369 --> 00:30:31,289
that there is universal character's war? Because I

848
00:30:31,289 --> 00:30:32,890
always interpret it as more of, like, it's

849
00:30:32,890 --> 00:30:34,650
lightning in the bottle trying to understand the

850
00:30:34,650 --> 00:30:36,650
character war. It changes so rapidly and so

851
00:30:36,650 --> 00:30:37,150
quickly,

852
00:30:37,690 --> 00:30:39,150
especially from a historical perspective.

853
00:30:39,450 --> 00:30:41,849
I I focus primarily marine corps, American civil

854
00:30:41,849 --> 00:30:42,349
war.

855
00:30:42,855 --> 00:30:44,315
Character war can change exponentially

856
00:30:44,694 --> 00:30:47,095
over the course of of several battles or

857
00:30:47,095 --> 00:30:49,494
a single battle. So who's making this argument

858
00:30:49,494 --> 00:30:49,994
that,

859
00:30:50,535 --> 00:30:53,494
the universal character war that character war is

860
00:30:53,494 --> 00:30:55,654
universal, and then how do you combat that

861
00:30:55,654 --> 00:30:56,154
idea?

862
00:30:56,529 --> 00:30:59,170
Well, almost the entire US government is making

863
00:30:59,170 --> 00:31:01,029
that argument, and they've done it in writing

864
00:31:01,970 --> 00:31:03,269
repeatedly, and and,

865
00:31:04,210 --> 00:31:07,190
verbally articulated. I mean, so you got generals,

866
00:31:07,809 --> 00:31:09,730
secretaries of defense, so on and so forth

867
00:31:09,730 --> 00:31:12,069
saying the character of war has dramatically changed.

868
00:31:12,214 --> 00:31:14,535
The character of war is now x. Because

869
00:31:14,535 --> 00:31:16,454
the character of war has changed, we need

870
00:31:16,454 --> 00:31:18,474
to buy this new system.

871
00:31:18,775 --> 00:31:21,414
We need to divest ourselves of these, you

872
00:31:21,414 --> 00:31:24,454
know, obviously, we're leaning into forces. Forces. Force

873
00:31:24,454 --> 00:31:26,890
design here, and I don't want and we

874
00:31:26,890 --> 00:31:28,190
can come to force design,

875
00:31:28,890 --> 00:31:30,410
and and I I take a middle ground

876
00:31:30,410 --> 00:31:33,049
approach on that on that very, very sensitive

877
00:31:33,049 --> 00:31:34,349
and controversial topic.

878
00:31:35,210 --> 00:31:37,849
But but this work I do attack force

879
00:31:37,849 --> 00:31:39,929
design in my book. I hope I do

880
00:31:39,929 --> 00:31:40,670
so constructively,

881
00:31:41,289 --> 00:31:42,349
but the the

882
00:31:42,704 --> 00:31:45,025
the basic argument that the character of war

883
00:31:45,025 --> 00:31:47,265
is universal is kind of endemic in our

884
00:31:47,265 --> 00:31:50,144
whole discourse, right? It's the way we talk

885
00:31:50,144 --> 00:31:50,884
about war.

886
00:31:51,984 --> 00:31:54,644
And because we haven't defined it and because

887
00:31:54,865 --> 00:31:57,444
we've just kind of blindly accepted this nebulous

888
00:31:57,585 --> 00:31:58,085
term,

889
00:31:58,839 --> 00:32:00,460
it it allows people to make

890
00:32:00,919 --> 00:32:02,839
kinda hyperbolic statements like that. We can say,

891
00:32:02,839 --> 00:32:04,700
oh, no. It's it's changed so dramatically

892
00:32:05,319 --> 00:32:07,319
that if we don't get rid of x

893
00:32:07,319 --> 00:32:09,659
or if we don't buy this incredibly exquisite

894
00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:10,619
missile system,

895
00:32:10,934 --> 00:32:12,934
we're gonna lose the next war. And it

896
00:32:12,934 --> 00:32:15,575
is almost always painted in existential terms. And

897
00:32:15,575 --> 00:32:16,954
I I point to

898
00:32:17,654 --> 00:32:18,474
Andrew Kropinovich,

899
00:32:19,414 --> 00:32:21,815
Bob Werk when he was his, deputy secretary

900
00:32:21,815 --> 00:32:22,394
of defense,

901
00:32:22,869 --> 00:32:25,909
very clearly making these statements and and very

902
00:32:25,909 --> 00:32:28,549
clearly in writing saying, the character of war

903
00:32:28,549 --> 00:32:29,210
has changed.

904
00:32:30,149 --> 00:32:32,069
If we do not buy these things, we

905
00:32:32,069 --> 00:32:32,809
will die.

906
00:32:33,269 --> 00:32:35,605
Which is such an interesting thing to hear,

907
00:32:36,085 --> 00:32:38,404
from the marine corps perspective because that was

908
00:32:38,404 --> 00:32:40,884
the argument that has been used many times

909
00:32:40,884 --> 00:32:42,505
to get rid of the marine corps

910
00:32:42,884 --> 00:32:44,265
that we don't need of anymore

911
00:32:44,804 --> 00:32:46,164
because we have this exquisite

912
00:32:47,009 --> 00:32:49,329
I mean, nuclear weapons, for example, was supposed

913
00:32:49,329 --> 00:32:49,990
to completely

914
00:32:50,849 --> 00:32:53,910
do away with things like marines. Yeah. Right?

915
00:32:54,049 --> 00:32:56,930
So is is your issue the definition of

916
00:32:56,930 --> 00:32:58,690
character war that they're using or the concept

917
00:32:58,690 --> 00:33:00,390
of character war in the first place?

918
00:33:00,744 --> 00:33:03,164
The concept. Right? The idea that you can

919
00:33:03,865 --> 00:33:05,724
create this universal universal

920
00:33:06,105 --> 00:33:08,125
description. As you yourself just said,

921
00:33:09,224 --> 00:33:11,865
you know, in in reality, if you if

922
00:33:11,865 --> 00:33:13,625
you dig in, this kinda goes back to

923
00:33:13,625 --> 00:33:16,049
why I why I wanted to build this

924
00:33:16,289 --> 00:33:18,450
database to start out with. If you look

925
00:33:18,450 --> 00:33:21,190
at the way war has actually been practiced

926
00:33:21,330 --> 00:33:23,570
around the world and not trying to kind

927
00:33:23,570 --> 00:33:26,150
of virtually fill in gaps with opinion,

928
00:33:27,170 --> 00:33:28,630
sometimes a very strong opinion,

929
00:33:29,174 --> 00:33:29,674
then

930
00:33:30,055 --> 00:33:32,855
you're you're left the only conclusion you can

931
00:33:32,855 --> 00:33:34,075
really come away with

932
00:33:34,695 --> 00:33:36,795
objectively is to say there is no universal

933
00:33:37,975 --> 00:33:40,455
character of war. It's different in many in

934
00:33:40,455 --> 00:33:42,855
in around the world at different scales and

935
00:33:42,855 --> 00:33:44,634
scopes and different kinds of terrain,

936
00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:47,740
depending on who's who's fighting. So

937
00:33:48,039 --> 00:33:49,420
if you can accept that,

938
00:33:49,880 --> 00:33:52,440
then all of these arguments about the dramatically

939
00:33:52,440 --> 00:33:54,839
changing character of war and the need to

940
00:33:54,839 --> 00:33:56,380
buy these things or divest

941
00:33:56,934 --> 00:33:59,095
kind of go out the window. Mhmm. And

942
00:33:59,095 --> 00:34:01,035
so this is an essential

943
00:34:01,494 --> 00:34:01,994
policy

944
00:34:02,375 --> 00:34:04,455
argument that I'm making here, even while I'm

945
00:34:04,455 --> 00:34:06,295
making what I hope is an interesting kind

946
00:34:06,295 --> 00:34:08,614
of military history argument and I have some

947
00:34:08,614 --> 00:34:10,775
case descriptions in there that are Mhmm. I

948
00:34:10,775 --> 00:34:13,000
I hope are are interesting as well. That's

949
00:34:13,000 --> 00:34:14,640
so interesting because the idea that I'm trying

950
00:34:14,640 --> 00:34:16,680
to make a universality of the character war

951
00:34:16,680 --> 00:34:18,440
when the nature war is supposed to be

952
00:34:18,440 --> 00:34:20,119
immutable, but the character war is supposed to

953
00:34:20,119 --> 00:34:21,880
be constantly evolving and changing that you can't

954
00:34:21,880 --> 00:34:23,320
make a universe. And the fact that the

955
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:25,079
a lot of people in the DOD have

956
00:34:25,079 --> 00:34:27,160
have done so is is is is quite

957
00:34:27,160 --> 00:34:29,824
interesting. So to go back into your to

958
00:34:29,824 --> 00:34:32,065
database to support your argument that you're saying

959
00:34:32,065 --> 00:34:33,905
there is no universal character war, which you

960
00:34:33,905 --> 00:34:35,444
you have great evidence for,

961
00:34:35,824 --> 00:34:38,144
what information were you inputting into this dat

962
00:34:38,224 --> 00:34:38,724
database?

963
00:34:39,184 --> 00:34:39,684
What,

964
00:34:40,889 --> 00:34:43,609
like, are are you describing battles? Are you

965
00:34:43,609 --> 00:34:44,909
just inputting figures?

966
00:34:45,690 --> 00:34:48,089
Like, please, let's let's let's dig into that

967
00:34:48,089 --> 00:34:49,529
a little bit. Yeah. Let me let me

968
00:34:49,529 --> 00:34:51,369
put a hook for something if we wanna

969
00:34:51,369 --> 00:34:53,295
follow-up a little later about the idea of

970
00:34:53,295 --> 00:34:56,494
the immutable nature and constantly changing character. Mhmm.

971
00:34:56,494 --> 00:34:58,734
Klasovitz never said that, so but we can

972
00:34:58,734 --> 00:35:00,734
come back to that. Mhmm. Yeah. That's on

973
00:35:00,734 --> 00:35:02,494
the quiz, actually. I think I got that

974
00:35:02,494 --> 00:35:04,255
one. Yeah. I'm ruining the quiz. I'm ruining

975
00:35:04,255 --> 00:35:05,554
the quiz here first.

976
00:35:06,069 --> 00:35:07,929
If anybody wants to take that, it's online

977
00:35:07,989 --> 00:35:09,349
at groundcombat.org

978
00:35:09,349 --> 00:35:11,210
and it's free and everything. But,

979
00:35:12,230 --> 00:35:15,289
so the database itself is is a

980
00:35:15,829 --> 00:35:18,230
description of as many battles as I could

981
00:35:18,230 --> 00:35:18,730
find

982
00:35:19,034 --> 00:35:21,434
in the public domain using as many sources

983
00:35:21,434 --> 00:35:23,835
as were available to me, including kind of

984
00:35:23,835 --> 00:35:25,375
paid databases and stuff.

985
00:35:26,954 --> 00:35:27,775
And I would

986
00:35:28,315 --> 00:35:30,635
it lists the battle itself, a description of

987
00:35:30,635 --> 00:35:32,875
the battle, who fought on which side. I

988
00:35:32,875 --> 00:35:35,679
try to answer four main questions. What was,

989
00:35:35,679 --> 00:35:37,400
you know, who fought and what was the

990
00:35:37,400 --> 00:35:38,219
order of battle?

991
00:35:38,599 --> 00:35:40,839
What was the geometry of forces? How were

992
00:35:40,839 --> 00:35:42,920
they arrayed against each other throughout the course

993
00:35:42,920 --> 00:35:43,659
of the battle?

994
00:35:44,039 --> 00:35:45,639
What was the narrative of the battle? What's

995
00:35:45,639 --> 00:35:47,480
the story? You know, is there a story

996
00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:49,079
that can be told in kind of very

997
00:35:49,079 --> 00:35:49,900
basic terms?

998
00:35:50,594 --> 00:35:51,255
And then,

999
00:35:51,554 --> 00:35:53,554
what was the timeline? How how did these

1000
00:35:53,554 --> 00:35:55,875
things transpire over time? And then I very

1001
00:35:55,875 --> 00:35:57,954
specifically dig into the technology that was used

1002
00:35:57,954 --> 00:35:59,255
in each in each fight,

1003
00:35:59,635 --> 00:36:01,635
down to the rifles that were employed by

1004
00:36:01,635 --> 00:36:03,539
both sides all the way up to missile

1005
00:36:03,539 --> 00:36:05,619
technology. And I code for that so it

1006
00:36:05,619 --> 00:36:07,780
can be used by students. Actually, there's a

1007
00:36:07,780 --> 00:36:09,700
team at West Point that's, doing this right

1008
00:36:09,700 --> 00:36:10,760
now with the database,

1009
00:36:11,780 --> 00:36:14,039
and it's available free online to anybody.

1010
00:36:14,739 --> 00:36:15,239
Incredible.

1011
00:36:15,619 --> 00:36:16,119
So,

1012
00:36:17,614 --> 00:36:18,755
my my question is,

1013
00:36:20,414 --> 00:36:22,494
going going forward, so you you you you've

1014
00:36:22,494 --> 00:36:23,234
pulled off

1015
00:36:23,534 --> 00:36:26,094
all of these, battles from various conflicts since

1016
00:36:26,094 --> 00:36:28,974
'20 you said 02/2003. Correct? January 2003. January

1017
00:36:28,974 --> 00:36:30,574
'2 thousand '3. Yes. 02/2003.

1018
00:36:30,574 --> 00:36:32,420
So I guess my question is,

1019
00:36:35,219 --> 00:36:36,819
a lot of this stuff, I guess, because

1020
00:36:36,819 --> 00:36:38,920
you you're right. There really hasn't been a

1021
00:36:39,299 --> 00:36:39,880
a traditional,

1022
00:36:40,420 --> 00:36:42,659
because the idea of traditional versus new military

1023
00:36:42,659 --> 00:36:44,474
history, the idea of like, you mentioned earlier,

1024
00:36:44,534 --> 00:36:46,295
just studying the maps, the tactics that it

1025
00:36:46,295 --> 00:36:48,375
would be is trying to figure out what

1026
00:36:48,375 --> 00:36:50,394
actually happened versus now where it's more,

1027
00:36:50,934 --> 00:36:51,755
again, like,

1028
00:36:52,054 --> 00:36:54,234
the human experience aspect of it.

1029
00:36:55,655 --> 00:36:57,335
To what extent do you do you feel

1030
00:36:57,335 --> 00:36:58,934
there may be gaps in your own in

1031
00:36:58,934 --> 00:37:01,170
databases based on the fact that there is

1032
00:37:01,230 --> 00:37:03,030
limited information out there? Are you just trying

1033
00:37:03,030 --> 00:37:04,210
to at least be a pioneer

1034
00:37:04,510 --> 00:37:06,670
to to guide other historians to follow suit

1035
00:37:06,670 --> 00:37:08,429
in you? Yeah. I think the latter. I

1036
00:37:08,429 --> 00:37:10,590
mean, I I acknowledge multiple times in the

1037
00:37:10,590 --> 00:37:12,429
book and in the database itself that it

1038
00:37:12,429 --> 00:37:13,329
is not comprehensive.

1039
00:37:13,894 --> 00:37:15,815
And I argue that, in fact, we can't

1040
00:37:15,815 --> 00:37:16,315
know,

1041
00:37:17,094 --> 00:37:19,335
all the battles that have taken place around

1042
00:37:19,335 --> 00:37:21,275
the world even in that twenty year period

1043
00:37:21,655 --> 00:37:23,835
because we've done such a poor job of

1044
00:37:23,894 --> 00:37:26,155
of recording them, of being physically present.

1045
00:37:27,289 --> 00:37:30,269
And I am very clear that

1046
00:37:30,730 --> 00:37:33,369
we know that there were hundreds of battles

1047
00:37:33,369 --> 00:37:34,589
in Iraq and Afghanistan

1048
00:37:35,369 --> 00:37:36,510
that are not

1049
00:37:36,889 --> 00:37:38,829
kind of visible in the public domain,

1050
00:37:39,449 --> 00:37:41,869
and but they are in databases

1051
00:37:42,974 --> 00:37:44,974
behind the green door that I'm trying to

1052
00:37:44,974 --> 00:37:46,835
help trying to help get released.

1053
00:37:47,454 --> 00:37:49,474
We'll see. Wish me luck on that one.

1054
00:37:50,095 --> 00:37:51,855
But yeah. No. I wanna I wanna shine

1055
00:37:51,855 --> 00:37:53,295
a light and say, look, we can do

1056
00:37:53,295 --> 00:37:55,454
this. I was told repeatedly when I tried

1057
00:37:55,454 --> 00:37:57,030
to do this at Rand, can't be done.

1058
00:37:57,510 --> 00:37:59,269
You can't come up with this list of

1059
00:37:59,269 --> 00:38:01,610
all these battles, so don't even bother trying.

1060
00:38:01,829 --> 00:38:03,429
And I don't it's not something I like

1061
00:38:03,429 --> 00:38:03,929
hearing.

1062
00:38:04,469 --> 00:38:06,710
So actually, like you said, hold my hold

1063
00:38:06,710 --> 00:38:07,769
my beer. Right?

1064
00:38:08,869 --> 00:38:10,215
And so it was brutal,

1065
00:38:10,695 --> 00:38:12,775
building even this version of it. I'm aware

1066
00:38:12,775 --> 00:38:13,914
of gaps in it already,

1067
00:38:14,295 --> 00:38:16,055
and I just hope it inspires other people

1068
00:38:16,055 --> 00:38:17,815
to do more. Is this was this a

1069
00:38:17,815 --> 00:38:19,015
solo mission? Do you have a team of

1070
00:38:19,015 --> 00:38:21,175
people working or Solo mission, I did have

1071
00:38:21,175 --> 00:38:22,394
some research assistants

1072
00:38:22,880 --> 00:38:25,119
doubling my effort on a select number of

1073
00:38:25,119 --> 00:38:28,579
cases just for what's called intercoder reliability to,

1074
00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:31,680
to but more on more on sourcing to

1075
00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:33,140
make sure I wasn't missing anything.

1076
00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:35,944
So one of the questions, excuse me, that

1077
00:38:35,944 --> 00:38:37,664
you post on your website is, what if

1078
00:38:37,664 --> 00:38:39,824
drones are are not really a game changer?

1079
00:38:39,824 --> 00:38:41,984
And that's obviously a big one. Just you're

1080
00:38:41,984 --> 00:38:43,045
you're seeing drones,

1081
00:38:44,224 --> 00:38:45,984
in a lot of cassette articles. That's it's

1082
00:38:45,984 --> 00:38:47,824
a it's a common reoccurring thing, especially in

1083
00:38:47,824 --> 00:38:49,284
the past, several years

1084
00:38:49,889 --> 00:38:52,609
and further aggravated by the Ukraine Russian war

1085
00:38:52,609 --> 00:38:53,750
that's going on currently.

1086
00:38:55,889 --> 00:38:58,389
Our drone's really a game changer. Yeah. No.

1087
00:38:58,769 --> 00:39:00,549
We are we are,

1088
00:39:01,329 --> 00:39:03,829
kind of hostages to our most recent

1089
00:39:04,175 --> 00:39:06,195
online experience in many ways.

1090
00:39:07,054 --> 00:39:08,355
And that that kind

1091
00:39:08,974 --> 00:39:11,934
of terminology, the kind of exaggeration that we

1092
00:39:11,934 --> 00:39:13,715
live in on a daily basis now,

1093
00:39:14,414 --> 00:39:16,574
this is insane, that'll blow your mind, you

1094
00:39:16,574 --> 00:39:18,594
know, this is a game changer, stop everything.

1095
00:39:19,110 --> 00:39:21,590
It it's we're so accustomed to hearing that

1096
00:39:21,590 --> 00:39:23,530
now that it's almost background noise,

1097
00:39:24,390 --> 00:39:26,869
but we've also accepted at face value that

1098
00:39:26,869 --> 00:39:27,369
drones,

1099
00:39:27,910 --> 00:39:29,769
first of all, are new somehow

1100
00:39:30,150 --> 00:39:32,470
and that they have completely changed the way

1101
00:39:32,470 --> 00:39:34,045
that we fight. They have not. They are

1102
00:39:34,045 --> 00:39:35,085
not new, first of all, and I'll get

1103
00:39:35,085 --> 00:39:36,684
into that in a second, but they haven't

1104
00:39:36,684 --> 00:39:38,364
changed the way that we fight. If you

1105
00:39:38,364 --> 00:39:40,684
spend a significant amount of time examining what's

1106
00:39:40,684 --> 00:39:42,925
actually happening on the ground in Ukraine, which

1107
00:39:42,925 --> 00:39:44,925
I have and I continue to do so,

1108
00:39:44,925 --> 00:39:47,190
I have a team in Ukraine right now

1109
00:39:47,190 --> 00:39:48,809
conducting a battle study.

1110
00:39:50,070 --> 00:39:51,590
We have a previous one called Battle of

1111
00:39:51,590 --> 00:39:53,989
Irpin River that's available online if anybody wants

1112
00:39:53,989 --> 00:39:55,769
to look at it, James Sladen.

1113
00:39:58,949 --> 00:40:00,650
The fighting that takes place

1114
00:40:01,224 --> 00:40:03,065
is similar to what would have happened with

1115
00:40:03,065 --> 00:40:04,605
or without drones flying overhead,

1116
00:40:05,065 --> 00:40:07,784
very, very similar. There are minor modifications here

1117
00:40:07,784 --> 00:40:08,445
and there,

1118
00:40:09,385 --> 00:40:09,885
but

1119
00:40:10,664 --> 00:40:13,005
we are in kind of enraptured by these

1120
00:40:13,545 --> 00:40:14,045
compilations

1121
00:40:14,344 --> 00:40:16,764
of FPV drone strikes and things like that.

1122
00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:18,420
First of all, drones have been around

1123
00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:21,300
since the beginning of the twentieth century.

1124
00:40:22,160 --> 00:40:24,000
They were first used in I'm ruining my

1125
00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:26,400
quiz here today. Right? But, yeah. Taking notes

1126
00:40:26,400 --> 00:40:28,160
actually. I know. Sorry. You're gonna get a

1127
00:40:28,160 --> 00:40:29,219
better score now.

1128
00:40:30,079 --> 00:40:32,000
They were they were used in combat in

1129
00:40:32,000 --> 00:40:34,934
in 1940. They were used throughout the throughout

1130
00:40:34,934 --> 00:40:37,174
World War two. They were used extensively in

1131
00:40:37,174 --> 00:40:38,775
the Vietnam War. They were used in combat

1132
00:40:38,775 --> 00:40:41,014
in the nineteen seventy three war. The Israelis

1133
00:40:41,014 --> 00:40:43,094
and the South Africans really built the modern

1134
00:40:43,094 --> 00:40:44,155
drone industry,

1135
00:40:44,550 --> 00:40:47,050
and they use the drones extensively in Lebanon,

1136
00:40:47,190 --> 00:40:48,890
in places like, Angola,

1137
00:40:49,590 --> 00:40:51,930
and then we adopted fully adopted drones,

1138
00:40:52,309 --> 00:40:53,910
and employed them. I mean, if you were

1139
00:40:53,910 --> 00:40:56,150
involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, drones were part

1140
00:40:56,150 --> 00:40:57,670
of your daily life. Right? Yeah. My dad

1141
00:40:57,670 --> 00:40:59,484
was actually at Dragon Eye when it first

1142
00:40:59,484 --> 00:41:01,164
came out. Yeah. Dragon Eye. Yeah. Right. Exactly.

1143
00:41:01,164 --> 00:41:02,385
At all at all of it. Now

1144
00:41:02,844 --> 00:41:04,144
were micro drones

1145
00:41:04,445 --> 00:41:05,824
anywhere near as ubiquitous?

1146
00:41:06,525 --> 00:41:07,025
No.

1147
00:41:07,405 --> 00:41:09,244
Of course not. That that's that would be

1148
00:41:09,244 --> 00:41:11,105
silly to say. Were drones

1149
00:41:11,859 --> 00:41:12,359
available

1150
00:41:14,739 --> 00:41:16,440
to groups like the Islamic State

1151
00:41:17,059 --> 00:41:18,280
in 2012

1152
00:41:18,739 --> 00:41:20,760
the same way that they were in 2017?

1153
00:41:20,820 --> 00:41:22,599
No, of course not. So there's

1154
00:41:22,900 --> 00:41:25,239
been a clear proliferation of drones

1155
00:41:25,619 --> 00:41:26,839
at the lower level.

1156
00:41:27,465 --> 00:41:28,605
It's, they're now ubiquitous.

1157
00:41:28,985 --> 00:41:29,485
However,

1158
00:41:30,025 --> 00:41:31,545
keep in mind that, and I made this

1159
00:41:31,545 --> 00:41:33,724
point for a CSIS panel the other day,

1160
00:41:33,864 --> 00:41:37,144
that there's a 1,200 kilometer fixed battle line

1161
00:41:37,144 --> 00:41:38,045
in Ukraine.

1162
00:41:39,239 --> 00:41:42,360
The entire industrial base of Ukraine and the

1163
00:41:42,360 --> 00:41:44,380
entire industrial base of Russia

1164
00:41:44,920 --> 00:41:47,420
is co located to a static

1165
00:41:47,719 --> 00:41:48,219
battlefront

1166
00:41:49,079 --> 00:41:50,699
feeding drones in

1167
00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:52,300
from the entire

1168
00:41:52,760 --> 00:41:53,659
world supply,

1169
00:41:54,664 --> 00:41:57,704
all focused on this one war. Right? China

1170
00:41:57,704 --> 00:41:58,525
is is

1171
00:41:58,905 --> 00:41:59,405
funneling

1172
00:42:00,025 --> 00:42:02,505
millions of drones. The United States is paying

1173
00:42:02,585 --> 00:42:04,585
right. So all of these drones are being

1174
00:42:04,585 --> 00:42:06,284
funneled towards this fixed frontline,

1175
00:42:06,905 --> 00:42:07,804
and they're ubiquitous,

1176
00:42:08,480 --> 00:42:10,659
but not every war is going to look

1177
00:42:10,719 --> 00:42:11,460
like that.

1178
00:42:12,079 --> 00:42:14,239
And now so again, keep in mind, the

1179
00:42:14,239 --> 00:42:15,859
fighting that's taken place in Ukraine

1180
00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:17,299
is actually

1181
00:42:17,839 --> 00:42:19,839
very similar to fighting that has taken place

1182
00:42:19,839 --> 00:42:20,339
elsewhere

1183
00:42:21,005 --> 00:42:23,644
and there's a there's a unique aspect to

1184
00:42:23,644 --> 00:42:24,545
the industrial

1185
00:42:25,244 --> 00:42:27,805
fixed nature of the fight too. So I

1186
00:42:27,805 --> 00:42:29,565
I I will make a very strong argument.

1187
00:42:29,565 --> 00:42:31,244
I'll I'll go down swinging on that one

1188
00:42:31,244 --> 00:42:33,405
that, drones have not changed warfare. And and

1189
00:42:33,405 --> 00:42:34,525
what what you mean by,

1190
00:42:35,164 --> 00:42:37,319
it's the same as where you would see

1191
00:42:37,319 --> 00:42:39,339
it in other places is we're talking

1192
00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:42,619
orders of battle of the same,

1193
00:42:43,559 --> 00:42:44,539
troop strengths

1194
00:42:44,920 --> 00:42:45,900
Yep. Positions,

1195
00:42:46,920 --> 00:42:48,299
named area of interests,

1196
00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:49,739
indirect,

1197
00:42:50,119 --> 00:42:50,619
direct,

1198
00:42:51,695 --> 00:42:52,195
FPCs,

1199
00:42:53,215 --> 00:42:54,195
you know, FPFs,

1200
00:42:55,855 --> 00:42:57,614
you know, all of those all the things

1201
00:42:57,614 --> 00:43:00,034
you learn at TBS, right, during, you know,

1202
00:43:00,815 --> 00:43:02,735
offense, defense, and all that good stuff. I

1203
00:43:02,735 --> 00:43:03,855
mean, is that essentially

1204
00:43:04,494 --> 00:43:06,255
I I teach I teach a class on

1205
00:43:06,255 --> 00:43:08,070
on the book. And one of the things

1206
00:43:08,070 --> 00:43:10,010
I do is I show a video montage,

1207
00:43:10,470 --> 00:43:12,150
a drone video montage. I mean, by the

1208
00:43:12,150 --> 00:43:13,750
way, there there are new ones produced every

1209
00:43:13,750 --> 00:43:16,070
single day the Ukrainians and the Russians churn

1210
00:43:16,070 --> 00:43:16,890
them out. Mhmm.

1211
00:43:17,190 --> 00:43:18,410
I probably watch

1212
00:43:19,315 --> 00:43:21,155
a hundred to a 50 drone strikes a

1213
00:43:21,155 --> 00:43:23,494
day on on various websites,

1214
00:43:24,195 --> 00:43:25,894
Telegram channels, things like that.

1215
00:43:26,355 --> 00:43:27,335
And then I show

1216
00:43:28,195 --> 00:43:29,094
trench combat,

1217
00:43:30,114 --> 00:43:32,295
infantry combat, mechanized assault

1218
00:43:32,619 --> 00:43:35,019
montage videos. And I say, if I put

1219
00:43:35,099 --> 00:43:37,440
if I split you into two different rooms

1220
00:43:37,820 --> 00:43:39,659
and I just fed you on a steady

1221
00:43:39,659 --> 00:43:40,159
diet

1222
00:43:40,539 --> 00:43:42,940
of one of these two and put you

1223
00:43:42,940 --> 00:43:45,500
back together, you you the two groups would

1224
00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,900
have a completely different perception of what war

1225
00:43:47,900 --> 00:43:48,400
is.

1226
00:43:48,885 --> 00:43:50,885
And what the reality is is that war

1227
00:43:50,885 --> 00:43:52,344
is both of those things simultaneously.

1228
00:43:52,724 --> 00:43:53,224
Okay.

1229
00:43:54,485 --> 00:43:56,885
Drones are there. Yeah. They're absolutely having an

1230
00:43:56,885 --> 00:43:57,385
impact,

1231
00:43:58,164 --> 00:43:58,664
but

1232
00:43:58,965 --> 00:44:01,204
for in a large part, both sides are

1233
00:44:01,204 --> 00:44:03,730
are are relying more heavily on drones because

1234
00:44:03,730 --> 00:44:06,130
they can't rely on their air forces. Mhmm.

1235
00:44:06,130 --> 00:44:08,449
You know, Ukraine has an anemic air force

1236
00:44:08,449 --> 00:44:09,589
compared to the Russians,

1237
00:44:10,369 --> 00:44:12,849
and the Russian air force has been has

1238
00:44:12,849 --> 00:44:15,089
been significantly damaged and is wasn't as strong

1239
00:44:15,089 --> 00:44:17,175
as we anticipated it would be. Yeah. Beginning

1240
00:44:17,175 --> 00:44:18,614
of the war. So, I mean, there's a

1241
00:44:18,614 --> 00:44:19,114
compensatory

1242
00:44:19,855 --> 00:44:20,355
in,

1243
00:44:21,175 --> 00:44:23,894
factor here as well. So you're you're making

1244
00:44:23,894 --> 00:44:25,894
the argument that drones are not changing the

1245
00:44:25,894 --> 00:44:26,954
character of war,

1246
00:44:27,335 --> 00:44:28,775
but it goes back into the this what

1247
00:44:28,775 --> 00:44:30,135
a lot of other people are saying is,

1248
00:44:30,135 --> 00:44:31,175
like, we need to buy,

1249
00:44:31,969 --> 00:44:32,789
this equipment.

1250
00:44:33,730 --> 00:44:35,569
Is is this necessary for us to sustain

1251
00:44:35,569 --> 00:44:38,130
ourselves? Do you but not, not believe that,

1252
00:44:38,449 --> 00:44:40,769
Americans should be investing in drones? Do you

1253
00:44:40,769 --> 00:44:41,670
think that

1254
00:44:42,609 --> 00:44:44,449
maybe if even the carriage war has not

1255
00:44:44,449 --> 00:44:45,989
changed, they're still worthy investment?

1256
00:44:47,005 --> 00:44:48,445
What are your thoughts on that? That's a

1257
00:44:48,445 --> 00:44:50,065
great I mean, that's a great question

1258
00:44:50,525 --> 00:44:51,025
because

1259
00:44:52,125 --> 00:44:54,304
our our culture now is

1260
00:44:54,605 --> 00:44:55,105
essentialist.

1261
00:44:55,565 --> 00:44:56,704
Right? So whatever

1262
00:44:57,085 --> 00:44:59,005
question you're asking, it either it's it has

1263
00:44:59,005 --> 00:45:01,719
a binary answer. Right? It's either all of

1264
00:45:01,719 --> 00:45:03,940
this or none of this or you know?

1265
00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:05,619
And of course, that's not how life

1266
00:45:06,239 --> 00:45:07,139
generally works.

1267
00:45:07,440 --> 00:45:09,599
Of course, we should invest in drones. Of

1268
00:45:09,599 --> 00:45:12,159
course, we should try to maintain the techno

1269
00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:15,599
technological advantage over our our current adversaries and

1270
00:45:15,599 --> 00:45:16,739
our perspective adversaries.

1271
00:45:17,094 --> 00:45:17,594
Absolutely.

1272
00:45:18,454 --> 00:45:20,375
And I think it's very easy to kinda

1273
00:45:20,375 --> 00:45:22,375
dismiss arguments like mine by saying, well, you

1274
00:45:22,375 --> 00:45:24,295
just don't you you just you're, you know,

1275
00:45:24,295 --> 00:45:25,114
Neil Luddite.

1276
00:45:26,055 --> 00:45:29,114
Right? And which, by the way, complete misunderstanding

1277
00:45:29,175 --> 00:45:32,550
of what Luddism was. But right? But I'm

1278
00:45:32,550 --> 00:45:34,570
not I'm not averse to technology,

1279
00:45:35,269 --> 00:45:36,730
but I'm also not a technophile.

1280
00:45:37,190 --> 00:45:39,750
And and the problem with this kind of

1281
00:45:39,750 --> 00:45:41,769
lack of knowledge is that we are vulnerable

1282
00:45:41,989 --> 00:45:42,650
to these

1283
00:45:43,190 --> 00:45:43,849
kind of

1284
00:45:44,150 --> 00:45:47,030
aggressive technophilic arguments. Right? That, you know Mhmm.

1285
00:45:47,030 --> 00:45:49,144
Yeah. It basically goes back to the revolution

1286
00:45:49,144 --> 00:45:50,824
in military affairs if you guys are you're

1287
00:45:50,824 --> 00:45:52,364
familiar with that. I mean, the,

1288
00:45:53,224 --> 00:45:54,045
the idea

1289
00:45:54,344 --> 00:45:54,844
that

1290
00:45:55,224 --> 00:45:57,405
the there is the this earth shattering

1291
00:45:58,105 --> 00:46:00,264
game changing event that takes place or new

1292
00:46:00,264 --> 00:46:02,664
technology that's introduced combined with a new tactic

1293
00:46:02,664 --> 00:46:03,324
or something,

1294
00:46:03,880 --> 00:46:04,380
that

1295
00:46:04,679 --> 00:46:07,000
that reorders the very nature of war, the

1296
00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:07,739
very nature.

1297
00:46:08,119 --> 00:46:09,960
This goes back to the hook that I

1298
00:46:09,960 --> 00:46:11,719
set earlier. Oh, we're coming back to it.

1299
00:46:11,719 --> 00:46:13,179
Don't worry. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

1300
00:46:13,719 --> 00:46:16,039
But it you know, it's an it's a

1301
00:46:16,039 --> 00:46:18,619
it's an important one because the arguments

1302
00:46:19,275 --> 00:46:21,434
for the revolution of military affairs for this

1303
00:46:21,434 --> 00:46:22,954
idea that if we just buy the right

1304
00:46:22,954 --> 00:46:25,375
technology that we'll solve all of war's problems.

1305
00:46:27,594 --> 00:46:30,288
And then painting anybody that disagrees as a

1306
00:46:30,288 --> 00:46:32,335
as a Luddite and not, you know, as

1307
00:46:32,635 --> 00:46:34,219
averse to technology,

1308
00:46:35,400 --> 00:46:36,380
which is just

1309
00:46:36,920 --> 00:46:38,039
often flat out wrong,

1310
00:46:39,480 --> 00:46:41,079
it it hinges on the idea that there

1311
00:46:41,079 --> 00:46:43,159
is this immutable nature of war and this

1312
00:46:43,159 --> 00:46:45,644
constantly changing character. And so if you wanna

1313
00:46:45,885 --> 00:46:48,045
lead in No. Yeah. Myself in. You mentioned,

1314
00:46:48,045 --> 00:46:49,724
you know, that Clausewitz did not say that.

1315
00:46:49,724 --> 00:46:51,644
Yeah. You did not. But MCDP one does

1316
00:46:51,644 --> 00:46:53,644
say that. So would you how would you

1317
00:46:54,364 --> 00:46:55,664
do you think based on

1318
00:46:56,445 --> 00:46:58,765
your arguments that you made that MCDP one

1319
00:46:58,765 --> 00:47:00,364
could use a rewrite in that regard, and

1320
00:47:00,364 --> 00:47:02,579
how would you rewrite it? Boy, that's been

1321
00:47:02,579 --> 00:47:03,079
tried.

1322
00:47:03,860 --> 00:47:06,019
Yeah, multiple times. I'm a huge fan of

1323
00:47:06,019 --> 00:47:09,059
MCDP one, and and, I am I I

1324
00:47:09,059 --> 00:47:10,599
I still refer to it frequently,

1325
00:47:11,539 --> 00:47:12,680
and I cite it,

1326
00:47:12,980 --> 00:47:14,920
and I think it is a fantastic

1327
00:47:15,554 --> 00:47:17,494
document. It is probably the best

1328
00:47:18,434 --> 00:47:18,934
doctrinal

1329
00:47:19,474 --> 00:47:19,974
publication

1330
00:47:20,275 --> 00:47:21,414
in The US military

1331
00:47:22,194 --> 00:47:24,514
period. And there's a reason it's people have

1332
00:47:24,514 --> 00:47:25,574
had so much trouble

1333
00:47:25,954 --> 00:47:26,855
rewriting it.

1334
00:47:28,110 --> 00:47:30,769
However, it doesn't mean it's flawless. Of course.

1335
00:47:31,070 --> 00:47:32,910
Look. I mean, I wouldn't even call it

1336
00:47:32,910 --> 00:47:33,410
necessarily

1337
00:47:34,030 --> 00:47:35,570
a a flaw. It's a gap.

1338
00:47:36,190 --> 00:47:37,570
What is the nature of war?

1339
00:47:38,590 --> 00:47:40,844
Right now, it lists a number of things.

1340
00:47:41,005 --> 00:47:42,204
The MCDP one is,

1341
00:47:42,684 --> 00:47:43,984
friction, chaos,

1342
00:47:44,764 --> 00:47:45,264
uncertainty,

1343
00:47:45,565 --> 00:47:46,065
dynamism.

1344
00:47:46,364 --> 00:47:47,585
What, am I missing?

1345
00:47:48,125 --> 00:47:49,744
I think I'm missing a couple there.

1346
00:47:50,844 --> 00:47:52,844
I miss Yeah. I mean, so the so

1347
00:47:52,844 --> 00:47:55,405
so the authors of MCDP one settled on

1348
00:47:55,405 --> 00:47:56,065
some Klasovitzian

1349
00:47:57,230 --> 00:48:00,190
terms Mhmm. That I think most people would

1350
00:48:00,190 --> 00:48:01,329
generally agree upon.

1351
00:48:01,949 --> 00:48:04,589
But most people generally agreeing on something doesn't

1352
00:48:04,589 --> 00:48:06,130
make it an immutable nature,

1353
00:48:06,510 --> 00:48:08,369
doesn't make it an immutable law.

1354
00:48:09,465 --> 00:48:12,505
And there are elements there there are points

1355
00:48:12,505 --> 00:48:15,164
in warfare where it's clear as day.

1356
00:48:15,545 --> 00:48:17,485
If I'm flying a drone

1357
00:48:17,785 --> 00:48:18,285
over

1358
00:48:18,585 --> 00:48:19,244
an enemy

1359
00:48:20,425 --> 00:48:22,525
target and they have no air defense

1360
00:48:22,860 --> 00:48:24,220
and that it's in the middle of a

1361
00:48:24,220 --> 00:48:25,900
desert and they have no concealment, I see

1362
00:48:25,900 --> 00:48:27,900
exactly where they are and I say blow

1363
00:48:27,900 --> 00:48:29,180
that up and I push a button and

1364
00:48:29,180 --> 00:48:31,420
I kill it. Okay. I mean, that's not

1365
00:48:31,420 --> 00:48:33,996
chaotic or dynamic or right? So Right. Or

1366
00:48:33,996 --> 00:48:35,289
I'm certain Yeah.

1367
00:48:36,525 --> 00:48:39,724
But but if Clausewitz never said that, and

1368
00:48:39,724 --> 00:48:41,184
by the way, Beatrice Heuser,

1369
00:48:41,964 --> 00:48:42,864
Tony Echeverria,

1370
00:48:43,565 --> 00:48:45,724
and others kinda back I think back me

1371
00:48:45,724 --> 00:48:47,085
up on that one. I I won't try

1372
00:48:47,085 --> 00:48:48,364
to speak for them, but I I cite

1373
00:48:48,364 --> 00:48:50,304
the I cite the references in the book.

1374
00:48:51,880 --> 00:48:52,380
Then

1375
00:48:53,079 --> 00:48:55,320
that whole argument is specious. Right? Mhmm. We

1376
00:48:55,320 --> 00:48:57,640
we that means that you can't say, well,

1377
00:48:57,640 --> 00:49:00,199
there's been this dramatic revolutionary change to the

1378
00:49:00,199 --> 00:49:01,980
nature of war because we've invented

1379
00:49:02,519 --> 00:49:04,460
nuclear weapons, because we've invented

1380
00:49:05,065 --> 00:49:06,204
precision guided munitions,

1381
00:49:07,065 --> 00:49:09,385
the historical kind of revolution in military affairs

1382
00:49:09,385 --> 00:49:09,704
arguments.

1383
00:49:11,545 --> 00:49:13,804
That whole argument, that whole thing falls apart

1384
00:49:14,025 --> 00:49:16,125
when you can't define or pin down

1385
00:49:16,425 --> 00:49:17,405
nature and character.

1386
00:49:18,769 --> 00:49:19,670
And I would argue

1387
00:49:20,849 --> 00:49:22,389
that those the RMA

1388
00:49:23,329 --> 00:49:23,829
proponents

1389
00:49:24,289 --> 00:49:24,789
abuse

1390
00:49:26,130 --> 00:49:27,429
our gap in knowledge

1391
00:49:28,050 --> 00:49:30,389
and abuse the lack of definition.

1392
00:49:31,089 --> 00:49:32,289
And I call them out directly.

1393
00:49:33,010 --> 00:49:35,144
I'm still waiting for a blowback on that

1394
00:49:35,144 --> 00:49:37,065
one. I'm sure Perfect. Sure it's perfect. Yeah.

1395
00:49:37,065 --> 00:49:39,465
Yeah. So is there a better set of

1396
00:49:39,465 --> 00:49:39,905
terminology

1397
00:49:40,344 --> 00:49:42,425
Yeah. That you think that we could use

1398
00:49:42,425 --> 00:49:43,804
to replace that's more productive,

1399
00:49:44,505 --> 00:49:46,605
or is it or is it worth reeducating

1400
00:49:47,650 --> 00:49:48,949
and and trying to actually

1401
00:49:49,250 --> 00:49:51,570
pin down these concepts with more with more

1402
00:49:51,570 --> 00:49:53,429
concrete historically informed terms?

1403
00:49:54,289 --> 00:49:55,650
Yeah. What I what I propose in the

1404
00:49:55,650 --> 00:49:57,889
book is just saying characteristics and not trying

1405
00:49:57,889 --> 00:49:58,389
to

1406
00:49:59,010 --> 00:50:01,425
create a reality that doesn't exist. Mhmm. You

1407
00:50:01,425 --> 00:50:03,505
know, I I mean, if you can't define

1408
00:50:03,505 --> 00:50:05,285
something, you can't you can't

1409
00:50:05,824 --> 00:50:08,704
create this clear holistic and comprehensive picture of

1410
00:50:08,704 --> 00:50:09,204
something

1411
00:50:09,505 --> 00:50:11,844
in real terms and you're dealing with something

1412
00:50:11,985 --> 00:50:13,445
very real and violent

1413
00:50:13,800 --> 00:50:14,300
with

1414
00:50:14,599 --> 00:50:16,219
sometimes existential consequences

1415
00:50:16,599 --> 00:50:17,180
like war,

1416
00:50:17,559 --> 00:50:18,380
don't do it.

1417
00:50:18,680 --> 00:50:19,180
Just

1418
00:50:19,960 --> 00:50:22,619
do what we say we do in MCDP

1419
00:50:22,840 --> 00:50:23,340
one,

1420
00:50:23,719 --> 00:50:25,099
which is to accept

1421
00:50:26,039 --> 00:50:26,539
uncertainty,

1422
00:50:27,695 --> 00:50:29,074
accept some chaos,

1423
00:50:29,614 --> 00:50:31,135
accept the fact that there are things we

1424
00:50:31,135 --> 00:50:32,514
just don't know,

1425
00:50:33,135 --> 00:50:33,635
and

1426
00:50:33,934 --> 00:50:36,094
we don't know what the the so called

1427
00:50:36,094 --> 00:50:38,494
character of war is. So just say, okay,

1428
00:50:38,494 --> 00:50:40,275
what can we know? We can know characteristics.

1429
00:50:40,739 --> 00:50:42,739
We can know we can see trends in

1430
00:50:42,739 --> 00:50:45,300
the use of different kinds of equipment or

1431
00:50:45,300 --> 00:50:47,219
tactics or the way that people behave in

1432
00:50:47,219 --> 00:50:48,039
certain conditions.

1433
00:50:48,340 --> 00:50:49,559
We can see trends

1434
00:50:50,019 --> 00:50:52,840
in innovation and economic influences

1435
00:50:53,300 --> 00:50:55,275
on the practice of warfare. So there are

1436
00:50:55,275 --> 00:50:55,775
characteristics

1437
00:50:56,474 --> 00:50:57,534
that are observable,

1438
00:50:58,315 --> 00:51:00,315
and they never give you a satisfying whole

1439
00:51:00,315 --> 00:51:03,114
picture, but they're definitely worth following. What how

1440
00:51:03,114 --> 00:51:03,855
is that

1441
00:51:04,155 --> 00:51:06,635
how is that being received, though, especially in

1442
00:51:06,635 --> 00:51:09,135
this era where, like you had mentioned,

1443
00:51:09,739 --> 00:51:11,359
we do sort of fall into

1444
00:51:11,659 --> 00:51:14,400
this desire for a binary solution.

1445
00:51:15,819 --> 00:51:18,859
And we definitely are out of an era

1446
00:51:18,859 --> 00:51:21,739
where Nuance is even not only is it

1447
00:51:21,739 --> 00:51:24,255
not accepted, but it's frowned upon Yeah. To

1448
00:51:24,255 --> 00:51:26,514
try to look at nuance. Is your approach

1449
00:51:27,534 --> 00:51:29,315
being well received, or

1450
00:51:29,694 --> 00:51:31,694
are you giving scoffed at? I mean, I'm

1451
00:51:31,694 --> 00:51:33,694
being it's it's well received by the people

1452
00:51:33,694 --> 00:51:35,214
that are telling me that they like the

1453
00:51:35,214 --> 00:51:36,815
book. I mean, I you know, but that's

1454
00:51:36,815 --> 00:51:38,429
a very small sample size. I mean, the

1455
00:51:38,429 --> 00:51:40,130
book is selling it's selling well.

1456
00:51:41,150 --> 00:51:42,929
I I I'll take that as,

1457
00:51:43,230 --> 00:51:45,730
hopefully, as some sign that it's being received

1458
00:51:45,789 --> 00:51:47,949
at least with some open mind. I am

1459
00:51:47,949 --> 00:51:48,449
getting

1460
00:51:49,230 --> 00:51:51,869
broader conversations, though. I am getting a little

1461
00:51:51,869 --> 00:51:54,244
bit of a sense of pushback. Yeah. And

1462
00:51:54,244 --> 00:51:55,684
that From which community is the same way?

1463
00:51:55,684 --> 00:51:57,445
Yeah. Is that policy makers or is that

1464
00:51:57,445 --> 00:51:59,605
military folks? Military folks,

1465
00:52:00,005 --> 00:52:00,505
colonels,

1466
00:52:02,485 --> 00:52:03,305
some majors,

1467
00:52:03,844 --> 00:52:05,925
had a couple of corporals and sergeants that

1468
00:52:05,925 --> 00:52:08,344
I had really interesting conversations with who

1469
00:52:08,780 --> 00:52:09,519
are not

1470
00:52:10,139 --> 00:52:13,099
buying into this enormous kind of tech forward

1471
00:52:13,099 --> 00:52:13,599
narrative.

1472
00:52:15,739 --> 00:52:16,719
Yeah. I I

1473
00:52:17,019 --> 00:52:18,940
I but I don't have any enough kind

1474
00:52:18,940 --> 00:52:21,179
of data to back up that I'm that

1475
00:52:21,179 --> 00:52:22,960
I'm winning an argument of any kind.

1476
00:52:23,545 --> 00:52:24,985
You know, we're we're in kind of a

1477
00:52:24,985 --> 00:52:26,985
chaotic moment in history here anyway, so I'm

1478
00:52:26,985 --> 00:52:28,824
not sure what kind of traction I'm gonna

1479
00:52:28,824 --> 00:52:30,905
get. I think, unfortunately, we're gonna be in

1480
00:52:30,905 --> 00:52:32,284
our next conflict before,

1481
00:52:32,905 --> 00:52:35,085
I find out. Mhmm. And then,

1482
00:52:35,864 --> 00:52:37,405
do you find that it's

1483
00:52:39,050 --> 00:52:40,269
sort of does this

1484
00:52:41,130 --> 00:52:41,869
does this

1485
00:52:43,210 --> 00:52:44,750
sort of paradigm shift

1486
00:52:45,210 --> 00:52:46,110
or a mindset

1487
00:52:46,489 --> 00:52:48,889
shift, does it work well in academia, but

1488
00:52:48,889 --> 00:52:50,190
it's hard to apply?

1489
00:52:50,570 --> 00:52:52,829
Or do you see a practical application,

1490
00:52:53,635 --> 00:52:55,815
a direct application to this sort

1491
00:52:56,595 --> 00:52:59,335
of nuanced approach to how we

1492
00:53:00,355 --> 00:53:02,835
prepare for war? Well, my argument is that

1493
00:53:02,835 --> 00:53:05,155
the practical application is gonna smack you right

1494
00:53:05,155 --> 00:53:05,815
in the face.

1495
00:53:06,275 --> 00:53:08,639
Right? And that if either you maintain the

1496
00:53:08,639 --> 00:53:10,719
capabilities that you need to fight an actual

1497
00:53:10,719 --> 00:53:12,339
ground combat Mhmm. Specifically,

1498
00:53:13,440 --> 00:53:13,940
and,

1499
00:53:14,319 --> 00:53:16,159
you know, if do if you wanna be

1500
00:53:16,159 --> 00:53:17,599
able to do the things you say you're

1501
00:53:17,599 --> 00:53:18,420
going to do,

1502
00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:21,539
then you need these things.

1503
00:53:22,005 --> 00:53:23,844
And if you haven't proven to me that

1504
00:53:23,844 --> 00:53:25,525
you don't need them, then don't get rid

1505
00:53:25,525 --> 00:53:26,105
of them.

1506
00:53:27,125 --> 00:53:29,464
We can think of some specific examples here.

1507
00:53:30,565 --> 00:53:31,065
And

1508
00:53:32,565 --> 00:53:34,264
if I'm if I'm wrong,

1509
00:53:35,230 --> 00:53:37,630
I'm only gonna be disproven by a series

1510
00:53:37,630 --> 00:53:38,130
of

1511
00:53:38,430 --> 00:53:40,610
events. But if I'm right, I can

1512
00:53:41,150 --> 00:53:42,590
be proven right in one and I won't

1513
00:53:42,590 --> 00:53:44,910
be happy to be proven right. I want

1514
00:53:45,150 --> 00:53:47,070
specifically, I want the Marine Corps and all

1515
00:53:47,070 --> 00:53:50,050
American and allied partner forces to be successful

1516
00:53:50,505 --> 00:53:52,045
And I don't want them to

1517
00:53:52,344 --> 00:53:54,505
to to fall, to come up short because

1518
00:53:54,505 --> 00:53:56,424
they don't have a capability. They don't have

1519
00:53:56,424 --> 00:53:57,784
the right number of people, the right type

1520
00:53:57,784 --> 00:53:59,304
of people. Yeah. They don't have the people

1521
00:53:59,304 --> 00:54:01,005
aren't don't have the right mindset,

1522
00:54:02,360 --> 00:54:03,019
You know?

1523
00:54:03,719 --> 00:54:06,199
Well, also too, it seems like through this

1524
00:54:06,199 --> 00:54:08,760
extensive research and this database you created that

1525
00:54:08,760 --> 00:54:11,079
there's an underpinning for it. This is just

1526
00:54:11,079 --> 00:54:11,579
opinion

1527
00:54:12,280 --> 00:54:15,340
based off of, you know, very limited empirical

1528
00:54:15,800 --> 00:54:17,739
evidence. Right? Like, you have

1529
00:54:18,414 --> 00:54:20,434
the analytics and the underpinning

1530
00:54:21,134 --> 00:54:23,474
Yeah. The intellectual underpinning. And it's transparent.

1531
00:54:23,855 --> 00:54:25,775
I I I am the database is free

1532
00:54:25,775 --> 00:54:26,994
and available online.

1533
00:54:27,295 --> 00:54:29,534
It is completely transparent. You can see every

1534
00:54:29,534 --> 00:54:31,619
single thing that I did. I walk I

1535
00:54:31,619 --> 00:54:32,519
walk you through

1536
00:54:32,819 --> 00:54:33,719
step by step

1537
00:54:34,099 --> 00:54:36,179
the exact process I took. I point out

1538
00:54:36,179 --> 00:54:38,099
the weaknesses in the database that I'm aware

1539
00:54:38,099 --> 00:54:38,599
of.

1540
00:54:39,299 --> 00:54:41,079
No. So everything is driven

1541
00:54:41,779 --> 00:54:44,199
by logical argumentation from evidence.

1542
00:54:45,619 --> 00:54:48,364
Look, from getting back to the characteristics piece,

1543
00:54:48,505 --> 00:54:49,405
I say, look,

1544
00:54:50,105 --> 00:54:52,765
okay, let's look at the trends and characteristics.

1545
00:54:53,704 --> 00:54:54,765
Tanks were employed

1546
00:54:55,304 --> 00:54:55,804
in,

1547
00:54:56,344 --> 00:54:58,204
I believe it's 69%

1548
00:54:58,860 --> 00:55:01,099
of all of the four twenty three modern

1549
00:55:01,099 --> 00:55:02,539
battles by one side or the other or

1550
00:55:02,539 --> 00:55:03,039
both.

1551
00:55:03,980 --> 00:55:07,019
That means that there was a perceived value

1552
00:55:07,019 --> 00:55:07,680
for armor,

1553
00:55:09,340 --> 00:55:11,519
light armor or lightly armored or

1554
00:55:11,900 --> 00:55:13,280
light armed vehicles,

1555
00:55:13,944 --> 00:55:15,065
I think was,

1556
00:55:16,344 --> 00:55:18,204
something like 96%

1557
00:55:18,505 --> 00:55:19,885
of it of uses. Infantry,

1558
00:55:20,424 --> 00:55:21,304
100%

1559
00:55:21,304 --> 00:55:22,284
of every case.

1560
00:55:23,065 --> 00:55:23,565
Alright.

1561
00:55:23,944 --> 00:55:27,724
Indirect small arms, indirect fire, every case. So

1562
00:55:28,690 --> 00:55:31,489
and artillery was, I believe, was in the

1563
00:55:31,489 --> 00:55:31,989
eighties,

1564
00:55:32,610 --> 00:55:35,110
manned aircraft, I believe, was in the 80%

1565
00:55:35,570 --> 00:55:36,070
range.

1566
00:55:37,010 --> 00:55:38,690
So all of what we would consider the

1567
00:55:38,690 --> 00:55:40,550
kind of traditional core combat capabilities

1568
00:55:41,005 --> 00:55:45,105
were essential to Magtaf stuff. Magtaf stuff. And,

1569
00:55:45,164 --> 00:55:46,844
you know, this does look, this does bring

1570
00:55:46,844 --> 00:55:48,445
us to force design. Right? And if we

1571
00:55:48,445 --> 00:55:50,045
wanna talk about that, I'd be happy to.

1572
00:55:50,045 --> 00:55:51,885
Well, yeah. It's well, so you it seems

1573
00:55:51,885 --> 00:55:53,164
like you've done sort of like the money

1574
00:55:53,164 --> 00:55:56,144
ball approach with of battles since 02/2003.

1575
00:55:56,450 --> 00:55:58,690
And you've already identified, you know, a %

1576
00:55:58,690 --> 00:56:00,769
of battles there's infantry, a % of battles

1577
00:56:00,769 --> 00:56:02,630
there was direct indirect,

1578
00:56:03,890 --> 00:56:04,789
fire in

1579
00:56:05,490 --> 00:56:08,150
80% there was artillery, 69% there was tanks.

1580
00:56:08,289 --> 00:56:09,570
So are you are you do you think

1581
00:56:09,570 --> 00:56:11,110
that in order for a military

1582
00:56:11,784 --> 00:56:14,105
to be prepared for the next conflict, that

1583
00:56:14,105 --> 00:56:15,065
they should embrace,

1584
00:56:15,465 --> 00:56:18,505
like, those specific features that appear more and

1585
00:56:18,505 --> 00:56:20,105
more throughout the 423

1586
00:56:20,105 --> 00:56:21,164
battles that you've observed?

1587
00:56:21,864 --> 00:56:23,644
So it's it's important that

1588
00:56:24,769 --> 00:56:26,289
we keep in mind that past is not

1589
00:56:26,289 --> 00:56:26,789
prologue.

1590
00:56:27,170 --> 00:56:30,210
So by amassing this historical database, I'm not

1591
00:56:30,210 --> 00:56:32,230
saying therefore trends will always continue

1592
00:56:32,769 --> 00:56:34,690
in this kind of steady pattern. However, they

1593
00:56:34,690 --> 00:56:35,190
have

1594
00:56:36,369 --> 00:56:39,510
consistently on a relatively consistent evolutionary trend

1595
00:56:40,525 --> 00:56:41,905
progressed in the same direction.

1596
00:56:42,844 --> 00:56:44,925
And so if we're arguing that there's a

1597
00:56:44,925 --> 00:56:47,744
dramatic break that is taking place right now,

1598
00:56:47,885 --> 00:56:49,244
we need to come up with some really

1599
00:56:49,244 --> 00:56:50,844
good evidence to back that up. And all

1600
00:56:50,844 --> 00:56:52,764
I'm seeing is strong opinion at the moment,

1601
00:56:53,719 --> 00:56:57,019
and anecdotal evidence, a lot of anecdotal evidence

1602
00:56:57,079 --> 00:56:59,260
that if you dig into it, does not

1603
00:56:59,480 --> 00:57:01,000
stack up. And I'll give you I'll give

1604
00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:03,319
you an example, the Nagorno Karabakh war. And

1605
00:57:03,319 --> 00:57:04,940
so a lot of us that were tracking

1606
00:57:05,159 --> 00:57:08,299
force design when it was first cropping up,

1607
00:57:08,545 --> 00:57:09,844
some of the immediate

1608
00:57:10,224 --> 00:57:12,784
told you so evidence was what happened in

1609
00:57:12,784 --> 00:57:13,925
the Gorno Karabakh

1610
00:57:14,545 --> 00:57:15,045
where

1611
00:57:17,344 --> 00:57:18,005
the Armenians

1612
00:57:18,784 --> 00:57:21,985
as Azeris and Artsakh on their side, were

1613
00:57:21,985 --> 00:57:24,090
fighting over control of this disputed region.

1614
00:57:24,489 --> 00:57:24,989
And

1615
00:57:25,369 --> 00:57:26,269
the narrative,

1616
00:57:26,650 --> 00:57:28,329
backed by a lot of video evidence from

1617
00:57:28,329 --> 00:57:30,750
the Bayraktar corporation, was the drones

1618
00:57:32,570 --> 00:57:34,510
won the war and that actually was

1619
00:57:36,184 --> 00:57:36,925
picked up

1620
00:57:38,105 --> 00:57:40,425
and and repeated in the original I think

1621
00:57:40,425 --> 00:57:42,125
it was in the commandant's planning guidance,

1622
00:57:42,744 --> 00:57:44,184
might have might not have been, might have

1623
00:57:44,184 --> 00:57:45,784
just been in the original force design of

1624
00:57:45,784 --> 00:57:47,085
March 2020.

1625
00:57:48,425 --> 00:57:51,085
But that drones dictated the conflict.

1626
00:57:51,840 --> 00:57:53,119
If you go back and look at the

1627
00:57:53,119 --> 00:57:54,739
drone data from that conflict,

1628
00:57:56,400 --> 00:57:58,660
that that's not patently true.

1629
00:57:59,039 --> 00:57:59,440
So,

1630
00:58:00,320 --> 00:58:01,380
yeah because I I have,

1631
00:58:01,760 --> 00:58:03,920
friends who had family fought there and, like,

1632
00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:06,445
asking their, like, their cousins combat experience. They

1633
00:58:06,445 --> 00:58:08,364
all point to at least from their I

1634
00:58:08,364 --> 00:58:09,905
think this could be me bringing the humanistic

1635
00:58:10,125 --> 00:58:11,885
aspect of war rather than historical. But, I

1636
00:58:11,885 --> 00:58:13,824
mean, they they they did note that

1637
00:58:14,525 --> 00:58:16,284
they they at least the the soldiers on

1638
00:58:16,284 --> 00:58:18,204
the ground felt that the drones had had

1639
00:58:18,204 --> 00:58:21,105
an overarching presence. So that's that's interesting that,

1640
00:58:21,710 --> 00:58:23,569
so what what does the data then show?

1641
00:58:24,190 --> 00:58:25,869
Well, first of all, the data that were

1642
00:58:25,869 --> 00:58:27,250
presented by the,

1643
00:58:28,269 --> 00:58:28,769
Azerbaijan

1644
00:58:29,389 --> 00:58:29,889
government

1645
00:58:30,510 --> 00:58:33,889
were heavily inflated. Mhmm. And Ido Hecht,

1646
00:58:35,150 --> 00:58:36,289
an Israeli analyst,

1647
00:58:36,855 --> 00:58:38,295
points that out and he says he kind

1648
00:58:38,295 --> 00:58:40,454
of breaks the data down. The other one

1649
00:58:40,454 --> 00:58:42,554
is the, the video montages

1650
00:58:42,855 --> 00:58:45,574
from that primarily from the Bayraktar Corporation. So

1651
00:58:45,574 --> 00:58:46,954
if you're familiar with the TB2,

1652
00:58:47,335 --> 00:58:49,335
it's a drone that was popularized by that

1653
00:58:49,335 --> 00:58:49,769
war.

1654
00:58:50,329 --> 00:58:52,409
It's a family company in Turkey that that

1655
00:58:52,409 --> 00:58:53,390
makes these drones.

1656
00:58:53,849 --> 00:58:55,469
They had they were highly incentivized

1657
00:58:55,769 --> 00:58:56,269
to,

1658
00:58:56,730 --> 00:58:58,650
you know, promulgate these videos and it and

1659
00:58:58,650 --> 00:59:00,190
they do look really impressive.

1660
00:59:00,570 --> 00:59:02,989
But if you look closely, they're not all

1661
00:59:03,465 --> 00:59:06,184
kills that even the the videos they're collecting

1662
00:59:06,184 --> 00:59:07,864
themselves are not it's not clear that the

1663
00:59:07,864 --> 00:59:09,405
drone itself did the killing.

1664
00:59:10,425 --> 00:59:12,585
A lot of them look to be maybe

1665
00:59:12,585 --> 00:59:14,664
artillery strikes or mine strikes or something like

1666
00:59:14,664 --> 00:59:15,805
that. And so

1667
00:59:16,110 --> 00:59:17,950
when you dig into the data, even in

1668
00:59:17,950 --> 00:59:19,090
this kind of very,

1669
00:59:19,950 --> 00:59:21,710
what appears to be a very obvious case

1670
00:59:21,710 --> 00:59:22,530
at first

1671
00:59:23,150 --> 00:59:25,090
glance, starts to fall apart.

1672
00:59:25,710 --> 00:59:27,010
But there are other

1673
00:59:27,309 --> 00:59:29,470
kind of narrow aspects to one case here

1674
00:59:29,470 --> 00:59:29,970
too.

1675
00:59:30,349 --> 00:59:31,329
This is fought

1676
00:59:31,905 --> 00:59:34,885
in large part in open terrain. The Armenians

1677
00:59:35,025 --> 00:59:37,125
had been sitting in these open trenches,

1678
00:59:37,824 --> 00:59:39,925
done a terrible job of improving

1679
00:59:40,224 --> 00:59:42,005
their defense positions over time.

1680
00:59:43,985 --> 00:59:47,519
Their anti air capabilities were dated and crumbling,

1681
00:59:47,980 --> 00:59:49,579
their morale of the will of fight of

1682
00:59:49,579 --> 00:59:51,119
their troops was very low,

1683
00:59:51,739 --> 00:59:53,980
they had done a poor job integrating their

1684
00:59:53,980 --> 00:59:55,599
Armenian Artsakh forces,

1685
00:59:56,380 --> 00:59:58,000
so they were highly vulnerable

1686
00:59:59,195 --> 01:00:00,635
to strikes from the air. And, you know,

1687
01:00:00,635 --> 01:00:03,434
again, when you're fighting on an open tableau

1688
01:00:03,514 --> 01:00:04,014
Yeah.

1689
01:00:04,474 --> 01:00:07,034
That's very different than fighting when there's even

1690
01:00:07,034 --> 01:00:08,494
single canopy tree cover.

1691
01:00:09,594 --> 01:00:10,094
And

1692
01:00:11,034 --> 01:00:13,059
so it sure looked it it sure looked

1693
01:00:13,059 --> 01:00:14,339
like an offset, but I would I the

1694
01:00:14,339 --> 01:00:16,099
argument I make in the book is that

1695
01:00:16,099 --> 01:00:17,699
a lot of these human factors had a

1696
01:00:17,699 --> 01:00:19,940
significant impact on the outcome of the battle

1697
01:00:19,940 --> 01:00:21,480
itself. But more importantly,

1698
01:00:22,739 --> 01:00:25,219
in what other historical case do we do

1699
01:00:25,219 --> 01:00:26,359
we cherry pick

1700
01:00:26,704 --> 01:00:28,724
examples that suit our

1701
01:00:29,425 --> 01:00:29,925
narrative

1702
01:00:30,945 --> 01:00:31,764
and accept

1703
01:00:32,304 --> 01:00:34,784
as professionals that that that that's proof of

1704
01:00:34,784 --> 01:00:37,585
something? Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. No. Alright. Excellent point.

1705
01:00:37,585 --> 01:00:38,085
So

1706
01:00:38,465 --> 01:00:40,704
you you sort of hinted, earlier when we're

1707
01:00:40,704 --> 01:00:42,809
talking that, you know, we may have found

1708
01:00:42,809 --> 01:00:44,010
out the answers to some of the questions

1709
01:00:44,010 --> 01:00:45,390
you posed in the next war.

1710
01:00:47,050 --> 01:00:48,890
And part of what marine corps you obviously

1711
01:00:48,890 --> 01:00:50,410
wanna talk about forces. I know. I think

1712
01:00:50,410 --> 01:00:52,250
we're down for forces. I don't actually want

1713
01:00:52,250 --> 01:00:53,650
to. No. No. No. It's no. Because it

1714
01:00:53,690 --> 01:00:55,230
it's it's fun. It's a hot topic.

1715
01:00:55,565 --> 01:00:57,805
Yeah. Because force design is obviously preparing us

1716
01:00:57,805 --> 01:00:59,425
in direction for a war,

1717
01:01:00,525 --> 01:01:03,005
the marine corps' role in a war against

1718
01:01:03,005 --> 01:01:03,505
China.

1719
01:01:05,085 --> 01:01:06,925
Is that the proper trajectory that the marine

1720
01:01:06,925 --> 01:01:07,905
corps should be taking?

1721
01:01:12,300 --> 01:01:12,800
No.

1722
01:01:13,340 --> 01:01:13,840
Mhmm.

1723
01:01:14,140 --> 01:01:17,039
So look, I mean, it's not the wrong

1724
01:01:17,500 --> 01:01:20,059
trajectory because it and I I looked I'm

1725
01:01:20,059 --> 01:01:20,719
I'm sympathetic

1726
01:01:21,019 --> 01:01:22,160
to general Berger's

1727
01:01:22,539 --> 01:01:25,454
original argument to some extent that there's China

1728
01:01:25,454 --> 01:01:27,474
was is identified as a pacing threat,

1729
01:01:28,335 --> 01:01:30,655
but I I I am gonna make this

1730
01:01:30,655 --> 01:01:33,454
argument in a forthcoming series of articles, hopefully,

1731
01:01:33,454 --> 01:01:34,434
in War on the Rocks,

1732
01:01:35,215 --> 01:01:37,535
that just because something is a pacing threat

1733
01:01:37,535 --> 01:01:40,109
doesn't mean it's all or or nothing. And

1734
01:01:40,109 --> 01:01:40,909
I know that the

1735
01:01:41,549 --> 01:01:43,089
that there's a very good

1736
01:01:43,869 --> 01:01:44,769
force design

1737
01:01:45,150 --> 01:01:47,230
pro force design argument that it wasn't all

1738
01:01:47,230 --> 01:01:49,309
or nothing and that that's an overstatement of

1739
01:01:49,309 --> 01:01:50,449
the case. However,

1740
01:01:52,214 --> 01:01:53,914
the one inescapable document

1741
01:01:54,375 --> 01:01:56,214
that they can't get away from is a

1742
01:01:56,214 --> 01:01:58,954
2019 Commandant Planning Guidance, which very

1743
01:01:59,335 --> 01:02:01,014
I would argue makes a pretty clear all

1744
01:02:01,014 --> 01:02:01,674
or nothing

1745
01:02:02,454 --> 01:02:02,954
argument.

1746
01:02:06,349 --> 01:02:07,010
It deprioritizes

1747
01:02:07,869 --> 01:02:09,809
the ability of the Marine Corps to fight

1748
01:02:10,030 --> 01:02:11,710
in a land war Mhmm.

1749
01:02:12,030 --> 01:02:12,530
Significantly.

1750
01:02:13,550 --> 01:02:16,269
While, however, unfortunately, for the Marine Corps, still

1751
01:02:16,269 --> 01:02:19,650
maintaining requirements for con plans and old plans

1752
01:02:20,324 --> 01:02:22,644
around the world where it will be required

1753
01:02:22,644 --> 01:02:25,204
to fight in as as of what, you

1754
01:02:25,204 --> 01:02:27,925
know, the unpopular term, America's Second land army.

1755
01:02:27,925 --> 01:02:30,005
Marine Corps has always been America's Second land

1756
01:02:30,005 --> 01:02:32,005
army. You know, I mean, not since its

1757
01:02:32,005 --> 01:02:33,840
inception, but certainly since World War one.

1758
01:02:34,719 --> 01:02:36,640
I. And the idea that the Marine Corps

1759
01:02:36,640 --> 01:02:39,280
is not the America's Second land army is

1760
01:02:39,280 --> 01:02:39,780
ridiculous.

1761
01:02:41,119 --> 01:02:42,880
Point to me a ground war where the

1762
01:02:42,880 --> 01:02:45,200
Marines have not been heavily involved. Right.

1763
01:02:46,000 --> 01:02:48,295
And and, you know, there's a better story

1764
01:02:48,295 --> 01:02:50,394
there. The marines and the army are constantly

1765
01:02:50,454 --> 01:02:51,355
working together,

1766
01:02:53,335 --> 01:02:55,735
but if the marines don't bring enough combat

1767
01:02:55,735 --> 01:02:57,594
power to the fight, it it undermines

1768
01:02:57,894 --> 01:02:59,255
not only the marines who are doing the

1769
01:02:59,255 --> 01:03:01,114
fighting, but also the army as well.

1770
01:03:02,280 --> 01:03:04,760
So, yeah, I'm not gonna make an argument

1771
01:03:04,760 --> 01:03:07,019
that the stand in force should not exist.

1772
01:03:07,640 --> 01:03:09,260
I think you can definitely

1773
01:03:09,559 --> 01:03:12,039
have the Marine Littoral Regiment doing its thing

1774
01:03:12,039 --> 01:03:12,699
out there,

1775
01:03:13,079 --> 01:03:16,175
but not have given up, I would argue,

1776
01:03:16,315 --> 01:03:19,434
most importantly, the artillery capability that the Marines

1777
01:03:19,434 --> 01:03:22,155
gave up initially very quickly without without much

1778
01:03:22,315 --> 01:03:23,934
I I would argue that much forethought,

1779
01:03:25,434 --> 01:03:25,934
and

1780
01:03:26,795 --> 01:03:28,574
not coming up with a way to compensate

1781
01:03:28,795 --> 01:03:30,894
for the cuts to the F 35 program.

1782
01:03:31,010 --> 01:03:32,449
Look, I think the F-thirty five is a

1783
01:03:32,449 --> 01:03:33,989
boondoggle and it's a disaster.

1784
01:03:34,609 --> 01:03:36,449
The ace that ate the Marine Corps article

1785
01:03:36,449 --> 01:03:38,050
that came out, I'm a big fan of

1786
01:03:38,050 --> 01:03:38,710
that article,

1787
01:03:39,569 --> 01:03:40,069
and

1788
01:03:41,250 --> 01:03:42,929
I was not a fan of General Amos'

1789
01:03:42,929 --> 01:03:44,469
approach to the acquisition

1790
01:03:45,170 --> 01:03:46,309
of that aircraft.

1791
01:03:47,784 --> 01:03:50,425
However, you gotta have something that's gonna deliver

1792
01:03:50,425 --> 01:03:51,244
air air,

1793
01:03:52,265 --> 01:03:53,085
aerial munitions

1794
01:03:53,465 --> 01:03:54,284
to the fight,

1795
01:03:55,385 --> 01:03:57,864
and we didn't immediately replace all that capability

1796
01:03:57,864 --> 01:03:59,625
with drones. So I you know, we we

1797
01:03:59,625 --> 01:04:01,545
got rid of our mobile protected firepower by

1798
01:04:01,545 --> 01:04:03,570
dropping the tanks. We have now while we're

1799
01:04:03,570 --> 01:04:04,630
waiting for the ACV,

1800
01:04:05,010 --> 01:04:06,869
we've got the LAV 25,

1801
01:04:07,490 --> 01:04:09,170
which, you know, that you might as well

1802
01:04:09,170 --> 01:04:10,630
have a ZU 23,

1803
01:04:10,849 --> 01:04:13,090
which any insurgent group around the world would

1804
01:04:13,090 --> 01:04:15,250
have a copy of. That's not enough combat

1805
01:04:15,250 --> 01:04:18,194
power, not enough firepower for ground combat for

1806
01:04:18,194 --> 01:04:19,654
a serious middleweight

1807
01:04:20,114 --> 01:04:21,414
force like the Marine Corps.

1808
01:04:22,275 --> 01:04:25,074
We we gutted our indirect fire capability. We're

1809
01:04:25,074 --> 01:04:26,594
building it back up, but I mean, we

1810
01:04:26,594 --> 01:04:28,114
we did a lot of damage to our

1811
01:04:28,114 --> 01:04:30,275
ability to provide indirect fires to our our

1812
01:04:30,275 --> 01:04:30,775
troops.

1813
01:04:31,380 --> 01:04:32,900
We got rid of some of our combat

1814
01:04:32,900 --> 01:04:34,359
engineering and bridging capabilities.

1815
01:04:34,819 --> 01:04:36,279
The things that are proven

1816
01:04:36,739 --> 01:04:38,980
in the data that I show that are

1817
01:04:38,980 --> 01:04:41,380
needed are still needed all the way through

1818
01:04:41,380 --> 01:04:42,519
the mid twenty twenties.

1819
01:04:42,900 --> 01:04:43,400
So,

1820
01:04:43,940 --> 01:04:45,159
I think we've done ourselves

1821
01:04:45,460 --> 01:04:46,679
unfortunate disservice

1822
01:04:47,434 --> 01:04:49,454
by leaning too heavily in one

1823
01:04:50,235 --> 01:04:51,914
direction. I think that's that's that's a good

1824
01:04:51,914 --> 01:04:53,994
cap to this conversation. I like it. So,

1825
01:04:54,315 --> 01:04:57,215
so, Ben, where can we, find your book?

1826
01:04:57,675 --> 01:04:58,414
It's available,

1827
01:04:59,195 --> 01:05:02,574
all retailers, Amazon, Georgetown University Press website.

1828
01:05:03,440 --> 01:05:04,619
If you go to,

1829
01:05:05,039 --> 01:05:07,779
httpsgroundcombat.org,

1830
01:05:08,400 --> 01:05:10,239
I list links to all of that. You

1831
01:05:10,239 --> 01:05:11,460
can also take the quiz,

1832
01:05:12,639 --> 01:05:14,799
and you can also download the database if

1833
01:05:14,799 --> 01:05:16,719
you want to. Yeah. We'll put all that

1834
01:05:16,719 --> 01:05:18,269
stuff in the show description. And

1835
01:05:18,614 --> 01:05:20,375
And do you have any, social media presence

1836
01:05:20,375 --> 01:05:22,454
you wanna put out there for viewers to

1837
01:05:22,454 --> 01:05:24,635
follow you? Or Absolutely not. Awesome.

1838
01:05:25,175 --> 01:05:26,635
Good answer. Good answer.

1839
01:05:26,934 --> 01:05:28,795
This has been really fascinating discussion.

1840
01:05:29,655 --> 01:05:31,815
Of course, I have others. Maybe we'll bring

1841
01:05:31,815 --> 01:05:33,094
you back on the show, but I definitely

1842
01:05:33,094 --> 01:05:35,769
wanna talk, especially with your intel hat about

1843
01:05:35,769 --> 01:05:37,789
information operations. Sounded fascinating

1844
01:05:38,489 --> 01:05:40,730
that there's so little that we know about

1845
01:05:40,730 --> 01:05:41,630
recent wars.

1846
01:05:42,250 --> 01:05:43,630
And, you know, we've got,

1847
01:05:44,569 --> 01:05:46,909
you know, in this information age, information

1848
01:05:47,289 --> 01:05:47,789
proliferation

1849
01:05:48,664 --> 01:05:50,824
rapidly. Like you said, I mean, you see

1850
01:05:50,824 --> 01:05:52,925
a 50 drone strikes a day.

1851
01:05:53,704 --> 01:05:55,005
But yet we don't know

1852
01:05:55,784 --> 01:05:57,164
contextually or historically

1853
01:05:57,784 --> 01:05:59,244
much about them at all.

1854
01:06:00,105 --> 01:06:01,530
So, yeah, I'd love to

1855
01:06:02,010 --> 01:06:03,769
pick pick your brain on that some other

1856
01:06:03,769 --> 01:06:06,030
time. Yeah. Be happy to come back. Awesome.

1857
01:06:06,170 --> 01:06:07,530
Thank you so much for being here. This

1858
01:06:07,530 --> 01:06:09,530
is really great. And, yeah, we'll put all

1859
01:06:09,530 --> 01:06:11,449
this stuff, in the show notes. So thank

1860
01:06:11,449 --> 01:06:13,369
you again. Yeah. Thanks for having me, guys.

1861
01:06:13,369 --> 01:06:14,750
Yeah. Have a good one, y'all.

1862
01:06:15,785 --> 01:06:17,785
Scuttlebutt is a production of the Marine Corps

1863
01:06:17,785 --> 01:06:18,285
Association.

1864
01:06:18,825 --> 01:06:20,765
You have heard the voices or contributions

1865
01:06:21,065 --> 01:06:23,724
from major Vic Ruble, USMC retired,

1866
01:06:24,105 --> 01:06:27,164
Nancy Lichtman, William Trudy, and our guest.

1867
01:06:27,545 --> 01:06:29,945
Ty Frasier is the editor, sound engineer, and

1868
01:06:29,945 --> 01:06:30,925
technical producer.

1869
01:06:31,329 --> 01:06:33,730
The Marine Corps Association is not an agency

1870
01:06:33,730 --> 01:06:34,710
of the US government.

1871
01:06:35,250 --> 01:06:37,329
The opinions expressed in this episode are the

1872
01:06:37,329 --> 01:06:38,869
personal views of the participants

1873
01:06:39,250 --> 01:06:41,250
and do not reflect the official position of

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01:06:41,250 --> 01:06:43,409
the United States Marine Corps, the Department of

1875
01:06:43,409 --> 01:06:43,909
Defense,

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01:06:44,210 --> 01:06:45,670
or the Marine Corps Association.