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Hey, Scuttlebutt listeners. This is episode 196.
This week, we welcome adjunct professor at Georgetown
University,
executive director for Battle Study Research Group, and
author of the book Ground Combat, Puncturing the
Myth of Modern War, doctor Ben Conable to
the show.
Ben is a retired marine intelligence and Middle
East foreign area officer,
was formerly a senior political scientist at the
RAND Corporation,
and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic
Council.
Ben talks to us about his experiences in
uniform and as a foreign area officer,
the impetus behind the writing of his book,
and the empirical research he and his team
at the Battle Research Group are doing to
help improve
the collective understanding of modern warfare.
Ben speaks candidly and authoritatively,
and it was fascinating to get his thoughts
on the current course of military thinking.
Here is episode 196.
Hey, Scott O'Bart listeners. Thank you for joining
us in your continued support. I'm Vic. I'm
here with William. Howdy. And, we're really excited
to be welcoming Ben Conable to the show.
Sir, thank you so much for being here.
Very happy to be here. Yeah. This is
great.
This was actually an easy yes for us
for scheduling,
because you came referred to us by Tom
Schuman,
friend of the show. And
without even
really looking into it, like, yeah, let's get
let's get him on. And then
looking at everything you've done, really excited
to have you on,
because
of the not only your experience in the
Marine Corps,
going from, you know, enlisted to officer,
places you've been
extremely pivotal, not only in Marine Corps history,
but geopolitical,
the landscape as we see it now.
But also you've got this book coming out.
You seem like a real
freethinker
seems a little trite,
but you're not afraid to oppose sort of
conventional thinking.
And so really
excited to kind of dive into a lot
of that,
really critical thinking about
a lot of the axioms and and the
cultures that we assume are ubiquitous
throughout time. So,
yeah. Again, thank you so much for coming
down, Battling Traffic, and and being here with
us today. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I I I
I prefer, professionally blunt. Yeah. For sure. Yeah.
Yes. Right. That's right. You can work with
that. Yeah. That,
it it doesn't do well for retweets. But
yeah. You're Yeah. No.
Well, really quick. So just,
to sort of level the playing field on
who doctor Ben Conable is, your, adjunct professor
professor at, Georgetown University
security studies program,
also part time principal research scientist at the
Center for Naval Analyses
and a senior research adviser at the DT
Institute here in DC,
a retired Marine Corps intelligence officer,
a Middle East, North African Foreign Area Officer.
And,
in,
o six and o nine,
you co led the Marine Corps culture intelligence
program, which I think is an empty building
now, but I Kayokel,
correct,
is what we we've known for us
gray beards. So it would have been Kayokel.
Is that right? So I was a plank
holder for Kayokel. I was the cultural intel
program lead with marine corps intelligence activity. Oh,
okay. But, yeah, Kayokel
Yeah. I think it's I think that was
the pronunciation. Terrible
accuracy. Yeah. Yeah. But, yeah, they're they're now
defunct. Yeah. Yeah. Which is just awful.
We had had talked, I think, with, Colonel
Woodbridge, our, editor in chief last time he
was on the show
about, sort of some of the programs that
really seem to be leaning into,
at least a cultural understanding, you know, signing
officers out of TBS regions. They had to,
you know, sort of show proficiency in throughout
their careers. That has gone away.
And it it seems like we've sort of
laid the groundwork for this, oh, shit moment
where we're gonna, like, oh, I wish we
had some cultural area people or regional
expertise. We should
talking standing forces,
and,
you know, sort of alone and unafraid,
immersed within these cultures as we try to,
you know, battle near peer.
That stuff, it's gonna be like, wow. I
really wish we had some cultural expertise out
there that we had started at a younger,
you know, younger age or whatever. But, anyhow,
so, obviously, you've got the pedigree.
Really excited to dive in,
on all of your experiences, DLI,
sort of talent management,
and then your book, Ground Combat and all
of the, like you said, sort of
unpacking a lot of the assumptions that we
assume about character war, nature
war, and this sort
of chasing the bright blue you know, the
bright light all the time. Like, oh, drones
and tech and
some of the things. We were talking before
we came in.
I was taking the quiz that's on your
website.
You're not doing very well on it. So
I think you're gonna learn us all something
today. So,
really long way of leading into
what was your,
experience pre marine corps? Like, why the marine
corps? Was it,
you saw, like,
the marine ethos was just calling to you,
or was it like, I could do this
or
go work at
I am I am the greatest,
recruiting office sucker story, you know, poster child.
They could probably actually put me on a
poster with a picture of me looking at
those little tiles. Yeah. The benefit tags. Oh,
that's right. So I walked I knew I
wanted to serve and I I, I just,
you know, was like, the heck with it
and went down to the recruiting station.
What area was this? New York. Okay. Yeah.
I dropped out of college, went to the
recruiting center, and,
you know, I went to the army and
they're like, oh, we can get you, you
know,
money for college and that kind of stuff.
I walked by the navy guy and, you
know, he didn't look it just wasn't impressive
to me, and I'll keep it that way.
And then I went to the marine
recruiter's office and he looked up and he
just couldn't have cared less that I was
there. At least did a really good job
of convincing me of that. Yeah. Yeah. And,
what are you doing here? And then threw
the tiles out. And if you've never done
those tiles before, it's
what matters most to you, and it's honor
and service,
and then money is there too. And so
I stacked them all up and put, of
course, honor and service. Yeah. Yeah. And money
last, and he did a pause very dramatic
and stared at me and said, you're exactly
what we're looking for. And that was it.
I was hooked, you know, immediately. Of course,
I I I'm sure that was what rehearsed.
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No. That's great. Yeah. I
they sort of they did the
the counter thing for me when I same
thing.
Look in what I wanna do. Everybody's offering
me, you know, special forces, money for college,
whatever. And then the oh so was like,
I don't know if we could get you
in. Like, we're kinda stacked up right now.
I was like, oh, yeah, motherfucker. Let's watch
this.
Hold my beer. Yeah.
So,
so then you you sign up and, if
I Celestia, you're a machine gunner. Is that
right? You went you went o three? I
did. Yeah.
You know, I was probably the worst machine
gunner in the marine corps because I came
out of Barrack City. I was at the
camp Camp David. Okay. Yeah. Ethan and I,
for my first tour. It was that was
really interesting because it was right in the
middle of the crack, epidemic in the late
eighties. Okay. And we were doing security on
the streets in Southeast DC. About to say
Southeast DC. That's a Tight crew there,
of marines from Eighth And Ninth, Camp David.
I'm still in close contact with a lot
of them.
That was from the late eighties.
Then I went out to 39,
when I was, you know, I was like
a barracks corporal, and so, yeah, I got
deservedly got no respect.
And and, I was in the Gulf War
though in in with three nine Okay. Task
force papa bear. I got to
the I was in colonel then then lieutenant
Frank Donovan, now lieutenant general Frank Donovan's platoon,
and it was he was, he was terrific.
Some really solid marines, and, you know, we
did our job. And is that where you're
sort of, like,
like, were you reading the tea leaves of
as far as, like, your the marines involvement
in The Middle East?
Is that what led you to that or
no? It was just, like, I Give me
the hell out of here. 19 year old
knucklehead.
You know, I think I was maybe 20
by the time I went out there. I
mean, it was no. I was just along
for the ride. And I volunteered. It was
it was kind of a funny story. I
was actually I had orders
to two nine and back then a corporal
would tell you where you were going. You
know, you would check-in. It was all paperwork.
Yeah. And he said, well, where you're going
to 29. I go, well, but I'm a
I had gone to an,
chemical biological defense course at Camp David and
they go, oh, well, we're gonna need you
and he just immediately switched my orders right
then and there. 29 was the only battalion
that didn't deploy if I remember correctly.
Okay. Well, they have good choice then. Right?
Yeah. Yeah. So then you went MECEP
directly after? Is that I did. Sort of
the promotion?
Yeah. And, that that is a terrific program.
It's a marine enlisted commissioning education program, basically
NCO to officer. Yeah. And I went to
the University of Colorado.
But I I will credit my experience even
as a kind of a crappy NCO,
to giving me the mindset that you alluded
to at the beginning of the podcast, which
is, you know, this be blunt and be
straightforward.
Be critical. Don't be afraid to speak your
mind. But if you if you do speak
your mind, have a plan Mhmm.
Of action to to make up for it.
So, you know, have a recommendation.
And as long as you come in with
a recommendation, as long as you're professional, then
you're doing the right thing. And so I
carried that with me through the MECEP program,
into into my time as an officer. Okay.
Nice. Yeah. And and just for those who
aren't aware, the MECEP program is an opportunity
for
enlisted marines,
to
be awarded
essentially a
college
scholarship
with
stipend for housing and and food, BRCBAH,
and non competitive promotion while you're in the
program
with a payback tour. Obviously,
once you're through,
if I had known about this as a
young man, I probably wouldn't have gone to
college. It's such a
fantastic
thing. And I encouraged when I was a
platoon commander, company commander, or even battalion XL,
like, let's use because in a lot of
ways, the the
the screening process is really can you get
the package together. Like, that's where you get
most of your attrition.
And especially now, there's so many universities
offering this program.
Yeah, if if you're listening and and
you're considering college, you feel like you have
to get out of the Marine Corps to
do it, you do not look into MICEP.
It's an unbelievable, unbelievable program. Yeah. I agree.
I can't say enough about it. Yeah.
So great. So then,
Intel then. So you go to TBS
quality thirds. Was it Oh, no. I I
I wound up getting,
military police because I was I think I
was I was, like,
aiming squarely at the bottom of the top
third. Yes. That's right. And I was, you
know, terrified. Top of the bottom, actually. Yeah.
I had, like, this
kernel of fear that I was gonna be
put into an MOS that I definitely did
not want. I won't list any of those,
but you you all know who you are.
And, so there were only two ways out,
Intel and MP. And because I had been,
Ethan and I Okay. And he was a
possibility. So I actually was a military police
officer for, for my first tour. Okay. Lap
moved then into Intel? Is that I lap
moved later. Yeah. Mhmm. Very cool. And then,
once you're in that pipeline, then DLI
followed suit? Or I I simultaneously applied for
the foreign area officer program fail and a
lat move into intel, and I got both
approved at the same time Oh, wow. Coming
out of a tour in Okinawa, where I
had been lucky to be on the fourth
marine staff, which was amazing, you know, just
kind of full immersion into the Pacific Theater
Yeah. Yeah. Life. Interesting.
So yeah. So the this old these thing
these cards just sort of fell on a
place then. It wasn't sort of premeditated like,
hey. I've been I had no no premeditation
for anything in my life. And so this
is one of the things I I tell
students and people that I I sometimes mentor
now as an older guy.
You just sink yourself into whatever's in front
of you, with a fanaticism. You know, you
just drive
completely
drive yourself into the deck, you know, focused
on the thing right in front of you
and and commit fully to the organization that
you're with now. And don't worry about what
comes next. Because if you do if you
do the right thing in the present, it
it'll all pay off. Yeah. So No. That's
great words. I I kinda yeah. I
had this really,
horrible characteristic of always looking at the like,
what's next even while I'm still learning what
the hell it is I'm doing. I'm already,
like, thinking about what's next.
So yeah. No. That's great. ADHD helps with
that.
And then so as your experience as a
foreign area officer,
I wanna say that,
and I might be jumping ahead to your
career, but you were
the,
attache
in Jordan? Yeah. I was jumping ahead. So
I I did,
I I went to Naval Postgraduate School, got
my degree, got my language training at DLI,
went to Cairo,
for a year, traveled around The Middle East,
which is great. So that's the
phase. Pre nine eleven?
That was nine eleven happened while I was
at Arabic language. Oh, wow. Okay. So it
was a bit of a How was that,
actually? Like yeah. How was like,
is this one of these, like,
oh, shit. This is now I get granted
you're already of a combat vet, but, I
mean,
I for me, 09/11,
because I came in through the Clinton era,
was not something that was, like, quite literally
on the radar.
Yep. So it was very
shocking, and
things got very real very quickly.
You being at DLI as
a as a Middle East you know, future
Middle East fail and Arabic
student.
What was that like for you? Like, were
you just like, my business is about to
get a lot busier. Yeah. Yeah. No. We
all were. I mean, because I was in
the Arab Arabic,
you know, cohort there. Yeah. And, you know,
we had a lot of young students in
there, and we had some conversations with, like,
this is it. We're very clearly going to
war now. Yeah. Everybody immediately knew that we
were we were going to war.
The base, you know, there was even concern
all the way out in Monterey, California that
we're gonna get attacked, which, you know, in
retrospect, it's a little bit silly, but the
feeling was very real. Mhmm.
And, you know, we transitioned to a wartime
footing almost almost, on a dime.
Jeez. Yeah. I can only imagine. So alright.
So, yeah, so now you're in the middle
you're in Egypt?
Sort of. Egypt,
and then I went back to headquarters Marine
Corps as an intel officer,
and was at was a Middle East Desk
Officer there at headquarters Marine Corps. And then
I just volunteered to deploy one time after
another Okay.
Into into Iraq. And I got to do
the march up, with the division forward
command post and then I returned into Anbar,
with general Mattis as his cultural advisor and
as an intel ops officer with general
then lieutenant colonel Gruen, retired
three star now.
And then my last tour, I was the
senior intel officer in Anbar Province,
working for Pete Devlin. What year was that?
So I invasion o three, then o four
for the
the Anbar tour sort of right there. Was
that Flusia Ramadi? Yeah. Okay. I was in
I was at Camp Blue Diamond in Ramadi.
And then,
in o five, o '6, I was back
as the Intel I'll start with Ramadi in
Flusia then. Okay. Yeah. Wow. They really you've
really wrecked and stacked it. Yeah. Yeah. What
was it like in Egypt,
post nine eleven?
I've really never talked to anyone who was
in that area. Like, what were the
I guess, what were our ally regional allies?
Like, how was what was the fuel?
Stunned,
I think, would be the right term. I
mean, it was it was vacant. I mean,
this is a this is a part of
the world that thrives on tourism. Yeah. And
so Egypt, Jordan, all the countries that I
was traveling to had this huge tourism deficit.
I mean, I went I went to the
Valley Of Kings,
and I was the only one there. I
went to, you know, every every place I
went, it was like I had the whole
the whole world to myself.
So as a tourist,
which was part of my job to go
travel around,
was it was fantastic, but it was terrible
for their economies. I mean, they probably still
haven't recovered from it.
And psychologically,
I you know, this is an important thing
to keep in mind as we deal with
the Canadians and Europeans and Mexicans now,
is that in my experience historically,
also I think in literature, if you engage
with people directly point to point, they'll tell
you, look, I have no issue with you.
It's your government.
That was the same mindset after 09:11 as
well. Okay.
Was there you know, because one of the
really salacious things that,
media outlets were doing here
were showing
sort of the Arab. And I use air
quotes for because you can't see what I'm
doing. But the and I I put Arab
in air quotes because
the media at that time sort of portrayed
anybody who was brown and not from South
America as Arab. Right.
And so they were showing sort of the
Arab response in at eleven. Of course, it
was the
most
sort of
flag
rallying sort of depictions. What was your experience?
Because I've heard from folks who,
you know, that there was actually a a
really a a sense of
of sadness and for you know, being really
forlorn over the thing, kind of already understanding
what the response is going to be like
and what its effect on their lives are
gonna That's a better description. Yeah. Look, I
mean, it's
it's average people. It's normal people going about
their daily lives.
They don't walk around for the most part
harboring
animosity and screaming
into cameras. I mean, that's Yeah. That's a
soda straw view, and it's a very select
one too. No. I didn't experience any of
that. Yeah. It's fascinating stuff.
Okay. And then so then, you leave the
marine corps, and then that's you and then
oh. Well, then I did
so my last, couple tours, I was
at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity here on Quantico,
which was great. I I really enjoyed it.
Great learning experience. I got to work with
some incredibly smart folks. And then my last
tour,
I I was in Natache, which was also
terrific. That was incredible. I mean, I had
one great tour after another. Yeah. And then,
yeah. Well, I was at the embassy in
Algiers for a little bit, and then I
went to Amman, Jordan for eighteen months as
a marine and naval attache. And that's how
I closed out my career. Yeah. You know,
I can't say enough. My all of my
experience with the Jordanians has been just absolutely
outstanding. You
know, obviously, they were just an absolute
key ally,
during the long war, especially, you know, with
us. And and I was out
in even though I was in
Anbar sort of
along Wadi Heron there at, Wuhayat, we still,
had a lot of interactions
out west in just the Jordanian intelligence and
stuff that they we were
they were feeding us and cooperation we had,
like a KV and all kinds of stuff.
It was just unbelievable.
And then I worked with some Jordanians when
I was in UAE as well and just
I can't say enough about that partnership and
and everything that they did enabling us to
do our mission. So They're real professionals, and
I still count a lot of them as
very close friends. I go back frequently.
Still stay heavily engaged in that area and
also in Iraq too.
But I may or may not have crossed
over the border at one point. Isn't that
tache to say hi to some marine friends
on the other side. Nice. Yeah. That was
fun. If it happened, it may not happen.
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. But there was a
really sharp colonel on the Jordanian side working
that border in a very tense time, and
I know there was a lot of great
support there. Great. That's that's so cool. So
how do you transition from the Marine Corps
and then to academia? Terribly.
I had no plan, even though I had
a family, my wife and a kid on
the way. I'd I'd really I
did what I always done, which is
ADHD committed myself to the job at hand.
And, I will tell you, if you're retiring,
don't ever do it from overseas.
Yeah. Really, really challenging
to do it. Does UAE
and FifthMed was my Yeah. Really brutal. But
I got I got really lucky. I I
was asked to speak at a workshop on
Anbar Province,
with Ray Gerber. Some of the listeners may
know who Ray is.
And just so happened there's a guy from
the Rand Corporation there, and he was listening
to me talk about Anbar, which was, you
know, one of my areas of expertise.
And he said, what are you doing? And
I said, I don't have a plan. He
goes, send me your CV. And two days
later, I had a job at Rand. Wow.
Yeah. It was amazing. That was really amazing.
And that that that went on to be
a terrific experience as well.
And then, you're still focusing in The Middle
East then through Rand,
or Diversified.
I mean, Rand one of the great things
about Rand so if any if anybody's unfamiliar
with it, it's a federally it has within
it federally funded research
and development centers,
which are kind of like half government, half
private,
research entities.
And so it it's a flattish
organization. It gives you an amazing opportunity to
work on many different areas. So I was
doing a lot yeah, I was doing a
lot of Middle East stuff, but I was
doing insurgency, counterinsurgency
theory, counterterrorism,
conventional warfare,
Middle East I'm sorry, Asia.
I got to travel all over the world.
I did a lot of Afghanistan work when
that
heated up. So,
no, it was a
really fascinating diverse intellectual experience and I got
to engage what was really great about it
is I stayed engaged
with Marines, with soldiers
on a routine basis. I got to go
out around the country and around the world
interviewing them,
and being in the field with them and
seeing
things through their eyes, which was which I
then tried to convey back to the policy
makers in DC. That's cool. Yeah. When we
mentioned,
before we started recording that you were doing
actual,
classes and briefings
for units that were working up, right? So
like we were talking about Afghanistan. So you
were actually working with those units that were
in the chute. Yeah. And I was lucky
to have amazing
Afghan real Afghan experts. I was not one,
but, Arturo Munoz and Dave Phillips,
they're,
talking to these bringing them out to speak
with marines and soldiers before they deployed.
Hopefully, we helped a little bit. Yeah. I've
yeah. I I got a when I my
brought to Afghanistan,
I was, I and I
in Jacksonville
got orders, and I was told, but don't
get a apartment. You're leaving, like, in two
weeks. Yeah. So I didn't get a lot
of that kinda workup stuff. But based off
of the performance of the marines, they were
definitely ready to go.
I think I was the one holding them
back. But,
so how did you end up then at
Georgetown?
Part of, part of being at Rand is
there are actually quite a few Rand folks
that teach as adjunct at Georgetown, and I
somebody suggested it, and I got invited over.
And, I've been teaching there for over ten
years now. I only teach one class a
year. I started out with insurgency and counterinsurgency,
and then I created a course on human
behavior and war centered on some work on
the will to fight Yeah. That I had
led at Rand in the last, I think,
seven years that I was there.
But I really Georgetown is also a terrific
institution. Sounds like an interesting course. Who do
you have, like, on your syllabus for recommended
reading for that? So I have two books.
One is,
Inside the Insurgency. I can't I'm sorry. The
name's escaping me at the moment. The Algerian
Insurgency by Zora Dreif.
The title is wrong, but,
it's a female insurgence
kind of autobiographical
explanation of what the insurgency was like. And
it's really her her book was the the,
inspiration for the movie, The Battle of Algiers,
if you've if you've ever seen it. Yeah.
And then the other one is Lord Moran's
Anatomy of Courage, which any marine should read.
It should be if if it's not on
the common knowledge reading list, it should be
on the common knowledge reading list. Yeah. And
then I've I overload I've been told I
overload the students with,
everything else because I want them to read
all of them. Yeah. Perfect. Well, we've asked,
I think, a lot of the, Vik has
asked a lot of the good cop questions.
Now it's it's bad cop time. You,
you currently, have a book that's coming out
in, this month. Correct? March? It's out. It's
out. It's out. Perfect. Alright. Go get it.
But, so the title is Ground Combat Puncturing
the Myths of Modern War. So just for
our audience's sake,
quickly just address, you know, what question what
gap in academia were you trying to answer
or fill?
What's your thesis? And then we can go
from there.
When I was at Rand,
I, you know, I was
repeatedly
frustrated
by
the lack of kind of constructive analysis of
modern warfare. We had a lot of kind
of deep dives on specific events. We had
a lot of political and sociopolitical analysis of
war, but we really didn't have like that
kind of traditional
historical
on the ground
consistent
approach to understanding what happened. So
in general, in The United States, we've stopped
treating war as history.
We treat war
as a political this is an academia, as
a political and social phenomenon,
which is fine because
the politics and the social aspects of warfare
are essential for us to understand, but abandoning
the history part of it, which we've done
to a significant extent,
means that we we don't we don't see
what has actually happened. And if you don't
know what has actually happened,
then you're you're bound to
draw some
bad start with bad assumptions and then draw
bad conclusions Right. From this impartial data that
we have. So one of the things I
I really wanted to do was build this
database
of of modern combat,
and to try to make it as comprehensive
as possible.
Zero interest
across the Department of Defense in doing that
kind of basic research.
Zero interest from the military historical
community,
because it takes money to get people out
into the field to do these things. So
So wait. Is that is that really the
rub? Is the money? Or is there just
a lack of intellectual curiosity?
The curiosity is there. The capacity is is
mostly gone. I mean, there there is don't
get me wrong. There's still military history departments
in United States, but they're
anemic compared to what we used to have.
And if you look at the kinda history,
when when we think military history, we think
like the stuff we read growing up about
World War two and Vietnam. It's incredibly detailed
and rich. You could tell
where
people were on the battlefield and the timeline
and the narrative and and Yeah. Order battle
and that kind of stuff.
I mean,
just go ahead and go through your head
and see if you could pull that up
for even battles that we participated in Yeah.
For both sides.
So, yeah, it it's and it's it does
take money. So one thing that doesn't take
a huge amount of money is to do
a deskside analysis
and do start by creating this database, which
I did. And that's what that's the foundation
of the book is this database of 423
modern battles. So 2003
to 2022,
'20 year period.
So,
when I so, essentially, then, I guess, the
second part of the question is, based off
of the data you collected from 423 modern
battles,
what argument are you trying to to make
that that a lot of academia is missing?
What because you said, quote, unquote, in your
on your website,
you asked several questions. Like, what if there's
no character of war? So let's start with
there.
You say that, we often assume that we
can characterize war with a universal explanation. Evidence
from both historical and modern war suggests that
there is not, in fact, a universal character
of war. Readers may be surprised to find
out who agrees with this conclusion. So my
first part is, who is making the argument
that there is universal character's war? Because I
always interpret it as more of, like, it's
lightning in the bottle trying to understand the
character war. It changes so rapidly and so
quickly,
especially from a historical perspective.
I I focus primarily marine corps, American civil
war.
Character war can change exponentially
over the course of of several battles or
a single battle. So who's making this argument
that,
the universal character war that character war is
universal, and then how do you combat that
idea?
Well, almost the entire US government is making
that argument, and they've done it in writing
repeatedly, and and,
verbally articulated. I mean, so you got generals,
secretaries of defense, so on and so forth
saying the character of war has dramatically changed.
The character of war is now x. Because
the character of war has changed, we need
to buy this new system.
We need to divest ourselves of these, you
know, obviously, we're leaning into forces. Forces. Force
design here, and I don't want and we
can come to force design,
and and I I take a middle ground
approach on that on that very, very sensitive
and controversial topic.
But but this work I do attack force
design in my book. I hope I do
so constructively,
but the the
the basic argument that the character of war
is universal is kind of endemic in our
whole discourse, right? It's the way we talk
about war.
And because we haven't defined it and because
we've just kind of blindly accepted this nebulous
term,
it it allows people to make
kinda hyperbolic statements like that. We can say,
oh, no. It's it's changed so dramatically
that if we don't get rid of x
or if we don't buy this incredibly exquisite
missile system,
we're gonna lose the next war. And it
is almost always painted in existential terms. And
I I point to
Andrew Kropinovich,
Bob Werk when he was his, deputy secretary
of defense,
very clearly making these statements and and very
clearly in writing saying, the character of war
has changed.
If we do not buy these things, we
will die.
Which is such an interesting thing to hear,
from the marine corps perspective because that was
the argument that has been used many times
to get rid of the marine corps
that we don't need of anymore
because we have this exquisite
I mean, nuclear weapons, for example, was supposed
to completely
do away with things like marines. Yeah. Right?
So is is your issue the definition of
character war that they're using or the concept
of character war in the first place?
The concept. Right? The idea that you can
create this universal universal
description. As you yourself just said,
you know, in in reality, if you if
you dig in, this kinda goes back to
why I why I wanted to build this
database to start out with. If you look
at the way war has actually been practiced
around the world and not trying to kind
of virtually fill in gaps with opinion,
sometimes a very strong opinion,
then
you're you're left the only conclusion you can
really come away with
objectively is to say there is no universal
character of war. It's different in many in
in around the world at different scales and
scopes and different kinds of terrain,
depending on who's who's fighting. So
if you can accept that,
then all of these arguments about the dramatically
changing character of war and the need to
buy these things or divest
kind of go out the window. Mhmm. And
so this is an essential
policy
argument that I'm making here, even while I'm
making what I hope is an interesting kind
of military history argument and I have some
case descriptions in there that are Mhmm. I
I hope are are interesting as well. That's
so interesting because the idea that I'm trying
to make a universality of the character war
when the nature war is supposed to be
immutable, but the character war is supposed to
be constantly evolving and changing that you can't
make a universe. And the fact that the
a lot of people in the DOD have
have done so is is is is quite
interesting. So to go back into your to
database to support your argument that you're saying
there is no universal character war, which you
you have great evidence for,
what information were you inputting into this dat
database?
What,
like, are are you describing battles? Are you
just inputting figures?
Like, please, let's let's let's dig into that
a little bit. Yeah. Let me let me
put a hook for something if we wanna
follow-up a little later about the idea of
the immutable nature and constantly changing character. Mhmm.
Klasovitz never said that, so but we can
come back to that. Mhmm. Yeah. That's on
the quiz, actually. I think I got that
one. Yeah. I'm ruining the quiz. I'm ruining
the quiz here first.
If anybody wants to take that, it's online
at groundcombat.org
and it's free and everything. But,
so the database itself is is a
description of as many battles as I could
find
in the public domain using as many sources
as were available to me, including kind of
paid databases and stuff.
And I would
it lists the battle itself, a description of
the battle, who fought on which side. I
try to answer four main questions. What was,
you know, who fought and what was the
order of battle?
What was the geometry of forces? How were
they arrayed against each other throughout the course
of the battle?
What was the narrative of the battle? What's
the story? You know, is there a story
that can be told in kind of very
basic terms?
And then,
what was the timeline? How how did these
things transpire over time? And then I very
specifically dig into the technology that was used
in each in each fight,
down to the rifles that were employed by
both sides all the way up to missile
technology. And I code for that so it
can be used by students. Actually, there's a
team at West Point that's, doing this right
now with the database,
and it's available free online to anybody.
Incredible.
So,
my my question is,
going going forward, so you you you you've
pulled off
all of these, battles from various conflicts since
'20 you said 02/2003. Correct? January 2003. January
'2 thousand '3. Yes. 02/2003.
So I guess my question is,
a lot of this stuff, I guess, because
you you're right. There really hasn't been a
a traditional,
because the idea of traditional versus new military
history, the idea of like, you mentioned earlier,
just studying the maps, the tactics that it
would be is trying to figure out what
actually happened versus now where it's more,
again, like,
the human experience aspect of it.
To what extent do you do you feel
there may be gaps in your own in
databases based on the fact that there is
limited information out there? Are you just trying
to at least be a pioneer
to to guide other historians to follow suit
in you? Yeah. I think the latter. I
mean, I I acknowledge multiple times in the
book and in the database itself that it
is not comprehensive.
And I argue that, in fact, we can't
know,
all the battles that have taken place around
the world even in that twenty year period
because we've done such a poor job of
of recording them, of being physically present.
And I am very clear that
we know that there were hundreds of battles
in Iraq and Afghanistan
that are not
kind of visible in the public domain,
and but they are in databases
behind the green door that I'm trying to
help trying to help get released.
We'll see. Wish me luck on that one.
But yeah. No. I wanna I wanna shine
a light and say, look, we can do
this. I was told repeatedly when I tried
to do this at Rand, can't be done.
You can't come up with this list of
all these battles, so don't even bother trying.
And I don't it's not something I like
hearing.
So actually, like you said, hold my hold
my beer. Right?
And so it was brutal,
building even this version of it. I'm aware
of gaps in it already,
and I just hope it inspires other people
to do more. Is this was this a
solo mission? Do you have a team of
people working or Solo mission, I did have
some research assistants
doubling my effort on a select number of
cases just for what's called intercoder reliability to,
to but more on more on sourcing to
make sure I wasn't missing anything.
So one of the questions, excuse me, that
you post on your website is, what if
drones are are not really a game changer?
And that's obviously a big one. Just you're
you're seeing drones,
in a lot of cassette articles. That's it's
a it's a common reoccurring thing, especially in
the past, several years
and further aggravated by the Ukraine Russian war
that's going on currently.
Our drone's really a game changer. Yeah. No.
We are we are,
kind of hostages to our most recent
online experience in many ways.
And that that kind
of terminology, the kind of exaggeration that we
live in on a daily basis now,
this is insane, that'll blow your mind, you
know, this is a game changer, stop everything.
It it's we're so accustomed to hearing that
now that it's almost background noise,
but we've also accepted at face value that
drones,
first of all, are new somehow
and that they have completely changed the way
that we fight. They have not. They are
not new, first of all, and I'll get
into that in a second, but they haven't
changed the way that we fight. If you
spend a significant amount of time examining what's
actually happening on the ground in Ukraine, which
I have and I continue to do so,
I have a team in Ukraine right now
conducting a battle study.
We have a previous one called Battle of
Irpin River that's available online if anybody wants
to look at it, James Sladen.
The fighting that takes place
is similar to what would have happened with
or without drones flying overhead,
very, very similar. There are minor modifications here
and there,
but
we are in kind of enraptured by these
compilations
of FPV drone strikes and things like that.
First of all, drones have been around
since the beginning of the twentieth century.
They were first used in I'm ruining my
quiz here today. Right? But, yeah. Taking notes
actually. I know. Sorry. You're gonna get a
better score now.
They were they were used in combat in
in 1940. They were used throughout the throughout
World War two. They were used extensively in
the Vietnam War. They were used in combat
in the nineteen seventy three war. The Israelis
and the South Africans really built the modern
drone industry,
and they use the drones extensively in Lebanon,
in places like, Angola,
and then we adopted fully adopted drones,
and employed them. I mean, if you were
involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, drones were part
of your daily life. Right? Yeah. My dad
was actually at Dragon Eye when it first
came out. Yeah. Dragon Eye. Yeah. Right. Exactly.
At all at all of it. Now
were micro drones
anywhere near as ubiquitous?
No.
Of course not. That that's that would be
silly to say. Were drones
available
to groups like the Islamic State
in 2012
the same way that they were in 2017?
No, of course not. So there's
been a clear proliferation of drones
at the lower level.
It's, they're now ubiquitous.
However,
keep in mind that, and I made this
point for a CSIS panel the other day,
that there's a 1,200 kilometer fixed battle line
in Ukraine.
The entire industrial base of Ukraine and the
entire industrial base of Russia
is co located to a static
battlefront
feeding drones in
from the entire
world supply,
all focused on this one war. Right? China
is is
funneling
millions of drones. The United States is paying
right. So all of these drones are being
funneled towards this fixed frontline,
and they're ubiquitous,
but not every war is going to look
like that.
And now so again, keep in mind, the
fighting that's taken place in Ukraine
is actually
very similar to fighting that has taken place
elsewhere
and there's a there's a unique aspect to
the industrial
fixed nature of the fight too. So I
I I will make a very strong argument.
I'll I'll go down swinging on that one
that, drones have not changed warfare. And and
what what you mean by,
it's the same as where you would see
it in other places is we're talking
orders of battle of the same,
troop strengths
Yep. Positions,
named area of interests,
indirect,
direct,
FPCs,
you know, FPFs,
you know, all of those all the things
you learn at TBS, right, during, you know,
offense, defense, and all that good stuff. I
mean, is that essentially
I I teach I teach a class on
on the book. And one of the things
I do is I show a video montage,
a drone video montage. I mean, by the
way, there there are new ones produced every
single day the Ukrainians and the Russians churn
them out. Mhmm.
I probably watch
a hundred to a 50 drone strikes a
day on on various websites,
Telegram channels, things like that.
And then I show
trench combat,
infantry combat, mechanized assault
montage videos. And I say, if I put
if I split you into two different rooms
and I just fed you on a steady
diet
of one of these two and put you
back together, you you the two groups would
have a completely different perception of what war
is.
And what the reality is is that war
is both of those things simultaneously.
Okay.
Drones are there. Yeah. They're absolutely having an
impact,
but
for in a large part, both sides are
are are relying more heavily on drones because
they can't rely on their air forces. Mhmm.
You know, Ukraine has an anemic air force
compared to the Russians,
and the Russian air force has been has
been significantly damaged and is wasn't as strong
as we anticipated it would be. Yeah. Beginning
of the war. So, I mean, there's a
compensatory
in,
factor here as well. So you're you're making
the argument that drones are not changing the
character of war,
but it goes back into the this what
a lot of other people are saying is,
like, we need to buy,
this equipment.
Is is this necessary for us to sustain
ourselves? Do you but not, not believe that,
Americans should be investing in drones? Do you
think that
maybe if even the carriage war has not
changed, they're still worthy investment?
What are your thoughts on that? That's a
great I mean, that's a great question
because
our our culture now is
essentialist.
Right? So whatever
question you're asking, it either it's it has
a binary answer. Right? It's either all of
this or none of this or you know?
And of course, that's not how life
generally works.
Of course, we should invest in drones. Of
course, we should try to maintain the techno
technological advantage over our our current adversaries and
our perspective adversaries.
Absolutely.
And I think it's very easy to kinda
dismiss arguments like mine by saying, well, you
just don't you you just you're, you know,
Neil Luddite.
Right? And which, by the way, complete misunderstanding
of what Luddism was. But right? But I'm
not I'm not averse to technology,
but I'm also not a technophile.
And and the problem with this kind of
lack of knowledge is that we are vulnerable
to these
kind of
aggressive technophilic arguments. Right? That, you know Mhmm.
Yeah. It basically goes back to the revolution
in military affairs if you guys are you're
familiar with that. I mean, the,
the idea
that
the there is the this earth shattering
game changing event that takes place or new
technology that's introduced combined with a new tactic
or something,
that
that reorders the very nature of war, the
very nature.
This goes back to the hook that I
set earlier. Oh, we're coming back to it.
Don't worry. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
But it you know, it's an it's a
it's an important one because the arguments
for the revolution of military affairs for this
idea that if we just buy the right
technology that we'll solve all of war's problems.
And then painting anybody that disagrees as a
as a Luddite and not, you know, as
averse to technology,
which is just
often flat out wrong,
it it hinges on the idea that there
is this immutable nature of war and this
constantly changing character. And so if you wanna
lead in No. Yeah. Myself in. You mentioned,
you know, that Clausewitz did not say that.
Yeah. You did not. But MCDP one does
say that. So would you how would you
do you think based on
your arguments that you made that MCDP one
could use a rewrite in that regard, and
how would you rewrite it? Boy, that's been
tried.
Yeah, multiple times. I'm a huge fan of
MCDP one, and and, I am I I
I still refer to it frequently,
and I cite it,
and I think it is a fantastic
document. It is probably the best
doctrinal
publication
in The US military
period. And there's a reason it's people have
had so much trouble
rewriting it.
However, it doesn't mean it's flawless. Of course.
Look. I mean, I wouldn't even call it
necessarily
a a flaw. It's a gap.
What is the nature of war?
Right now, it lists a number of things.
The MCDP one is,
friction, chaos,
uncertainty,
dynamism.
What, am I missing?
I think I'm missing a couple there.
I miss Yeah. I mean, so the so
so the authors of MCDP one settled on
some Klasovitzian
terms Mhmm. That I think most people would
generally agree upon.
But most people generally agreeing on something doesn't
make it an immutable nature,
doesn't make it an immutable law.
And there are elements there there are points
in warfare where it's clear as day.
If I'm flying a drone
over
an enemy
target and they have no air defense
and that it's in the middle of a
desert and they have no concealment, I see
exactly where they are and I say blow
that up and I push a button and
I kill it. Okay. I mean, that's not
chaotic or dynamic or right? So Right. Or
I'm certain Yeah.
But but if Clausewitz never said that, and
by the way, Beatrice Heuser,
Tony Echeverria,
and others kinda back I think back me
up on that one. I I won't try
to speak for them, but I I cite
the I cite the references in the book.
Then
that whole argument is specious. Right? Mhmm. We
we that means that you can't say, well,
there's been this dramatic revolutionary change to the
nature of war because we've invented
nuclear weapons, because we've invented
precision guided munitions,
the historical kind of revolution in military affairs
arguments.
That whole argument, that whole thing falls apart
when you can't define or pin down
nature and character.
And I would argue
that those the RMA
proponents
abuse
our gap in knowledge
and abuse the lack of definition.
And I call them out directly.
I'm still waiting for a blowback on that
one. I'm sure Perfect. Sure it's perfect. Yeah.
Yeah. So is there a better set of
terminology
Yeah. That you think that we could use
to replace that's more productive,
or is it or is it worth reeducating
and and trying to actually
pin down these concepts with more with more
concrete historically informed terms?
Yeah. What I what I propose in the
book is just saying characteristics and not trying
to
create a reality that doesn't exist. Mhmm. You
know, I I mean, if you can't define
something, you can't you can't
create this clear holistic and comprehensive picture of
something
in real terms and you're dealing with something
very real and violent
with
sometimes existential consequences
like war,
don't do it.
Just
do what we say we do in MCDP
one,
which is to accept
uncertainty,
accept some chaos,
accept the fact that there are things we
just don't know,
and
we don't know what the the so called
character of war is. So just say, okay,
what can we know? We can know characteristics.
We can know we can see trends in
the use of different kinds of equipment or
tactics or the way that people behave in
certain conditions.
We can see trends
in innovation and economic influences
on the practice of warfare. So there are
characteristics
that are observable,
and they never give you a satisfying whole
picture, but they're definitely worth following. What how
is that
how is that being received, though, especially in
this era where, like you had mentioned,
we do sort of fall into
this desire for a binary solution.
And we definitely are out of an era
where Nuance is even not only is it
not accepted, but it's frowned upon Yeah. To
try to look at nuance. Is your approach
being well received, or
are you giving scoffed at? I mean, I'm
being it's it's well received by the people
that are telling me that they like the
book. I mean, I you know, but that's
a very small sample size. I mean, the
book is selling it's selling well.
I I I'll take that as,
hopefully, as some sign that it's being received
at least with some open mind. I am
getting
broader conversations, though. I am getting a little
bit of a sense of pushback. Yeah. And
that From which community is the same way?
Yeah. Is that policy makers or is that
military folks? Military folks,
colonels,
some majors,
had a couple of corporals and sergeants that
I had really interesting conversations with who
are not
buying into this enormous kind of tech forward
narrative.
Yeah. I I
I but I don't have any enough kind
of data to back up that I'm that
I'm winning an argument of any kind.
You know, we're we're in kind of a
chaotic moment in history here anyway, so I'm
not sure what kind of traction I'm gonna
get. I think, unfortunately, we're gonna be in
our next conflict before,
I find out. Mhmm. And then,
do you find that it's
sort of does this
does this
sort of paradigm shift
or a mindset
shift, does it work well in academia, but
it's hard to apply?
Or do you see a practical application,
a direct application to this sort
of nuanced approach to how we
prepare for war? Well, my argument is that
the practical application is gonna smack you right
in the face.
Right? And that if either you maintain the
capabilities that you need to fight an actual
ground combat Mhmm. Specifically,
and,
you know, if do if you wanna be
able to do the things you say you're
going to do,
then you need these things.
And if you haven't proven to me that
you don't need them, then don't get rid
of them.
We can think of some specific examples here.
And
if I'm if I'm wrong,
I'm only gonna be disproven by a series
of
events. But if I'm right, I can
be proven right in one and I won't
be happy to be proven right. I want
specifically, I want the Marine Corps and all
American and allied partner forces to be successful
And I don't want them to
to to fall, to come up short because
they don't have a capability. They don't have
the right number of people, the right type
of people. Yeah. They don't have the people
aren't don't have the right mindset,
You know?
Well, also too, it seems like through this
extensive research and this database you created that
there's an underpinning for it. This is just
opinion
based off of, you know, very limited empirical
evidence. Right? Like, you have
the analytics and the underpinning
Yeah. The intellectual underpinning. And it's transparent.
I I I am the database is free
and available online.
It is completely transparent. You can see every
single thing that I did. I walk I
walk you through
step by step
the exact process I took. I point out
the weaknesses in the database that I'm aware
of.
No. So everything is driven
by logical argumentation from evidence.
Look, from getting back to the characteristics piece,
I say, look,
okay, let's look at the trends and characteristics.
Tanks were employed
in,
I believe it's 69%
of all of the four twenty three modern
battles by one side or the other or
both.
That means that there was a perceived value
for armor,
light armor or lightly armored or
light armed vehicles,
I think was,
something like 96%
of it of uses. Infantry,
100%
of every case.
Alright.
Indirect small arms, indirect fire, every case. So
and artillery was, I believe, was in the
eighties,
manned aircraft, I believe, was in the 80%
range.
So all of what we would consider the
kind of traditional core combat capabilities
were essential to Magtaf stuff. Magtaf stuff. And,
you know, this does look, this does bring
us to force design. Right? And if we
wanna talk about that, I'd be happy to.
Well, yeah. It's well, so you it seems
like you've done sort of like the money
ball approach with of battles since 02/2003.
And you've already identified, you know, a %
of battles there's infantry, a % of battles
there was direct indirect,
fire in
80% there was artillery, 69% there was tanks.
So are you are you do you think
that in order for a military
to be prepared for the next conflict, that
they should embrace,
like, those specific features that appear more and
more throughout the 423
battles that you've observed?
So it's it's important that
we keep in mind that past is not
prologue.
So by amassing this historical database, I'm not
saying therefore trends will always continue
in this kind of steady pattern. However, they
have
consistently on a relatively consistent evolutionary trend
progressed in the same direction.
And so if we're arguing that there's a
dramatic break that is taking place right now,
we need to come up with some really
good evidence to back that up. And all
I'm seeing is strong opinion at the moment,
and anecdotal evidence, a lot of anecdotal evidence
that if you dig into it, does not
stack up. And I'll give you I'll give
you an example, the Nagorno Karabakh war. And
so a lot of us that were tracking
force design when it was first cropping up,
some of the immediate
told you so evidence was what happened in
the Gorno Karabakh
where
the Armenians
as Azeris and Artsakh on their side, were
fighting over control of this disputed region.
And
the narrative,
backed by a lot of video evidence from
the Bayraktar corporation, was the drones
won the war and that actually was
picked up
and and repeated in the original I think
it was in the commandant's planning guidance,
might have might not have been, might have
just been in the original force design of
March 2020.
But that drones dictated the conflict.
If you go back and look at the
drone data from that conflict,
that that's not patently true.
So,
yeah because I I have,
friends who had family fought there and, like,
asking their, like, their cousins combat experience. They
all point to at least from their I
think this could be me bringing the humanistic
aspect of war rather than historical. But, I
mean, they they they did note that
they they at least the the soldiers on
the ground felt that the drones had had
an overarching presence. So that's that's interesting that,
so what what does the data then show?
Well, first of all, the data that were
presented by the,
Azerbaijan
government
were heavily inflated. Mhmm. And Ido Hecht,
an Israeli analyst,
points that out and he says he kind
of breaks the data down. The other one
is the, the video montages
from that primarily from the Bayraktar Corporation. So
if you're familiar with the TB2,
it's a drone that was popularized by that
war.
It's a family company in Turkey that that
makes these drones.
They had they were highly incentivized
to,
you know, promulgate these videos and it and
they do look really impressive.
But if you look closely, they're not all
kills that even the the videos they're collecting
themselves are not it's not clear that the
drone itself did the killing.
A lot of them look to be maybe
artillery strikes or mine strikes or something like
that. And so
when you dig into the data, even in
this kind of very,
what appears to be a very obvious case
at first
glance, starts to fall apart.
But there are other
kind of narrow aspects to one case here
too.
This is fought
in large part in open terrain. The Armenians
had been sitting in these open trenches,
done a terrible job of improving
their defense positions over time.
Their anti air capabilities were dated and crumbling,
their morale of the will of fight of
their troops was very low,
they had done a poor job integrating their
Armenian Artsakh forces,
so they were highly vulnerable
to strikes from the air. And, you know,
again, when you're fighting on an open tableau
Yeah.
That's very different than fighting when there's even
single canopy tree cover.
And
so it sure looked it it sure looked
like an offset, but I would I the
argument I make in the book is that
a lot of these human factors had a
significant impact on the outcome of the battle
itself. But more importantly,
in what other historical case do we do
we cherry pick
examples that suit our
narrative
and accept
as professionals that that that that's proof of
something? Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. No. Alright. Excellent point.
So
you you sort of hinted, earlier when we're
talking that, you know, we may have found
out the answers to some of the questions
you posed in the next war.
And part of what marine corps you obviously
wanna talk about forces. I know. I think
we're down for forces. I don't actually want
to. No. No. No. It's no. Because it
it's it's fun. It's a hot topic.
Yeah. Because force design is obviously preparing us
in direction for a war,
the marine corps' role in a war against
China.
Is that the proper trajectory that the marine
corps should be taking?
No.
Mhmm.
So look, I mean, it's not the wrong
trajectory because it and I I looked I'm
I'm sympathetic
to general Berger's
original argument to some extent that there's China
was is identified as a pacing threat,
but I I I am gonna make this
argument in a forthcoming series of articles, hopefully,
in War on the Rocks,
that just because something is a pacing threat
doesn't mean it's all or or nothing. And
I know that the
that there's a very good
force design
pro force design argument that it wasn't all
or nothing and that that's an overstatement of
the case. However,
the one inescapable document
that they can't get away from is a
2019 Commandant Planning Guidance, which very
I would argue makes a pretty clear all
or nothing
argument.
It deprioritizes
the ability of the Marine Corps to fight
in a land war Mhmm.
Significantly.
While, however, unfortunately, for the Marine Corps, still
maintaining requirements for con plans and old plans
around the world where it will be required
to fight in as as of what, you
know, the unpopular term, America's Second land army.
Marine Corps has always been America's Second land
army. You know, I mean, not since its
inception, but certainly since World War one.
I. And the idea that the Marine Corps
is not the America's Second land army is
ridiculous.
Point to me a ground war where the
Marines have not been heavily involved. Right.
And and, you know, there's a better story
there. The marines and the army are constantly
working together,
but if the marines don't bring enough combat
power to the fight, it it undermines
not only the marines who are doing the
fighting, but also the army as well.
So, yeah, I'm not gonna make an argument
that the stand in force should not exist.
I think you can definitely
have the Marine Littoral Regiment doing its thing
out there,
but not have given up, I would argue,
most importantly, the artillery capability that the Marines
gave up initially very quickly without without much
I I would argue that much forethought,
and
not coming up with a way to compensate
for the cuts to the F 35 program.
Look, I think the F-thirty five is a
boondoggle and it's a disaster.
The ace that ate the Marine Corps article
that came out, I'm a big fan of
that article,
and
I was not a fan of General Amos'
approach to the acquisition
of that aircraft.
However, you gotta have something that's gonna deliver
air air,
aerial munitions
to the fight,
and we didn't immediately replace all that capability
with drones. So I you know, we we
got rid of our mobile protected firepower by
dropping the tanks. We have now while we're
waiting for the ACV,
we've got the LAV 25,
which, you know, that you might as well
have a ZU 23,
which any insurgent group around the world would
have a copy of. That's not enough combat
power, not enough firepower for ground combat for
a serious middleweight
force like the Marine Corps.
We we gutted our indirect fire capability. We're
building it back up, but I mean, we
we did a lot of damage to our
ability to provide indirect fires to our our
troops.
We got rid of some of our combat
engineering and bridging capabilities.
The things that are proven
in the data that I show that are
needed are still needed all the way through
the mid twenty twenties.
So,
I think we've done ourselves
unfortunate disservice
by leaning too heavily in one
direction. I think that's that's that's a good
cap to this conversation. I like it. So,
so, Ben, where can we, find your book?
It's available,
all retailers, Amazon, Georgetown University Press website.
If you go to,
httpsgroundcombat.org,
I list links to all of that. You
can also take the quiz,
and you can also download the database if
you want to. Yeah. We'll put all that
stuff in the show description. And
And do you have any, social media presence
you wanna put out there for viewers to
follow you? Or Absolutely not. Awesome.
Good answer. Good answer.
This has been really fascinating discussion.
Of course, I have others. Maybe we'll bring
you back on the show, but I definitely
wanna talk, especially with your intel hat about
information operations. Sounded fascinating
that there's so little that we know about
recent wars.
And, you know, we've got,
you know, in this information age, information
proliferation
rapidly. Like you said, I mean, you see
a 50 drone strikes a day.
But yet we don't know
contextually or historically
much about them at all.
So, yeah, I'd love to
pick pick your brain on that some other
time. Yeah. Be happy to come back. Awesome.
Thank you so much for being here. This
is really great. And, yeah, we'll put all
this stuff, in the show notes. So thank
you again. Yeah. Thanks for having me, guys.
Yeah. Have a good one, y'all.
Scuttlebutt is a production of the Marine Corps
Association.
You have heard the voices or contributions
from major Vic Ruble, USMC retired,
Nancy Lichtman, William Trudy, and our guest.
Ty Frasier is the editor, sound engineer, and
technical producer.
The Marine Corps Association is not an agency
of the US government.
The opinions expressed in this episode are the
personal views of the participants
and do not reflect the official position of
the United States Marine Corps, the Department of
Defense,
or the Marine Corps Association.